THE TURKS OF CENTRAL ASIA

Charles Warren Hostler

THE TURKS OF CENTRAL ASIA

Charles Warren Hostler

PRAEGER

Westport, Connecticut
London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hostler, Charles Warren.
The Turks of Central Asia / Charles Warren Hostler.
p. cm.
Rev., updated ed. of: Turkism and the Soviets. 1957.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–275–93931–6 (alk. paper)
1. Turkic peoples. 2. Turks. 3. Pan-Turanianism. I. Hostler, Charles Warren. Turkism and the Soviets. II. Title.
DS26.H6 1993
958'.0049435—dc20 92–37525

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 92–37525
ISBN: 0–275–93931–6

First published in 1993

Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Copyright Acknowlegment

Extracts in this volume consisting of three maps and appendices 1–6 from *Turkism and the Soviets* by Charles W. Hostler, copyright 1957, reprinted by permission of George Allen & Unwin Ltd., now Unwin Hyman, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers Limited.

Contents

Preface

Preliminary thought and collection of material for this study began at the time of my first wartime duty in Turkey and the Balkans (1945 to 1947). Later, as a member of the early U.S. Military Mission to Turkey (1948 to 1950) under the Greek-Turkish Military and Economic Aid Program, it was possible to continue the academic pursuit of my interest in this question. Returning from Turkey in 1950, I was assigned to the U.S. Air Force's far-sighted graduate training program at Georgetown University to take a course leading to a master's degree in international relations. In this period I had the good fortune to become associated with Dr. Stefan T. Possony, who guided me in writing a shorter study, "The Pan Turanian Appeal." This work was brought to fruition with the invaluable advice of an earnest scholar of Turkish affairs, Dr. Kerim K. Key. In 1951, while assigned to Headquarters, United States Air Force, in Washington, D.C., I was able to continue work at Georgetown University.

The United States Air Force, recognizing the need for trained Near Eastern specialists, then assigned me to the American University of Beirut for a two-year training program in 1953, resulting in a master's degree in Middle Eastern studies. Being in the Near East once again was invaluable, and the special atmosphere of the American University of Beirut aided the progress of my study. Of equal importance was the opportunity to travel to Istanbul, Ankara, Cairo, London, Paris, and other cities, where I secured interviews and material that would otherwise have been unobtainable. Full credit for assistance should be extended to the persons interviewed, as mentioned in text, as well as to Professor Zeine N. Zeine, Chairman of the Department of History, American University of Beirut, and Dr. Nabih Amin Faris of that university for their guidance. Mr. Wlodzimierz Baczkowski provided Russian and Polish translations, experienced advice, and the use of his private collection of Russian Documents. Dr. Kerim

K. Key of American University, now associated with Southeastern University, Washington, D.C., and Professor Enver Ziya Karal of Ankara University offered invaluable suggestions, corrections, and direction.

NOTE ON SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

The Turkish peoples, broadly speaking, live in three individual sociopolitical and cultural zones. The Anatolian Turks have their own state, in which they form the dominant majority. The Turkish peoples in the former Soviet Union were separated from each other by the Soviet policy of *divide et impera* and were cut off from the outer world. The Turks in Sinkiang, Afghanistan, and Iran are underdeveloped politically and culturally and are oppressed in varying degrees by their respective non-Turkish governments. (The availability of data was influenced by these factors.)

Material dealing with the Ottoman (or Anatolian) Turks is plentiful in the chief European languages and covers nearly all fields of national life. Current data dealing with the Turks of the former Soviet Russia is chiefly in Russian and in the Turkic dialects of the individual Turkish peoples of the former USSR, and is extremely biased. Soviet publications often extolled the Russian cultural and political achievements in the Turkish provinces of the Moscow empire. At the same time, non-Soviet Turkological publications prepared by Turkish political émigrés from Russia and their European friends often overemphasized the various independent and anti-Soviet movements. Objective and purely scientific material was limited and obtainable only with difficulty.

Information dealing with the Turks in Sinkiang, Afghanistan, and Iran was very limited and was chiefly scattered in periodicals. Even such an important area as Iranian Azerbaijan is, in some aspects, terra incognita. It is an interesting fact, for example, that the Turkmen minority in Iran, who are more accessible for research than their co-tribespeople in the former Soviet Turkmenistan, have not been studied for a long time. Baron Clement Augustus de Bode's article on the Yamud and Goklan tribes, written over a hundred years ago (in 1848), is still a most useful account of the Turkmen in Persia.[1]

These differences in the scope and character of the literature dealing with the separate Turkish zones dictate different approaches to the analysis and description of the individual portions of the Turkish world. Thus, in order to avoid duplication, the treatment of the Anatolian Turks is restricted to chosen problems, and many important but well known subjects have been omitted. On the contrary, in relation to the Turkish area of what was Soviet Russia, I also included introductory data. An attempt was made to secure Soviet and Turko Tatar views and material (since the Western view is more accessible to us); therefore, wide use has been made of these sources wherever possible.

NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

The word *Turk* (as well as similar terms, such as *Turkish*) is used in this work to designate the Turkish population of Anatolia plus the Tatars of Russia and all other related peoples who use Turkic languages. The term *Turko Tatars* or simply *Tartars* is used to describe the Turks of what was formerly the USSR, with the exception of the Turkestanis and Azerbaijanis (some Russian sources also identify Azerbaijanis as Transcaucasian Tatars). To define the individual Turkish peoples and tribes in what was the USSR, Iran, Sinkiang, and so on, the individual names are also used (such as Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Yakuts).

The events of the last several years have caused such dramatic changes in what was formerly the USSR that the subject of the Turkish-speaking peoples of the region has undergone a resurgence of interest and pertinence. Accordingly, during my assignment as U.S. ambassador to the State of Bahrain, I undertook a revision and update of my original book, *Turkism and the Soviets*, which had been published in 1957. I was very fortunate to continue to have the invaluable assistance of Professor Kerim K. Key, who has retained his scholarly dedication and interest in all things Turkish. The onset of the invasion of nearby Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the subsequent Western retaliation, "Operation Desert Storm," set back the timetable, but the fine publisher, Praeger, was indulgent and understanding. My thanks to Mrs. Joy Barnes, who was diligent and capable with the typing and editing, and to Mr. Jay Freres and Ms. Marian Adle for their advice and encouragement.

It is understood, of course, that the views and opinions expressed in this work are solely the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or any other U.S. government agency.

Abbreviations

AO	The Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast.
AR	Autonomous Region: After the ASSRs came the smaller autonomous units, with very restricted autonomy within the RSFSR or SSRs. There were four Turkish Autonomous Regions: Gorno-Altai, Karachai-Cherkess, Khakass, and Nogorno-Karabakh. (This last AR had an Armenian majority and Azeri Turkish minority but fell administratively in the Azerbaijan SSR.)
ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: Where national units were found within the RSFSR or the SSRs, there were smaller, self-governing areas with varying degrees of autonomy. The most important were constituted as ASSRs. There were eight Turkish ASSRs: Bashkir, Chuvas, Kabardino-Balkar, Kara-Kalpak, Nakhichevan, Tatar, Tuvin, and Yukut. (Note: In what was the Dagestan ASSR, of ten major peoples, two are Turkish, namely the Kumyk and Nogai.)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States.
RSFSR	The former Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the largest component of the former USSR.
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic: The former USSR consisted of sixteen Soviet Socialist Republics, which were also called Union Republics. There were five Turkish Soviet Socialist Republics: Azerbaijan, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Turkmen, and Uzbek, all of which are now independent.
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the former official name of Soviet Russia.

The Turks of Central Asia

1

Introduction

The Turkish world occupies a broad belt of territories extending across Asia from the eastern Mediterranean to Mongolia and reaching in the north to the Middle Volga basin and the Siberian borderline of Kazakhstan. This enormous area is divided by the southern borderline of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) into two halves. This region forms one of the most important emerging geopolitical issues of our century. This fact has been generally unrecognized in the Western world owing to memories of the weakness and disorder that accompanied the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the relatively late emergence of the question of the Turkish peoples in Russia, Iran, and Sinkiang.

A significant manifestation of the Turkish issue is connected with the so-called Pan-Turkist ideal, which concerns Anatolia and the Turkic-speaking areas of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as other Central Asian territories (including Sinkiang, Afghanistan, Turkestan, Iranian, and Azerbaijan).

Pan-Turkism emerged as a significant political problem when the development of nationalism in the East caused the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and later, with the creation of Kemalist Turkey. The Russian revolution of 1917 activated the nationalist and separatist inclinations of the Turko Tatars and the other non-Russian peoples of the Russian Empire. This led to the transformation of the centralized empire into a federative one and to the creation of a number of republics with varying degrees of autonomy.

Until late 1991, the Turkish people of the former USSR were organized into:

a. Five "Turkish" Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs): Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which are now independent republics.

b. Eight "Turkish" Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs): Bashkir, Chuvash, Kabardino-Balkar, Kara-Kalpak, Nakhichevan, Tatar, Tuvin, and Yakut. There were also "Turks" in the Dagestan ASSR, namely the Kumyk and Nogai.
c. Four "Turkish" Autonomous Regions (ARs): Gorno-Altai, Karachai-Cherkess, Khakass, and Nogorno-Karabakh (in Azerbaijan where the Azeri Turks were a minority, since the Armenians made up 75 percent of the population).

Other Turkic peoples, in descending order of group size, include the Crimean Tatars, Uigurs, Meskhetian Turks, Tuvins, Gagauz, Khakass, Shors, Karaim, and Krymchaks.

The development of modern communication has diminished the geopolitical role of distance and augmented the strategic significance of the Turkish regions of the former Soviet Union and the Middle East. It is of military interest that the basic Turkish areas chiefly involve the southern territories of what was the USSR and that they were a "soft underbelly" of the former Soviet Empire. Their economic importance is enormous since, for example, many oil resources are located in the Turkic-speaking areas. The Baku wells produce about 50 percent of all the oil of what was formerly the USSR and form the richest asset of Azerbaijan. The so-called "Second Baku" is located in the half-Turkish areas between the Volga River and the Urals. The third most important oil region—the Emba district—is located along the Emba River in western Kazakhstan. Other oil resources are also connected with the half-Moslem and partially Turkish areas of the northern Caucasus (Grozniy and Maikop). Coal and iron ore are abundant in the Caucasus and in Kazakhstan, and cotton is a major product of Central Asia and Azerbaijan.

The Turkish regions of the former Soviet Russian Empire historically and culturally gravitate toward the Middle and Near East, the seat of Islamic civilization. The Turkish Republic, by its mere existence, affects the political and cultural life of the Turkish area of former Soviet Russia. On the other hand, Turkey is naturally interested in the liberation of the Turkish peoples of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), though formerly, this interest was rarely manifested.

After the United States, Turkey has the largest army in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since the initiation of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, Turkey's contacts with the "Turkish" republics of the former USSR have increased, and at the same time, closer relations with Moscow are being effected. The Turkish government formerly stated that Turkey had no political aims, but only cultural and economic interest, in the Turks of the former USSR. However, when, in 1989, the Soviet authorities tried to crush ethnic unrest in the then Azerbaijan SSR, Turkey was not slow to protest strongly. Even after the end of the Cold War, Turkey was a stabilizing force in the region, particularly during the Persian Gulf crisis. Other powers, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, China

and Pakistan, have, until recently, been relatively inactive. There is now great interest on the part of these and other powers to exert influence in Central Asia, somewhat to the discomfort of the Russian Republic.

My aim is to consider the political potentiality of the Turkish world as revealed by its population, its history, and its unifying ideals of Turkism and Pan-Turkism. I shall discuss certain pertinent questions including: Who are the Turkish peoples of Anatolia, the former Soviet Russia, and other areas? Are they really a kind of "nation in dispersion," or are they only a galaxy of kindred, yet disunited and scattered, tribes? What is the *spiritus movens* of these peoples? Is it nationalism, communism, or the slogan of independence? Is it a slow trend toward dissolution, in what was a Slavonic world—or toward Western society, in the case of the Anatolian Turks? What are the ideological and political ties of the Turkish area with the outer world? Does it hold Islamism, Westernism, or Pan-Turkism as a regional pan-idea?[1]

These questions will be considered in relation to the powerful influence of nationalism on present world society, and in relation to the potentialities of the former Soviet Empire. Among the most potent forces operating in Euro-Asia, broadly speaking, is the assimilative pressure of the former Soviet state toward the Turkish peoples of the Commonwealth of Independent States (and toward the other peoples of what was the Soviet bloc). There is also an assimilative pressure from the West toward Anatolian Turkey. Another potent force arises from the nationalist and independent movements of the individual peoples of Euro-Asia, including the trends of Turkism and Pan-Turkism.

The evolution of national policy in the former USSR indicates that the assimilative processes were provoking opposition which demanded permanent attention and drastic countermeasures. An example of this was the liquidation in 1944–45 of three political units in the former USSR containing Turks (the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Karachai Autonomous Region, and the Balkar portion of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), as a repressive measure aimed at the anti-Soviet attitude of the population in 1941–43.[2]

During February 1956, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, in his secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress condemning Joseph Stalin's crimes, recommended the rehabilitation of the deported non-Russian nationalities, including the Chechens, Ingushi, Kalmyks, Karachais, and Balkars. As a result, their autonomous territories were restored. Khrushchev had not mentioned the Soviet Volga Germans, the Meskhetians, or the Crimean Tatars. Later, the Crimean Tatars were also cleared of any treasonable acts, but few were able to return to their Crimean homeland as no administrative or financial support was provided by the Soviet authorities. Returning deportees encountered a hostile reception from the Russian and Ukrainian settlers who had moved in after the indigenous inhabitants had been evicted.

Some of the Volga Germans were able to go to Germany. The Meskhetian Turks (Georgians who were Turkicized and Islamicized in the seventeenth cen-

tury) had been deported to Central Asia during 1944 from the border areas of southwestern Georgia, near Turkey. Some Meskhetians were attacked by Uzbek youths in the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan during June 1989. About 100 were killed, and their houses were pillaged and burned in ethnic violence. The Meskhetians number about 207,369 persons and are mostly Sunni Moslems, with some Ali Illahis (Shias), who are religious and have a strong sense of belonging to the Turkish nation and culture.

In the Turkish Republic, nationalism forms a distinctive trait of its structure, constitution, and current policy. In times of war or revolutionary change within neighboring areas during the twentieth century, Turkish policy has historically moved toward Pan-Turkism. This was the policy of the Young Turks during World War I and after the Russian revolution of 1917. The politics of Enver Pasha during his adventurous exploits in Turkestan in 1921-22 also followed this line, and the same tendencies were visible in Turkey during the 1941–43 German offensive in the then Soviet Union.

The status of nationalism among the Turks justified my assertion in 1955 that in the case of a third world war—or an intensification of the Cold War, or in case of internal troubles involving the disintegration of Soviet power (as occurred in 1991–92), Turkish nationalism (especially the Pan-Turkish variety of Turkish nationalism) would influence the policies of the Turkish Republic and the actions of the politically developed Turkish-speaking peoples of the former Union of the Soviet Republics (USSR).

2

Handbook of the Turkish Peoples of the World

ORIGINS AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Before going into the matter of contemporary Turkish groups, it is desirable to review the ethnic substratum of the Asiatic population of Russia, Euro-Asia, and the neighboring countries. It has been ascertained that groups of primeval people moved northward from their original home in the southwestern corner of Asia and fanned out in three directions. Eventually, they became concentrated in three main areas, which are now the respective homes of the Mongol, Turkish and Caspian "racial groups." These groups, in time, matured into the Mongol, Alpine, and Nordic types. The Alpine type spread over the lands that became the home of the Slavs (a linguistic, not a racial, group), and it is probable that there was some admixture of Nordic stock.[1]

In the far north of the former Soviet Union and in the lands to the east of the Volga, the native peoples are characterized by straight hair (usually black) and yellow-white, yellow-brown, or yellow-red skins; with the exception of the Eskimos, they have mesocephalic or brachycephalic head forms.[2] These peoples are of both Turkish and Mongol origin, and it is an error to treat them as an inseparable unit. According to Great Britain's *Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism*, the difficulty of ethnographical demarcation is partly due to their physical affinity, and partly to the past condition of fluidity in Central Asia.[3] In spite of many physical, ethnic, linguistic, and habit links, there is no difficulty in distinguishing between Turks and Mongols since, practically speaking, they are different peoples. The Turks speak Turkic dialects; they are Moslem by religion, and fall within the Arabic-Islamic and, to some extent, European sphere of influence. In contrast, the Mongols speak Mongolian, are Buddhist by religion, and fall within the sphere of the Chinese civilization. The Mongolian hordes of Genghis Khan (1162–1227) constituted only the nucleus of far more numerous

Turkish hordes. The chief traces left in Europe of the Mongol invasion consist of the Turkic-speaking Tatars in the former Soviet Russia. The name of Genghis Khan's son Chagatai is commonly applied to a Turkic dialect, Amu-Darya, in the region of the Oxus.[4]

The Language of the Turkish Peoples

Linguists treat the languages spoken by the different Turkish peoples as belonging to one Turkish linguistic unit. They separate these languages from Mongol and Tungus (the nearest kindred linguistic groupings), sometimes defining the Turkish tongues (speeches) as "Turkish languages" and sometimes as "Turkish dialects." The well-known French Turkologist Jean Deny, in a contribution to a thorough collective study on the languages of the world (published in 1952 under the auspices of the Société Linguistique de Paris), enumerated the different Turkish tongues under the title, "Répartition géographique des dialectes turcs."[5] According to Deny, the Turkish dialects are divided into eight groupings:

1. Northeastern: spoken by the Yakuts and Yakutized Dolgans, Turks of Mongolia, and the Tuva, Karagais, and other small Turkish-speaking tribes.
2. Hakas (Khakass): spoken by the small Turkish-speaking tribes of the Abakan and Minusinsk areas.
3. Altaic: spoken by the small tribes of the Altaic Mountain region.
4. Eastern-Siberian: spoken by the petty tribes of the Chulim River region, of Baraba steppe, and of the Tobol and Tobolsk areas.
5. Volga-Ural: spoken by the Tatars of Kazan, the Bashkirs, and some other dwindling tribes of Mishars and Teptiars.
6. Central Asian dialects: spoken in Chinese Turkestan and in Kuldja, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and the Kara-Kalpak region.
7. Southwestern or Oghuz groupings: the dialects of the Turkmen, Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus and in Persia, the northern Caucasus, the Turks of Anatolia, small tribes of Gagaus in what is now the Republic of Moldova (formerly a part of Rumania), and other petty units.
8. Other dialects: spoken by the Crimean Tatars, Chuvash Nogais of the Dobruja and Kuban regions, and the Karaites, among others.[6]

All these Turkish languages, with the exception of Yakut and Chuvash, are related dialects of the Turkish tongue. "Malgré . . . quelques changements," wrote Deny, "les langues turques (tchouvache et yakoute mis à part) sont . . . relativement peu differencées."[7]

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE TURKISH PEOPLES

The name *Hiung-nu* appears in early Chinese sources (2000 B.C.) and was applied to the people living to the west and northwest portions of China. Most likely, this term described the Turks and Mongols plus nomadic peoples of related stock. *Tu-kiu* (Turk) was first used by the Chinese in the sixth century A.D. to describe a nomadic people who founded two empires stretching from Mongolia and the northern frontier of China to the Black Sea. The northernmost of these empires was situated near Lake Baikal in the region of the southern tributaries of the Yenisei River, and the Western Empire had its center near Urumchi (Chinese Turkestan) and to the north of Tashkent (in the former Soviet Central Asia). These empires were placed under the nominal suzerainty of the Chinese Tang dynasty, but the Northern Empire regained its independence, which it held until A.D. 744.[8]

The oldest known Turkish inscriptions, the Orkhon runes, are carved on stone slabs (steles) and were inscribed in honor of the khans (princes) of the Northern Empire of the eighth century A.D. The slabs were found in 1721 in the valley of the Yenisei River in Siberia and in 1889 in the valley of the Orkhon River in Mongolia. In these inscriptions, the name *Oghuz* is used to refer to a tribal federation as well as to the ruling khans. The Uighur Turkish people are mentioned as living on the Selenga River in Mongolia, and the Kirghiz people as being on the Yenisei River.[9]

The slow withdrawal of the Turks from Mongolia forms an interesting portion of early Turkish history. In A.D. 745, the rule over Mongolia passed from the Oghuz to the Uighurs, while the Oghuz migrated west and south.[10] These Oghuz migrations explained the formation of the present group of southwestern Turks, to which belong the Turkmen, the Azerbaijanis, and the Anatolian Turks.[11]

The fate of the Uighurs who settled in Mongolia is an important fragment of early Turkish history. In the ninth century A.D., the Uighurs adopted the Manichean religion, which was spread among them by the Sogdians.[12] The Sogdian system of writing was the basis for the Uighur script, which soon replaced the old Turkish runic script which had been used until then.

Soon after, in A.D. 840, the Uighur state was destroyed by the Kirghiz. When the Uighurs were driven out of Mongolia, they founded two new states, one in Kansu and the other in Bishbalik and Kara-Khodja.[13] The former of these two new states was conquered by the Tanguts in 1028, while the second lasted until Genghis Khan's onslaught around A.D. 1200. The Kirghiz, in turn, were driven out of Mongolia in A.D. 924 by the Kara-Kitai, who were of Tungus or Mongol stock. This marked the end of Turkish rule in Mongolia. Some of the Kirghis migrated to the south, to the present Kirghiz region.[14]

Khazars

Mention should be made of the Turkish tribe of Khazars, who emerged from the Urals and created an empire which, in the seventh century A.D., stretched

to the Caucasus, and in the eighth century extended to the Crimea and the Dnieper River. This state lasted until the end of the tenth century, when it was destroyed by the forefathers of the present Ukrainians and Russians. The Khazars were probably related to the Bolgars, who lived in the middle and lower Volga and were conquered by Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century. At an earlier period, some of the Bolgars had conquered the Ukraine and part of the Balkans. In following centuries, they were assimilated by the native Slav population; their name is preserved in the appellation of the Bulgarian people.[15]

Beginning of Islamization. The whole Near East was transformed by the Islamic conquests of the Arabs: After subduing Persia in 639, they spread to Transoxiana and, in 659, were able to declare that they had annexed the entire western Turkish world, including Dzhungaria, Tashkent, Ferghana, and Bukhara. The process of Islamization was very slow and lasted until the twentieth century, when some Turkish nomadic tribes of northern Kazakhstan and western Siberia were converted to Islam by Kazan Tatar missionaries.[16]

During the next three hundred years (seventh to tenth centuries), the Arabs were supplanted in Central Asia by the Persians. Transoxians became a part of the Abbasid Caliphate, and later of the Samanids' empire, until A.D. 999, when the Turkish dynasty of Karakhanides again brought the country, as far as the Amu-Darya River, under Turkish rule.[17] The presence of the Persians in Transoxiana and in the Caucasus explains Iranian influences on the ethnic groupings, the cultures, and the languages of this portion of the Turkish world.

The tenth century in Turkish history was marked by the rise of the dynasty of Ghaznevids at Ghazni (between Kabul and Kandabar) and the Uighur kingdom, which included Kashgar and Khotan in eastern (Chinese) Turkestan. The legendary Uighur leader, Bughra Khan of Kashgar (died circa A.D. 960) was converted to Islam; his state continued until 1120.[18]

The Seljuks and the Ottomans

The Seljuks were a section of the Oghuz tribal union. The Seljuk leader Khan Toghrul drove out the Ghaznevids and established himself as protector of the Abbasid caliphate, while the son of Toghrul, Alp Arslan, defeated the Byzantines at Manzikert in 1071 and prepared the way for Ottoman conquests. Konya (in southern Anatolia) became the capital of the sultanate of Asia Minor, and various Seljuk dynasties established themselves in Kerman and in Iraq and Syria.[19]

The Seljuks lost their domination over Iraq and Khorasan to their vassals, the Khans of Khiva, who were also known as the Khwarezm Shahs. They, in turn, had to contend with yet another arrival from the east, the Kara-Kitais, who conquered Khotan, Yarkend, and then Transoxiana. The Kara-Kitais pushed the Oghuz tribes before them into Persia and Afghanistan. The presence of several Oghuz Turkish tribes in both these countries today is partially explained by the Kara-Kitai onslaught.

The domination of the Seljuks over Anatolia was terminated by the rise of

the Ottomans.[20] The Ottomans, like the Seljuks, belonged to the Oghuz tribal union; their habitat was in the neighborhood of Brusa, near the shores of the Sea of Marmara. The Ottomans (or Osmanli, or Osmans) rose to power in a section of Anatolia in 1326, and the Ottoman Empire grew steadily until it stretched from Algeria to Persia and from Yemen to Crimea, Moldavia, and Hungary. Except for the invasion of Timur (1402), the Ottomans did not suffer from the attacks of other Turkish peoples and instead were able to devote their strength to the conquest of the Byzantine Empire. The Ottoman Empire reached its maximum power in the sixteenth century. It was reduced in size after World War I to the present Turkish Republic.[21]

Genghis Khan's Legacy. The influence of Genghis Khan (born 1162, and died in 1227) and his successors in Turkish history is enormous. The Mongol warlord subordinated many Turkish peoples to his rule and destroyed the Khwarezm (Khiva) kingdom. The territory of Euro-Asia as far as the Dneiper was conquered by his generals. After the death of Genghis Khan in 1227, this empire was divided between his four sons. Juchi was given the western lands, stretching from the Syr-Darya, across the Urals to the valleys of the Volga, and farther west (called the Golden Horde). Chagatai ruled Transoxiana, Ferghana, Semireche, and Sinkiang. Ugedei received the original lands of the Mongols, and Tului held territories in China. Batu-Khan, the son of Juchi, extended the territory of the Golden Horde (nomadic Asian warriors) to Crimea.

The Turkification and, subsequently, the Islamization of the Mongol invaders occurred under the rule of the successors of Juchi and Chagatai. The Mongols represented an elite who were the ruling minority in the enormous dominions of Chagatai and Juchi. These lands were populated predominantly with Turkish peoples, who were already partially Moslemized; this process was far advanced in the Chagatai dominion but gradual in the Golden Horde. The first khan of the Golden Horde who embraced Islam was Berke (d. 1266); however, Islam did not become the official religion of the Golden Horde until the middle of the fourteenth century.[22]

The Golden Horde dissolved into three new Turko-Tatar states: the Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimean khanates (princedoms). The first two were conquered by Russia in 1552 and 1536, respectively, and Crimea was made a vassal of the Ottomans in 1475 and finally crushed by Russia in 1783.[23]

Timur (Tamerlane) and the Uzbek States

The power of the successors of Chagatai diminished until Timur (1336–1405), one of the Turkish governors in the Chagatai dominion, usurped power in Transoxiana in 1369. At Timur's birth, the members of his clan, while proud of their Mongol lineage, had already been Turkicized. They spoke Turkish and most of them were converted to Islam. While Genghis Khan was considered a "heathen," Timur was a Moslem, and this fact helped him during his campaigns in the Near East; on the other hand, it made Timur's attitude toward the non-Moslem peoples

less tolerant than that of Chengis.[24] Timur conquered Dzhungaria (1370), Persia and the Caucasus (1390), the Kipchaks on the Volga (1395), and northern India (1398). He then invaded Syria and Asia Minor, where he defeated the Ottoman Turkish sultan Bayezid I near Ankara (1402).

The house of Timur did not retain his more distant conquests, but it ruled at Samarkand until 1499. Originally cruel and bloody, it later became one of the most enlightened and cultivated Turkish dynasties.[25] Timur's empire was overcome by a returning wave of Turkish peoples from the Kipchak region, the Uzbeks, who were named after a descendant of Batu-Khan. The Kazakh area was gradually conquered by Russia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Uzbek territory was confined to the lands north of the Amu Darya and the Kopeth Dag; in this area, three Uzbek states were created between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. These were the Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva and Kokand khanates, which became vassals of the advancing Russian power in the nineteenth century.[26]

Fragments of Turkish History. Mention should be made of several undiscussed fragments of Turkish history; for example, the history of the Turkish tribes of the Pechenegs and Kipchaks, which unexpectedly appeared on the scene and then disappeared after a short period of activity.

The Pechenegs were driven from their habitat in the Volga-Ural region by the Oghuz tribes at the end of the ninth century A.D.[27] They migrated toward eastern Europe, where they defeated the Magyars. The Pechenegs established a state in the south of Russia, which was almost wiped out by Byzantium in 1091. Some groups of Pechenegs settled in various parts of Hungary and merged with the local population.

At the beginning of the Oghuz migrations, the Turkish tribe of the Kipchaks, advanced from the Irtysh River to the Syr Darya area in the direction of eastern Europe. The Kipchaks (known in Russian history as the Polovtsy) conquered the region between the Danube Delta, the Carpathian Mountains, the Crimean Peninsula, and the lower reaches of the Volga. The Mongols destroyed the Kipchak state in 1239, and the Polovtsy then merged with other nomadic tribes.[28]

The Moghols were another element of Turkish history that were important in the liquidation of Timurid power by the Uzbeks. The chief opponent of the new Uzbek dynasty in the Timurids' area was Babur (1483–1530), who represented the house of Timur in the fifth generation. Babur invaded India (1526) and founded the famous dynasty of Great Moghols, which ruled in India until that country became a British dominion.[29] Among the outlying Turkish tribes are the Yakuts, whose role in history was insignificant. They were driven out of Yenisei River territory into the valley of the Lena River.

A last and rather important fragment of Turkish history is connected with the Kalmuk Mongols. They were not of Turkish stock, and instead originated from the Oirot Mongol Empire. This empire broke up in 1455 and was reestablished toward the end of the fifteenth century to become the last nomad state of Central Asia. The Kalmuks invaded the khanate of Khiva in 1603–4. In 1618, a part of

the Kalmuks separated from the main group in the Ili Valley and marched toward the west. In 1632, these "Western" Kalmuks occupied a considerable territory on the banks of the lower Volga. During the eighteenth century, the Kalmuks, who had been alarmed by rumors of further oppression, determined to leave the Volga region and return to China. A vast horde of Kalmuks assembled in 1771 on the east bank of the Volga after having destroyed their villages. (The Kalmuks of the western Volga were unable to join their brethren, and it is their descendants who inhabited the western steppes.)[30] The hardships endured in this exodus form one of the great tragedies of history. Barely a third of the 300,000 people who started eventually crossed the frontier and settled in the fertile Ili basin of Chinese Turkestan. In accordance with the so-called Lenin national policy, the Kalmuk ASSR was created.[31] After World War II, this republic was liquidated and the remnants of the Kalmuk population were deported to the east.

Comments on the History of the Turks. This sketch reflects the chaotic development of events in Turkish history. The historical centers of activity of the Turkish peoples often shifted from one subcontinent to another. Short-lived states and empires appeared unexpectedly, and the continuity of events was disrupted with astonishing regularity. Olaf Caroe saw the succession of rulers and tribes with their gatherings, severances, and overlappings as resembling raindrops moving on a window pane, meeting, dissolving, fading away, and often streaming together across the glass. This is true in a land whose terrain has, until recently, imposed nomadic habits on its populations, so that the forces themselves have been perpetually on the move.[32]

Arnold J. Toynbee gave a more profound explanation: Nomads live "without history," and their entrances into the field of history are occasional. These incursions by the nomads were provoked sometimes by an "increase of desiccation" or by social vacuums that arose in adjacent sedentary societies. These causes are quite extraneous to the nomadic experience.[33]

THE TURKISH PEOPLES NOW

In most cases, the numbers of the individual Turkish peoples may be ascertained only roughly. In countries like Iran, China, and Afghanistan, a census in the European sense is unknown, and thus only general estimates are available. In the former Soviet Union, the last census was made in January 1939, but World War II has affected the population and influenced the normal course of the birthrate in that country. The only country where statistical data was easily available was the Turkish Republic. There is also difficulty using data on the national composition of states with Turkish minorities, since multinational states, under the influence of the leading nationality, often underestimate the size of minority groups.

The following are approximate figures for the various Turkish groups:

In the USSR		19,000,000 (1939)[34]
In the Turkish Republic		20,079,000 (1954 est.)[35]
In the Chinese Republic (Sinkiang)		8,000,000[36]
In Persia		5,700,000[37]
In Afghanistan		1,400,000[38]
	Total	54,179,000
In the USSR		49,500,000 (1989 census)
In the Turkish Republic		55,000,000
In China		7,000,000
In Persia (Iran)		10,000,000
In Afghanistan		2,000,000
Other		3,000,000
	Total	126,500,000

These figures should be augmented to reflect the natural increase of the Turkish population, as well as the small and scattered Turkish-speaking groups in Bulgaria, Iraq, Rumania, Greece, Syria, Cyprus, and Egypt. By 1990 the total number of Turks in the world had reached about 130 million.

A 1947 Turkish source, *Turkiye Yilligi* (Turkish yearbook) gave the following data concerning the distribution of the Turks in Asia and Europe:[39]

Turkey		16.0 million (1947)
Russia		22.0 million
Iran		6.0 million
China		4.0 million
Afghanistan		2.0 million
Bulgaria		0.4 million
Iraq		0.2 million
Rumania		0.2 million
Greece		0.1 million
Syria		0.05 million
Cyprus		0.04 million
Egypt		0.01 million
	Total	51.09 million
Turkey		55.0 million (1989)
Russia		49.5 million
Persia (Iran)		10.0 million

China	7.0 million
Afghanistan	2.0 million
Bulgaria	1.0 million
Iraq	0.4 million
Rumania	0.2 million
Greece	0.2 million
Mongolia	0.2 million
Yugoslavia	0.2 million
Egypt	0.1 million
Cyprus	0.1 million
Syria	0.1 million
Other	1.5 million
Total	127.5 million

The estimated total, according to this source, was 51 million Turks in 1947. In 1989, Turkey's population reached 56.7 million.

Much higher figures have been given by other Turkish sources. For example, Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer, the well-known leader of the Crimean Tatars and one of the leading Pan—Turkists, stated there were 65 million Turks in the world in 1952.[40] Currently, (as indicated in the 1989 figures listed above), the estimated population of Turks in the world is over 126.5 million.

In the beginning of modern history, the Turkish peples occupied enormous territories in eastern Europe, Siberia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and later, in Anatolia. However, the Turkish areas were greatly decreased during the territorial and political development of the Grand Duchy of Moscow and the Russian Empire (sixteenth to nineteenth centuries). The Chinese push toward the Amur River, Mongolia, and Central Asia, plus the cultural and political development of the West (seventeenth to nineteenth centuries), also diminished the Turkish regions. With the exception of the Turkish portion of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish states were all reduced to the status of colonies of the Russian, Chinese, and Persian powers.

Roughly speaking, the present Turkish territory, is enclosed by the boundaries of the Turkish Republic, the Persian province of Azerbaijan and some other Turkish enclaves in Persia, and the Turkic Republics and Autonomous Regions of the former USSR. The Chinese portion of Turkestan (Sinkiang) also belongs to the Turkish area. There is a Turkish populated strip in the Turkestan borderland of Afghanistan (called Afghanian Turkestan). In addition, a small and dwindling Turkish minority exists in Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, and in the Arab world (in Iraq, Syria, Egypt), as well as in Cyprus.

THE OTTOMAN OR ANATOLIAN TURKS

Origin and Ethnic Complexity

Ethnologically, the Anatolian Turks differ greatly from their kin in Turkestan and other Turkish areas in Asia and eastern Europe. A. J. Toynbee, Eliot Grinnell Mears, and the authors of three official British publications dealing with the Turkish world have emphasized the extremely heterogeneous ethnic composition of the Anatolian Turks.[41] According to the clearest source, the Anatolian Turks are a people whose physique shows not the slightest trace of the Turkish type. Their nationality is Turkish in a political sense only. Ethnologically, they represent the most varied conglomerate imaginable. They are a mixture of the Turks with Greeks, Slavs, Kurds, Persians, Armenians, Georgians, Circassians, Arabs, and other groups. The "Turanian" type has become so effaced that traces of it are rarely seen. It was only in Anatolia proper that the majority of the Ottoman population showed a certain uniform type which had evolved from a Greek substratum. As for European Turkey, Istanbul itself presents the highest degree of mixture.[42]

Not all of the Turkish population of Anatolia is of Ottoman origin. Certain other Turkish tribes there have preserved purer Asiatic physical traits. The most numerous are the Yürüks, who live in small groups from the region around Izmir to the eastern Taurus. *Yuruk* means *nomad*, and the Yuruks have preserved many of their old Central Asian habits. They resemble the Azerbaijanis, both in physique and in dialect, rather than the Ottoman Turks. Their language has retained a considerable number of old Turkish words. Moreover, it is interesting to note that their tents are still the circular Central Asiatic shape.

Turkmen tribes form another Turkish group in Anatolia. More distinctively Asiatic, they cluster in the level plains around the salt lake (Tüz Gölü) in the center of the country and in the eastern Taurus.

The Kizil-Bash Turks live principally in the plains around Ankara, Tokat, and Karahissar. They had historical affiliations with Iranian Turks from Azerbaijan and Transcaucasia. Smaller tribes of Avshars and Nogais live in the anti-Taurus and around Adana.[43]

The Kemalist regime, with its modern school system, its industrialization, and its tendency to erase remnants of the feudal and nomadic past, has reduced the distinctiveness of the individual Turkish tribes, at least partially, they have been blended with the rest of the Turkish population.

National Composition and Distribution

The whole population of the Turkish Republic in 1927 was 13,648,270, while by 1950, it had grown to 20,934,670. According to language groups, in Turkey in 1945 there were:[44]

Turks	16,598,037
Kurds	1,476,562
Arabs	247,204
Greeks	88,680
Circassians	66,691
Armenians	56,179
Jews	51,019
Lazes	46,987

In recent years the Turkish *Statistical Yearbook* has not included ethnic, religious, or linguistic classifications. According to *The World Factbook* (July 1990), the Turkish population was composed of 85 percent Turks, 12 percent Kurds, and 3 percent other groups. The other groups include Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and other minorities. Turkey is 98 percent Sunni Moslem and 2 percent other religions, including Christians and Jews.

Some observers believe that there are a larger number of Shiites and an unknown number of Circassians, Lazes, Arabs, and Iranians. It is estimated that there are fifty thousand Armenians, twenty thousand Jews, and about ten thousand Greeks in Turkey. In 1989, about two million Turks worked abroad.

Population density varies greatly; in some eastern and mountainous provinces, there are not more than five persons per square kilometer, while in the coastal areas, there are about ninety-two individuals per square kilometer.[45] The liberal admission to Turkey of immigrants of Turkish ethnic origin, the permanent and steady process of Turkification of the minorities, and the policy of colonization of the outlying underpopulated provinces are all improving this situation.[46]

Political Potentiality of the Anatolian Turks

The Anatolian Turks, in comparison with other Turkish peoples, are the most un-Asiatic and the most un-Turkish ethnically, and are at the same time the leading Turkish people with the most highly developed Turkish national feelings. Their ancient qualities as Central Asiatic nomads seem to have been preserved or recovered in Turkified Anatolia. Ideological, cultural, linguistical, and religious elements may have tended to maintain their militarism and values.

The brilliant lectures delivered at London University in 1937 by Paul Wittek included a description of the sources of the qualities that enabled the Anatolian Turks to build a great empire in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries and save the Turkish nation from collapse in 1918–22.[47]

The first Ottomans, Wittek believes, felt that they were a community of *Ghazis*, or champions of the Mohammedan religion, a community of Moslem warriors devoted to the struggle with the infidels in their region. In addition to the common

battle cry, we find in the Ghazis the acknowledgment of the *futuwwa*: a canon of rules by means of which the virtuous life might be lived.[48] This movement, which is comparable to European knighthood, was popular in the far-off Anatolian borderlands and expressed itself in military effort and in achievements in empire building. These characteristics of the knight-warriors were so prevalent that at the time of the foundation of a Ghazi state, there was initially a lack of trained personnel such as clergy, peasants, artisans, and merchants, which were necessary to organize and utilize the conquered territory.[49]

These qualities of the early Ottomans later decayed, and the Ottoman Empire declined after the spectacular rule of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–66). Western European historians have tended to emphasize the negative periods of the Ottoman Turks, when their character and talents were tainted by the corruption of the period of decline and dissolution.

THE CAUCASIAN TURKS

The Caucasus region is a broad isthmus between the Black and the Caspian seas. Its northern border is the shapeless steppe region between the Azov Sea and the northernwestern shores of the Caspian Sea; it meets Anatolia and Persia on the south and west.[50] Various civilizations have striven together in the Caucasus. Traces of the powerful Persian civilization, as well as those of the Byzantines and the Ottomans, are permanent in this region. Owing to its strategic position, the Caucasus has served during millenia as a crossroads for migrations of various races and peoples. This resulted in the present heterogeneity of its population.

The Caucasian population should be divided into aborigines and newcomers (chiefly Russians and Ukrainians). Even the indigenous population is heterogeneous, and specialists differ on its proper classification. For this study, the classification presented by Mehmet Emin Resulzade, the late Azerbaijan leader and writer, will suffice.[51] According to Resulzade, the Caucasians may be divided into four ethnographic groups:

1. Azerbaijanis, who speak Azeri Turkish and mostly belong to the Shia sect of Islam:
2. Armenians, who have a language of Indo-European origin and follow Christianity of the Gregorian branch;
3. Georgians, who speak an Ibero-Caucasian language and are members of the Greek Orthodox Church; and
4. North Caucasians, who speak Ibero-Caucasian dialects or Turkic. They profess Islam, except for some of the Ossetians, who follow Orthodox Christianity.[52]

In the Soviet Caucasus, according to the census of 1939, there were:[53]

Basic nations:	
Azerbaijanis	2,274,805
Georgians	2,248,566
Armenians	2,151,884
Tribes:	
Dagestan peoples	857,371
Chechens	407,690
Ossetians	354,547
Kabardins	164,106
Ingush	92,074
Adigheyan Cherkesses	87,973
Karachais	75,737(58)
Abkhazians	58,969
Balkarians	42,666[54]

In the Soviet Caucasus, according to the census of 1989, there were:

Basic Nations:	
Azerbaijanis	6,791,106
Armenians	4,627,227
Georgians	3,983,115
Tribes:	
Dagestan peoples	2,072,071
Chechens	958,309
Ossetians	598,802
Kabardins	394,651
Ingush	237,577
Adigheyan*	124,941
Cherkesses	52,356
Karachais	156,140
Abkhazians	102,938
Balkarians	88,771

*Based on census figures for the former USSR for 1989.

The number of Azerbaijanis in Iran has been estimated to be between 8 million and 10 million, and probably closer to the larger figure. Georgians in Turkey (Lazes, Gurdju, and others) may be as high as 200,000. Armenians in the former USSR, including those in the Armenian SSR, total over 4.6 million, with over

3 million outside, totaling some 8 million. Figures on North Caucasians in Turkey and the Middle East are believed to be about 800,000.

The Caucasian-Turkish population is composed chiefly of Azerbaijanis who extend into the northwestern part of Persia. The Azerbaijanis form a link among the Turks in Anatolia, Iran, and Turkestan. Other Turkish tribes include the Kumyks, Nogais, Karachais, and Balkars. These last two national units were deported to the east during the Soviet period. However, they have been rehabilitated and their territories have been restored. These small isolated groups of Turks in the northern Caucasus have formed, until recent times, a link among the Turks of the Caucasus, Crimea, the Volga region, and Turkestan.

Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus

Their History. The well-known Soviet orientalist Gurko Kriazhin stated that in the period of decline of the Baghdad Caliphate (tenth and eleventh centuries), a slow penetration of Turkish elements began into eastern Transcaucasia. The aboriginal population was either destroyed, driven into the mountains, or assimilated by the invaders. After the Mongol onslaught in the thirteenth century, the Azerbaijan-Turkish population began to dominate in the present Azerbaijan area. They were aided by the conquests of Timur and invasions of Turkmens, Ottoman Turks, and other groups.[55]

Resulzade gave much earlier dates for the arrival of the first forebears of the contemporary Azerbaijanis and believed that the Turkish tribes from the north of Euro-Asia passed through the Caucasus to attack Persia in the middle of the fifth century.[56] The Turkish nomads from the steppes of the northern Caucasus and the region of the Don and Terek basins were invited by the rulers of the southern Caucasus to take part in their wars with Persia. Turkish elements then began to infiltrate into the present-day area of Azerbaijan. In the seventh century, the Khazar Turks, the allies of the Byzantine emperor, Heraclius, occupied the Caucasus. After the fall of the Sassanids, the Khazar Turks dominated the Caucasus for a long period. This was one reason for the settlement of many Turkish tribes in the country. During the Arab domination in the Caucasus, the influx of Turks from the north was checked but the Turks from the south continued to move in. The Seljuk conquest of the Caucasus in the eleventh century did not meet strong opposition because of the presence of the Turkish groups, and new tribes settled in the Caucasus in the twelfth century.[57]

Following Genghis Khan's invasions, additional Turkish tribal units arrived in Aberbaijan, chiefly Oghuz Turks. Timur flooded the Caucasus three times with his armies, and after each invasion some Turks settled there. This was the last great phase of the Turkification of Azerbaijan, and its slow process makes it difficult to describe the early Turkish history of that region. The Turkish rulers of the petty khanates divided the country into a number of small states (vassalages of Persia, the Mongols, and the Ottoman Porte). The rivalry between Persia and the Ottoman Porte over Azerbaijan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

weakened the moves for unification of the Azerbaijan khanates and opened the road for Russian penetration in the eighteenth century. This penetration was facilitated by the pro-Russian policy of the Transcaucasian Christians (the Georgians and Armenians), who looked to Christian Russia for protection. The Georgian king, Heracles II, voluntarily approached Russia in 1783 and accepted that nation's protection for his kingdom. Although Russia promised not to interfere in internal affairs, it violated the agreement and annexed Georgia in 1801.

Having obtained a firm foothold in the Central Caucasus, Russia successfully continued the fight with the khanates of Azerbaijan. The Russian rule over that khanate was rather mild until the second half of the nineteenth century, when Russian strength was firmly established in the northern Caucasus and the rivalry with Persia and the Ottoman Porte had been decided in favor of St. Petersburg. The Russians then started liquidating the remnants of local autonomy. Representatives of the local dynasties were deported to the northern provinces of the huge empire, and Russians were nominated in place of the former officials. Taxes were increased enormously. Later, seeking friendship with the local gentry, the Russian *ukase* (edicts) of 1846 granted land estates to the *beks* (lords or princes), who administered these lands in the name of their khans. The beks were empowered to collect taxes and also were granted certain administrative and judicial rights over their peasants. This represented virtual serfdom in a form quite contrary to the Azerbaijan tradition.[58]

These measures made the new estate owners grateful to the Russian government and divided the nation into antagonistic groups. A kind of serfdom in Azerbaijan lasted until 1912, which hindered the nation's normal development. Under Russian occupation, the cultural life of the people was stifled. The general situation deteriorated to such an extent that the Armenians, who had escaped from despotic Moslem rule in Turkey to the protection of the Christian czar in Transcaucasia began to secretly return to Turkey and Persia.[59]

Before the Russian occupation, cultural life in Azerbaijan had been influenced primarily by Persian civilization. Persian language and literature were in general use among the educated classes. This cultural link between the newly conquered country and its still strong Persian neighbor annoyed Russia, which tried to destroy it by supporting local Turkish cultural developments. These and other social currents contributed to the revival of the local Turkish culture, illustrating the Persian proverb that "the enemy may be very useful, if God wills it."

The Azerbaijani cultural revival may be divided into three phases: the first, lasting until 1905; the second, until the 1920s; and the third, to our times. The first period of revival was started by the works of Mirza Fathali Ahund Zade (1812–78), who published his first drama in 1850. His dramas were written in the popular Turkic-Azerbaijan language and urged reform.[60] Fathali urged equality for women and demanded the substitution of the Latin script for the Arabic.[61] Fathali was one of the first dramatists in the modern Islamic world, and some of his dramas are still produced.

Other writers began to imitate Fathali's style and language. In 1875, the first

newspaper in the Azerbaijan language, *Ekingi* (The cultivator), was started by Hassan Melik-Zade Zerdabi. This paper demanded the end of serfdom, equality of the sexes and of all citizens, organization of schools, and similar reforms, but Russian censorship shortly stopped its publication. In general, the national literature of this period was characterized by criticism of existing conditions and the advocacy of reforms in all fields of life. Political independence was not then an objective because the existing political situation made any such hopes unreal.

The second period of revival in Azerbaijan is connected with the first Russian revolution (1905). The liberalization of the Russian regime after that year enabled the Azerbaijanis to organize new schools, theaters, newspapers, and cultural and welfare organizations. Revolution in Persia in 1906 and in Turkey in 1908, as well as growing Russian chauvinism toward non-Russian citizens of the empire, intensified the desire for independence. The papers established in 1905 (*Hayat* and *Irshad*), and in 1913 (*Açik Söz*), increased their circulation. The paper *Açik Söz* began to substitute the word *Turk* for the *Tatar* (which was introduced by the Russian administration). Various dramatists, poets, and satirists appeared, and the first Azerbaijan opera was composed, based on Fizuli's poem *Leila and Mejnun*.[62]

This cultural revival was a first step in the region's political awakening. The most important role in this direction was played by the Musavat (Equality) national democratic party, which was established in 1911.[63] The party demanded equality for all nationalities in the empire. In 1917, the first party congress met to advocate national independence for Azerbaijan. The revolution of 1917 opened a new vista of events in the Caucasus. At the beginning of the revolution, some Georgians, and even more the Armenians, chiefly out of fear of the Turks and of isolation, demanded the autonomy of Caucasia within the framework of a future Russian democratic federated state.[64]

Growing anarchy in Russia, fear of communism, and Turkish treatment of Caucasia as a province of a hostile Russian state, as well as German influences, led the Caucasians to declare their political independence and sovereignty. The first step in this direction was taken in February 1918, when the Federal Democratic Republic of Transcaucasia was proclaimed. Differences between the pro-Turkish Azerbaijanis and the anti-Turkish Armenians and Georgians resulted in the dissolution of this federation in May 1918 and in the proclamations of the independence of four separate Caucasian nations. The North Caucasian Mountaineers declared their independence on May 11, 1918, and on May 26, 1918, Georgia established her sovereignty. Finally, on May 28, 1918, the independence of Azerbaijan and Armenia was declared.[65]

After the declaration of independence, an Azerbaijan parliament was created and its members were elected on the basis of universal, free, secret, and proportionate representation.[66] The Musavat (Equality) party dominated the parliament, though this party never achieved such complete control of state affairs as did the Dashnak party in independent Armenia. Besides the Musavat majority there was also the Ittihad (Union) party, representing the Moslem clericals, and

the Socialist bloc, representing the leftist group. Armenians held twenty out of the one hundred twenty seats. Non-Turkish and non-Caucasian minorities also were represented, including Russians, Jews, and Poles.[67]

The Azerbaijan parliament introduced a number of reforms, with the extension of suffrage to women being probably the most spectacular. Another important accomplishment was the opening of a state university in Baku. (About one hundred additional students were sent to universities in the West.) The distribution of private and state lands to the landless peasants was planned, and a limit for private landholding, suggested. This plan was announced by the Musavat party, but because of the strong opposition of the landowners and their supporters in the party, it was shelved until the convocation of an Azerbaijan constituent assembly.

The difficulties of the young republic were great. The economy of the country depended heavily on the export of oil, but the Russian civil war had closed the Russian market. The finances of the Azerbaijan government underwent a series of crises, but fortunately the Baku oil, even when it did not bring in money, assured Azerbaijan of credit abroad. During their occupation of Baku, the British drew heavily on the resources of the Baku State Bank.[68] The British participated in Azerbaijan affairs in the beginning of 1918, yet it was not until August 17, 1918, that English troops (slightly more than one thousand men) arrived in Baku. This modest number attempted to defend Baku against the Ottoman units and to restore order in the country. Superior Ottoman forces forced the British commander, Major-General L. C. Dunsterville, to withdraw.[69] On September 14, 1918, under the cover of night, the British left their Armenian and Russian allies and proceeded to Enzeli, a port on the Persian section of the Caspian Sea. The British action looked like a betrayal of an ally, but from a military point of view, it was the only thing that could be done.[70] The British withdrawal was followed by an Azerbaijan-Ottoman occupation of Baku.

Early in November 1918, the Ottoman military command informed the Azerbaijan government that within a few days, the Turkish troops would leave Azerbaijan because of the Ottoman defeat and armistice. The Baku government sent a delegation to Enzeli to negotiate with the new commander of the British troops in Persia, and General Thomson arrived in Baku on November 1, 1918. His assignment was as commander of the Allied French, British, and American forces. This new intervention occurred in conformity with the treaty signed with the defeated Ottoman Empire which permitted the British, representing the interests of all allies, to replace the Ottoman troops. The Azerbaijanis took advantage of the uncertain position of the British toward the Russian centralists and ran state affairs at their own discretion. The parliament was convened and a new government was formed. The election of a parliament and the constitutional procedure of the Khoiskii cabinet convinced the British that they were dealing with a representative government. On December 28, 1918, General Thomson declared that in view of the formation of a coalition government in Azerbaijan, the Allied Command would accord full support to that government as the only

legal power within the limits of Azerbaijan. Later, the international situation forced the British to withdraw their troops from Transcaucasia as well as from Transcaspia, and the evacuation began on November 20, 1919.[71]

On November 10, 1918, the Azerbaijan government sent a telegram to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, requesting help and recognition. The Azerbaijan government also approached American circles looking for cash in exchange for oil. In June 1919, the government negotiated with a representative of Standard Oil Company and agreed that the company would buy one hundred thousand tons of petroleum at thirty-three dollars a ton in 1919–20. It was intended that this would be followed by another purchase of an equal amount at the same price. The Soviet historian Raevskiy has written that British oil interests, represented by Shell Company, were opposed to this American penetration of the Azerbaijan economy and pressed the government of Azerbaijan to break the agreement. Whatever the reason may have been, the agreement was canceled.[72]

The Azerbaijanis again approached President Wilson in Paris in the spring of 1919, requesting recognition, assistance, and the exchange of diplomatic representations. President Wilson granted the Azerbaijan delegation an interview, at which he displayed a rather unsympathetic attitude. As the delegation reported to its government, Wilson stated that the conference did not want to partition the world into small pieces. He advised the Azerbaijanis that it would be better for them to develop a confederation. Such a confederation of all the peoples of Transcaucasia, Wilson stated, could receive the protection of some power on the basis of a mandate granted by the League of Nations. The Azerbaijan question, Wilson concluded, could not be solved prior to the general settlement of the Russian question.[73]

The efforts of the Caucasian leaders and a certain interest by the Western powers in the fate of the Caucasus resulted in de facto recognition by the Allied Supreme Council in January 1920 of Azerbaijan and Armenia (while Georgia was accorded a de jure recognition).

However, the independence of Caucasia was very short-lived since, on January 9, 1919, the White Army of General Denikin reconquered the North Caucasus for Russia just before that army was eliminated by the Reds. In April 1920, Baku was taken by the Red troops, after which the whole republic of Azerbaijan was occupied.

On May 2, 1920, a revolt was started by the Reds in Georgia, but the communist uprisings were overpowered in some provinces of the new state and the Russians were forced to sign a peace treaty on June 16, 1920. Nevertheless, seven months later, better-equipped Soviet troops attacked the young republican army, and in the period from February 11 to March 18, 1921, they occupied the whole country. In the meantime, the combined forces of Kemalist Turkey and Red Russia crushed the independence of Armenia.[74]

After the occupation of Azerbaijan and the stabilization of Red power, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan was created, on April 28, 1920. On March 12, 1922, the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic became a member of the Trans-

caucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, which was composed of the three Soviet republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. On December 5, 1936, this federation was dissolved, and Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, became members of the former Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic.[75]

The subsequent partition of the Caucasian area is outlined below:

Caucasian Political Subdivisions

SSRs, ASSRs, and ARs	Population (Census of 1939)	Main Ethnic Strain	Area in Capital Square Miles
TRANSCAUCASIA			
Azerbaijan SSR	3,209,700	Turkish	32,100 Baku
Nakhichevan ASSR		Turkish	2,100 Nakhichevan
Nagorno-Karabakh AR		Armenian	1,700 Stepenakert
Armenian SSR	1,281,600	Armenian	11,500 Erivan
Georgian SSR	3,542,300	Ibero-Cauc.	29,400 Tiflis
Abkhazian ASSR		Ibero-Cauc.	3,360 Sukhumi
Adzharian ASSR		Ibero-Cauc.	1,080 Batum
South Ossetian AR		Iranian	1,500 Stalinir
NORTH CAUCASIA			
(After World War II)			
Dagestan ASSR	930,500	Ibero-Cauc.	14,750 Makhachkala
North Ossetian ASR	328,900	Iranian	3,550 Dzaudzhikau
Kabardino-Balkar ASSR	329,200	Ibero-Cauc.	4,550 Nalchik
Karachai-Cherkess AR	92,500	Ibero-Cauc.	1,500 Cherkessk
Adhigei AR	241,800	Ibero-Cauc.	1,700 Maikop

The Upper-Karabakh AR is now known as the Nagorno-Karabakh AR. The Kabardian ASSR is now known as the Karachai-Cherkess AR, while the Adhigei AR has retained its designation.

The 1989 census figures are shown below:

Transcaucasia

Azerbaijan SSR	7,029,000	(1989)
Georgian SSR	5,449,000	

Armenian SSR	3,283,900	
North Caucasia		
Dagestan ASSR	1,802,188	(1989)
North Ossetian ASSR	n.a.	
Kabardino-Balkar ASSR	753,531	
Karachai-Cherkess AR	415,000	
Adhigei AR	n.a.	

Note: In 1979, the population of the North Ossetian ASSR was 597,000, and of the Adhigei AR, was 404,390.

Azerbaijanis in Persia

The Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus do not form the entire nation. Beyond the former Soviet Caucasian-Persian border lives the second half of the same people, who form the majority of the population of Persian Azerbaijan. Until the Russian annexation of the Caucasus, both groups lived within the borders of the same cultural-political environment and possessed a common history. The first Persian-Russian War of 1804 permitted the Russian General Tsitsianov to occupy Gandzha and to penetrate into the Erivan area. In 1806, the Russians occupied Derbent and Baku, and in 1809 they annexed Nakhichevan and besieged Erivan for the second time. In 1812, after a successful campaign, Russia concluded the Treaty of Bucharest with Turkey, and Persia thus lost her Ottoman ally. In the same year, St. Petersburg concluded an agreement with Great Britain. Persia, which had been supported until then by Britain, was left isolated. After some additional successes, the Russian troops occupied Lenkoran and the Talish Khanate, and on October 24, 1813, the Persian-Russian Peace Treaty of Gulistan was concluded.[76] Persia lost the whole of Caucasian Azerbaijan and Dagestan, as well as sovereign rights over five petty Georgian kingdoms.

In 1826 Persia tried to reconquer the lost provinces, but a better equipped Russian army under General Paskevich defeated the Persians and occupied Tabriz in 1827. The new Peace Treaty of Turkmanchai (February 22, 1828) definitely decided the fate of the Azerbaijanis, and after this date, Azerbaijan was divided between Persia and Russia.[77] The history of the Azerbaijanis has since been separated; however, this separation has not been absolute, as northern Persia was under strong Russian influence. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Russia made large loans to Persia, receiving in exchange important concessions. These concessions included customs facilities for Russian goods, the organization of a Russian-Persian Bank in Teheran, the building of a narrow-gauge railway between Djulfa and Tabriz, coal mine and oil concessions between Tabriz and Kazvin, and a fleet on Lake Urmia.

On August 31, 1907, by Anglo-Russian agreement, Persia was virtually partitioned between Great Britain and Russia. Northern Iran, including the Turkish

portion (i.e., Persian Azerbaijan), as well as several other Turkish tribes in Khorasan plus the bulk of the Persian population and its capital, became a Russian sphere of influence. The southern part of the country was a British sphere of influence, and the middle belt of deserts and mountainous regions was left as a neutral area. After this division of the country, Persian Azerbaijan was practically absorbed by Russia.

The Russian revolution of 1905, the Persian revolution of 1906, and the subsequent unrest in the Caucasus and Persia all influenced the feeling of unity of both parts of Azerbaijan. Events approached the point where northern Persia was virtually included in the Russian Empire. The war of 1914–18 brought Russian plans for expansion near to fulfillment in the region of the straits and Turkish Armenia, as well as in northern Persia. Only the revolution of 1917 and the military and political collapse of the Russian Empire saved the northern Persian provinces.

Consolidation of the Persian Empire under the new dynasty of Reza Pahlevi reduced Soviet Russian and foreign influences and restored the old frontier between the Soviet Union and Persia. Persian Azerbaijan once more was distinctly separated from the Caucasian portion and underwent intense pressure aimed at Persianization. The Persian police regime was powerful, and manifestations of national Turkish feelings were not tolerated.[78]

During World War II, after the refusal of Persia to authorize use of its territory for the transit of Allied war material to the former USSR, the country was occupied in 1941 and divided into two zones of occupation. The former Soviet Russia obtained control of the five provinces of the north (Persian Azerbaijan included), while Britain got the rest of the country. Teheran became a neutral enclave.[79]

The Soviets used every opportunity to exploit their presence in the northern provinces and to promote their influence. The Soviets supported the Communist-led *Tudeh* (Masses) party, operated a huge propaganda machine, and supported and intrigued among national minorities, such as the Armenians and Kurds. As for the Azerbaijanis, the Soviets favored their integration into the former USSR. This fact played a great role in the postwar period.

As soon as the Japanese surrender was signed on September 2, 1945, serious disturbances broke out in Persian Azerbaijan. On December 12, 1945, former Tudeh members, acting under the new name of "Democrats" and aided by thousands of Soviet agents (who crossed the border), deposed the Persian governor of Tabriz and proclaimed the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. The Red Army gave them full protection and prevented Persian government troops from reaching the province.[80] The new Tabriz government, under the veteran Comintern agent Jaafar Pishevari, openly thanked the Red Army for assistance. Soon afterwards, an independent Kurdish republic was established under Soviet auspices in Mahabad and its leaders concluded an alliance with the Tabriz rebels.[81]

The Autonomous Azerbaijan Republic was a short-lived, artificial creation.

The Soviet Union was forced by the Triparite Treaty of 1942 (concluded by Great Britain and Soviet Russia with Persia) to evacuate its troops from Persia, and the Red Army left Persian territory on May 9, 1946 (more than two months after the stipulated deadline). The withdrawal of Soviet troops removed a major intimidating factor in Soviet-Persian relations. The Persian government then reoriented its policy and dismissed leftist members of the administration. After a few months of inconclusive negotiations with the Azerbaijan separatists, Persian Premier Qavam ordered government troops into Azerbaijan, where they encountered only weak and spasmodic resistance. After a full year of separate existence, the rebel regime collapsed as soon as the army reached Tabriz on December 15, 1946.[82]

Distribution and Numbers of Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus and in Persia. The Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus are concentrated chiefly within the borders of the Azerbaijan SSR. Several large minority groups live in this republic, the ethnic composition of which is as follows (these are 1946 figures):[83]

Azerbaijanis	more than 60 percent
Russians	about 16 percent
Armenians	about 12 percent
Talishes, Dagestanis, Kurds, Tats, Georgians, Jews, etc.	about 22 percent

In 1989, of the nearly 7 million inhabitants of the Azerbaijan SSR, 78 percent were Azerbaijanis, 8 percent were Russians, and less than 8 percent, Armenians. The remaining 6 percent included Talishes (Talyshes), Dagestanis, Kurds, Tats, Georgians, and Jews. During 1988–89, many Armenians left for the Armenian SSR and other areas, and Azeris left Armenia for Azerbaijan and other Muslim republics. It is reported that some Russians may also have left both these republics.

There are Azerbaijan minorities in the neighboring Transcaucasian Republics of Armenia and Georgia. Before 1988, the Azerbaijanis formed 8.2 percent of the Armenian population. Small groups of Azerbaijanis are scattered throughout the Dagestan ASSR and adjoining regions.

During 1988–89, 160,000 Azerbaijanis in the Armenian SSR left for the Azerbaijan SSR, while 200,000 Armenians in the Azerbaijan SSR left for the Armenian SSR or other parts of the former USSR, in the wake of ethnic disturbances in both regions. There are still 200,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan, but there are few Azeris in Armenia.

The minority groups in the Azerbaijan SSR are concentrated in more or less definite regions. For example, the Armenians live predominantly in Baku and the Karabakh Autonomous Region, and the Russians are chiefly in Baku and the administrative centers. The Karabakh Autonomous Region is now called the Nagorno-Karabakh AR. Owing to this grouping of non-Azerbaijanis in specific

areas, the rest of the country is fairly homogeneously populated with Azerbaijanis.[84]

The number of Azerbaijanis in the entire former USSR (chiefly in the above-mentioned areas) as shown by the census of January 17, 1939, was 2,274,805. In 1989 the numbers of Azerbaijanis in the former USSR was 6,791,106. The number of Azerbaijanis exceeds all other nationalities of the Caucasus (compare with the table of Caucasian nationalities presented above).[85] In Persia, the Azerbaijanis are concentrated largely within the Azerbaijan province and adjacent regions. A rather important Azerbaijan colony exists in Teheran (a fact well known to every resident of that city). According to Soviet sources (which were always very interested in the national composition of neighboring countries), the population of Iran is divided as follows.[86]

In 1989, the population of Iran included: 51 percent Iranians, 25 percent Azeris, 9 percent Kurds, 8 percent Gilaki and Mazandarani, 2 percent Lurs, 1 percent Baloch, 1 percent Arabs, and 3 percent other. The religious distribution was as follows: 95 percent Shia, 4 percent Sunni, and small numbers of Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Bahais.

In 1989 the population of Iran was 55,647,000 (according to *The World Fact Book*, July 1990). The number of Turks, therefore, may be stated to be about 5 million. The non-Azerbaijan Turks in Iran are not numerous and consist of nomadic Turkmens in Khorasan province and very minor tribes of Kadjars, Kashkais, and other groups. It would seem justified to estimate the number of Azerbaijanis in Iran at over 3 million. (This figure is also given by Azerbaijan émigrés in Turkey.) Thus, the total number of Azerbaijanis in the former Soviet Union and Iran probably exceeded 5,274,805 in 1939–40. The number of Azeris and other Turks in Iran in 1989 was between 8 and 10 million, and Azeris in the former USSR numbered 6,791,000.

Similarities to Other Turks. Azerbaijanis, unlike the Ottoman Turks, are largely Shiite Moslems, but otherwise they are the nearest Turkish kinspeople to the Anatolian Turks, and their language is closely related. N. Marr, the famous Russian linguist, stated that the Azerbaijan language is nearest to Turkmenian, Anatolian, and southern Crimean Turkish; however, the Iranian influence is strong and affects syntax and phraseology.[87] There are several Azerbaijan dialects, but all Turks of Azerbaijan understand each other without difficulty and can be understood by Anatolian Turks.

Of the non-Iranian languages of Iran, Turkish is spoken by the largest number of persons. Among the several dialects of the Turkish tribes of Iran, only in Azerbaijan has any serious attempt been made to develop a literary form of the language. This has been mainly stimulated by the literary activity in what was formerly Soviet Azerbaijan (though there, an adaption of the Cyrillic alphabet is used, while on the Iranian side, the Arabic script is still maintained).[88]

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Azerbaijan literary language experienced a revival in Transcaucasia. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the language became strongly influenced by Ottoman Turkish, an

influence that ended only after the revolution of 1917. In the former USSR, the Azerbaijan literary language was one of the first Turkic languages for which a Latin alphabet was officially adopted (in 1924). This original Latin script was replaced by the Unified Turkic Latin alphabet in 1933; this, in turn, gave way to a Cyrillic alphabet in 1934–40.[89] Since 1989, many of the Turkic republics have introduced language reforms and have begun to adopt the Arabic or Latin script. Azerbaijan has reintroduced a script similar to the modern Turkish Latin alphabet.

Other (Non-Azerbaijan) Turkish Tribes in the Caucasus

There are four small Turkish tribes in the northern Caucasus that are large enough to form a basis for the creation of autonomous areas. These are the Karachais, the Balkars, the Nogais, and the Kumyks.

The Karachais lived predominantly within the borders of the Karachai Autonomous Region. In 1939, in the entire former Soviet Union, there were 75,737 Karachais, while there were 156,140 Karachais in 1989. Their language resembles that of the Codex Cumanicus of 1303 and has dialectic peculiarities indicating that the Karachais came neither from the east nor the south, but from the north: that is, from the Kuma steppe.[90]

F. E. Korsh defined this language as a northern Turkish dialect, while A. N. Samoylovich classified it as northern-western (i.e., the Kipchak group of the Turkish dialects).[91] S. Wurm emphasized the similarity between the Karachai and Balkar Turkish dialects and stated that a literary language known as Karachai-Balkar was developed after the adoption of the Latin script in 1924.[92] The alphabet was later modified, and in 1938–39, it was replaced by a Cyrillic alphabet. Literary activity in this language ceased after World War II, when the Karachai Autonomous Region was dissolved and the Karachai and Balkar peoples ceased to exist as officially recognized ethnic-linguistic entities. After 1957, they were rehabilitated.

The Balkars lived predominantly within the borders of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, together with the non-Turkish Kabardinians. In 1939 there were 42,666 Balkars.[93] In 1989, this number had grown to 88,771.

The Nogais, once a numerous and powerful tribe, are represented now only by a few scattered groups living in Rumania, the Crimean Peninsula, and the North Caucasus. Several thousand Nogais live within the borders of the Cherkess Autonomous Region, and a majority live within the borders of the Dagestan ASSR and in scattered groups in the neighboring regions. The Soviet census of 1939 did not show a separate category of Nogais and instead counted them as one of the component tribes of the Dagestan ASSR and other small national units of the North Caucasus. The total number of Nogais in the second half of the nineteenth century was about 100,000.[94] There were about 34,400 Nogais in 1926, and 75,564 in 1989; linguistically, they belong to a branch of the

northwestern group of Turkic languages.[95] Efforts were made to create a unified literary Nogai language, especially after 1937, when the Latin script was replaced by a Cyrillic script.[96]

The Kumyks live predominantly within the borders of the Dagestan ASSR and form a compact population in the Kumyk lowland. Small Kumyk groups are scattered in other regions of the North Caucasus. In 1926 there were 97,900 Kumyks, and in 1989, they had increased to 282,178. Linguistically, they belong to the northwestern branch of Turkic languages. They used an Arabic script until the Latin script was adopted in 1927, but in 1939 this was replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet.[97]

THE TURKS OF THE VOLGA-URAL AREA

The Turks of the Volga-Ural area are concentrated chiefly in the Middle Volga Basin and in the Belaya River Basin. The emergent physical features of the region are the Volga River itself, the most important waterway of the former USSR, and the Ural Mountains, which are one of the biggest mineral sources of the union. The Volga-Ural area has played a great role in the modern history of Euro-Asia. This is the meeting place of the Slavic peoples with the Eastern races, and the region has possessed a heterogeneous Slavic-Oriental character. Broadly speaking, the population may be divided into three main racial groups: Turkish, Finno-Ugrian, and Slavic. The Turkish group numbers about ten million persons and is divided into three sections: Kazan Tatars, Chuvashes, and Bashkirs. The Soviets established the Tatar ASSR, the Chuvash ASSR and the Bashkir ASSR. Only the Chuvash ASSR possesses a somewhat homogeneous Turkic-speaking population, while the Tatar and Bashkir Republics have large (from 40 to 50 percent) non-Turkish minorities. The neighboring Ugro-Finnish Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (Mari ASSR, Udmurt ASSR, and Mordvinian ASSR) have some Turkish minorities. The adjacent non-autonomous administrative oblasts also include some compact Turkish groups. The Kazan Tatars are extremely dispersed throughout the whole region, with the majority living outside the borders of their national Tatar ASSR. For essential data on these republics and the non-Russian peoples of the Volga-Ural area see the following table:

Middle Volga-Ural ASSRs[98]

ASSRs	Population (Census of 1939)	Main Ethnic Strains	Area in Square Miles Capital
Bashkir	3,144,700	Turkish and Slavic	55,400 Ufa
Chuvash	1,077,600	Mixed: Turkish and Finno-Ugrian	7,100 Cheboksary
Mari	579,500	Finno-Ugrian	8,900 Ioshkarola

Mordivinian	1,188,600	Finno-Ugrian and Slavic	10,080 Saransk
Tatar	2,919,400	Turkish and Slavic	26,100 Kazan
Udmurt	1,220,000	Finno-Ugrian	16,300 Izhevsk

Basic Non-Slavic Peoples of the Middle Volga-Ural Area, (Census of 1939)[99]

Tatars	4,300,336
Mordvinians	1,451,429
Chuvashes	1,367,930
Bashkirs	842,925
Udmurts	605,673
Mari	481,262

According to the 1989 census, there were:

Bashkirs	1,449,462
Chuvash	1,839,288
Mari	670,288
Mordvinians	1,153,516
Tatars	6,645,588
Udmurts	746,562

The Tatars as well as the Bashkirs are scattered in different areas in addition to their own SSRs. The Turkish peoples of the Middle Volga-Ural area are considered in detail below.

Kazan Tatars (Turks)

The town of Kazan is the historic center of the Kazan Tatars, but the majority of these people live outside the borders of the Tatar ASSR. The Tatars are the most dispersed Turkish people in the former Soviet Union.

Historical Sketch. Upon the disintegration of the Golden Horde in the beginning of the fifteenth century, three states sprang up in the Volga region: the Astrakhan Khanate, the Nogai Horde, and the Kazan Khanate.[100] The Astrakhan Khanate, at the estuary of the Volga River (with its capital at Astrakhan), did not play an important role in the history of the Tatars. Still less significant was the Nogai Horde, but the role of the Kazan Khanate, on the contrary, was consequential. The date of the establishment of this khanate is given by Tatar historians as 1437. The foundation of the state is attributed to a prince of the Tuktamish house named Ulug Mohamet. The capital of the khanate was established in Kazan and the state was named after the capital.[101]

Relations with the Grand Duchy of Moscow were strained from the outset.



Map of Kazan, Astrakhan, Nogai and Crimean Khanates (ca. 1500 A.D.)

During the more than one hundred years of existence of the Kazan Khanate, there were about twenty-five wars between Kazan and Moscow. In 1552, Ivan the Terrible, who reigned from 1547 to 1584, conquered Kazan with the help of a large army, which was well equipped with artillery and aided by German specialists. After the conqest, the Russians made great efforts to Russify and colonize the country. Russian colonization of the Kazan area was so dynamic that before World War I, there were no Tatar villages within twenty miles of Kazan itself. According to a ukase of 1593, all mosques and Moslem schools in Tatar territory that fell into the hands of the Russian administration were destroyed. This oppression caused an anti-Russian independence movement and when the Polish occupied Moscow in 1610–12, the Kazan Khanate regained sovereignty briefly (in 1612).

The unrelenting opposition of the Tatars and their support of the pretenders to the throne of Moscow during the "Time of Troubles" (1584–1613) convinced the Russians that the conquest of the Kazan by force alone was useless, and that instead, some political moves had to be taken to close the gap between the two societies. In 1613, certain aristocratic Tatar representatives were invited to take part in the Zemsky Sobor (National Assembly) of 1613. The Kazan delegates even proposed a Tatar candidate to the throne of Moscow. Many high posts in the army and civil administration were given to Tatars, and in a short time, a large, influential class of Tatar estate owners had sprung up.

In 1628 and 1648, restrictions were promulgated to reduce the influence of the new rich Tatar class. These contributed to a new wave of dissatisfaction and the Tatars' strong support of the Stepan Razin rebellion.[102]

During the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725), the area of the Kazan Khanate was integrated into the rest of the empire and a large-scale attack on the Tatar national life was started. New and still greater unrest among the Volga Tatars came to a head in 1708. After defeating the Russian troops, the Tatars even seized Kazan, but shortly thereafter, the town was retaken by the Russian army and a new wave of repressions began. All estate owners of the Moslem faith were forced to accept Christianity in six months' time or face the confiscation of their properties. (The number of Tatars who were willing to accept Christianity, even under this compulsion, was very small.)

These acts by Moscow produced new revolts, which are known in Tatar history as the Ilmiak-Abz uprising of 1735 and the Kara Sakala uprising of 1739. They were mercilessly crushed, and a new drive to Christianize the Tatars was begun with a liquidation of Moslem cultural and religious centers. In 1742, 418 mosques (of a total of 546) were destroyed in one county of Kazan. The Moslem clergy was refused the legal support of the state. Freedom of trade was greatly reduced, and all metal crafts were forbidden to the Tatars (such as the production of knives, sabers, and even horseshoes and nails). The tension was so great that the Tatars supported en masse the Pugachev rebellion, and together with Pugachev's partisans, the Tatars again took Kazan.[103]

Uprisings and abortive Russian countermeasures forced Katherine II (1762–

96) to revise imperial policy. The empress personally went to Kazan and sponsored the building of a new mosque in the town. The law forbidding the Tatars to reside within a twenty-mile perimeter of the town of Kazan was revoked. The rights of the Tatar aristocracy were returned, but not their landed estates. Free trade possibilities were offered the Tatar merchants who had trade contacts with the East. A ukase of 1788, officially permitted the Moslem clergy to establish a so-called Moslem Religious Council, and some legal rights were given to the Moslem religious organization.

Under Katherine II new mosques were erected in many Tatar localities; *medresses* also were built (religious Koranic schools) and high schools for *mullahs* and teachers. In 1844, there were four medresses in Kazan alone. The literacy rate was quite high, and there were a number of prominent Tatar scientists, theologians, and reformers.

In the second part of the nineteenth century, the Russian government became concerned by the Tatar cultural and material development and began a new anti-Tatar drive. Tatar trade and industrial enterprises were highly taxed, and restrictions were applied to prevent their expansion, while Russian trade and industry were artificially supported.

In the cultural sphere, repressions also occurred; certain medresses were closed, and very few new schools or mosques were erected. Several small uprisings took place, and many Tatars emigrated to the Ottoman Empire. Politically minded Tatars reacted by increasing their Muslim spiritual counteroffensive, and religious orders were founded, headed by *ishans* (sheikhs). The popular order of Nakshbendi was supported by tens of thousands of believers. The members of the order propagated not only a purely religious dogma of spiritual and bodily purity, but also an anti-Russian doctrine. The members of the Veisi order urged the restoration of the old Bolgar-Moslem state, passive resistance, and similar actions. This order was suppressed by the Russians. Some of its leaders died in prison, and many members were deported to Siberia. The influence of Ismail Gaspirali's weekly *Terguman* (interpreter) was strongly felt, and modern ideologies penetrated deeply into Tatar society. Many European-educated Tatars modernized the old, almost medieval, opinions and concepts.[104]

Following the first Russian revolution of 1906, the Tatars took part in two Moslem congresses in 1905 and 1906. After the liberalization of the Czarist regime and the promulgation of the Tsar's manifesto of October 17, 1905, about fifty Tatar periodicals came into existence and political life greatly expanded. In the Russian *Duma* (parliament) a unified Turko-Tatar representation appeared, which defended the interests of all Turko-Tatars of Russia. Russian countermeasures reappeared and a new ukase on June 3, 1907 reduced the liberalism of the manifesto of 1905. The number of Tatar delegates to the *Duma* were greatly diminished.

In spite of new restrictions, mass education among the Tatar population made outstanding progress, and in the 1913–1914 school year practically all Tatar children were enrolled in national primary schools. The printing of books con-

tinued to expand rapidly; in 1914 around one thousand Tatar book titles were represented in the Printing Exhibition in St. Petersburg.

The Tatars of the Volga and the Crimeana Tatars were conscripted for duty in the Russian Army, while the other Turkish peoples of Russia were freed from obligatory military service. During World War I, most Tatars desired the victory of the enemies of Russia and many tried to desert or avoid military service.

Tatar political emigrants in Ottoman Turkey and Germany were very active in presenting the Tatar point of view. In Lausanne in 1916, a conference under the chairmanship of Yusuf Akçoraoğlu (a Kazan Tatar who lived from 1876 to 1933) represented the Volga Tatars. Supported by Ottoman Turkey and Germany, this group of emigrants was busy with the organization of Tatar troops, who were recruited from among the Tatar prisoners of war in Germany.[105]

During the revolution of 1917, the Russian Tatars presented their demands as a united national group and an All-Moslem Congress was convoked in Moscow on May 1, 1917. A majority of the nine hundred delegates, who represented all the Moslems in Russia, desired a federative and democratic structure for the empire. The congress elected an All-Russian Moslem executive committee, to reside in St. Petersburg. The Second All-Moslem Congress was convened in Kazan in July 1917, but the delegates of Turkestan, Crimea, and the Caucasus were unable to attend because of the anarchic conditions in many regions of the empire. Thus, the conference represented only the Turks (Tatars) of the Volga and the neighboring regions.

Two other assemblies were convoked in Kazan: the Moslem clergy and the All-Russian Moslem military conference. The Moslem Clerical Assembly was occupied with religious matters, while the military conference discussed the organization of national Tatar regiments. The political assembly voted for cultural-national autonomy for the whole Idel-Ural (i.e., the Middle Volga region and the neighboring Ural area). This decision was repeated at the united conference of the participants of all three conferences.

A national assembly was convoked in Ufa in November 1917, which proposed cultural autonomy. It voted certain laws, and an autonomous national government was nominated. This autonomous government was responsible for three phases of national life: Moslem religion, finances, and education. A delegation of three persons was nominated to proceed to the Versailles Conference in Paris. The national assembly elected a special body for the study of questions connected with the establishment of a separate Turko-Tatar-Idel-Uralian autonomous federative state. The Moslem Military Conference elected an All-Russian Moslem Military *shuro* (council), which began the organization of Tatar regiments.[106]

The Communist revolution and the rise of Bolshevik power prevented the normal development of the Tatar national government. Struggles occurred between the local Bolshevik organizations and the troops, but until April 12, 1918, the national autonomous government and the military shuro dominated the Idel-Ural area.

In April 1918, after concluding the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, a strong Bolshevik

force captured Kazan and Ufa after waging several battles. Tatar national institutions were crushed, national leaders were arrested, and the Tatar regiments were demobilized.

Between May and August 1918, a new possibility of regaining independence occurred when Czech detachments virtually occupied the Trans-Siberian Railway and temporarily eliminated Bolshevik influence in the Kazan area.[107]

The government of the White Russian Admiral A. V. Kolchak fought not only against the Reds but also against the so-called Tatar separatists. This anti-independence policy of Kolchak gave the Bolsheviks an opportunity to assume the role of defenders of the oppressed peoples. The Bolsheviks in their propaganda promised not mere autonomy but actual independence for the Tatars. The establishment of the Tatar ASSR on May 27, 1920, was a formal fulfillment of these promises, but in fact, the Tatars of Kazan were again subordinate to a centralized totalitarian state.

Distribution and Numbers. A comparison of the population figures for the Tatar ASSR with the numbers of the Tatars in the entire former Soviet Union indicates that the majority of the Tatars live outside the borders of that republic. This fact gains meaning after an analysis of the national composition of the Tatar ASSR, which possesses large non-Tatar minorities. Estimates made in 1933 show that Tatars in the Tatar ASSR formed 50.4 percent of the population.[108] Russians in the Tatar ASSR formed 41.8 percent of the population, while other groups formed 7.8 percent.

This means that in the Tatar ASSR there were only about 1.5 million Tatars, while approximately 2.8 million Tatars live outside the borders of that republic. In the Bashkir ASSR the Tatars form 17.3 percent of the population.[109] In 1989, the total Tatar population in the former USSR was 6,645,588. Tatars in the Tatar ASSR were only 3,641,742 because of the diaspora. The low population growth of the Tatars has been due to a slow natural increase of the urban Tatar colonies and the assimilation of the Tatars by the host nationalities, both Russian and Moslem-Turkic, in the numerous diaspora colonies. The Volga Tatars are the only migratory Moslem-Turkic nation in the former USSR.

There are four main Tatar categories of colonies:

1. The Middle Volga and Urals (mostly rural communities);
2. The original homeland of other Tatar groups, where they are minorities;
3. The urban Tatar diaspora; and
4. Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and the Ukraine.

The Tatars are the only Moslem-Turkic nationality which, because of its diaspora, is being linguistically assimilated by the Russians. Especially in their original homeland of the Volga and Urals, the Tatars remain attached to Islam, but this is changing in urban areas of the diaspora.[110]

The Turkish Character of the Kazan Tatars. The Kazan Tatars are a mixture

of Turks and Finns, but they speak "a pure Turkish dialect."[111] At the time of the khanate of Kazan, their literary language was the same as the language in the khanate of Crimea, but it soon became influenced by Chagatai and by old Ottoman Turkish.[112] In the early nineteenth century, the influence of modern Ottoman Turkish became noticeable, but in the second half of the nineteenth century, there was a successful movement to base the literary language on the local Tatar dialect. A modified Arabic alphabet was in use in Kazan for a short while after the Russian revolution of 1917. The Unified Turkic Latin alphabet was adopted in 1929–30; this was superseded by the Cyrillic alphabet, in 1939–40.[113]

The Chuvashes

The Chuvashes are concentrated chiefly within the Chuvash ASSR and form the second largest Turkic-speaking unit in the Middle Volga-Ural area.

History. In the fifteenth century, the Chuvashes were under the domination of the Kazan Khanate and many representatives of the Chuvash upper classes were "Tatarized."[114] Chuvashia was conquered by the Russians in 1552, at the same time as the Kazan Khanate, and Russian policy was similar in these regions. Russian colonists expropriated the best lands, fisheries, and hunting regions; labor service was made compulsory, and Christianity was forcibly introduced.

The mid-sixteenth century was punctuated by incessant struggles between the Chuvashes and the Russians. From 1572 to 1584, there were bloody uprisings, and the Chuvashes also took part in the Bolotnikov rebellion.[115] In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Chuvashia had to pay very high *yasak*, and the land of the natives was systematically occupied by Russian estate owners and orthodox monasteries.[116] The whole of Chuvashia was disrupted during the peasant war of Stepan Razin, and many Chuvashes were in Razin's forces. After stamping out Razin's revolt, the Russians issued a ukase that gave the privilege of a reduced yasak and other taxes to every Chuvash adopting Christianity; the pauperized Chuvashes became Christians in large numbers, and the government resettled the new converts in order to separate them from non-Christian influences.

The Chuvashes took part in the uprisings of the Tatars and the Bashkirs, and in 1774–76 they aided Pugachev's rebellion. During this revolt, Chuvashian partisans executed hundreds of Russian priests and merchants and destroyed many churches and vodka stores. From 1750 until 1850, the Chuvash peasants were under the supervision of the Department of State Domains, and were called "state peasants." They were utterly impoverished, and therefore they accepted the poorest of jobs. Some became *burlaks* on the Volga route or worked in the forests, while others, influenced by the Tatars, emigrated to the Ottoman Empire.[117]

After the emancipation of the peasants in Russia in 1861, the government continued its previous policy of Russianization and Christianization; however,

in the churches and missionary schools, the Turkic-Chuvashian language was partially permitted. The first Chuvashian secondary school was founded in 1868 in Simbirsk. In 1875, this school became a missionary seminary and produced nearly one thousand Orthodox priests and many school teachers.

In 1917 the poor peasants began to demand land and to attack priests and estate owners. An All-Chuvashian National Congress, convoked from July 20 to July 28, 1917, declared its solidarity with the Provisional Government of Russia but refused to support cultural and national autonomy for the Chuvashes because of their underdevelopment. The Bolsheviks were zealous in the organization of their own cells and the Chuvashian military units in Kazan were under their supervision. In the spring of 1918, the Bolsheviks were able to influence events in the country; after the conflict of two revolutionary factions (leftist and rightist), the Bolsheviks gained the upper hand. In June 1920, the Autonomous Chuvashian Oblast was created; in 1925 this oblast became the Chuvashian ASSR.

Religion of the Chuvashes. The Turks of the Middle Volga-Ural are largely Sunni Moslems: A low percentage of the Kazan Tatars, whose forefathers were compelled by Russian missionaries to accept Orthodoxy, are known as *Kriasheny* (or *Kreshchoniy*) meaning *baptized* in Russian.[118]

The Chuvashes, however, present a rather complex problem. Although they are chiefly nominal Orthodox Christians, some are Moslems, and others still adhere to their old pagan faith. The Moslems among the Chuvashes are more culturally developed, and nearly every remnant of the ancient faith has disappeared due to the strict monotheism and intolerance of idolatry that are inherent in Islam. The Christian Chuvash easily identifies Orthodox Christian saints with the old pagan gods because of the extensive use of images in the Russian Church.[119] The fact that some of the Chuvashes adopted Islam indicates that culturally, at least, this group belongs to the Turkish-Tatar-Bashkir society of the Middle Volga-Ural area.

Distribution and Numbers. In 1933 the national composition of the population of the Chuvash ASSR was:[120]

Chuvashes	80.0 percent
Russians	15.8 percent
Others	4.2 percent

A comparison of the total population in the Chuvash ASSR with the numbers of Chuvashes in general indicates that approximately 400,000 Chuvashes live beyond the borders of that republic.

In 1989, the Chuvash ASSR had a population of 1,338,023. The total number of Chuvash in the former USSR was 1,839,228. The Chuvash live mainly in the Chuvash ASSR. Many, however, live in settlements in the Tatar ASSR and the Bashkir ASSR, as well as in the Kuibyshev, Ulyanovsk, and Saratov ARs.

The Turkish Character of the Chuvashes. Arminius Vambery (1832–1913),

the famous Hungarian Turkologist, alleged that the Chuvashes were originally a Turkish people modified by the influence of their Finnish neighbors.[121] Chuvashes speak a language quite unlike other Turkic dialects. Although Turks living as far apart as the Anatolians and the East Turkestanians can understand each other, an accomplished Turkish scholar can decipher a Chuvash text only by an intimate study of its accidence and phonetics.[122] The Chuvashian dialect falls into the agglutinative classification and is closest to the Turkic family of languages, although it differs from the Turkic group in phonetics and morphology.[123]

The Chuvash literary language developed around 1850 using a modified Cyrillic alphabet. The alphabet remained in use until 1938 when new Cyrillic characters were introduced. It is interesting to note that old Chuvash tombstone inscriptions, dating back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, are written in Arabic characters.[124]

The Bashkirs

The Bashkirs form the third largest Turkish unit in the Middle Volga-Ural area.[125] After the dissolution of the Golden Horde, Bashkirian territory was parceled out among the Siberian, Kazan, and Nogai khanates. Russian penetration began at the time of their conquest of Kazan in 1552. The town of Ufa was founded in 1558, and vast Bashkir lands were taken as rewards by the participants in the military occupation of Bashkiria. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, the towns of Menzelinsk, Kungur, and Biisk were inaugurated as outposts of Russian expansion, and were unsuccessfully attacked by the Bashkirs. There were uprisings of the Bashkirs in 1645, 1661, 1682–83, and 1704–8, but all these revolts were crushed mercilessly.

The establishment of the Ural Iron Works at the end of the seventeenth century increased Russian pressure on the Bashkirs. The expropriation of forests and lands was practiced on a large scale, and in 1724, the Bashkirian forests were declared state property. One of the iron works (Avsiano-Petrovskiy Zavod) appropriated large areas of forests for the sum of twenty rubles. The founding of Orenburg in 1732 was accompanied by a general insurrection which lasted until 1741. During the liquidation of this revolt, some thirty thousand Bashkirs were turned over to slaveholders. Local tribes (Mishars and Teptiars) were engaged by the Russians to suppress the conflict and were granted Bashkir lands; however, part of the confiscated properties were later returned to the original owners.

The Russian Orthodox Church took an active part in the forced Christianization of the natives, and baptisms were performed en masse. A new rebellion occurred in 1755, led by Mullah Batirsah Ali (Aleyev). The Bashkirs also participated in Pugachev's revolt under the leadership of Salavat Yulai (Yulayev), looting and destroying many Russian factories and enterprises. Later, when the Baskirs were exhausted, pacification of the country was begun, and in 1832, the St. Petersburg rulers distributed lands among the Bashkirs and other native tribes.

The emancipation of peasants in 1861 brought another wave of quasilegal

seizures of lands, and many colonists arrived from central Russia. In 1869, property again was redistributed and was sold to Russian state officials for fabulously low prices. The old patriarchal life was disrupted under the influence of colonization, forced distribution of lands, expropriation, industrialization, and the erection of towns, and a new social regime was instituted. Large groups of Bashkirs were turned into a labor force by the process of denomadization. Compulsory military service was introduced, and the remnants of local autonomy were gradually eliminated. In the nineteenth century, several ukases were issued legalizing the status of the Moslem clergy, the population gained general political rights, and anti-Russian troubles subsided.

The Russian revolt of 1905 did not produce any significant reaction among the Bashkirs, but a Tatar-Bashkirian paper, *Ural*, was started in that year at Orenburg and about forty editions were published.

After the 1917 revolution, the Bashkirs were united in their conflict against the Russian colonizers and supported revolutionary groups that approved their claims to the confiscated lands of their forefathers. This was one source of the radical postrevolutionary trends that ended with the creation of the Bashkirian Autonomous Republic in 1919.[126]

Distribution and Numbers. The Bashkirs live within the Bashkir ASSR. In 1933 its national composition was:[127]

Bashkirs	23.5 percent
Russians	39.9 percent
Tatars	17.3 percent
Others	19.3 percent

The Russians form the largest national population unit, but the Turkish national groups (Bashkirs, Tatars, and others) form more than forty percent of the population of the republic. In 1939 there were 842,925 Bashkirs (see the previous table on the Non-Slavic peoples of Middle Volga-Ural area, in the subchapter on the Turks of the Volga-Ural area).

In 1989, the population of the Bashkir ASSR was 3,043,113. The total number of Bashkirs in the former USSR was 1,449,462. In addition to Bashkirs, the Bashkir ASSR has many Russians, Tatars, Chuvash, Ukrainians, and other nationalities.

The Bashkir are Sunni Moslems. The relative slow rate of growth of the Bashkirs (one of the slowest rates of all Moslem peoples except the Volga Tatars) is caused not by low fertility, but by assimilation of the Bashkir diaspora by either other Moslem Turks or Russians (especially in the case of city dwellers). The Soviet authorities tried to foster the Bashkir's national identity and divide them from the Tatars in order to weaken the potential Tatar national movement. This policy was not successful and the Bashkirs strongly resisted Russian efforts at suppression.

The Turkish Character of the Bashkirs. The Bashkirs are commonly regarded as Turkified Ugrians, but linguistic and historic evidence appears decidedly to favor the view of Arminius Vambery that their fundamental nationality is Turkish. Intermarriage with the neighboring Finno-Ugrian Ostiaks and Voguls has given the Bashkirs certain Finno-Ugrian physical characteristics, but without changing their national Turkish idiom. The people use the name *Bashkirs*, and in Turkish, they are called *Baskurds*.[128] The Bashkirs inhabiting the steppes of Bashkiria are a more pronounced Turkish type than those who live in the mountainous Ural area, and the steppe Bashkirs are physically similar to the Turko-Tatars of Kazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimea.[129]

The Bashkirs form one of the links in the Turkic linguistic chain extending from the upper Irtysh to the Middle Volga; however, their dialect differs due to a slight influence exercised by the Ugrian language in phonetics and vocabulary.[130] Soviet Turkologists classified the Bashkir language in the northwestern group of Turkic dialects, to which belong some Altayan, Kazakhian, Kirghizian, and Siberian Turkic tongues, plus the majority of the Crimean and Middle Volga Tatar dialects. The Kazan Tatars are also linguistically very close to the Bashkirs.[131]

The first attempts to create a separate Bashkir literary language occurred in the early twentieth century. The language came into general use upon the creation of the Bashkir national republic in 1917 and persisted after the collapse of that state. The original Arabic script was replaced by a modified Arabic alphabet, which was in use until the adoption of the Unified Turkic Latin alphabet in 1930 and a Cyrillic alphabet later, in 1939.[132]

THE CRIMEAN TURKS

Liquidation of the Crimean ASSR

The Crimean ASSR was dissolved by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the former USSR on June 25, 1946, because of the alleged disloyalty of the Turkish population of the peninsula during World War II and for collaboration with the occupying German forces. As with other ethnic groups accused of similar acts (the Karachais in the North Caucasus, the Balkars, the Chechens, the Ingushes, the Kalmuks, and the Volga Germans), the Turks of Crimea were deported to the eastern and northern provinces of the former USSR. It is probable that a significant percentage of these deportees died of exposure and hunger in their new environment.[133] The Crimean ASSR was converted into an ordinary administrative unit within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. In a ukase of February 19, 1954, issued by the Supreme Soviet of the then USSR, the Crimean Oblast was separated from the RSFSR and included within the borders of the Ukrainian SSR.[134]

The dissolution of the Crimean ASSR and the deportation of its Turkish population is the latest chapter in a long historical process. Since the end of the

eighteenth century, the eviction of Turks from the Crimean peninsula has been steady. At the time of the conquest of the Crimea by the Russians in 1783, the Crimean Turks began to emigrate, sometimes en masse, to Ottoman Turkey and the Balkans. This emigration, combined with Russian colonization, resulted in a decrease in the number of Turks and an increase in the population of non-Turks, so that by the revolution of 1917 the Turks in Crimea were a minority.[135] In this light, the Soviet decree liquidating the Crimean ASSR loses much meaning, since the Soviet deportations were only a last blow in the long process eliminating Turkish Crimea.

Before World War II, the Turks in Crimea constituted 23 percent of the Crimean population.[136] There are said to be about two million Crimean Turks in Turkey because of the Crimean emigration in the nineteenth century. Thus, the Crimean Turks may be considered to form a landless nation. (They do not agree with such a description of their fate since, in their opinion, Turkey is also their homeland.) They were at home in the Ottoman Empire and are at home in the Turkish Republic of Ataturk and his successors. Many of them feel it is their duty to regain their smaller homeland with the help of their fellow Turks. They believe that a Russian or Ukrainian Sevastopol ultimately means a Straits of Sevastopol in enemy hands and that it is not in the interest of the nations of the Balkans and the Caucasus to permit the countries of the former USSR to continue their hold over Crimea and the Black Sea.[137]

Historical Sketch

The steppe region of Crimea was seized by the nomadic Turks in the thirteenth century at the time of Batu Khan's invasion of the Kiev principalities. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the fall of Kaffa (Genoese colony) in 1475 gave the Crimeans mastery of the whole peninsula. Turkish Crimea formed an administrative province of the Golden Horde. In the fifteenth century, Crimean vassals of the Golden Horde achieved the status of independent rulers. In 1478, the Crimean Khanate became a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. This status proved very useful when the Russians attempted to occupy Crimea, since Ottoman Turkey, aided by French policy, prevented Russia from conquering the peninsula. Nevertheless after the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji (1774), Russia managed to "free" Crimea from the Ottoman Turkish protectorate, and in 1783, Crimea was officially attached to the Russian Empire.

Russian policy in the Crimea was a repetition of her attitude toward other conquered Moslem countries. The expropriation of land and its distribution among officials and Russian gentry caused a mass departure of Tatars: By the year 1790, about three hundred thousand had emigrated.

In the 1860s the Russian government began to resettle the Tatar population away from the coast for security reasons. The government's persecution was so strong that between 1860 and 1862, there were 141,667 Tatar emigrants. At the end of the nineteenth century, the peninsula contained only 102,291 Tatars and

had 687 deserted villages, which obliged the government to improve the situation of the Moslem population. The policy of Russianization also affected the Russian-Tatar schools, where only a very small percentage of the Tatar children were admitted. For example, before 1914, among the 399 pupils of the Eupatorian Peninsula secondary schools, only 6 were of Tatar nationality.

The Tatars began a cultural reaction in which a special role was played by Ismail Gaspirali, the famous Tatar reformist, writer, and politician.[138] The activity of Gaspirali and the continuous challenge of oppressive Russian policies caused a Crimean Turkish revival in the first decade of the twentieth century. Three ideological groups fostered the political revival in this period:

a. Gaspirali's successors, grouped around the paper *Terğüman*, which was devoted mainly to pedagogic, literary, and cultural activity;
b. Revolutionary Young Tatars, who played a leading part in the political events in Crimea at the time of the Russian revolution of 1905; and
c. National youth groups, who were linked in a clandestine organization called *Vatan* (Homeland) which aimed at the liberation of the Crimea from Russian domination. These groups were the principal promoters of the national uprising in 1917.[139]

This third movement was very important and provided a close link between the Crimean Tatars and Ottoman Turkey. In 1908 Crimean students in Istanbul organized an Association of Crimean Students under the chairmanship of Noman Celebi Cihan, with Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer as secretary. This association was a legitimate Crimean students' cultural and national organization. However, in 1909, the students created a secret organization called Vatan (Homeland). This latter group was devoted to covert political work in Crimea, the organization of a net of cells, and the distribution of illegal revolutionary Turkish literature. Its activity was very successful, and in 1916 nearly every Turkish-Crimean village and town had clandestine cells directed by Vatan. The reports of the Russian political police about these secret cells mistook the movement for that of Pan-Islamism.[140] The successful work of Vatan provided the necessary organizational structure for the events of 1917 and furnishes an explanation of the successes of the Crimeans in that period.

The members of Vatan in Ottoman Turkey took part in the Committee of Russian Turko-Tatars, under the leadership of Yusuf Akçoraoğlu.[141] This committee was very active in 1915–16 in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, and Sofia, and published several publications in European languages. Aided by its Crimean members, this committee took part in the League of the Non-Russian Peoples of Russia in 1916 in Stockholm, and in the Third Congress of Nationalities in Lausanne, June 27–29, 1916.

The revolution of 1917 offered three political possibilities for the Crimean Turks: cultural autonomy within the framework of the Russian Empire, territorial

autonomy in a Russian federation, or independence. Actually, in the short space of nine months, the Crimean Turks sampled each of these alternatives. From April 7, 1917, until the middle of May 1917 they experienced a period of cultural autonomy. Then, from the middle of May until mid-November, they struggled for territorial autonomy, supported by the All-Russian Moslem Conference in Moscow in May 1917. This congress strongly influenced the political course of all the Turko-Tatar peoples of Russia. The Crimean Turks were represented by a delegation of twenty-five, including three women. The congress approved the emancipation of Moslem women and recommended the introduction of a uniform Turkish literary language in the secondary and higher Turkish schools in Russia (local Turkish dialects were to be permitted in primary education only). It also proposed the organization of a Turkish military council in Kazan and a central Moslem Council of Russia.

On November 22, 1917, the Ukraine declared its independence and separation from Russia. The political position of the Crimea was radically changed by this event and the possibility of the realization of the Crimean Turks' national aims was increased enormously. Their situation was aided by the return to Crimea on November 30, 1917, of two regiments of Crimean Turkish cavalry. On the same day, there was a general election for a Crimean Turkish *Kurultay* (National Assembly). A Crimean Constitution was voted, the Kurultay was renamed as a national parliament, and a government was elected, with Çelebi Cihan as prime minister and Cafer Seydahmet as minister of foreign affairs. On December 26, 1917, de facto independence was proclaimed.

The Crimeans sent a delegate to Constantinople in September of the same year for discussions with the Ottoman Turkish government, but without consequence. In December, the Turkish prime minister, Talaat Pasha, received a Crimean memorandum about the Crimean national movement, along with a request for help, but these overtures again had no effect. Ottoman passivity toward the Crimeans in the beginning of 1918 was explained three months later by Talaat Pasha. He said he had no accurate information about the Crimean independence movement and supposed that it was merely a small, active group of youths.[142]

The rivalry with the Ukraine was acute, and Khomenko, representing Ukrainian interests in Constantinople, issued a statement to the Turkish press on February 26, 1918, declaring that the Crimean ports on the Black Sea belonged to the Ukraine. The Turkish newspapers denounced this claim as an usurpation.

The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was signed on February 9, 1918, and the Ukrainian leaders considered the possibility of occupying Sevastopol. The Crimeans protested and informed the Central European Powers, the Turkish peoples in Russia, and the Ottoman Turkish government about these Ukrainian plans. The German government urged the Ukrainians to avoid any aggressive moves, and later, the German army occupied the Ukraine. German troops crossed the Crimean frontier as a friendly force, and the situation in Crimea remained relatively calm. In May 1918, the Ottoman Turkish government (and later the

German government) recognized the independence of Crimea, whose position toward the Ukraine was thereby strengthened. The Turkish press protested violently against Ukrainian diplomatic attempts to convince the German government that the Crimea should be united with the Ukraine for economic reasons.[143]

Early in July 1918, the Ukrainian government declared an economic blockade of Crimea, and the diplomatic war between the Ukraine and Crimea flared anew. The negotiations of the Crimean delegation in Kiev (the capital of the Ukraine) were fruitless, and a Crimean delegation was sent to Constantinople and Berlin to request Ottoman Turkish and German intervention on behalf of Crimea. The Ottoman prime minister, Talaat Pasha, advanced his arrival in Berlin, and on September 7, 1918, he stepped out of his car and warmly embraced Cafer Seydahmet as a demonstration of his country's sympathy with the Crimean cause. Talaat Pasha declared to the Germans that Ottoman Turkey was ready to sever diplomatic relations in the case of German opposition. In consequence, the German government forced the Ukrainians to cease their blockade of Crimea. The Germans recognized Crimean independence and the Crimean right to participate in the future peace conference. On October 10, 1918, the Crimean delegation returned home, completely successful.[144]

Ottoman and Crimean relations were very close because of the Turkish raison d'état and the idea of Turkism, which was dominant at that time in Ottoman Turkey.[145] The Ottoman Turks disclosed their interest in Crimea in March 1918, when the German army occupied the Ukraine and the Ottoman Turkish army penetrated deeply into the Caucasus.[146] This military move intensified Ottoman Turkish aspirations toward the Russian Tatar territories, including the Crimea. The Turkish press, in March 1918, attacked the Bolshevik occupation of Crimea and defended Crimean national interests. Turkish newspapers declared the intention of the Ottoman government to liberate their kindred in the Crimea with the help of the Germans. On April 9, 1918, the Turkish paper *Tanin* published an article stating that it was a Turkish duty, arising from their kinship, to support a policy of friendship with the Caucasian and Crimean Turks.[147]

The Turks dreamed then of a triple alliance of Ottoman Turkey, Crimea, and Caucasia. On March 23, 1918, the Turkish paper *Ikdam* stated, "The Black Sea is a Moslem and Ottoman Sea," and informed its readers that millions of men and women related to the Turks inhabited its shores. On May 7, 1918, the paper *Tasviri Efkar* demanded that Ottoman Turkey be a successor to the property rights of the Russian Black Sea fleet.

On May 2, 1918, before the German occupation of Sevastopol, the Ottoman fleet paid a call to that city and was greeted with great enthusiasm by the population. The Turkish press expressed its great satisfaction. The Constantinople daily *Tanin*, of May 5, 1918, published an article stating that the source of permanent danger (Sevastopol) was liquidated, and that now that city would "serve the idea of Turkism."[148] The kinship between Crimea and Ottoman Turkey was emphasized in the statement that "the common danger of Russia

unites both countries." The main portion of the Ottoman fleet stayed in Sevastopol until July 13, 1918, and some vessels were sent to Theodosia.

Talaat Pasha requested Germany to sign the Ottoman Turkish-German Protocol of September 23, 1918, concerning the Caucasus, Crimea, Turkestan, and the Black Sea. The paragraphs concerning Crimea declared:

> Le Gouvernement Impérial Allemand reconnait que la situation des musulmans en Crimée, comme en Russie en général, en ce qui concerne la conversation de leur caractère national, de leur religion et de leur culture, est d'une importance particulière pour le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman.
>
> Sans préjudice à la forme politique future de la péninsule le Gouvernement Impérial Allemand, en tant que cela dépend de lui, est d'accord que l'état de choses existant dans ce pays (un cabinet mixte avec un Président du Conseil Musulman) soit maintenu.[149]

Of course, the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 annulled all Ottoman-Crimean and Ottoman-German plans for the future of the Turks of Russia.

The role of Constantinople, and Turkey in general, was very important in the development of Crimean affairs. In Constantinople in 1918 the bimonthly *Kirim Mecmuasi* (Crimean review) was the only Crimean-Turkish paper abroad defending Crimea's independence. Constantinople was the center of political activity for a Crimean-Turkish colony.[150] This collaboration and assistance from Turkey was severed upon the defeat of the Central Powers, and the Crimean ASSR was formed in 1921.

The period in Crimea from 1921 to 1941 under the Soviets followed the pattern of all other Turkish areas in the former USSR. World War II gave new hope to the Crimean Turks, but at the beginning of their occupation of Crimea (in late 1941), the Germans did not support Crimean plans for independence. Under the pressure of defeats in 1943–44, the Germans began to consider the possibility of collaboration with non-Russian nationalities of the former Soviet Union. This gave the Crimean-Turkish political leaders a chance for open independence propaganda. In November 1944, the Crimean-Turkish paper *Kirim* (Crimea) was started. The first editorial was written by Edige Kirimal and declared that the new course of the Crimean movement was toward independence. The paper propagated a policy of Turkism and, in disagreement with German publications, used the terms *Turks* and *Crimean Turks* in discussing the Moslem population of Crimea. The Germans insisted on the use of the word *Tatars*, and an excerpt from a secret order shows that they required German use of the term *Tatar* in defining the Moslems of Crimea.[151] The idea of Turkism was nevertheless supported by some of the Schutz Staffel (SS) leaders. The SS headquarters organized one united all-Turkish SS division, composed of Kazan Tatars, Bashkirs, Azerbaijanis, Turkestanis, and Crimeans. A special periodical, *Turk Birligi* (Turkish union), was published for this unit and used an all-Turkish language, as had been proposed years before.[152]

The Turkish Character of the Crimean Tatars

The Crimea has an area of about 10,000 square miles, and has its capital city at Simferopol.[153] In 1939 its population was 1,126,800 persons. According to a 1931 Soviet estimate (based on the census of 1926) the population of Crimea was composed of:

Crimean Turks (Tatars)	23.1 percent
Russians	43.5 percent
Ukrainians	10.0 percent
Germans (colonists)	5.7 percent
Jews	7.4 percent
Others	10.3 percent

The Turkish nationality of the Crimean Moslems is not questioned by researchers. The literary language of the Crimean Turks in the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries was identical to the literary language of the Golden Horde, and afterward, it acceded to the pressure of the Ottoman literary language. At the end of the nineteenth century, there was a revival based on a southern dialect that belongs to the same group as Anatolian Turkish, which it strongly resembles. After the 1905 revolution in Russia, a decline occurred in Crimean dialect literature; however, a second revival occurred after 1920. In 1930, the Unified Turkic Latin Alphabet was adopted for Crimean Turks, but in 1940, this was replaced by a script based on the Cyrillic alphabet. After the dissolution of the Crimean ASSR and the deportation of its Turkish population, Crimean Turkic disappeared from the linguistic maps of the former USSR.[154]

Culturally, the Crimean Turks belong to Islamic society, and yet their devotion to Islam is weak. The general cultural level before the 1917 revolution was rather low, whereas among the Kazan Tatars, persons who could not read or write were rare. In the Crimea, whole villages were found where, except for the mullahs, no one could read the Koran. The status of the mullah himself was low because 90 percent of the Moslem religious endowments had been diverted by the Russian government. After the revolution and the establishment of the Soviets in Crimea in 1921, illiteracy greatly diminished. Compulsory primary education was introduced, and several technical and secondary schools were organized.[155]

In 1967, the Crimean Tatars were finally cleared of the accusation of treason during World War II. They were rehabilitated and their long deportation was ended. They held their identity in the hostile diaspora, when the entire Tatar population of the Crimea was uprooted. Unlike the Volga Tatars, they have not been assimilated by the Russians or the native Moslem-Turkic host nationalities in the Urals, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

The permission to return to their homeland applied to 250,000 Crimean Tatars,

but Crimean Tatar spokespersons claim that the true number involved is 500,000. So far, by mid-1990, about 100,000 had returned to their Crimean homeland. The 1989 census listed 265,739 Crimean Tatars.

THE TURKS OF WESTERN (OR RUSSIAN) TURKESTAN

Soviet authors did not use the term *Turkestan* to designate the overall territory of the five republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Instead, they preferred two distinct geographic appellations for this area: Kazakhstan and Soviet Central Asia. Soviet geographers included in Soviet Central Asia the four southern republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kirghizstan, as well as the southern portion of Kazakhstan. (The rest of Kazakhstan was defined as a separate unit.)[156]

Turkestanian writers attest that the bisection of the five republics into two geographic units was dictated by Russian political objectives, which were to divide the country and eradicate the traditional and consolidating name *Turkestan* (which is Persian for "land of the Turks").[157]

Western European authors often use the name *Turkestan* to indicate the area incorporated in the five republics.[158] Geographically, ethnically, and historically, Turkestan is not wholly enclosed within the confines of the five republics; rather, there are prolongations of Turkestanian territory in southern and eastern directions. In the Iranian province of Khorasan and the adjacent areas of Afghanistan, there are compact groups of Turkestanians, and a notable branch of them forms the larger portion of the population of Sinkiang province.[159]

Turkestan is an extensive region, a subcontinent in fact, and its climate varies from Siberian cold in the north, to subtropical heat in the south. It is a country of deserts, steppes, fertile oases and riverbeds, mountains, and lakes. Cotton is the chief staple of the south; coals and minerals are mined in the north, and petroleum is found near the Caspian Sea.[160]

The population totals seventeen million inhabitants, and in 1931, the Turks numbered ten million. Turkestan was the last bastion of the independent Eastern Turkish states which were conquered by Russia in the mid-nineteenth century (these were Bukhara, Khiva, Kokand, and the Turkmenian steppes).

The country has preserved its primordial Turkish traits. In most of the provincial areas the Turks form an overwhelming representation, while the large non-Turkish group (consisting mostly of Russians and Ukrainians) is concentrated in the northern fertile belt, in industrial centers, and in the east.[161]

The National Republics of Turkestan

SSRS, ASSRs, and ARs	Population (Census of 1939)	Main Ethnic Strain	Area in Square Miles	Capital
Kazakh SSR	6,145,900	Turkish & Slavic[162]	1,063,200	AlmaAta
Uzbek SSR	6,282,200	Turkish	157,300	Tashkent

Kara-Kalpak ASSR[163]		Turkish	Nukus
Turkmen SSR	1,254,000	Turkish	187,200 Ashkabad
Tajik SSR	1,485,100	Iranian	55,000 Stalinabad
Gorno-Badakhshan AR[164]		Iranian	Khorog
Kirghiz SSR	1,459,300	Turkish	76,000 Bishkek

Population Census of 1989

Kazakh SSR	16,538,000
Uzbek SSR	19,906,000
Kara-Kalpak ASSR	
Turkmen SSR	3,534,000
Tajik SSR	5,112,000
Gorno-Badakhshan AR	
Kirghiz SSR	4,291,000

The Turkish Nationalities of Western Turkestan (Census of 1939)[165]

Uzbeks	4,844,021
Kazakhs	3,098,764
(Tajiks: Iranians ethnically)	1,228,964
Kirghiz	844,306
Turkmen	811,769
Kara-Kalpaks	185,775

The Turkish Nationalities of Western Turkestan (Census of 1989)

Uzbeks	16,686,240
Kazakhs	8,137,878
Tajiks	4,216,693
Kirghiz	2,530,998
Turkmen	2,718,299
Kara-Kalpaks	423,436

Descriptions of the various Turkish peoples of Western Turkestan are presented below.

The Kazakhs

The Kazakhs are a numerous Turkish people living principally within the Kazakh SSR. A substantial percentage of them dwell in the Uzbek SSR (particularly in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR).

Upon dissolution of the Golden Horde at the end of the fourteenth century, two states were created on the location of present-day Kazakhstan: the Uzbek Khanate and the Nogai Khanate. The incessant skirmishes between these two khanates forced several nomadic tribes to look for more tranquil locations. Thus, in the middle of the fifteenth century, two tribal leaders, Djanibek and Girai, emigrated with their followers to Mogolistan, an area south of Lake Balkhash. They founded a new state in the vicinity of the River Chu and in the region of Kizil Bashi. A history of the Kazak Soviet Socialist Republic maintains that this state was a nucleus of the Kazakh Khanate.[166]

Until the end of the sixteenth century, the Kazakh Khanate remained in reality a loosely connected federation of tribes with several petty sultans governing more or less geographically separated stretches of Kazakhstan. In the seventeenth century, the country was divided into three hordes:

1. The Great Horde (*Uluyuz*), which occupied regions south of the northern end of the Caspian Sea and the northern end of the Aral Sea;
2. The Small Horde (*Kiciyuz*), between the northern end of the Caspian Sea and the northern end of the Aral Sea; and
3. The Middle Horde (*Orta Yuz*), between the two other Hordes.

In spite of their separate and centrifugal inclinations, a reciprocal harmony emerged among these three hordes. In mid-eighteenth century a weak political union existed between the Middle and Small hordes, but the Great Horde as a separate state felt strong ties of belonging to the same Kazakh nation.[167] These feelings of unity were cemented by an earlier common danger from the east. In 1643, the Kazakh Hordes were attacked by Oirots (Kalmuks), the inhabitants of a powerful state called Dzhungaria. From 1681 to 1684, the Kalmuks devastated the south of Kazakhstan. These external dangers constituted a merging force, and by the end of the seventeenth century, the majority of the Kazakh tribes were consolidated around Khan Tauke (1680–1718).

The Kazakhs had tried to repulse the Russian expansion in the northwest, but during the wars with the Kalmuks, they looked for help from the Russians. Peter the Great (1696–1725) tried to assimilate the Kazakh Khans by diplomatic and military encroachments.[168] In 1723, the final onslaught of the Kalmuks occurred, and during this disaster, the Kazakh Khans of the Middle and Small hordes yielded and accepted Russian protection (in 1731). This act was not generally approved, and opponents took part in a revolt against their own khans; later, some Kazakh tribes participated in the effective Pugachev rebellion.[169] The

Kazakh struggle against Russian expansion was unorganized, and each *Yuz* (horde) fought separately.

The expansion of Russian trade and the dislocation of local industries, as well as the pauperism of the Kazakh masses (resulting from the Kalmuk attacks), brought about a strong class differentiation. This internal tension was magnified in the next century by the growing Russian colonial exploitation. The natives were dispossessed of their best pastures and their most fertile areas: The local Russian authorities, acting on behalf of St. Petersburg, periodically removed the Kazakhs to less arable areas, and the Slavs were then settled on the best land. The overpopulation of the central regions of the empire and many parts of the Ukraine intensified the pressure for this policy of colonization, which continued into the twentieth century.[170]

After 1917, three elements struggled for supremacy in Kasakhstan: the Russian Whites, Russian Reds, and Kazakh nationalists. In 1919, after the country had been successively dominated by each group, the Reds overwhelmed the others and imposed their regime. On April 4, 1919, the Soviet Commissariat for Nationalities began the preparation of an All-Khirghizian Congress for the proclamation of the Kirghizian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[171] The First Kazakh Soviet Conference in January 1920 decided to unite all Kazakh administrative units into one Soviet republic. In February 1920 the Kazakh Conference elected a new revolutionary committee, and in this same month the Kirgiz (Kazakh) ASSR started its Soviet history.[172]

As a result of the troubles and dissatisfaction of the Kazakhs under the new Soviet government, Moscow arranged in 1921 that all lands along the Irtysh River and a six-mile tract along the Cossack Presnogorkovskaya frontier in Almolinsk governorship were restituted to the Kazakh owners. The lands confiscated by the Czarist government for the new Russian settlers and still unoccupied by the prospective newcomers were handed back to the nomads. The lands taken by the Orthodox convents or assigned for rent to Russian gentry were returned to the Kazakhs. In the province of Semirechye and in Syr-Darya Oblast all expropriation of lands by Russian colonists from the overpopulated central and western regions to Kazakhstan was temporarily stopped.

In 1924 there occurred a national frontier realignment of Kazakh and the neighboring Central Asian territories. Some Kazakh-populated zones were included in the Kazakh ASSR (the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Oblast was established in 1925). The capital of the Kazakh ASSR was transferred from Orenburg to Perovsk, which was renamed Kzyl-Orda (Red capital), and in 1929 the capital was changed for a third time, to Alma-Ata.

In 1921, a notable reshaping of the Kazakh ASSR occurred. As a result, the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Region became an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and was removed from the Kazakh ASSR. In 1936, the Kara-Kalpak ASSR was annexed to the Uzbek SSR. In December 1936, with the promulgation of the new Soviet constitution, the Kazakh ASSR was elevated to a Soviet Socialist Republic.[173]

Numbers and National Composition. The Kazakh SSR is five times larger than the Ukrainian SSR but has about one-fifth the population of what was formerly the Soviet Ukraine. The total population of the Kazakh SSR as of March 1954 was in the vicinity of 7,200,000 persons.[174] In 1989, there were 8,137,878 persons. Basically, the inhabitants are Kazakhs, but the colonization of Kazakh territory by Russians, Ukrainians, and others has changed the composition of the population between the eighteenth century and the last Soviet census of 1939. This census lists the urban population as being 1,706,200. With industrialization and the creation of large mining centers, the town population increased during the Soviet period. The rural population was 4,439,000 in 1939, and nomadism among the natives was dwindling.[175] In 1926, the urban count was 8.6 percent, while in 1939 it was 27.8 percent of the total. The largest towns are Alma-Ata (the capital of the republic), with 1,128,000 in 1989; Karaganda, with 165,900; Semipalatinsk, with 109,800; and Chimkent, with 74,200. Statistics of 1933—the only ones available—show the Kazak SSR to be composed of:

Kazakhs	57.1 percent
Russians	19.7 percent
Ukrainians	13.2 percent
Uzbeks	3.2 percent
Others	6.7 percent

The last item (''Others'') includes small Turkish minorities: the Taranchis, Kirghizes, Tatars, Kara-Kalpaks, and Europeans, such as White Russians (Belorussians), Germans, and others. Turks predominate in the Kazakh SSR, since the Kazakhs, the Uzbeks, and the smaller Turkish tribes account for over 60 percent of the inhabitants.[176] The non-Turkish groups are centralized in the arable areas of northern and eastern Kazakhstan and in the town and industrial centers. The central and southern parts of the country, therefore, have a greater proportion of Turks, and thus, a greater portion of the rural area has retained its homogenous Turkish character.[177]

In 1989, the population of the Kazakh SSR was 16,538,000. Its area is 1,049,200 square miles. The total number of Kazakhs in the former USSR was 8,137,878. The Kazakhs make up only 36 percent of the population of the Kazakh SSR. Only 50 percent of the population is Moslem. About 41 percent are Russians; 6 percent Ukrainians; and 2 percent, Tatars; others, including Uzbeks, account for 15 percent.

During the 1950s, pasture lands were converted to cultivation. Vast deposits of coal, oil, iron, tin, copper, lead, and zinc exist, and Kazakhstan grows 33 percent of the former USSR's wheat. The Soviet space program also is centered in Kazakhstan. The region is faced with industrial pollution and environmental problems, and has been a dumping ground for industrial waste.

The republic of Kazakhstan and Chevron Corp. of San Francisco announced a joint venture to develop the Tengiz and Korolev oil fields, which is expected to begin full-scale operations on April 1, 1993. The joint venture is one of the largest business ventures between a U.S. company and a former Soviet republic. The Kazakh government and the oil company said they have been negotiating legal documents, working on tax issues, and ensuring that needed legislation is enacted in Kazakhstan.

In addition, Chevron agreed in June 1992 to take part in a pipeline venture led by Oman to transport oil from Kazakhstan, and the company is discussing several options with consortium members, including possible equity investments. The Kazakhstan development and production agreement calls for Chevron to be a 50 percent partner in the venture. However, taxes and other factors will diminish Chevron's share of the profit to about 20 percent.

In December 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev dismissed the ruler of Kazakhstan, along with other leaders of some of the republics belonging to the old regime. The mistake was that the replacement was a Russian instead of a Kazakh. This resulted in two days of demonstrations. Since the declaration of sovereignty by the Russian republic, Kazakhstan also declared the primacy of its laws and its sovereignty.

The Turkish Character of the Kazakhs. The admixture of Mongolian blood in the Kazakhs and their nomadic sociopolitical characteristics differentiate them sharply from other Turks. Though ethnically they are a rather Mongolian type, they retain unimpaired a primitive Turkish speech. Their language is a linguistic unit with hardly any dialect variation between the Kazakhs of the Caspian and those on the Upper Irtysh. The prevalence of a nearly pure Turkish speech throughout the Kazakh steppe indicates that the Turkish element must have been ascendant.[178]

Its uniformity is reported also in the Soviet *Literaturnaya Entsiklopedia*, which states that in spite of a great territorial spread, the Kazakh language is the same throughout the area.[179] It contains many Mongolian, Persian, and Arabic words, as well as some that may have been borrowed from the Palaeo-Siberians, who were partly absorbed by the Kazakhs.

A literary language among the Kazakhs was in evidence in the 1800s and showed a rapid evolution toward the end of that century.[180] The Arabic script was revised by Baytursum to facilitate writing. Following their consolidation of power in western Turkestan by 1924, the Soviets devised a Roman orthography to replace the Arabic script used for the native languages. This threatened to cut off subsequent generations from their Turkic and Islamic traditions, since the vast store of religious and national literature was written in the Arabic alphabet.

In 1928, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the great Turkish reformer, also instituted the Roman alphabet as the standard for Turkey. This move apparently severely affected the Soviet colonial administration, and the Roman alphabet in use in Kazakhstan was abolished. Thousands of school books were withdrawn, and the instruction of the children was switched to the Cyrillic system. The confusion

and delay was probably well worth it, since it was felt necessary at all costs to hinder cultural contact between the Soviet Moslems and Turkic peoples and their kindred outside the former USSR. Consequently, the number of Kazakhs who can read foreign and Arabic or Turkish newspapers must be very small.[181]

It is difficult to estimate the degree of success that Soviet linguistic policy achieved or even the extent of opposition to it. As a means of writing Turkic or even Iranian languages, the Cyrillic script is far more suitable than the Arabic and equally suitable as the Latin. Left to their own devices, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia might either have retained the Arabic script or, following the example of Turkey, adopted a Latin system.[182]

The Uzbeks

The Uzbeks are the most numerous Turks in Turkestan and dwell in Uzbekistan, with many small settlements in neighboring republics.

The Past. The word *Uzbek* is not an ethnological term but a political one, and is derived from the name of Uzbek Khan (1312–40), of the house of Juchi; he was Chengiz's eldest son.[183] Early in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, *Uzbek* began to mean the Moslem Turks, as Uzbek Khan was a great propagator of Islam. At the start of the sixteenth century this name was assumed by the adherents of the Shibani Khan, the last conqueror of Transoxiana. Finally, it was used to designate the ruling tribes in the Central Asian khanates, in opposition to the names *Kirghiz* and *Sarts*. In 1500 the Uzbeks deposed Babur, the last of Timur's successors, who then went to India, where he founded the Moghol dynasty. In the early seventeenth century, the territory of the Uzbeks was confined to the lands north of the Amu Darya and the Kopet Dagh under the khanate of Bukhara. The political history of the Uzbeks is that of the Bukhara Khanate, which occupied the area of present-day Uzbekistan, plus a portion of Tajikistan.[184]

The founder of the Bukhara state was Khan Muhammad Shiibani, and the khanate existed from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. During the rule of Abdullah Khan (1583–98) the new lands of Khorezm (Khiva), Badakhshan, Tashkent, and a part of Khorasan were annexed. Bukhara was a rich and important state whose foreign trade extended to Russia, Siberia, and India. The state constructed many public buildings such as post offices, palaces, schools, caravansaries, and baths, as well as bridges. The beautiful town of Bukhara became the capital and gave its name to the state itself, and even during its decay in the 1870s, it was a highly civilized Oriental city. The American traveler and geographer Eugene Schuyler wrote:

I am not surprised at the high idea Asiatics entertain of Bukhara, it is officially called *al sherif*, the noble, although probably from religious reasons, for in spite of all its discomforts, it made upon me a very strong and pleasant impression. You cannot walk the street without seeing at once that it is really a capital: the persons at leisure well dressed and

riding well groomed and richly caparisoned horses, the crowd of idlers who beset the market place, even the very narrowness of the streets and the heights of the houses, numerous bazaars, and the great amount of trade which is constantly going on there every day seeming like a bazaar day, show you that this is a metropolis.[185]

In the middle of the eighteenth century, during an economic crisis, the central power of the khan was reduced and several local vassals regained autonomy, causing the dissolution of Bukhara into several principalities. This weakening of the state permitted Persia to occupy the country in 1740. In 1753, Mohamed Rahim Khan liberated it and ruled with the new title of emir. Bukhara never regained its former power, however, and its old dominions of Khorezm, Tashkent, and Fergana were not recovered.

Soviet sources claim that following the 1917 revolution:

The noble Bukhara became the center of the anti-Soviet "Basmachi" movement and the Emir of Bukhara was supported by British from Persia. In September, 1920, the Emir's rule was liquidated with the help of the brotherly Russian people and with the assistance of troops under Red Commander Frunze. On September 14, 1920, the Bukharian Peoples Soviet Republic was proclaimed. In 1924, this Republic was transformed into a Socialist Republic and was formally included within the borders of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Uzbek SSR.[186] Today it is the independent republic of Uzbekistan.

Distribution and Numbers. The frontiers of Uzbekistan and those of its neighboring republics of Turkmenstan, Tajikistan, and Kirghizstan are sinuously designed for ethnic collectiveness, yet in the early 1950s, approximately 1.5 million Uzbeks out of a total 4.8 million lived in the adjacent republics.[187] In the Turkmen Republic, 10.5 percent of the population is of Uzbek extraction; in Tajikistan, 17.9 per cent; and in Kirghizistan, 11 percent. More recent 1989 percentages of Uzbeks in other neighboring Turkic republics were: in Turkmenistan, 9 percent; in Tajikistan, 23 percent; and in Kirghizistan, 12 percent.

In 1989, of a population of 19,906,000 in the Uzbek SSR, Uzbeks formed 69 percent of the population; Russians, 11 percent; Tatars, 4 percent; Kazakhs, 4 percent; Tajiks, 4 percent; and others, 8 percent. Uzbekistan is 73 percent Moslem (mostly Sunni). In addition to Uzbeks in the Uzbek SSR, many Uzbeks live in neighboring Moslem-Turkic republics, and also in Sinkiang.

The area of Uzbekistan is 172,700 square miles. The capital, Tashkent, has a population of 2,073,000, and is the largest city in Soviet Central Asia. Tashkent has the region's only subway.

Uzbekistan was economically Soviet Central Asia's most important republic. It produced 67 percent of the USSR's cotton, and has industrial, mineral, and agricultural resources. Uzbekistan is the world's largest cotton producer.

Uzbekistan has declared its sovereignty and the primacy of its laws. There has been a revival of Islam and many mosques have been built in recent years.

There are, furthermore, from four to eight million Uzbeks in Sinkiang, and Afghanistan has a large Uzbek minority estimated at over one million persons.[188]

Turkish Character of the Uzbeks. The Uzbeks are of Turkish origin and are composed mainly of various Turkish clans. Some authorities divide the Uzbeks into two subnations: the Uzbeks and the Sarts. The Sarts are Uzbeks with a greater admixture of Iranian elements, chiefly bilingual townspeople, who speak the Uzbek and Tajik languages. Since the Sarts do not have a nomadic appearance, they differ from their less sophisticated Uzbek kinspeople, and, until recent times, were treated as a separate nation.[189]

Chagatai, the literary language of the Uzbeks, has an interesting history. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, two prominent Turkish literary languages developed in diverse parts of the Moslem Turkish world; these were Ottoman Turkish and Chagatai. The Ottoman literary language thrived in various forms until early in the twentieth century, when it was replaced by modern Turkish. The Chagatai literary language, which was used in the lands of Chengiz Khan's second son, Chagatai, persisted from the fifteenth century to the early twentieth century, giving way to the Uzbek literary language after the conquest of the emirate of Bukhara by the Soviets in 1920.[190] The distinction between Chagatai and present-day Uzbek results from grafting the dialect of the northern Turkish invaders on to the older Chagatai. Chagatai is the written language of the old ruling class, while Uzbek is the language of the people. The traditional Arabic script of the Uzbek language was replaced by a modified Arabic script in 1923. A Latin alphabet was made official in Uzbekistan in 1930, and a new literary language was introduced, with the vocabulary and grammar based phonetically on the dialect of the town of Tashkent. A text written in this literary language was reasonably intelligible to those who knew the surrounding Turkic dialects. It was superseded in 1937 by a new literary language, which, like the former, used the urban dialect of Tashkent as the phonetic basis but sought a closer approach to the grammatical and vocabulary peculiarities of the Uzbek dialects of the Ferghana Valley. In consequence, a text written in this last version of the Uzbek script became rather difficult for the users of the surrounding Turkic languages to understand. In 1940 and 1941, the Latin script was replaced by the script that was still in use, based on the Cyrillic alphabet with additional symbols. Now the Latin alphabet has been adopted in the Turkic republics.

The Kara-Kalpaks

The frontiers of Uzbekistan includes what was the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Kara-Kalpaks. A small, peaceful tribe, the Blackcaps, are mentioned in the early annals of the eleventh century as being neighbors of the Russians and as having changed their habitat several times.

The Kara-Kalpaks are a Turkish tribe (of 185,775 persons in 1939), who speak an eastern Turkic dialect and are neighbors of the Kazakhs and Turkmen as well as the Uzbeks. The national composition of their republic is heterogeneous; Uzbeks form about one-third of the group, with a Kazakh minority.

In 1989, the population of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR was 1,212,207. The total number of Kara-Kalpaks in the former USSR was 423,436. About a third of the population of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR were Uzbeks, followed by Kazakhs, and Turkmens.

Until 1928, the Kara-Kalpaks had no literary language of their own. After the Unified Turkic Latin alphabet was adopted, language development was fairly rapid, but in 1939, the Latin alphabet was replaced by one based on Cyrillic.[191]

The Turkmens

The Turkmens (also called Turcomans or Turkomans) live within Turkmenistan, which is almost as big as France. Important minority groups of Turkmen live in Afghanistan and Iran, and some half-nomadic Turkmen tribes live in central Anatolia.

History. In modern times, the Turkmens have lived in a state of near-anarchy, although in previous eras, they provided the Turkish world with the founders of two Turkish empires: the Seljuks and the Ottomans. In the sixteenth century, the Turkmens were partially subjugated by the Uzbeks of Khorezm (Khiva), the Uzbeks of Bukhara, and the Persians. In the wars waged by these states, the Turkmens fought as allies of first one state and then another.[192]

The Turkmens resisted strongly against Russian conquest, and the Russian-Turkmenian war in the second half of the nineteenth century was important in the history of Central Asia. The greater part of Turkmenistan's territory was conquered during the period of 1879 to 1880, while the southeast, with the town of Merv, was occupied as late as 1884, almost twenty years after the capture of Tashkent.[193]

In June 1918, General Wilfrid Malleson was appointed head of a British mission with the object of checking

> Turkish and German designs to penetrate, via Baku and Krasnovodsk, with the active assistance or tactic consent of the Bolsheviks then in control of Turkistan, to the Afghan frontier, where their object was to bring pressure to bear on Afghans and tribesmen alike to embark on a religious war against the British in India.[194]

Malleson reported that the Turkmen of all classes were pathetically insistent that the British should remain, but by April 1919, the last Indian troops marched from Ashkhabad toward the Persian frontier. At the same time, the last British troops entrained from Ashkhabad for Krasnovodsk, the final British strongpoint, which was relinquished that same year.

The Soviets reoccupied Turkmenistan and, after a long period of interregnum, the Turkestan Autonomous SSR was proclaimed in April 1921. In 1924, after the so-called *Natsionalnoye Razmezhevanye* in Central Asia (the delineation of national frontiers among the Turkish peoples of Turkestan), the Turkmen Re-

public was formed, and in May 1925, it was accepted as the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic.[195] Today it is the Independent Republic of Turkmenistan.

Distribution and Numbers. Most of the population of the Turkmen Republic inhabit the fertile valleys of the Amu Darya, the Tedjeh and the Murgab Rivers, the shores of the Caspian, and the northern hills of the border mountains. Deserts and dry steppes cover 90 percent of the area of the republic.[196] Turkmenistan is bordered by Iran and Afghanistan, both of which have Turkmen minorities, including about 380,000 individuals in Afghanistan. The national composition of the Turkmen SSR in 1933 was:

Turkmen	72.0 percent
Uzbeks	10.5 percent
Russians	7.5 percent
Others	10.0 percent

The Turkish sector of the population thus represents more than 82.5 percent of the inhabitants.

In 1989, the population of Turkmen SSR was 3,534,000, of which 68 percent were Turkmen; 13 percent, Russians; 9 percent, Uzbeks; and 3 percent, Kazakhs. The total number of Turkmen in the former USSR was 2,718,297. The area of Turkmen SSR is 188,417 square miles, 90 percent of which is desert. The capital is Ashkhabad, population 398,000. The Kara Kum desert occupies 80 percent of the area. The arable land was tripled by the construction of the Kara Kum canal which was started in the 1950s. The canal will be 900 miles long. Turkmenistan produces cotton, carpets, and chemicals, and its minerals are oil and coal. The population is 70 percent Moslem (mostly Sunnis). There are 300,000 Turkmen in Afghanistan, about the same number in Iran, and smaller numbers in Turkey and Iraq.

The Turkish Character of the Turkmens. In physical type, the Turkmens belong fully to the west central group of Turks. They form a link with the western Turks since they do not differ essentially from the Persian Azerbaijanis and the Anatolian Turks. Moreover, their language belongs to the same group as Anatolian and Azerbaijan. Among the three most kindred Turkic languages—Anatolian, Azerbaijan and Turkmen, the first two are more closely connected, and the Azerbaijanis can understand Anatolian Turkish with more ease than they can Turkmen.[197]

In the fourteenth century, the Turkmens used their own literary Turkmen language, especially for poetry. In the fifteenth century, this language came under the influence of Chagatai, but in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a purely Turkmen literary language again developed. This persisted until after the revolution of 1907, when a new literary language based on living Turkmen dialects (especially on the Tekke and Yomud dialects) was gradually accepted.[198] The Unified Turkic Latin alphabet was adopted in 1929–30, and the Cyrillic alphabet, in 1939–40.[199]

The Kirghizes

The Kirghizes live within the mountainous Republic of Kirghizistan, and in small groups in Sinkiang, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan.

History. In the thirteenth century, the Kirghizes formed a component part of the Chengiz Empire and a hundred years later they were included in the Oirot (Kalmuk) Confederation.[200] A section of Kirghizstan and part of the Kazakh steppes were overrun in 1723 by the Dzhungars, whose capital was at the source of the Ili River. The khanate of Kokand overwhelmed the Kirghizes in the nineteenth century and the Kokandians (Uzbeks) began the colonization of Kirghizian lands. By 1860, northern Kirghizstan was in the hands of the Russians, and following a battle near Uzun Agac, the Kirghizian-fortified settlements of Pishpek and Tokmak were captured as well as the region of the Issyk-kul Lake.[201]

As in Kazakhstan, Russian mass colonization determined the development of northeast Kirghizstan in the twentieth century. It started in 1866 but became significant only after 1907. Up to that year, only 20 Russian settlements were founded, but between 1907 and 1914, they tripled.[202]

Dissatisfaction among the Kirghizes was pronounced and prompted many rebellions. Although Kirghizes accounted for about two-thirds of the population of Kirghizstan in 1926, by the eve of World War II, their representation had dropped to approximately 50 percent. Leading posts in industry, finance, and trade passed into the hands of Russians. The settlement of nomads proved to be abortive and resulted in a 70 percent decrease in cattle, sheep, and goats. The local population was impelled either to move into mountainous, inhospitable regions to work as farmhands on Russian properties, or to emigrate to China (eastern Turkestan). The Communist party tried to place full responsibility for this economic catastrophe on the Kirghiz nationalists.

In 1917, many local nationalist Kirghiz committees and other organizations, such as the *Shura Islamiye* (Islamic Council) and the *Olash Orda* in Pishpek, were organized in Kirghizia.[203] The leftist group *Pukhara* (Proletarian) was founded that year, as well as the Bolshevik Initiative Center in Pishpek, headed by Ivanitsin, an old Bolshevik. The Red Guard, recently recruited, forced the election of a Bolshevik, Shvets Bazarniy, as chairman of the local elected legislative council. A Bolshevik coup at Verniy (Alma-Ata) on March 3, 1918, established the Soviets in Kirghizia. The opposition organized several revolts, all of which were crushed in a manner that almost completely eliminated anti-Soviet factions.

The Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast came into existence in 1924, and in 1926 was granted the status of an autonomous Soviet socialist republic. In 1936 the republic was elevated to the highest level of autonomy, that of a union republic. It is now the independent republic of Kyrgyzstan.

National Composition and Distribution. Statistics of 1933 show the Kirghiz SSR to be heterogeneous:

Kirghizes	66.6 percent
Russians	11.7 percent
Ukrainians	6.5 percent
Uzbeks	11.1 percent
Tatars, Dungans, Kashgarians, and others	4.1 percent[204]

The Kirghizes, with 66.6 percent; Uzbeks, with 11.1 percent, and the Tatars and other minorities totaled more than 78 percent, making the Turks by far the predominant element. The Russian and Ukrainian minorities live chiefly along the northern boundary and in the towns.[205]

The 1989 population of the Kirghiz SSR was 4,291,000, of which over 48 percent were Kirghiz; 26 percent, Russians; 12 percent, Uzbeks; 3 percent, Ukrainians; and 2 percent, Tatars. The total number of Kirghiz in the former USSR in 1989 was 2,530,998. There are also some 10,000 Kirghiz in Afghanistan, of which 4,000 were relocated to Turkey in 1982, as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The area of Kyrgyzstan is 76,642 square miles. A Turkic-speaking people, the Kirghiz are 55 percent Moslems, mostly Sunni. The capital is Bishkek, with a population of 616,000. Industries include machinery, instrument making, chemicals, and breeding cattle and horses. Kirghiz is third in wool production in the former USSR. Products of Kyrgyzstan include tobacco, cotton, coal, and mercury.

The Turkish Character of the Kirghizes. The Kirghizes have remained almost entirely unmixed, and are, on the whole, the truest ethnic representatives of the Turks.[206] Their language belongs to the northwestern group of the Turkic languages and has some Mongolian words, while the number of Arabic and Persian words is smaller than in other Turkic languages.[207]

The Kirghiz literary language took form in prerevolutionary times. After the alphabet was modified in 1924 and the Unified Turkic Latin alphabet was adopted in 1928, the literary language showed remarkable development. The Latin alphabet was replaced by a Cyrillic alphabet in 1940.[208]

THE SIBERIAN TURKS

The Yakuts

In the far north lies the Yakut ASSR, the largest single administrative unit (in area) of the former USSR. It extends 1,182,300 square miles and incorporates 400,500 persons, of whom Yakuts are 81.6 percent, Russians are 10.4 percent, and Evenki, Lourovetlans, and other groups make up the remaining 8.0 percent.[209]

The Yakut ASSR had a population of 328,018 in 1979, which grew to 1,094,065 in 1989. This large increase was due to new settlers, including many Russians. The number of Yakuts in the former USSR rose only slightly, from 328,018 in 1979 to 382,255 in 1989.

Yakutia has vast natural resources in mines and extensive forests. In the central region, agriculture and cattle breeding are the means of livelihood, and in other parts, fishing, trapping, and reindeer raising are the main occupations.[210] The Yakuts are strong and prolific. Early Russian settlers were absorbed and their native neighbors (the Evenks) now generally speak Yakut.[211] This is a Turkic language which differs considerably from western Turkic dialects since it is more archaic (the normal result when a branch of a language is isolated). It deviates so widely from other Turkic dialects that its classification has been questioned.

The first textbook written for a people of Soviet Russia on the basis of the Latin alphabet was published in 1920; it was the *Novgorodov Alphabet*, an adaptation of the Latin alphabet to the Yakut language. Its author was a Yakut intellectual, S. Novgorodov, who had graduated from the St. Petersburg School of Oriental Languages.[212] A Unified Turkic Latin principle was introduced in 1927–28, and the Cyrillic alphabet was established in 1939–40.[213]

The Turks of the Gorno-Altaian, Khakass, and Tuvinian Areas

In the Altai Mountains, nearly at the geographical center of the Asiatic continent and bordering on Mongolia in the south, there are three neighboring areas peopled with a galaxy of primitive Turkish tribes. These areas are the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast (originally known as the Oirot Autonomous Area), the Khakass Autonomous Oblast, and the Tuvinian Peoples' Republic.

The Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast (AO), was also referred to as the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Region (AR). The Khakass Autonomous Oblast (AO) was also referred to as the Khakass Autonomous Region (AR). The Tuva (Tuvin) Peoples' Republic was founded in 1926. It became an Autonomous Region (AR), and in 1962, it was elevated to an autonomous Soviet socialist republic (ASSR). It is now the Tuvin ASSR.

The Gorno-Altai Oblast covers 35,800 square miles, mostly forested mountains, and has 161,400 inhabitants, with its capital at Gorno-Altaisk.[214] The Oirots (or Upper Altaians) form 36 percent of the population, and the Russians, 64 percent. Oirot is a collective name for several small Turkish tribes: the Altaians, Kumandins, Shore, Teleuts, and several others. All their dialects belong to the Turkic group, and the dialect nearest to these is that of the Kirghizes.[215] Soviet national policy favored the unification of the dialects and the creation of one literary Oriot language.

In 1922, the Oriot literary language, which was based on the "Altai proper" dialect, came into use by the local tribes.[216] Its first alphabet was a modified Russian one, which had formerly been circulated by Orthodox Russian missionaries for the dialect of the Teleuts (one of the local tribes). A Unified Turkic

Latin alphabet replaced it in 1930, and in 1938 a Cyrillic system of characters was adopted.

The Khakass Autonomous Oblast in south-central Siberia extends over 24,000 square miles. In the late 1930s the mixed population approximated 270,000, and Abakan is the capital.[217] The region has agriculture, dairy farming, and lumbering, and there are rich coal, gold, barite, iron, copper, and zinc mines. The name *Khakass* includes several small tribes, including the Chulin Tatars, Kyzyks, Kachins, and Sagais, and the modern Khakassian language is a synthesis of their Turkish dialects.[218] The autonomous oblast was formed in 1930; its population is half Russian and half Khakass.

The Tuvinian Peoples' Republic is not part of an oblast or a *kray* and is the only administrative division of its kind in the former USSR. Formerly known as the Uriankhai Territory, the region was previously part of the Chinese Empire. Its administrative center is Kyzyl, and it covers an area of 68,000 square miles.

The number of Russians and other people who moved into the three areas under discussion here account for the large increases in population:

1. The population of Gorno-Altai AR was 191,000 in 1989. The number of Altais in the former USSR was 71,317 in 1989.[219]
2. The population of Khakass AR was 567,000 in 1989. The number of Altais in the former USSR was 71,317 in 1989.
3. The *Tuva* (Tuvin) Peoples' Republic was founded in 1926; it became an Autonomous Region (AR) and then, in 1962, it was elevated to an ASSR. The population of Tuvin ASSR was 308,557 in 1989. The number of Tuvinians in the former USSR was 206,924 in 1989.[220]

The Tuvinian language is defined as Turkic. A Latin script for the literary language was adopted in 1930 "for the Turkic tribes of the area who speak the *Tuva* (Uriankhai) language." In 1940 an alphabet based on Cyrillic script was introduced.[221]

Other Minor Turkish Tribes (within the Former USSR)

Karaims are Jews by religion, but they reject the Talmud. They are concentrated in Crimea; after the change in status of this peninsula (see the subchapter on the Crimean Turks), they probably were dispersed throughout the former Soviet Union.[222] The number of Turkish-speaking Jews and Karaims declined from 4,571 in 1970 to 3,341 in 1979 and 2,803 in 1989.

Another minor Turkish tribe, the Shors (or Shortsy) dwell in an area to the west of the Khakass Autonomous Oblast. In 1926 there were nearly 12,000 Shors.[223] In 1989, there were 16,572 Shors in the former USSR. The separate literary language established for these people was first written in a modified Russian script. This was later replaced by the Unified Turkic Latin Alphabet, and then by a Cyrillic alphabet in 1937–38.[224]

The Kara-Papakhs are a declining tribe in Soviet Armenia of about 6,000 (1926).[225] In 1989, there were about 10,000 Kara-Papakhs in the former USSR. The Kara-Papakhs live in North Armenia near the Georgian border. The majority are Ali Illahis (Shias). They are a Turkmen tribe who speak a dialect close to Azeri Turkish, using Turkish as their literary language. In the census, they are listed under Azeris or Turks (Turki). The Kashgarians are immigrants from Sinkiang, living in the Uzbek and Kazakh Republics and speaking a Uighur dialect.[226] In 1920, there were about 40,000 Kashgarians. The Soviet census makes no reference to Kashgarians, who are included in the Uighur figure.

The Teptiars are Volga-Tatars, whose dialect is halfway between those of the Kazan Tatars and the Bashkirs. The Teptiars are a peasant community. In 1912 they numbered 300,000. They are now listed under Tatars in the census. The Mishars are Turkicized eastern Finns who were converted to Islam. They use a dialect of the Kazan Tatar Turks. In 1912, they numbered 200,000. They are also included in the census as Tatars. The Teptiars and the Mishars live in the Tatar ASSR, Bashkir ASSR, and neighboring provinces. They are dwindling subdivisions of the Volga-Ural Turko-Tatars.[227]

In the far north are two Turkic-speaking groups: the Dolgans (Yakutized Tunguzes), who lived in the Yakut ASSR, and the Tofa, a tribe in the northern part of the Irkutsk Oblast with only approximately 415 persons.[228]

THE TURKS OF CENTRAL ASIA (OUTSIDE THE FORMER USSR)

Sinkiang Turks (Eastern or Chinese Turkestan)

Sinkiang, which is also known as Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, is bordered by the Mongolian Peoples' Republic on the east, by the former USSR on the north and west, and by India and Tibet on the south. The Tien Shan is the best known of three main mountain ranges, which cover almost half of the province.[229] Eastern Turkestan is 660,976 square miles in area and had 4,360,020 inhabitants in 1943.[230] A former vice-governor, Mehmet Emin Bugra, believed this figure to be somewhat over 8 million as of the 1940s, but some Eastern Turkestanian sources consider the population to be much larger, perhaps as much as 10 or 15 million.[231] The bulk of the population is of Turkish origin.

In 1989, the total number of Moslems in China was 14.6 million, of which Turks numbered over 7 million. The Turks were broken down as follows:

Uighur	5,900,000
Kazakh	907,000
Kirghiz	114,000
Uzbek	12,400
Tatar	4,100

Sala (Turkic Moslems living in Kansu)	69,100
Total	7,006,600

History. Eastern Turkestan fell under the domination of China on three occasions: originally, in the first century B.C., then again in the first century A.D., and afterwards, in the fifth and six centuries A.D. In modern times, the Chinese reconquered Eastern Turkestan (in 1959).[232] Traditional unrest broke into revolt early in the nineteenth century, when Eastern Turkestanian Moslems and Moslems of the adjacent provinces fought their Chinese rulers. The Eastern Turkestanians requested, but did not receive, help in 1819 from the Bukhara emirate and Afghanistan. The Chinese crushed the revolt, and about 70,000 Eastern Turkestanians emigrated to Western Turkestan to avoid persecution. Over the years, new outbreaks occurred with the same unhappy results and with further emigrations toward the West.

One anti-Chinese revolt was successful, in 1864, when the united Dungan-Turkish forces defeated the enemy and freed themselves.[233] The five minor states that were thus created fought each other from their very inception, preventing a stabilization of their victories. The leading personality, Yakub Bek (1820–77), who eventually united the whole country, attempted to conclude peace with China and sent a legation to Constantinople requesting recognition and help. The Sublime Porte (residence of Ottoman rulers) answered with a small military mission and consignment of arms; the British and Russians also recognized the new state.[234]

The Chinese invasion of 1877 terminated sixteen independent years. Simultaneously, the Chinese government renamed the country Sinkiang, "the New Dominion." Russian penetration started after the revolt of 1864, when the Russians temporarily occupied the region of Ili and the town of Kuldja, but their forces were withdrawn following an agreement with the Chinese government. Russian economic and political influence grew without interruption, and Sinkiang was saved from Russian occupation only by the outbreak of World War I and the revolution of 1917. These events in Russia permitted Chinese Turkestan to live as a semi-independent state for several years.

Under the Soviet government, economic relations were renewed and because of the weakness of the central Chinese state, Moscow entered into direct negotiation with the Chinese governor-general at Urumchi. A consular and commercial agreement was concluded between the former USSR and Eastern Turkestan, and consulates were opened at five points in each country. The Chinese governor and his government were supported by the Soviets, and thus were strong enough to check the independence movement of the Eastern Turkestanians. Otherwise, Eastern Turkestan was completely at the mercy of Soviet Russia. In 1927, the whole foreign trade of Eastern Turkestan was in Soviet hands, nine-tenths of the total foreign trade of the country being with the former

USSR. Soviet commercial agencies emerged at every important point in the country.[235]

The growing Soviet influence produced dissatisfaction and in sections of the country there were plans for uprisings against both Chinese and Soviet greed. The Chinese governor applied for Soviet help, and the struggle began. In August 1933, the Eastern Turkestanians proclaimed their separation from China, and a part of the province (Kashgaria) was cleared of Chinese detachments. A leader of the anti-Chinese uprising, Hoja Uyaz-Haja, was proclaimed president of the republic of Eastern Turkestan.

The situation of the young republic was hopeless, since both the Chinese and the Soviets opposed the new government. Under these circumstances, on February 15, 1934, the newly elected president concluded an agreement accepting a Soviet protectorate over the country. Although this agreement was declared illegal by supporters of the independence movement, subsequently, the Soviets and Chinese together restored the previous state of domination by the Chinese. The real power, however, was in the hands of the Soviets who used the Chinese governor and his administration as tools.[236]

This provoked an uprising in 1940, but the outbreak of World War II caused a complete change of direction. The country was relieved of Soviet influence in 1942, and the next year the government of Chiang Kai-shek took over Eastern Turkestan. The liquidation of the Chinese nationalist government and the Sovietization of China decided the fate of Eastern Turkestan; it was occupied by Communist Chinese forces in August, 1949.[237]

Distribution and Numbers. The Moslems of China are separated into four groups: the Moslems of Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang) are Turks, and represent 94 percent of the population of Sinkiang; the Moslems of the Chinese provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, and Chinghai, are called Dungan (Tungan), a Turkish word meaning *convert* (they are a mixture of Turkish and Chinese and are estimated at 50 percent of its inhabitants); the Moslems of Yunnan, called Panthay; and the Moslems of the rest of China.[238] Excluding Sinkiang, the total population of the above provinces is 18,303,670, of which nearly 9 million are Moslems.[239]

The Dungans have attracted the attention of many researchers. The American geographer Eugene Schuyler, who traveled in Central Asia in the nineteenth century, wrote: "Dungans are supposed to be the remnants of the old Uighurs, who, under the name of Gao-tchan, were in very early times colonized in the provinces of Han-su [Kansu] and Shensi, to the number of 800,000 men."[240]

In 1989, there were 69,886 Dungans in the former USSR. The Dungans are mostly Sunni Moslems, with the majority living in China. In the former USSR, the Dungans live in Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and Uzbekistan. They use a Chinese dialect. Dungans have been treated well by the Soviet authorities because of the competition with China for influence. This is also true in the case of the Uighurs, who also received favorable treatment in the former USSR.

The Uighurs were mentioned in the Orkhon inscriptions as living on the

Selenga River in Mongolia, and in the ninth century, they adopted the Manichean religion. After their state was destroyed by the Kirghiz in A.D. 840 and they were expelled from their homeland, they founded two new kingdoms, one in Kansu and the other in Bishbalik and Karakhoja.[241] They came to be regarded as Turks par excellence, and are not mentioned by Arabic geographers of the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries as Uighurs, but rather as Turks.[242] The people of Sarigh Uighur (Sari Yogur) in Kansu were Turks, but Buddhists by religion; they used the old Uighur orthography until the early 1800s, when they adopted the Tibetan script.[243]

This does not imply that all Dungans are of unmixed Turkish-Uighur origin. The Dungans are far more numerous than the remnants of the Uighurs. They are Moslem and speak Chinese.[244] The Soviet writer A. Maksimov believed the Dungans were descendants of the ancient Uighurs who were Sinologized. Their customs are Chinese, yet some old Turkish elements are preserved in their wedding ceremonies and superstitions. Thus, besides the "pure" Turks in Sinkiang, there are four million Dungans with some Turkish lineage living in the Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, and Chinghai provinces.

The divergence between the population of Sinkiang, which the *China Handbook* stated is 4,380,020 in the 1930s, and the figure of 8 million Turks in Sinkiang given by Bugra may be somewhat narrowed since it is possible that this last approximation represents a portion of the Dungans. Bugra estimated the numbers of Turks in Sinkiang as approximately:

Eastern Turkestanians	7,000,000
Kazakhs	930,000
Kirghizes	65,000

The Turkish Character of the Sinkiang Population. The Tarim Basin region of Eastern Turkestan was Indo-European in speech from pre-Han times until well after the seventh century of our era (206 B.C. to A.D. 220), and then, in a relatively short time, it became Turkicised. The Climatic Cycle was not a factor in the history of Eastern Turkestan, as there is no evidence of any significant change in climate from the time of the Han up to the present.

The Uighurs assumed the dominant part in the Turkisation of the north and east, while the Qarakhanids were mainly responsible for the Turkisation of the south and west. Turkisation was practically complete by the time of the Qara-Qytay, while the region was not completely Islamised until well after Mongol times.[245] Çokayoğlu believed the Turkish inhabitants of Sinkiang are an extension of the Turks of Western Turkestan, being of the same descent, language, and religion.[246] Owen Lattimore, who spent long periods of time in northern China, found that in the Chinese province of Sinkiang, the Chinese comprise no more than 10 percent of the population, and that the Turkic speaking population of Eastern Turkestan, which forms 70 to 80 percent, are more closely related to the Uzbeks of Uzbekistan than the Slovaks are to the Czechs. He pointed out

also that there are Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and a few Tajiks who are related to people of the same origin in what was then Soviet territory.[247]

Linguistic affinities support these assertions. The Turkish universally spoken in Chinese Turkestan is Chagatai, the Uzbek dialect of Central Asia, which is essentially identical to that of the Uzbeks in Ferghana. The inhabitants of Eastern Turkestan and Transoxiana can easily understand each other, and the literary language of both regions may be said to be almost exactly the same.

Though the former never apply the term *Turk* to themselves, they call their language *Turki*.[248] Wurm gave the following somewhat different description of Turki: The Chagatai language, mixed with elements from local dialects, had been in use in Eastern Turkestan, but the local forms of speech became increasingly prevalent in writing, until eventually they supplanted Chagatai. A common Eastern Turkestan literary language did not come into use, and the literary products show slight variations according to the dialect of the writer, although the Arabic script helps to veil many of the phonetic differences that exist in the spoken language.[249]

The most easterly limit of the Turkish population of Eastern Turkestan is the town of Kumul (in Turkic, or Hami in Chinese), which forms the Chinese linguistic frontier.[250] After the occupation of Eastern Turkestan, Communist China introduced some radical changes in orthography and linguistic policy. Following the Soviet pattern, national autonomous regions were established for the nationalities of Moslem faith in China; the organization of Uighur and Kazakh autonomous regions is under way.[251] In such provinces as Sinkiang, Kansu, Chinghai and Ningsia, minority nationalities of Moslem faith in the mixed areas, together with other non-Moslem nationalities, have organized local governments. In 1946, before the Chinese Communist conquest, the Kazakhs of Sinkiang had succeeded in obtaining a wide measure of regional autonomy.[252]

Soviet propagandists take great care to emphasize the Kazakhs' dependency on the former USSR, not only politically but culturally, and point out Soviet influences on Kazakh culture and development. They uphold the great Kazakh poet, Abai Kunanbayev (1845–1905), who translated Krylov, Pushkin, and Lermontov and made them as popular among his people as the favorite native poets.

Soviet strategists regarded the Uighurs, who are the most numerous people in multinational Sinkiang, as far more important than the Kazakhs. The Uighurs are split into a galaxy of communities so isolated from each other that it has been difficult to deal with them as a real national unit, however. Any Soviet ideas of eliminating Chinese rule in Sinkiang would have undoubtedly hinged on the support of the Kazakh and Uighur inhabitants.[253]

Sinkiang's press and publications have reportedly flourished and are said to include eight dailies, three periodicals in Uighur (Uzbek), five newspapers and magazines in Kazakh, and many books in these two languages.[254]

The Turks of Afghanistan

The population of Afghanistan is a medley of tribes and nationalities, and the Afghans form only about 50 percent of the whole. The approximate national composition is estimated to be:[255]

Afghans	5,000,000
Taijiks	2,100,000
Uzbeks	1,000,000
Turkmens	380,000
Hazaras	1,000,000

Another Soviet source stated that the number of Turkmens is larger, and while the Uzbeks form more than 6 percent of the population, the Turkmens total about 4 percent.[256] Jarring used the figures 700,000–900,000 for just the Uzbek and Turkmen population.[257] These figures are all questionable since the number of Afghanistan's inhabitants has never been systematically established and estimates vary between 7 and 12 million.[258]

The Turkish portion of the population thus may be estimated to be between about 800,000 and 1,380,000. The Turkish peoples are concentrated in the northern parts of Afghanistan, and the southern boundary of their dissemination is roughly at the Hindukkush. This part of the country is generally called Afghan Turkestan or Charharvilayet.[259]

The most important Turkish groups in Afghanistan are the Uzbeks (who in the nineteenth century formed ten semi-independent khanates in Afghan Turkestan) and the Turkmens.

In smaller numbers are also found Kazakhs, Kirghizes, and Kara-Kalpaks, and other minor tribes. All these peoples are closely related to their relatives in the former USSR and, to some degree, in northeastern Persia.[260] The Uzbeks, according to Soviet sources, form a single and undivided group with their kindred in the Uzbek SSR, who are territorially their neighbors. They speak Uzbek, but many of them are bilingual and also speak Tajik. The Turkmens are concentrated in the western part of the district of Mazari-Sharif and in the district of Maimana.

In 1989, the population of Afghanistan was 15,862,293. Pashtuns make up 50 to 60 percent of the population (between 8 and 9.5 million). These are only estimates, as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and that country's subsequent withdrawal resulted in population dislocations.

Ethnic Groups

Tajiks	2,000,000–3,000,000
Uzbeks	800,000–1,000,000
Hazaris	600,000

Chahar Aimak	400,000
Turkmen	200,000–300,000
Baluchi	20,000
Kirghiz	10,000 (probably now 6,000, since 4,000 Kirghiz migrated to Turkey in 1982)

Languages

Pashtan and Dari Persian (both official)

Pashtan	50 percent
Afghan, Dari Persian	35 percent
Turkic languages (mainly Uzbek and Turkmen)	11 percent
About thirty minor languages, principally Baluchi and Pashai[261]	4 percent

Turkish Tribes in Iran

In addition to the Azerbaijanis, who are chiefly concentrated in Iranian Azerbaijan, there are other Turkish tribes scattered mainly in northern Iran; each has its own chief (formerly designated by the shah). Once compact units, they are now dispersed across the wide expanses from Paropamisus to the Kurkish Mountains and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf.

Their settlements are in the following regions: Khamseh, the region between Azerbaijan and Teheran (principally in the vicinity of Zindjan); the district of Teheran, around the capital and in the Damavand valley; Kirman, in the area near Fars; Eraq, in the neighborhood of Hamadan; Fars, where they wander between Isfahan and the seacoast; and Khorasan, where they are most numerous around Nishapur and Kuchan.[262]

Ethnically, the Turks of Iran form a connecting link between the Turkmens proper and the Anatolian Turks. Ethnologically and linguistically, they differ little from one another; they descend from Turks who, through Seljuk pressure, emigrated from regions north of the Aral Sea, and they are closely akin to the Turkmens. Several of their tribes (such as the Khoja-ali and Begdili in Karabagh, the Kara in Kirman, and the Bayat around Nishapur) are identical in name with corresponding groups among the Turkmens in the former USSR.

Other tribes of Turkmen origin, although their names are in disuse among the Turkmens proper, are the populous Avshars, near Urmia, who have become Shiites; the Kajars, former dwellers of the steppes near Astarabad, now scattered throughout Iran (from whom sprang the Kajar dynasty of Persia); and the Kashkai in Fars, who are known to have migrated to southern Persia during the rule of the Il-Khans.

Four tribes have not dispersed and generally occupy their original habitat.

They are the Kajars; the Shahsevens (adherents of the shah), composed of various Turkish tribes from Azerbaijan and the Caucasus; the Kashkai and Allahverdis of the south (in the province of Fars); and the Karakuyunlus, near Khor.[263]

L. P. Elwell-Sutton listed only three chief Turkish groups in Iran, which were the Azerbaijanis (see the subchapter on the Azerbaijanis in Iran); the Turkish Hashkais, who live in Fars province and totaled between 100,000 and 150,000; and the Turkmen in Khorasan (whose numbers are not given). A newspaper partly in the Turkmen dialect was published in 1946 in Gorgan (Asterbad), near Bandar Shar, the Caspian terminal of the Trans-Iranian railway.[264]

All the Turks of Iran are markedly influenced by Persian culture. The Iranian Turks appear refined in contrast to their congeners in the northeast and the west, yet they have many vital qualities. This vitality is due to their centuries-long dominance in Iran, where they represented the true warlike elements. Past armies of the shah consisted largely of Turks. Although Iranians and Turks share a common faith, they remain as mutually antagonistic as they were nearly three thousand years ago.

Shah Reza Pahlevi's strongly nationalistic regime actuated the process of Persianization to the extent that many minor Turkish tribes probably lost certain Turkish traits to some extent. Later, however, after the occupation of Iran in the summer of 1941 by Soviet and British troops, the nomadic tribes reverted to militant autonomy.[265]

The number of Azeri Turks and other Turkish people and tribes in Iran have been estimated to be about 8 to 10 million. Some sources believe the figure to have been 11 million in 1989. They include Azeris, Kashkai (Qashqai), Turkmen, and smaller groups and tribes.

Other Minor Turkish Groups

There are other Turkish groups outside the former USSR, China, Iran, and Afghanistan. Polish or Lithuanian Tatars (about 12,000 in 1939) lived chiefly within the prewar frontiers of Poland and Lithuania, but there were also smaller groups on the western verge of prewar Soviet Russia. Now they are probably dispersed along what was the Iron Curtain. They have forgotten their Turko-Tatar language but have retained the Moslem faith and are proud of their Tatar genesis.[266] The Gagauses, living at the estuary of the Danube in Bessarabia, speak Turkish-Gagaus and Bulgarian. They are Orthodox and numbered 76,266 persons in 1907.[267] In 1989, there were 197,164 Gagauses, mainly in what is now the republic of Moldova. Turkish minorities are in Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, Syria, Cyprus, and Egypt. In 1989, the Turks in the Balkans and the Middle East were estimated to be as follows:

Bulgaria	over 1,000,000
Rumania	200,000
Greece	200,000

Yugoslavia	200,000
Cyprus	126,000
Syria	100,000
Egypt	100,000

There were about 400,000 Turks working in Iraq. However, most of them left in August-September 1990. There are Turkoman Turkish tribes in Iraq (Turkmen); their numbers are not known, but they probably are less than 100,000.

The 1989 population of Cyprus included:

Greeks	560,000	80 percent
Turks	126,000	18 percent
Others	14,000	2 percent

The Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus was established in November 1983, and so far has been recognized only by Turkey.

3

The Emergence and Development of Turkism

BEGINNINGS OF TURKISM

Most researchers are inclined to consider Turkish nationalism as a modern phenomenon, born in the nineteenth century and inherent in the well-known political occurrences in the Ottoman Empire. Hans Kohn, historian and researcher in the field of nationalism, saw the genesis of Turkish nationalism in the first constitutional reforms in Turkey in 1826, which owed their origin partly to Mohamed Ali Pasha of Egypt (1769–1849) and his victories in Syria and Anatolia. These reforms started a chain of events that led to the Young Turks' revolution, and the participation of Ottoman Turkey in World War I. The strong nationalistic tendencies of the Committee of Union and Progress reached their climax during World War I in the form of Enver Pasha's Pan-Turkist attempts.[1]

Lewis V. Thomas asserted that when the Western ideal of nationalism was first explained to Ottoman society, the word for *nationalism* did not exist in the Turkish language. The phrase "Young Turks" was coined in Paris by a few young Westernized Ottomans. When it was translated into the language of the Ottoman Empire, it did not read *Genç Türkler* ("Young Turks"), but *Genç Osmanlilar* ("Young Ottomans"). The Young Turks' movement does not deserve on all counts to be labeled proto-Turkish nationalism. It was the defeat of 1918 and its consequences that created the deep nationalist sentiments that gave rise to modern Turkish nationalism. Here is the source of the existence henceforth of "a Turkey which was Turkey of, by and for Turks, and for the most part, only Turks."[2]

Uriel Heyd placed the inception of Turkish nationalism between 1911 and 1913, when the first signs of nationalism could be detected in the works of the Young Turks' leading ideologist, Ziya Gökalp.[3]



Ethnic Composition—Soviet Central Asia

The foregoing opinions do not fully concur with assertions by other specialists in the field of nationalism and do not agree with some basic facts in the early history of the Turks in Asia Minor. For example, Carlton Hayes emphasized the deep historical genesis of nationalism:

If we designate the tribe by the word "nation" as many ancient writers did, we can readily perceive that "nationalism" is an attribute of primitive society. It becomes clear to us that the prehistoric world was peopled with nationalists and that the tribesmen described by Homer, or by the authors of the Old Testament, or by Tacitus, or by discoverers of America, or explorers of Africa, were devoted to nationalism.[4]

He maintained that not only ancient primitive tribes were carriers of the feeling of nationalism, but that the early, highly civilized Hebrews, Armenians, and Japanese were permeated with nationalist sentiment as well.[5] Frederick Hertz presented a still more general view about the omnipresent character of nationalism: "Great empires have broken down under its [nationalism's] assault, wars and revolutions have been started in the name of nationality which have changed the face of the world. Economic interests, morality and religion were unable to stem the torrent, which seems to push our whole civilization towards an abyss."[6]

Max Boehm believed that even such an ancient and supranational element as religious phenomena may be understood as primitive forms of nationalism. Close analysis reveals that in the sphere of the Christian religion (and even more so in Judaism and Islam), there is a starting point for nationalism. It is only the dogma that is strictly supranational.[7]

These views indicate the error in identifying the origins of Turkish nationalism with recent history and encourage us to look for manifestations of nationalism in the distant past of the Turks in Asia Minor. A very interesting phenomenon of nationalism was the Turkification of Anatolia, which occurred in the eleventh to fifteenth centuries during the conquest of Anatolia by the Turks. To Arnold Toynbee, the process of Turkification in east-central Anatolia is one of the puzzles of history. Four centuries earlier, Byzantium, which was then apparently far weaker and less refined than it was in the eleventh century, had succeeded in repelling the invasions of the powerful, civilized Arab Empire. Later, however (in the period beginning with the eleventh century), the sedentary, socially cultured population of east-central Anatolia was assimilated by a barbarous nomadic people, which had been driven out of their native environment on the steppes by some variation of climate. The Seljuks did not have even numerical strength on their side. The Greek population which they found in the country must have been comparatively dense, while contemporary records, as well as our general knowledge of nomadic social conditions, indicate that the invaders' numbers were small.

The Turkification of west and northwest Anatolia began two hundred years later. In two distinct stages, all Anatolia was absorbed by Turkish-speaking communities.[8]

A most significant fact is that this process of Turkification was not achieved by a massacre of the native populations. Rather, Turkification was a result of the assimilation of the indigenous population and their acceptance of the Turkish language, "Turkish" religion (i.e., Islam), and Turkish culture. This fact is evident in the physical character of the population. The question remains, however, as to what extent, if any, the linguistic phenomenon of the Turkification of Anatolia may be an expression of Turkish nationalism.

An excellent report on nationalism by a group of British scholars contained an enlightening explanation of the equation between culture and language in the early stages: "culture follows language, and . . . the literature written in that language will form one of the proudest parts of the national heritage."[9] The *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* corroborates and amplifies this description:

> Perhaps the most important factor in modern nationalism is language. The concept of a mother tongue has made language the source from which spring all intellectual and spiritual existence. The mother tongue represents the most suitable expression of spiritual individuality. The development of philology since the middle of the eighteenth century cannot be understood without the basic supposition according to which language is represented as the key to the most essential characteristics of a people and its culture. . . . In syntax, word sound and rhythm, [the people find] the most faithful expression of [their] temperament and general emotional life. . . . Closely related to language is the script.[10]

Roman Smal-Stocki has studied the interrelation of language and nationality and believes that in the development of the national idea from its primitive elements to its present form, language has played a paramount role:

> Language is the means of thinking and of expressing thought[;] . . . the basis of forming and developing society. . . . But the vibrating words express not only meanings. They express also emotions and feelings with which many meanings are interwoven. . . . They have their own music and characteristic cadence, [and] contain a special sentence melody. . . . The importance of language in the life of a people, nationality, or nation, cannot be overestimated. Language with its thinking and emotional processes is their creative force and represents their national heritage. Wilhelm von Humboldt (*Kraft der Worte*) is right: "True, genuine home and mother country [of a nationality] is the mother language." . . . God manifested Himself to the Jews not in an image, but by sound; the "word," *Logos*, became the intermediary between him and the chosen people. Language and faith and law permeated one another.[11]

The inherent ties between language and nationalism lend weight to the assertion that the Turkification of Anatolia from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries had some of the characteristics of modern nationalism with its aggressiveness and aggrandizement plus its denationalization of minorities and conquered peoples.[12]

At the beginning of the Anatolian conquest, the Turks were already devout Moslems, and the Turkification of Anatolia was paralleled by the Islamization of that country. This raises a question as to whether the Islamic civilization of

the Turks involved supranational elements that changed the essence of Turkification. Here again we are challenged by the interrelation of religion and nationalism; however, the relationship corresponds to that of language and nationalism. Hans Kohn pointed out that:

> Religion has played an enormous role as a symbol of nationality. The real motive behind many struggles which are commonly regarded as religious was nascent national sentiment, striving for expression in national personality. On the other hand, it was religion which to a large extent imparted to a people that close solidarity which is implied in the idea of a nation, and which decisively contributed to the rise of the conviction that devotion to the national cause, and self sacrifice in its service, were duties, commanded by an authority, higher than any human government. . . .
>
> In ancient times many peoples displayed a close connection between religion and nationality. A most momentous development towards both nationality and supra-national ideals took place in Judaism. . . . Religion became the most powerful unifying factor among the latter Jews; to many it was the substitute for nationality, but it also transcended the aims of merely national aspirations.[13]

These assertions find confirmation in Turkish history; it is only theoretically that Islamization of the Turks should have denationalized them. By the same token, their Arabization or partial Persianization should have been a natural result of their settling on the lands of these ancient and highly cultured peoples. Hellenization as well as partial Armenization could have been a third possibility for the Turks settled in the portions of Anatolia and Transcaucasia with a predominantly Armenian population. None of these suppositions occurred, however; in spite of their Islamization, the Turks turned out to be one of the greatest assimilative forces. Nearly all territories occupied by them were Turkified to a certain degree, and many ancient and highly culturally developed peoples lost their national identity. Anatolia was Turkified, as were Iranian Transcaucasia and part of the Iranian population of Russian Central Asia, along with some of the Ugro-Finnish tribes of the Middle Volga region. The de-Turkification of the Turkish Bolgars in Bulgaria is the only exception to this trend. The disappearance of nomadic Turkish tribes from the steppes between the Danube Estuary and the northern Caspian cannot be treated as an exception since these tribes were not numerous and were scattered over enormous territories. Some of them simply emigrated elsewhere, as for example the Kara-Kalpaks, who live now in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR.

It was only under the torrents of Russian mass colonization that the Turks of the Eurasian areas gradually diminished in power. This Russian onslaught coincided with similar Chinese encroachments in the Far East.

The Turkification of Anatolia indicates, then, that the Islamization of the Turks (which preceded Turkification of Anatolia) was not a denationalizing force. A deep feeling of national and linguistic separateness existed, and no outside cultural elements attracted the Turks. The Turkification of Anatolia from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries was greater in scope and in results than that of the

Kemalist period. There may be traced a general line of Turkish national policy linking the eleventh, thirteenth, and fifteenth centuries to the twentieth century, and it can be surmised that Turkification, the heart of the policy of the Young Turks, Kemalists, and Pan-Turkists, is a continuous and intrinsic element of the Turkish nationalist policy.

TURKISH NATIONALISM AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The foregoing suggests that there were two influences in Turkey's nationalism. The first was primitive, theoretically ungrounded, and elemental, but also dynamic and aggressive. The second, modern nationalism, was Westernized and theoretically grounded. Periodically, both trends dropped below the political horizon. In periods of victories or of weak opposition from the conquered, for instance, any manifestation of Turkish nationalism was superfluous and even harmful to Turkish interests. During the Ottoman period, any open or aggressive nationalist attempts at aggrandizement would have been suicidal to Turkish imperial ambitions. However, the universalist and supranational "Ottomanism" proved fruitful to the Turkish masters of the expanding empire.

Some denationalization, brought about by compromises with supranational elements, was unavoidable and resulted in the partial Arabization and Persianization of Turkish culture, language, and everyday life, plus Byzantinization of the state structure. However, even from a Turkish point of view, these were necessary and useful achievements. After the conquest of Anatolia, the Turks could not retain indefinitely their tribal organization, nomadic culture, and primitive customs. There was no alternative but to adapt certain aspects of the conquered cultures. The next centuries proved this policy to be wise, since the Greeks and Armenians were excellent cobuilders of the Ottoman Empire and effective guardians against Western encroachments.[14] The Arabic and Persian influence advanced the social culture of the Turks, and Islam introduced the necessary universal outlook.

With few exceptions, multinational states and empires were based on a dominant national core. This was the case with the Roman, Persian, Chinese, Russian, and Spanish empires. All nonnational elements were subjugated and forced to acquire the culture, outlook, and pattern of life of the dominant nation. The most recent example is still more brutal and nationalistic: In the former Soviet Union, in spite of numerous declarations of the equality of all union republics as member states, and in spite of the wording of the 1936 Soviet Constitution, it was the Soviet culture, language, and nation that dominated the entire huge empire.

This situation defines the reality that existed in the Ottoman Empire. The Turks were the master race, the capital of the empire was in Turkish Constantinople, and the highest offices were in the hands of Turks or subordinates of non-Turkish origin.[15]

It is difficult to produce proper material on the existence of Turkish nationalism

in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. These were the centuries of satiety, following the enormous conquests of the first period of the empire, and were the centuries of decline. There was no necessity to be harsh toward the empire's non-Turkish Moslems, and in peaceful periods, Christians were treated tolerantly under the *millet* system of self-administering religious communities. In time, this relatively peaceful coexistence of the different peoples of the empire was concluded due to a number of causes, both external and internal.

Nationalism in the Middle East, in the modern sense, is of Western origin and came in four stages.[16] The first was in the time of Napoleon Bonaparte, who went to Egypt in 1798 and penetrated Syria, Haifa, and Acre. The Napoleonic expeditions, with their accompanying savants, helped to stimulate a revival after three hundred years of lethargy. During his stay in Egypt, Napoleon launched the slogan, "Egypt for the Egyptians"; he returned the functionaries and ulemas sent by Constantinople and replaced them with local people.

The second stage of nationalism in the Middle East occurred about 1860 with an increase in the activity of educational and missionary groups. The American University of Beirut and many other schools and colleges devoted great attention to the revival of Arab scholarship and the Arabic language.

A third important stimulus was the Russo-Japanese War. The year 1905 convinced the Asiatic nations that if they organized into modern, integrated nations like Japan, they could resist the West. From that time on, revolutionary movements were organized, including in Iran in 1906, and in Turkey in 1908.

A fourth stage of the development of nationalism in the Middle East was World War I, when, for the first time, the masses themselves were involved in nationalism. Two events connected with this war were significant: Woodrow Wilson's slogan of the self-determination of nations and the Russian revolution of 1917. Both events had an immense influence on the Middle East.

The emergence of modern nationalism in Turkey, in the narrow sense of the word, began with the reforms of 1826 and 1839.[17] At this early date, Islamic slogans and theocratic formulas prevailed in official life, and even prominent Turkish scholars and researchers somewhat erroneously treat the period of reforms (*Tanzimat*) as being void of modern aims. Abdulhak Adnan-Adivar wrote that the Tanzimat period, which was to continue until the Young Turks' Revolution of 1908:

> was marked by a desire to defend the theological precepts of Islam against modern science. This desire was so intense and so characteristic of the age that it may be termed a new era of apology in Islam. Even the modern authors who had travelled and studied in the West did not hesitate to defend those very religious ideas which appeared contrary to scientific fact.[18]

This Islamic fervor had little to do with the development of Turkish nationalism. In reality, the dynamism of the Islamic foundations of the Ottoman Empire

which started in the period of Tanzimat most probably was stimulated not only by religion but also by a national Turkish undercurrent. This is understandable in light of the close relationship between religion and national feelings, especially in Oriental societies.

PAN-ISLAMISM

A second important set of ideas was the Pan-Islamic movement. After the failure of Ottomanism in 1876, this was the most significant policy to develop in the latter part of the nineteenth century.[19] The word *Pan-Islamism* in its various forms is apparently of European coinage and was probably adopted in imitation of the term *Pan-Slavism*, which had become current in the 1870s. While Gabriel Charmes perhaps made the word popular by his articles and book of 1881 and 1882, the first use thus far discovered is that in a German work by Franz von Werner, published in 1877 but written before July 1876, wherein he spoke of the Young Turkish party, "die den 'Pan-Islamismus' in ihr Programm aufgenommen hat."[20]

Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani, a Moslem progressive who died in 1897, is given credit for being the founder and the earliest and greatest intellectual leader of Pan-Islamism.[21] Though he failed in his supreme objective, his influence lives on in the more recent popular movements which combine Islamic fundamentalism with an activist political program.[22]

An important force related to Pan-Islamism is the rivalry between the Great Powers. In the period between 1850 and 1880, the most serious conflict to directly affect Islam was that of Russia and England in the Near East and in Central Asia, while at a later date other rivalries developed to a critical point in Egypt, Morocco, and Tripoli. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most willing and eager supporters of the Ottoman Caliphate in the earlier period were Central Asiatic and Indian Moslems, who, finding themselves at the mercy of both British and Russian expansionists, frequently discussed the idea of a Moslem league and occasionally appealed for aid to the Ottoman sultan.[23] Though no solid achievement çame of these activities, the sultan kept in touch with Central Asiatics who might be residing in Constantinople or passing through the city, and sometimes sent missions to their rulers.[24] One of the best known missions was that to Yakub Bek of Kashgar (Eastern Turkestan).[25]

What did this activity signify? Some contemporaries insisted that it meant nothing and that Central Asiatic Moslems were indifferent or even hostile toward the sultan-caliph.[26] One observer, however, believed that the very practice of exchanging missions in itself constituted a Moslem league.[27] However, Vambery, after residing in Constantinople and making a journey through Central Asia in the 1860s, concluded that there was no longer any trace, at least among the Ottomans, of the animated diplomatic intercourse with Turkestan that was characteristic of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[28]

There is considerable evidence to show that British activity was as important as any other factor in the development of Pan-Islamism during the reign of Abdul Aziz (1861–76) and the early years of Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909).[29] The interests of Great Britain were linked with those of the sultan by the fact that both were rulers of Moslem peoples and that both, along with the Moslems of Central Asia, were threatened by Russian expansion. In India, propaganda for recognition of the sultan as caliph, which was favored by the disappearance of Moghul rule in 1857 and the loss of independence of the outstanding Asiatic khans a little later, was turned to account by the British, who admonished their "forty million" Moslems to be loyal to the government that was the caliph's friend.[30]

Great Britain has not been alone in attempting to exploit Pan-Islamism when circumstances seemed to favor it. During World War I, Germany tried to use it in order to weaken Great Britain and France. Italy in the 1930s used the same tactics, and the Arabs in their conflicts with both France and Great Britain have sought support through arousing the sympathies of fellow Moslems. There is reason for believing that Pan-Islamism has always had either behind it or paralleling to it the power policy of some European state whose aims and interests at the moment seemed to coincide with those of Islam or of some Moslem potentate.[31]

From the purely Ottoman point of view, Pan-Islamism was a useful political tool. Emissaries of Abdul Hamid reached Java, Russia, and Tunis, and frequently, the claims of the caliph as the supreme protector of Islam were successfully asserted. The emir of Bukhara, Shah Murad, called on the Kirghiz to make war on the Russians, since the Turkish sultan—the caliph, God's shadow on earth—had so commanded. Even the Christian powers acknowledged the Caliph's claim to exercise a certain jurisdiction over the Moslems in their domain. In 1913, in the treaties with Greece and Bulgaria, the sultan caliph secured for himself the exercise of similar influence in the appointment of the chief mufti in those countries; he also nominated the supreme cadi in Egypt. Abdul Hamid's name was cited in the Friday prayers in Indian mosques.[32]

These nonreligious and purely political motives, when concealed behind a spiritual screen of Islamic and Pan-Islamic slogans, resulted in the impotence of the movement and its virtual bankruptcy. Pan-Islamism, instead of fostering Islamic feelings and the unity of all believers, only brought the negative realization that reforms were needed in order to give the Moslem nations the strength to resist Europe. The national ideal came increasingly to prevail over religion as a political principle.[33]

These practical, political motives were even more vivid and apparent to the non-Turkish Moslems of the Ottoman Empire, particularly for the Arabs. Constantine K. Zurayk, a well-known independent politician and scholar of Syrian origin, has stated that Pan-Islamism was a Turkish invention to divert the energies of Arab subjects from the dangerous path of Arab nationalism.[34]

THE YOUNG TURKS

With an analysis of the Young Turks' movement, another complex of political and cultural ideas, we complete the picture of the development of the Turkish nation from the end of the nineteenth century to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918.

Mention should be made of the Turkism of the "Young Ottomans" which took place in Europe between 1867 and 1871. The Young Ottomans, who worked in Paris under the direction of Fazil Mustafa Pasha, had a political program that envisaged liberty and a constitution.

At the outset, the Young Turks' movement was antidespotical and constitutionalist. Midhat Pasha (1822–84) was the most active participant in the constitutional movement of 1876–78 and supported the deposition of the sultan, Abdul Aziz. After being nominated grand vizier by Sultan Abdul Hamid, he proclaimed the constitution on December 24, 1876. According to this constitution, the power of the sultan was restricted by a two-chamber parliament and by a government responsible to that body. These achievements were cruely liquidated by the sultan in February 1877, and Midhat Pasha was sent abroad. He returned to Turkey in 1878 and was nominated governor of Syria, and later Smyrna. He was then arrested, deported to Taif in Arabia, and reportedly murdered on the sultan's order.[35]

Thus, for the time being, the Young Ottoman movement had been liquidated. Further reform activity occurred when several students of the Military Medical Faculty organized in 1889 a secret organization under the name of Ittihad ve Terakki (Union and Progress). It is important to note that the founders of this organization were representatives of different nationalities in the Ottoman Empire and that its aim was to terminate the sultan's autocracy. The police uncovered the plot, and the committee disappeared.[36]

Two years later, in 1891, a new organization of Young Turks, also known as the Committee of Union and Progress, came into being in Geneva. After some time, the operations of the committee were transferred to Paris, and in 1906, the committee's headquarters was established in Salonika. The strictest secrecy was observed, following the examples of the Freemasons and the Italian secret societies at the time of the Risorgimento. The committee started with lofty slogans of equality for all the peoples of the empire. An understanding was successfully established in 1903 between the Young Turks and the Armenian Committee in Paris, and in spite of great difficulties, a section of the Macedonian Committee was persuaded to cooperate. At the Paris Congress of 1907, representatives of the Turks, Armenians, Bulgars, Jews, Arabs, and Albanians were in agreement. It was agreed that the sultan should be deposed, that the empire should remain united, that all races and religions should enjoy equal rights, and that the government should be based on a parliamentary democracy.[37]

A year later, the revolution of July 24, 1908, gave full power to the Young Turks' Committee of Union and Progress. After the revolution, the sultan restored

the constitution, abolished censorship, released all political prisoners, and disbanded his army of forty thousand spies.[38] In the atmosphere of enthusiasm, general elections were held for the first parliament under the new constitution. Unfortunately, the delicate structure of projected supranational equality of rights for the peoples of the empire collapsed at this moment.[39]

It should be stressed that in the Committee of Union and Progress, the leading role was in the hands of Turks: Nazim Bey, Ahmed Riza Bey, and others.[40] George Antonius, the Christian Arab historian of the Arab independence movement, explains how the elections exposed the situation:

> The electoral machinery was controlled by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), and had been so geared as to ensure the return of a great majority of their nominees. But more than that, the electoral constituencies had been demarcated in such a way as to favor the Turkish element at the expense of the other races. The Turks were by no means the largest element in the empire, and were actually outnumbered by the Arabs, roughly in a ratio of three to two. Yet in the Chamber of Deputies which assembled in December, out of a total of 245 elected representatives, 150 were Turks and 60 were Arabs, a ratio of 5 to 2 to the advantage of the Turks. In the Senate which numbered 40 members appointed by the Sultan, there were only three Arabs. This was the first of the series of measures which were to reveal an ever widening gap between what the Turks professed and what they practiced in the matter of racial equality.[41]

This was reality, yet the Young Turks did not cease propagating their lofty slogans on the equality of peoples. After these elections in 1911, the Fourth Party Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress adopted a program that declared:

> Every citizen, without distinction of race or religion, has equal rights and a claim to absolute freedom, and all have equal duties. All Ottomans are equal before the law, and all subjects of the Empire shall be admitted to the State service according to their fitness and capacity. (Art. 9)[42]

Non-Turkish sources confirm the assertion concerning the nationalist content of the Young Turks' political program. A Soviet university manual on the history of the East (with the notorious Russian passion for strong words), stated that the Young Turks began their policies of Turkification and extermination of the non-Turkish minorites immediately after the deposition of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II on April 27, 1909. Aiming at the liquidation of all national non-Turkish movements, the Young Turks' Committee of Union and Progress adopted a policy of "the most brutal chauvinism."[43]

A new history of Turkey published by the Academy of Sciences of the former USSR maintains that just before, as well as after, the revolution of 1908, Ottomanism, aiming in reality at the creation of a united Ottoman (Turkish) nation, was the leading ideology of the committee.[44] Jemal Pasha, one of the most conspicuous leaders of the Young Turks, explained that the Turkish people

formed the foundation of the whole empire. The Turks understood the slogan of Ottomanism to imply the Turkification of all non-Turkish components of the state, and later, the Young Turks accepted a candid program to accomplish this objective. A statement of the Committee of Union and Progress in Autumn 1911 declared that, earlier or later, full "Ottomanization" was unavoidable and that this aim might be attained with the use of forceful methods. "The national minorities are a '*quantite negligeable*,' [and] they can preserve their religion but not their language," continued this resolution.

An Armenian author writing under the name of Zarevand maintains that the Young Turks' policies were brutal and were intended to assimilate all non-Turkish minorities. Nazim Bey, one of the leaders of the Young Turks, openly declared: "Our state must be purely Turkish, because the existence of other nationalities inside our borders gives only an excuse to foreign powers for intervention on their behalf. We must Turkify non-Turkish nationalities by force."[45]

The 1911 resolutions of the plenum of the Central Committee of Union and Progress stated that the empire must be Islamic and foreign elements must be refused the right to possess autonomous national organizations. The expansion of the Turkish language was seen as the best method of securing the domination of Moslems and the assimilation of non-Turks. Turkism with an admixture of Islamism was the committee's new ideological principle. It did not publish these resolutions for some time, however, in order to avoid offending the non-Turkish members of the Young Turks movement. When they became known, the Arabs coined a description of the Young Turks' policy: "Pan-Islamist without Islam."[46] The Young Turks were Ottoman Turks first and reformers afterward.[47]

George Kirk has approached an evaluation of the nationalist content of the Young Turks' policy from the point of view of the history of the Arab independence movement. The nationalists of Syria, he said, had been greatly encouraged by the Turkish Revolution. In Istanbul in September 1908 they formed the Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood (*al-Ilkha al-Uthmani*), which aimed to unite all the races of the empire in loyalty to the sultan, protect the new liberal constitution, promote the well-being of the Arab portion of the empire on a footing of equality, and so forth. After April 27, 1909, the Young Turks introduced new security measures, one of which was the prohibition of all societies founded by non-Turkish groups. The *Ilkha* was shut down and the Arab nationalists were driven underground to continue their political activities in secret.[48] After the Young Turks' revolution, liberals throughout the world congratulated themselves in the belief that a new and happier day had dawned for the Near East. The Young Turks, however, soon showed themselves to be still under the influence of Turan and Inner Asia, and the results of their policy included disaffection, revolts, and foreign wars.[49]

An official British handbook published in 1920 exaggerated somewhat in describing the politics of the Young Turks when it said that they showed: "there could not be any nationalism but Ottoman Turk; not any official language except

Turkish, and not any home rule in the Empire. Its program was for one race, one language, and one administration."[50]

In summary, the supranational trends in Turkey in the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth appear to have been utopian and impracticable. The nationalist Turkish content was always present and very often was stronger than the supranational veneer.

One reason was the decline of the Ottoman Empire as a construction intended to transcend national boundaries. This decline began after the rule of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–66) and continued intermittently until the collapse of the empire in 1918. Another cause was the rise of nationalist feeling among the empire's non-Turkish subjects, which provoked many harsh Turkish countermeasures. A third factor was the pressure of the foreign powers, especially Russia, Great Britain, and Austro-Hungary, on behalf of the Christian population of the empire and its Balkan neighbors.

ZIYA GÖKALP

Ziya Gökalp (pseudonym of Mehmet Ziya, 1876–1924), is considered the father of modern Turkish nationalism and one of Turkey's eminent intellectuals. His life and work parallel the evolution of pre-Kemalist Turkish society and help explain the success of Kemalism in the new Turkey.

Gökalp wrote poems, historical plays, studies on the religion of the ancient Turks, and an unfinished history of Turkish civilization. One of his most noteworthy compositions was *Türkçülügün Esaslari* (The foundations of Turkism), which was first published in Ankara in 1923. It contains the articles he published in the papers *Yeni Mecmua* (New review; Istanbul, 1917–18 and 1923), and *Küçük Mecmua* (Small review; Diyarbekr, 1922–23).[51] He was the author of some three hundred articles scattered in numerous periodicals, many of them published in the provinces in the difficult years of 1908–09 and 1914–21. Not all have been reprinted in book collections, very few have been translated into European languages, and some are unavailable for research. There is yet no edition of his complete writings, even in Turkish.[52] The best account of Gökalp's life and work to date in a Western language is Heyd's *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, which was based largely on original material.[53]

Ziya Gökalp was born in the Turkish border town of Diyarbekr in 1875 or 1876. In his days, the province of Diyarbekr was largely populated by non-Turkish communities which constantly struggled against the yoke of the Ottoman sultan. Kurdish tribes were revolting against the central government, and the Armenians had formed an underground movement aimed at securing their independence. Amid these conflicting national traditions and aspirations, the future leader of Turkish nationalism was born. It has often been observed that "border populations are usually imbued with a particularly militant nationalism."[54]

In the early 1890s, Gökalp was under the influence of a Kurdish doctor,

Abdullah Cevdet (an avowed atheist and revolutionary), and several other free-thinkers who had been expelled by Sultan Abdul Hamid from Constantinople to Diyarbekr. Determined to continue his studies in Constantinople, he met resistance from his family and attempted to kill himself, but his life was saved by an operation. This protest opened the road to the capital, and in 1896, Ziya, almost penniless, entered the Veterinary College in Constantinople, the sole school offering him free board and tuition. Later, with a ceremony moulded on the pattern of Freemasonry, he was installed as a member of the secret society of Union and Progress. The secret police found a letter written by Gökalp expressing his political views, and he was expelled from college. He was then arrested and sentenced to one year's imprisonment. On leaving prison, Gökalp was exiled to Diyarbekr, but there, his wife's property permitted him to devote his life to the study of Western, and particularly French, philosophy, psychology, and sociology.[55]

In Diyarbekr, Gökalp took part in an armed uprising against the local Kurdish *Hamidiye* militia, which scourged the province by looting and imposing arbitrary taxes on the peasantry. Gölkap enthusiastically received news of the Young Turks' revolt of 1908. Through his lectures in the local Union and Progress branch, Gökalp became known as one of the outstanding leaders in Diyarbekr. In autumn 1908, he was invited to attend the Salonika Congress of the Union and Progress movement as a representative of his district and was elected a member of the Central Council, a position that he held until the party's dissolution in 1918. He settled in Salonika, and Talaat Bey, one of the chief leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, became his close friend. Gökalp's poems and articles were usually signed "Tevfik Sedat," "Demirtas," or "Gökalp," with the last eventually becoming his permanent pen name.[56]

When the Balkan Wars broke out in 1912, the headquarters of the party was moved to Constantinople and Gokalp transferred his residence to the capital. He lectured at the university and, as a member of the Central Council, dealt with social, legal, and cultural problems. In the autumn of 1917, he submitted a memorandum to the party congress advocating the closing of religious colleges and the abolition of the *Seyhulislam,* the highest religious authority.

Following the armistice, Gökalp continued his university lectures, but after the occupation of the capital by the Allied forces, he was arrested and exiled to Malta along with other Turkish nationalists.

After Mustafa Kemal's victory over the Greeks in 1921, Gökalp and his colleagues were freed and allowed to return to Turkey. Gökalp was not warmly welcomed, however, since the new administration in Ankara had little sympathy for the ex-chiefs of the Union and Progress party and believed they had caused the loss of the war. Gökalp was not reinstated as professor at the university, and instead he returned to his native Diyarbekr. He taught psychology and literature at the local teachers seminary and secondary school, and renewed his journalistic activity. With the help of friends, he managed to publish, from June 1922 onward, a small weekly, *Küçük Mecmua* (Little review), in which he supported Mustafa

Kemal and his policies. He died October 25, 1924, at the age of forty-eight or forty-nine; his funeral was a national event.[57]

Gökalp's Teachings

In Salonika, Gökalp came in contact with liberal Turkish and European circles, including Jews, Christians, and Moslemized Jews, the so-called *Dönmes*. Deeply imbued with Western, and particularly French, culture, representatives of these communities took an active part in the Union and Progress party. The cosmopolitan and tolerant atmosphere of Salonika increased his interest in European philosophy and sociology, and he gave lectures to a private circle on modern French thinkers, such as Fouillée, Tardé, and Le Bon. He also studied the books of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), who was to exert the strongest influence on him. During that period he believed in the ideal of Ottomanism—the equality of all citizens of whatever race or religion, and consequently placed little emphasis on Islam. In 1911 he wrote that the social revolution would only be born out of the Ottoman spirit; however, at times he called the future national culture Ottoman and, at other times, Turkish.

As an admirer of Durkheim, he accepted the concept of the divinity of society with some drastic revisions, and for *society* he substituted *nation*. In Salonika there were two conflicting trends in Gökal's soul: the political ideal of the multinational Ottoman state and philosophical acceptance of the nation as the highest spiritual and secular value.[58]

Later, Gökalp began to doubt the value of Ottomanism as a political ideal. He saw that fraternal feeling had quickly cooled among the component communities following the 1908 revolution, and that the non-Turkish peoples of the empire, with their desire for national independence, could no longer be imbued with loyalty to the Ottoman state. Great European powers supported efforts to reconquer their old possessions. The non-Turkish components of the empire and all non-Turkish neighbors were inimical toward the Turks. Gökalp accepted this as a lesson, and in 1914 he wrote that a state could exist only if based on one nation. In that existing wave of nationalism, multinational empires were doomed and there was no way to prevent the dissolution of the Ottoman empire. The conclusion was logical: The only element of the empire that could be relied on were the Turks.

Gökalp's nationalist outlook was most definitely formed prior to the Balkan Wars (1912–13). Tekin Alp stated that before the Balkan Wars, there were people who regarded Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism as an empty dream and saw the Turkish element as the savior of the Ottoman empire. Among them were the members of the Constantinople branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, where Ziya Gökalp created a separate cell and prepared a program for the defense of nationalism.[59] Tekin Alp's assertion was supported by Ahmed Emin (Yalman), who wrote that in 1909, when Gökalp attended the convention of the party of

Union and Progress, "he was already an ardent Turkish nationalist with a deeper mental training than most of the men in the new political life."[60]

The evolution toward nationalism was nevertheless slow and difficult. On the road to integral nationalism, there were many obstacles, the foremost being Islam and its supranational teachings. Gökalp's early outlook was formed by religion, yet very early in life he severed his spiritual relations with orthodox Islam.

Most sources on Gökalp's teaching excessively emphasize his positivistic outlook. Abdulhak Adnan-Adivar explained that Gökalp was saturated not only with the sociology of Durkheim but also with the spiritual philosophy of Henri-Louis Bergson.[61] Niyazi Berkes felt that Gökalp was practically an idealist: "He was the type of intellectual not infrequently found in the East: a spiritual guide, an inspirer, a *mursid*, as he was called in Turkey. He had marked Sufi inclinations, and the influence of *tasawwuf* [mystical teachings of the Sufi school] always remained conspicuous in his thinking."[62]

His hesitant attitude toward religion and his limitation of the caliphate to purely religious matters, combined, on the other hand, with the idea of unrestricted state sovereignty, explains why Gökalp did not accept Pan-Islamism as a political creed. The idea of uniting all Moslem nations under one ruler was, in Gökalp's opinion, merely a messianic hope.

Gökalp occasionally pointed out regretfully that Islam originated from the culture of the Arabs, the Persians, and the Europeans. These foreign elements should be discarded, he felt, and only the genuine beliefs and traditions of Islam retained. All these demands have the flavor of Johann von Herder, and thus he advocated the "nationalization" of the Islamic language in Turkey and the conduct of all religious worship in Turkish instead of Arabic.[63] Gökalp's teachings had practical consequences during World War I, when he became almost an intellectual dictator. Under his influence, the Koran was translated into Turkish, and in some Istanbul mosques, the imams and muezzins conducted the ritual in the Turkish vernacular.[64]

Gökalp and Turkism

According to Heyd, the heart of Gökalp's teachings is in his theory of Turkism, wherein national movements pass through three stages: cultural awakening, political movement, and, finally, the formulation of an economic program. The roots of modern Turkish nationalism are to be found in the intellectual and cultural movement, which Gökalp called Turkism (*Türkçülük*). This movement was born under the influence of several stimulating forces. The political and cultural decline of Moslem countries in general, and of the Ottoman empire in particular, in contrast with the progress of the West, awakened educated Turks to the desire for a new ideology. This ideology was supplied by the impact of Western ideas and by European Turkologists, who showed the Turks that they belonged to a great and ancient nation. The work of Western Turkologists was later followed by that of Turkish scientists.[65]

Another source of Turkism is seen in the Pan-Islamic movement and the teachings of its herald, Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani, who called on the Moslem nations to liberate themselves from the rule of Christian Europe. These trends led the educated and intellectual Turks to nationalism and Turkism. The idea of Turkism began to spread in 1909, and writers, historians, poets, and publicists contributed to its growth and development. It was Gökalp who supplied the theoretical basis for Turkism in his essay, *Yeni Hayat ve Yeni Kiymetler* (New life and new values), which was published in 1911.

The basic philosophy of Gökalp's Turkism was very simple: In the course of generations the Turks had drifted away from their national traditions and adopted the cultures of other peoples. "We succeeded in conquering many places, but spiritually we were conquered in all of them," he wrote in his poem *Kizil Elma* (Red apple: a symbolic expression for a promised land). It was now the duty of Turks to "know themselves," to rediscover the soul of the people that had been lost through the influence of alien cultures. This could be done by research into the history and culture of the ancient Turks and by examining those aspects of the popular culture that had remained faithful to their own origin and character. Gökalp's essays glorified the ancient Turks and described their political and cultural achievements, the extended pre-Islamic Turkish kingdoms, and the feats of Attilla, Genghis Khan, Timur, Bābur, and the Ottoman sultans. To him, the ancient Turks were distinguished by a multitude of excellent qualities, such as hospitality, modesty, and courage. They did not oppress other nations; their god was one of peace and was devoid of all imperialistic ambitions. The great Turkish conquerors sought only to unite the Turkish tribes. The Turks had a worthy mission which was to realize the highest moral virtues and to prove that sacrifices and heroic deeds were not beyond human strength.[66]

Gökalp looked on language as the touchstone of nationality and regarded linguistic independence as a necessary condition to political independence. He denied the right of two languages to exist side by side, such as Ottoman, which was permeated with Arabic and Persian influences, and simple Turkish, the everyday language of the common people. Rather, there should be only one language for all strata of society, based on the spoken language of Constantinople. However, Gökalp, did not advocate an excessive linguistic purity, and he believed that the Arabic, Persian, and other non-Turkish words that had become completely assimilated into spoken Turkish were a national asset. He pleaded for modernization and Westernization of the language in regard to ideas, Islamization of scientific expressions, and Turkification in all other words, grammar, syntax, and orthography. The introduction of a Latin script was not among Gökalp's proposals.[67]

The nationalist ideal was the central feature of Gökalp's political views, and he felt that everything restraining nationalism was bad. Islam was good because it strengthened patriotic sentiment, even in its aggressive forms: He found support in the Islamic conception of *jihad* (Holy war) against unbelievers. Ethics were not supranational values, and morality was identical for him with love of country

and service to the nation. Nationalism was a supreme ideal, and there was no room for the absolute value of the individual.

Adopting the ideal of full independence for all nations, Gökalp consequently condemned all empires; until empires vanished from the world, peace could not be established. It was imperative that every nation's right to establish its own independent state be recognized. While empires made up of various nations were disintegrating, there was a striving for union between countries with populations of the same nationality. This tendency could lead to a union of all Turks, whether living in Turkey, Russia, Persia or other countries.[68]

The political regime that Gökalp envisaged was a national democracy. He desired to place supreme control not in the masses, but in the national elite, who must govern in the interest of the people; their right to speak in the name of the people was based only on their own inner conviction that they understood the people's needs and would work in their interest. Gökalp gave prominence to the leader in his state; in times of serious threat, such a leader must have absolute power. (These words were written a year before Mustafa Kemal started preparations for the war of independence.)

He was preoccupied by the inequality of rights between the sexes, and he influenced steps toward raising the position of women. Gökalp was responsible for instigating the transfer of the Islamic (*Sheriat*) courts to the authority of the Ministry of Justice and for the family law revision of 1916.[69] Halide Edib, a Turkish woman writer and one of Turkey's first emancipated women, pointed out that Gökalp collected data on the early social customs of the Turks, at a time when women and men were equals.[70]

His prominent teachings on Turkism are included in his collection of articles published in 1918 under the title, *Türkleşmek, Islâmaşmak, Muasirlaşmak* (Turkification, Islamization, modernization). He borrowed this phrase from the works of his friend Huseyinzade Ali (Turan) (1864–1941) of Baku. Gökalp made it the basis of his principles and elaborated on it both theoretically and practically. His slogan was, "We belong to the Turkish nation, the Moslem religious community, and the European civilization." Gökalp felt that all these elements were complementary to one another; the Turks should accept from the West only material achievements and scientific methods, and from Islam, its religious beliefs, without its political, legal, and social traditions. All other elements of culture, especially the emotional and moral values, should be Turkish.[71]

Gökalp laid the theoretical foundations of modern Turkey and its nationalist doctrine, which is the root of Kemalist ideology. Berkes stated: "If some of his ideas are almost forgotten in present-day Turkey, and if some of them, quite new in his time, seem merely commonplace today, it is because they became facts. All this shows the depth of his influence and the scope of his influence."[72]

KEMALIST TURKEY

The year 1923 can be regarded as the onset of an era in Turkish history. In that year, the Lausanne Treaty was signed (July 24, 1923), Turkey was admitted

to the postwar community of free nations, and radical changes were officially introduced in that country's internal structure. In October, Turkey was proclaimed a republic and Kemal Ataturk was elected as its first president. In his Eskisehir talk, during the last period of the struggle for independence, Ataturk said, "Neither Islamic union nor Turanism can form a doctrine, a logical policy for us."[73] He enunciated a positive program of national policy:

> In order that our nation should be able to live a happy, strenuous and permanent life, it is necessary that the state should pursue an exclusively national policy and that this policy should be in perfect agreement with our internal organization and be based on it. I speak of national policy, I mean it in this sense: to work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of the nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence.[74]

These rigid and partially tactical declarations are not in full conformity with other expressions and traits of Kemalist political ideals. Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkish slogans were discarded, and their supporters were held responsible for the empire's participation in the war and for its defeat. However, Turkish nationalism, the core of Pan-Turkism, sprang from the chaos of defeat and revolution as a purified and dominant force in the postwar Turkish Republic. Kemalism meant fighting Islamic traditionalism and Pan-Islamism, and, on the other hand, extolling nationalism and "Turkishness" as the highest national values.

The liquidation of the Caliphate was followed by restrictions on religious order and schools and participation by the clergy in public affairs. Moslem Sheriat law was replaced by Swiss, French, and German codes. All international links based on common religion between Turkey and the outer Moslem world were broken. Aya Sofia became a museum of Byzantine art and architecture. The Koranic alphabet was Latinized, and the Moslem calendar was replaced by the Western European system. The Friday (Moslem) holiday was to be officially celebrated on Sunday. Contrary to Moslem tradition, the full rights of citizenship were granted to women.[75] In summary, we can say that only the vestiges of Islam were left intact, while nearly all its political and international evidences were eliminated.[76] Simultaneously, Turkification became the ruling principle, and this involved primarily the Turkish language.

Uriel Heyd pointed out that the first phase of Turkish language reform came in the wake of the political, social and cultural changes of the Tanzimat. The second phase developed with the Young Turks' revolution of 1908 and 1909. The new rulers of the empire wished to arouse political consciousness in the masses and to create a national movement, first of an Ottoman, and later of a Turkish or Pan-Turkish, character. In these efforts, the press was called on to play a major role. Its language had to be intelligible, as pointed out in 1909, even to the uneducated, and especially to the soldiers. Furthermore, it had to be understood by non-Turkish minorities or, as demanded in 1911, with a sig-

nificant change of emphasis, to all Turks as far as Manchuria and to Moslems everywhere. In fact, the newspapers' language was considerably simplified in those years.[77]

In spite of strong opposition from conservative writers, the "new language" asserted itself, and by the end of World War I, its victory was secured. The old Ottoman language, with its colorful but difficult grammar, vanished with the multinational and multilingual Ottoman Empire. Nationalism, the central pillar of Kemalist ideology, found its expression in a strong demand for the purification of the Ottoman language by replacing its foreign elements with genuine Turkish words, old or new. In the words of Ataturk, "The Turkish nation which knew how to defend its country and noble independence must also liberate its language from the yoke of foreign languages."[78] The romantic, almost mystical, desire to rediscover the national genius of the Turkish people and to base the new culture on the ancient, partly pre-Islamic, traditions of the nation also played a part. The Turkish Linguistic Society was founded in July 1932, and appeals were published to the people to eliminate Arabic and Persian words from their speech.

Over half the words in the common dictionaries were of Arabic or Persian roots, as indeed were many terms appearing in legal documents and imperial decrees. Turkish is relatively simple, but mixtures of that language with other Eastern tongues were more complicated than any of the three in a pure form. Many of the writers employed Arabic words and Persian words, to the confusion of almost anyone who did not know all three languages.

In November 1932, the cabinet issued a decree enjoining the administrative organs all over the country to collect Turkish words existing in the language of the people but not recorded in the standard dictionaries or not used in the written language.[79] Each provincial language committee submitted periodic reports on new synonyms that it had uncovered, and the headquarters of the Linguistic Society recorded the information sent in from each organization. Within a few months after the start of the program, the society published weekly lists of newly approved equivalents to demonstrate what they wanted. In the winter of 1934–35, the newspapers began using a few of the substitute words. The society published its *Osmanlica-Türkçe* pocket glossary in March 1935, and the counterpart, *Türkçe-Osmanlica*, four months later. Each contained about eight thousand equivalents. In 1935, the metropolitan press tried to print only approved Turkish words. Unfortunately, even the best-educated readers could not comprehend the daily news without looking up several words per paragraph in their pocket dictionaries. This resulted in a tremendous drop in circulation, and publishers were relieved when reformers admitted that the pace had been too severe and agreed to let their ends be accomplished more gradually. The press now is using an increasing number of purely Turkish words, and all the primary school textbooks are written in this manner.[80]

In this period there was developed a new linguistic thesis known as the Sun Language Theory (Güneş-Dil teorisi). Its exponents claimed that just as Central

Asia, the ancient homeland of the Turks, was the cradle of human civilization, so Turkish was "the mother of all languages."[81] The Sun Language Theory was actually a tactical retreat from extremism in language reform. An interesting document affected by this theory is the four-volume manual of history (*Tarih*) published in 1934 and approved by the Ministry of Education for use in the schools as an official textbook.[82] It indoctrinated Turkish youth concerning the greatness of their ancestors and nation as well as the dominant role of Turkish civilization in human history.[83] It pointed out that writers on the Turks and Islam had "confused Turkish genius and civilization with that of Islam." *Tarih* stressed that a long time previous to the Christian era, the Turks founded states and civilizations in many places when they spread out from Central Asia.[84]

In Kemalist Turkey, the Turkification of all non-Turkish ethnic elements was accelerated. Linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences were diminished; non-Turkic-speaking groups were encouraged to renounce their non-Turkish nationality, language, and religion. In outlying minority groups, such as the Georgian-speaking Lazes and numerous Kurdish tribes, some pressure was employed. Lewis V. Thomas acknowledged this "second-class" citizenship:

> You will note that the growing feeling of "Turkishness" as being the key to status in the Turkish nation was exclusive. It had in it very little room for those residents of Turkey who were not Turkish in language and not Moslem in religion—for the remnant minorities of the ex-Ottoman Empire. To the present date, with varying degrees of intensity, Turkey's Jewish and Christian citizens have enjoyed under the Turkish Republic only a secondary status as citizens. This is not written into law but is expressed in the ordinary attitudes and mores of the land and embodied in the ideology of Turkish nationalism.[85]

One of the practical expressions of Turkish nationalism was the increase in the Turkish ethnic potential by the encouragement of immigration of Turkic-speaking nationalities living outside new Turkey. This policy was started by the Young Turks' government during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, and now, a considerable percentage of Turkey's population is composed of non-Ottoman Turkish immigrants. During and following the Balkan Wars, 248,392 persons (children included) made new homes in Turkey. The number of migrants from 1926–36 was 299,685, and additional thousands are moving out of the Balkans every year.[86] The government furnished each family with a house, land, livestock, and maintenance until the first harvest, and many migrants were placed in model villages.[87]

Nationalism was the official basic principle of state policy and all other lesser principles derived from it. At their third congress in Ankara in 1931, the Peoples' party (in reality, the only party) adopted "Six Principles of Kemalism," which expressed the fundamental political philosophy of the new republic. These principles were later (in 1937) formally incorporated into the constitution as republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatisme, secularism, and revolutionism (meaning a complete repudiation of tradition and precedent if they did not serve

national interest).[88] These components are the modern traits of nationalism; they could realistically be listed as nationalism and its derivatives, which are republicanism, populism, etatisme, secularism, and revolutionism. In his book on Kemalism, Tekin Alp confirmed this rearrangement: "un des principaux articles, et nous dirons même, l'article principal du crede kemaliste, c'est le nationalism."[89]

Kemalist doctrine evolved from early chauvinism and xenophobia to more mature and moderate forms. This emerged particularly in economic nationalism envisioning the creation of a state that would be economically independent. In the long run, this did not work out, and since World War II the philosophy was generally abandoned. Instead, collaboration with the democratic West is currently the leading idea of Turkish internal and foreign policy. The dominant ideology of Turkey is still nationalism, and Turkish feelings of nationhood are pervasive and strong. It is a loyal complex that is increasingly effective. Turkish nationalism may be exclusive, but for 98 percent of Turkey's population, it has been, and seems increasingly to have become, a liberative, creative force.[90]

To recapitulate, Turkish nationalism is a historic phenomenon that is centuries old, and its foremost expression is found in the expansion of the Turkish language. The Turkification of the conquered Anatolians by the Turks in the eleventh to fifteenth centuries was the first sign of its existence and dynamism. Turkish nationalism was a latent but potent component of the Ottoman period; this was an era when its camouflaging was dictated by national interest. Nationalistic aggrandizement was possible through promotion of certain pan-ideals (i.e., Ottoman and Islamic universalism).

The 1908 Young Turks' Revolution and the estrangement of the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire, plus the influence of Western-type nationalism, revived and activated this force in the latent consciousness of the ruling class. Finally, the war of 1914–18 and the dissolution of the empire removed the last barrier to the wave of nationalism.

4

Pan-Turkism

In the second year of World War I, in the German town of Weimar, a book was published entitled "Turkismus and Panturkismus" by M. Cohen, an author who used the name Tekin Alp.[1] It was described by a French historian and political writer, Rene Pinon, as a "breviaire de la politique pantouranienne," and the author was named the "createur" of "Panturquisme."[2]

Such a high appraisal of the book and its author seems now to be exaggerated and partially unfounded (as far as being a creator of Pan-Turkism), yet it is probably the best essay on Pan-Turkism published in a European language, and its translation by the British Admiralty was certainly justified.[3] It has an enlightening definition of Pan-Turkism as a struggle toward the union of all the Turks in the world and as the ardent desire to give all Turks a common soul, a common consciousness, and a common civilization.[4] In other words, Pan-Turkism is a movement that aims at the union, whether cultural or political, of all Turkic-speaking peoples.

Although its antecedents are deeply rooted in history, Pan-Turkism is a modern phenomenon and is connected with the nineteenth, and particularly the twentieth, century. The development of Pan-Turkist aims are somewhat different among the western Turks (mainly within the Ottoman Empire, which is now the Turkish Republic) and the eastern Turks (chiefly within what was the Russian-Soviet Empire).

Efforts to unify the Turks in the Ottoman Empire were brought into existence upon the collapse of the abortive experiments with the supranational slogans of the Tanzimant period and the first phase of the Young Turks' revolution of 1908. As we have seen, Turkish nationalism (Turkism) emerged in Turkey as an indisputable ideal of the nation. The Pan-Turkist undercurrent, a natural and unavoidable consequence of Turkism, will be discussed in this chapter.

Demonstrations of Turkism and Pan-Turkism in the Russian orbit have been touched on in the historical sketches of this work. The rise of nationalism and Pan-Turkism in the eastern Turkish world will now be treated as one broad process embracing the more developed Turkish peoples of Russia. However, the prior inclusion of the history of Turkish nationalism is justified by the peculiar character of the development of Turkism and Pan-Turkism in Russia.

Any progress in Moslem culture and national life in the eastern Turkish world was organically connected with the trends, events, and inspirations emanating from the capital of the caliph and Turkish sultan. In the opinion of far-off Turko-Tatar peoples in Russia, he was the only independent and powerful ruler among the Turks. This natural attractiveness of Istanbul as a center of the Islamic and Turkish world produced many links between Moslem and Turkish revivalism and the Ottoman Empire, and in consequence, tinted the eastern Turks with Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkish concepts. This is why national and reform movements among the eastern Turks belong, in principle, within the scope of pan-ideals such as Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism.

The unusual character of nationalist trends in Russia is reflected in their strong mutual interdependence. They have blended into an amalgam of Pan-Islamic, national Turkish, and Pan-Turkish movements. This fusing of Turkism and Islamism in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is profound and natural. It is based on the palpable fact that the CIS Moslems are 90 percent Turks, and more than 90 percent of the Turks of the CIS are Moslems. In other words, the Turkish and the Moslem areas of the CIS envelop each other by more than 90 percent.

The non-Moslem Turkish peoples include the following groups based on the 1989 census:

Yakuts	382,255 (mostly Buddhists)[5]
Tuvinians	206,924 (mostly Buddhists)
Khakasses	81,428 (mostly Eastern Orthodox Christians)

Other non-Moslem Turks include Chuvashes, numbering 1.8 million, with the majority being Eastern Orthodox Christians. There are Christianized Kazan Tatars (Volga Tatars), as well as Christianized Bashkirs. The Gagaus Turks of Moldavia are mostly Eastern Orthodox Christians. There are also several thousand Turkish-speaking Jews.

Many of the small Siberian Turks (Dolgans, Khakasses, Altai, Shors, and Tofalar) are basically from Eastern Orthodox Christianity.[6] It may be estimated that only about three million Turks of the CIS are not Moslems. Yakuts, as well as other small Siberian Turkish tribes, are outlying primitive groups that are not part of substantial Pan-Turkist planning.

The Moslem non-Turkish peoples of the CIS include the following groups:

Tajiks (Indo-Iranian)	1,228,964 (1939) 4,216,693 (1989)
Certain North Caucasian tribes	1,500,000 (1939)[7] 1,700,000 (1989)

The North Caucasian tribes comprise Dagestanian tribes plus the Turkish tribes of the Kumyks and the Nogais. Moslems of non-Turkish origin in the CIS are under the strong influence of their Turkish environment. The Tajiks are bilingual and speak Uzbek and Tajik, especially in the towns and bigger settlements.[8] They were under the rule of the Turkish Uzbek Khanate of Bukhara and form part of the Independent United Turkestan objective of the Turkestanian emigration.[9]

The North Caucasian tribes of non-Turkish origin traditionally have adhered to the Turkish Empire. This was evidenced by the mass emigration of North Caucasians to Turkey after the occupation of their country by Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1917–18, Dagestan and other North Caucasian regions showed strong pro-Turkish sympathies, and the Turkish offensive in 1918, under Enver Pasha's brother, Nuri Pasha, was aimed at Dagestan. Turkish linguistic influence in North Caucasia was also strong. Besides Arabic, the lingua franca of the educated mullahs and ulemas, the Turkish Kumyk language, was in common use throughout the country.[10]

In the blending of Islamism with Pan-Turkism there is an explanation of the confusion in the use of these terms. Thus, for example, *Turkestanskoye Okhrannoye Otdelanye*, (The Turkestanian Security Office, a branch of the Russian Political Police), had in its 1913 files the following descriptions of Pan-Islamism: "Pan-Islamists do not have a strictly definite program. Their actual aim is political struggle with the existing regime of the [Russian] Empire. This regime, according to their view, is the chief obstacle in their attempts toward national self-determination of the Moslems."[11]

Thus, the essentially religious Pan-Islamist movement was defined in the political terms of the struggle for national self-determination. Soviet authors have stated that prerevolutionary documents concerning Pan-Islamism speak more about Pan-Turkism than about Pan-Islamism itself.[12] Stalin, the chief Soviet authority on the nationality problem, wrote in 1912–13:

> The rising tide of militant nationalism above the series of repressive measures taken by the "powers that be" in vengeance on the border regions for their "love of freedom," evoked an answering tide of nationalism below, which at times took the form of crude chauvinism in Poland and of Pan-Islamism among the Tatars, the spread of nationalism among the Armenians, Georgians and Ukrainians, the general tendency of the ordinary man to anti-Semitism, all these are generally known facts.[13]

Here Stalin used the term *Pan-Islamism* as a Turkish equivalent for Zionism among Jews, as an equivalent of Polish chauvinism, and as nationalism among the Armenians, Georgians and the Ukrainians.

In the resolutions of the Communist party of the former Soviet Union, which was adopted by the Tenth Congress in March 1921, both Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were treated as a source of deviation from communism toward "bourgeois democratic nationalism," which at times assumes the form of "Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism."[14]

The attitude of the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* toward Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism is also significant. It does not contain an article on Pan-Turkism, but only treats Pan-Islamism. A condensation of this article states:

Pan Islamism—is a religious political doctrine propagating a state unification of all Moslems under the leadership of a Caliph. . . . Pan-Islamist slogans were exploited by the independence and anti-feudal movement of the Caucasian Mountaineers (Kazi-Mulla and Shamil). At the end of the nineteenth century Djemal-ed-din-el-Afgani (died in 1896) was a leading ideologist of the movement. His teachings were exploited by British imperialists. Afgani was also very near to Sultan Abdul Hamid the Second and through the Sultan to imperialist circles of Germany. In 1911 to 1912, the Germans established a special Pan-Islamist center and Enver Pasha was one of the leaders of this center. Enver occupied at that time the post of Military Attaché in Berlin. The German Pan-Islamist center issued publications and organized a vast net of agents in Turkey, Iran and the Moslem areas in Russia.

Pan-Islamism was occasionally an important element of many bourgeois-nationalist organizations in Tsarist Russia and her colonies (for example: Ittifak-ul-Muslimin, Mussavat, Bukharian djadids). Pan-Islamism was actively exploited by both struggling camps in 1914 to 1918. In the colonies of Russia, England and France, leaflets were distributed against Germany and Turkey under the auspices of the Mufti of Orenburg, the British Moslem Association, and the Agha Khan. After the liquidation of the Caliphate in Turkey in 1924, Pan-Islamic propaganda was increased in the colonies. This propaganda was conducted chiefly by the Indian Caliphate center under the auspices of London. This center is organizing Pan-Islamist congresses in Mecca, Cairo and Jerusalem. . . .

After the 1917 revolution, Pan-Islamism became an instrument of the enemies of the former USSR. During the civil war bourgeois nationalists, White Guards and interventionists exploited Pan-Islamism to combat the former Soviet Union. One of the allies and tools of this activity was Enver Pasha.[15]

This is an example of filling the term *Pan-Islamism* with Pan-Turkish content, especially in the fragments concerning Enver Pasha, a leading Turkish Pan-Turkist, who is described by Soviet authors entirely in Pan-Islamic terms. In a book by Lavrenti Beria on the Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia, as well as in a Soviet history of the Eastern countries published in 1952, a similar confusion in terminology can be noted.[16]

In summation, the Russians often used the terms *Pan-Islamism* and *Pan-Turkism* interchangeably. This accords with the fusing of both concepts in the political and religious life of the Turks of Russia. There are three points to be stressed: First, revivalism and nationalism among the Turks in Russia have the characteristics of pan-movements and are primarily Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist. Second, the local tribal attempts at revival—that is, those confined within in-

dividual ethnic units—were ineffectual. Finally, on the other hand, those that ran parallel to the all Turkish trends were strong and relatively successful.

Turkism, Pan-Turkism, Islamism, and Pan-Islamism, are closely interrelated and often fuse in varying proportions. There is a terminological chaos in Russian sources reflecting the intermixture of nationalism with pan-movements among the Turks of the former USSR. Thus, Pan-Turkism was often hidden behind Islamism, Pan-Islamism, and certain other trends that are more limited in scope.

TURKISM AND PAN-TURKISM IN RUSSIA

Beginnings of the Movement: Mergani, Nasiri, and Feizkhani

The Turkish awakening in Russia began in the middle of the nineteenth century and was initially confined to religious and educational problems. Sihabeddin Mergani (or Mercani), who is considered to have been the most influential reformer of Islam in Russia, started the long process of secularization of Turkish life that was indispensable to national revival. He was born near Kazan in 1815 and was educated in Bukhara and Samarkand (1838–49). He returned to his native Kazan where he died in 1889.[17] Mergani urged a rapprochement with Western culture and argued that Islam and the West were not incompatible. The ideological doctrine of Mergani may be summarized in six principles:

1. Everyone must find in his own mind the answers to the religious questions in the Koran;
2. The teaching of the Koran, the Hadith, and the history of Islam should be introduced in the schools;
3. It is necessary to return to the foundations of Islam;
4. Blind obedience must be terminated;
5. Formal and medieval curricula ought to be eliminated from the schools; and
6. European knowledge, as well as instruction in the Russian language, should not be opposed.[18]

The lifework of Mergani was highly praised by the radical and nationalist leaders of the Kazan Tatars. Mergani was the first to fight against dry ritualism and the suppression of women, and he was the first to promote the teaching of the native Tatar Turkish language.[19] His work was an important first step in the broad national revival of the Turko Tatars of Russia. Dissemination of his teachings was made easier by the fact that Mergani had been born and worked in Kazan, the most dynamic and enlightened Turko Tatar center in Russia. Tatar merchants in the second half of the nineteenth century traveled all over Russia, and Kazan Tatar factories and shops were in every eastern town of the empire.

In Turkestan, in the Kazakh steppes, in Bashkiria, and along the Middle and Lower Volga, as well as in other neighboring regions, there were strong Kazan Tatar colonies.[20] The instruction of the famous reformer united and inspired a great number of disciples and successors.[21]

Kayyum Nasiri (or Abdul Kayyum Nasiri) (1824–1902), who was nine years younger than Mergani, played a similar role. However, to a certain extent he was still more radical than Mergani. After his *medresse* (school) years, instead of choosing the profession of seven generations of his forefathers, that of mullah, he accepted a position as a teacher of the Tatar language in a Russian Orthodox Seminary (1855–71). Afterward, until 1876, he was a teacher in the model Tatar primary school attached to the Teachers' High School at Kazan. The rest of his life he spent as a private teacher and an independent writer.[22]

Nasiri collected the popular literature of the Kazan Tatars and published it in two encylopaedic collections. He also wrote the *Tatar Phonetic Dictionary and Manual of Grammar*. His most important achievement, from the viewpoint of the development of national feeling among the Kazan Tatars, was the publication of calendars utilizing portions of his collection of popular literature.[23] The calendars had the character of a periodical and were published after the Russian government refused permission for a Tatar paper.[24] In his writings, Nasiri used the Kazan Tatar-Turkish language (with some Ottoman and Chagatai influences) and aimed at elevating it to a literary language that was understandable to the masses.[25]

The third noted reformer, Huseyin Feizkhani (1826–66), was born near Simbirsk, which is known today as Ulianovsk (Lenin's birthplace). He was a European-educated scholar and Orientalist who advocated the Europeanization of Tatar culture and the unrestricted modernization of the school system and curricula.[26]

The Tanzimat period in Ottoman Turkey had a very important influence on the modernist movement among the Russian Turks, especially in the Kazan Tatar area. There was a strong cultural rapprochement between liberal Ottoman circles and the Kazan Tatar reformers. In testimony of the spiritual and cultural interrelation in Turkish society, Ayas Ishaky stated: "In the struggle against old tradition, Turko-Tatar progressivists have been supported morally by the reforms which have been going on in Ottoman Turkey."[27]

The reforms in the Turko Tatar society in Russia, in the period of activity of the above-mentioned personalities, were mainly confined to the schools. The modernization of school methods and the elimination of old scholastic and purely religious teachings were the central aims of the reformers and their supporters. On the other side of the barricade stood the reactionary partisans of the old medieval society, but some Moslem religious leaders and many ordinary mullahs upheld the reformers.[28]

The trend toward modernism and Westernism among the Turko Tatars sometimes forced some of their leaders to go too far in collaboration with the only available representatives of modern and European civilization, the Russians. The

Kazakh leader, Chokan Velikhan, is a significant example. He was brought up in a very culturally limited Kazakh nomadic environment and became a greater admirer of Russian liberalism and the West. He started by trying to cleanse the Turkish tradition from the accretions brought by the Moslem religion and to attune it to a new synthesis that he admired in Russia. He graduated from the Russian War Academy and was a friend of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, but his Russian career ended and his Turkish patriotism (or nationalism) then erupted violently. His pro-Russian ideals disappeared as he observed the Russian policy of colonization and the suffering of his own people.

His career resembles that of Kayyum Nasiri, who also began as a Russian official and a teacher at the Russian Orthodox Seminary, and afterwards retired into private teaching and literary work. Like Nasiri, who collected popular literary works, Chokan Velikhan was the first to study the Kirghiz Manas epic, and he transcribed parts of it into literary Turkish. His greatest contribution was to make popular the ballads of the famous singers who loved the old Turkish tradition.[29]

In more recent times, Turkic national sentiment has been reflected in local literature. The Kirghiz novelist Chingiz Aitmatov, in a novel written in Russian in 1980, stressed his deep attachment to his Turkic heritage. He deplored modernization in the Soviet form, which deprives people of their individuality. While favoring the teaching of Russian in the schools, he felt this should not be done at the expense of the native language and literature. A moderate, he has emerged as a political leader who favors independence within the framework of a Russian federation.

Another example is Mamadali Makhmudov, who criticized the Russian conquest of Central Asia in the nineteenth century in a piece published in an Uzbek literary magazine. This article, entitled *Almas Qaialar* (Immortal cliffs), gained him renown.

Most Turkic writers were careful in their statements not to risk trouble with the authorities. They made sure to criticize Stalin while praising Lenin, and other such devices. In general, articles in journals were not censored as much as items that appeared in newspapers with wider distribution.

Arsharuni and Gabidullin saw the beginnings of Pan Turkism in these reform movements of the Russian Moslems. Modernization of the schools and rapprochement with "the new times" became a slogan uniting the Turko Tatar "bourgeoisie." Mergani, Naziri, and others were in reality inexperienced beginners not yet comprehending the ultimate aims of their work, and the real leader of the All-Turkish movement in Russia was Ismail Bey Gaspirali (in Russian, Gasprinskiy). The whole organization of the All-Turkish modernist movement and its political leadership in Russia was in the hands of this Crimean *murza* who was apparently chosen by fate to be the spiritual leader of the Pan-Turkist movement in Russia during his entire life.[30]

Gerhard von Mende, the author of a comprehensive history of the national struggle of the Turks of Russia, devoted a great number of pages to Gaspirali.[31] Ayas Ishaky was of the opinion that Gaspirali's role in the modernization of the

Tatar school system, in the unification of the Turkish Tatar languages, and in similar reforms "is exceptionally great."[32] One of the most influential and cultured leaders of the Turko Tatar émigrés, Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer, wrote a volume devoted to Gaspirali.[33] Zeki Velidi Togan, a professor at Istanbul University and one of the émigré leaders of the Turks from Russia, paid great homage to Gaspirali in his voluminous history of modern Turkestan.[34]

ISMAIL GASPIRALI

Ismail Gaspirali (1851–1914) was born in the village of Gaspra near Bakhchisaray in Crimea in a moderately well-to-do family.[35] His early education was obtained in a village medresse, and from there he was sent to the Moscow Military (secondary) School. He finished only five of the eight grades of this school and then returned to Bakhchisaray in 1866.

The years of 1871–75 he spent in Paris and Constantinople. In 1877, after returning to Crimea, he worked as a teacher in a primary school. He edited the first alphabet based on phonetics and prepared a project of a school curricula. Gaspirali became the mayor of Bakhchisaray and simultaneously began his literary activity. He was the author of several pamphlets and, in 1881, he began publishing a small paper, *Tonguc*. On April 23, 1885, after long preparation, he received permission to publish the weekly *Terğuman-Perevodchik*, which was famous in the modern history of the Turks of Russia. *Terğuman* (in modern Turkish, *Tercuman*, or in Russian, *Pereovodchik*) means *interpreter*. Until 1905, this was the only important All-Turkish paper in all of Russia. It played an "enormous historical role" in the sociopolitical life of the Turkish peoples of Russia.[36]

In addition to *Terğuman*, Gaspirali wrote and published several books. In all his publications he defended the right of the Russian Turks to a free cultural development. He promoted the spiritual and cultural unity of the Turks of Russia and the necessity for the general education of both sexes in modernized schools. It was through his efforts that the schools introduced the study of the Koran in Arabic, as well as the natural sciences, history, and geography, and above all, he gave proper attention to the Turkish languages. About five thousand schools among the Russian Turks were organized along the curricula proposed by Gaspirali. He took part in many congresses and conferences organized by Turkish leaders in Russia, and his activity took him to Islamic countries beyond the Russian borders. He traveled in India and Egypt and stimulated revival in many Islamic centers. Gaspirali was an initiator of the All-Islamic Congress in Cairo in 1908, which dealt with the problems of decline of the Islamic world, and tried to find a method of Islamic regeneration in the sphere of morality and sociology.[37]

The eastern travels of Gaspirali and other Russian Moslems were known to the Oriental Islamic intellectuals, and the role and influence of their Moslem brothers from Russia was appreciated. The Arab paper *Liva*, in its issue of

November 3, 1907, declared that if a revival of the Islamic world should materialize, it would be due to the activity of the Russian Moslems.[38] The personal role of Gaspirali in this period in the east, especially through the Congress of 1908, was recognized by the periodical *Moslem World*, which stated:

> Some of the more thoughtful foreign students at Al-Azhar have been Russian Moslems. Indeed, I suspect that that very unprogressive university has itself proved quite unsatisfying to such men. Russian Moslems figured at the Mecca International Conference for the reform of Islam. It is a Russian Moslem, Mr. Gasprinski, who has taken the lead in the matter of the proposed Second Conference.[39]

By avoiding any direct contact with current politics and concentrating his efforts in the cultural field and in editing *Terğuman*, Gaspirali promoted his slogan of "unity in language and in spirit."

Gaspirali's Conflict of Soul

The teachings of Gaspirali give a first impression of being contradictory and chaotic fragments of opinions that were popular in his environment around the 1850s. Togan, and Sir Olaf Caroe after him, tended to increase this impression since Togan emphasized the early influences of Russian liberal and Pan-Slavic literature and quoted fragments of Gaspirali's early articles, which were written as long as seventy-five years ago and are not easily understandable in our times. Gaspirali wrote, in the nineteenth century, that the Eastern peoples cannot trust the democracy of the West because great atrocities and cruelties were committed by Western governments. Europe was undermined by socialism, which foretold the end of the West. Gaspirali's style and ideas were Russian Slavophilic, with the exception of his belief that the rescue of the West lay in Islamic morality.[40]

There were still stronger pro-Russian accents in Gaspirali's early writings. Before the Russian conquest of Turkmenistan, he expressed the astonishing opinion that Russia should annex that area since Russia was the heir to the former Tatar possessions. He even predicted that Russia would be one of the greatest Moslem states in the world. He believed the situation of the Moslems in Russia was much better than in the Moslem colonies of the Western powers. At the same time, Gaspirali complained about Russian mistakes in its Moslem policy and strongly attacked Russian lack of interest in the education of Moslem peoples and their material betterment, resulting in their emigration from Russia to Turkey. The Tatars should have the same rights as Russians, and relations between them should be sincere. Russia should help them achieve a high standard of living and give up the idea of Russianization.

In the past, the Tatars had rendered great services to the Russians and taught them how to rule over great states. Gaspirali exclaimed:

> I believe that in the future the Russian Moslems shall be more civilized than any other Moslem nations. We are a steady nation, give us the possibility to learn. You, great

brothers, give us knowledge. The sciences should be admitted to the Tatar schools, and in the Tatar language. New schools should be erected in Baku, Tashkent, Kazan, etc. The teachers should be graduated from an especially organized Russian Eastern University, in the same way as in India, where the pupils are educated in Indian schools, and in the Indian language. The Russians and Moslems shall come to an understanding in this way.[41]

Caroe popularized Togan's view and stated:

He was taken up as a promising young Turk, and went through the Russian War Academy, where he was influenced by the liberalism of the middle nineteenth century. His life's work was to appeal to the Russians in a spirit of brotherly loving kindness to forsake policies of assimilation, while attracting the Turks to what was good in Russian civilization.[42]

To illustrate the conflict in the soul of Gaspirali, Caroe quoted a moving passage by Togan:

I came across Gaspirali's book in the home of Ebubekir Agha, in Russian service. I remember saying to him that Ismail Bey [Gaspirali] had been too servile: the Russians had abolished slavery, but introduced a new slavery in its place. It was dangerous for us to encourage the Russians to approach us in the guise of a big brother, creep into our hearts, give us decorations and uniforms, make love to us in order to betray us. It was better for the future of the colonial peoples to refrain from close mingling, as the English did. Ebubekir replied—"The ideas of that period were rather different; moreover, had Ismail Bey said that, his book would never have passed the censorship. In bad times he brought us at least some comfort," and smiling sweetly, he played on his harmonium some old Bashkurd melodies, more beautifully than I could have imagined. His own eyes, and the eyes of his wife, filled with tears.[43]

Contemporary Turko Tatar authors do not like to mention the early pro-Russian periods in the life of Gaspirali.[44] They may be justified because there was no other way for Gaspirali to work in his field without disarming Russian suspicions.[45] Most probably, his pro-Russian writings were a manifestation of his tactics: to pretend to be friendly with the Russians and to pay this price for a degree of freedom. There is some proof also of Gaspirali's capacity for maintaining his burning and sensitive Turkish nationalism and yet enduring a Russian environment in his school years, and afterwards in Bakhchisaray. In Moscow, his schoolmates were the children of Russian nationalists and Pan-Slavists. By chance, he spent a summer vacation with the family of M. N. Kathov (1818–87), who was one of the most conservative Russian publicists, and in his later period of activity, a supporter of a "strong-hand policy" toward the national and racial minorities of the empire.[46] In this environment, Gaspirali's feelings were exposed only once: In his period in the Moscow Military gymnasium, when his schoolmates were volunteering for service with the Greek partisans (to take part in the revolt in Crete against the Turks), Gaspirali secretly escaped to Turkey and tried to join the Turkish army.[47] For some unknown reason he was not

accepted. Ishaky analyzed the "Russian" period in the life of Gaspirali in few words, but apparently objectively:

> Ismail Bey by some chance came across the exact center of Pan-Slavism. Profound knowledge of the idea of Pan-Slavism, unending talks about this movement and the absolutely sincere articles of Katkov dealing with this idea, naturally, evoked many questions in the mind of Gaspirali, and among others, the future of his own nation. . . . Thus, the formation of the political views of Ismail Bey occurred during his school years in the Moscow Military School, and with his acquaintances in the Pan Slavic milieu.[48]

Mende gave a portrait of a man without any internal conflicts, a man of positive and creative work who was not interested in fighting but who devoted his life to national revival. Katkov and his Russian friends, through their zeal for Pan-Slavism, influenced Gaspirali strongly to serve his own nation in an analogous way. His stay in Turkey and in Western Europe inspired him toward raising his people to the level of the West. Practically, this aim could be achieved through the extension of education to the masses; school reform and modernization of the curricula were thus the focal points of his program.[49]

A deeper element in his philosophy of revival was the linguistic and spiritual unification of all the Turks. The starting point is the obvious fact of linguistic divergencies among the individual Turkish dialects. At the Third Congress of Moslems of Russia in 1906, Gaspirali said: "In the evolution of our languages we have to come to such a point that we do not understand each other. Schools must open the way for our language and for our literature. It must bring us to a common understanding."[50]

The idea of a common language was understood by Gaspirali as one shared by all Turks from Crimea to Herat and from Constantinople to Kashgar, and not only for the educated, but for the simple people as well. He tried to create an All-Turkish language out of his own Crimean Turkish, which was under the strong influence of Ottoman Turkish. He simplified the artificialty of the Constantinople dialect and avoided all Russian influences.[51]

Terğuman became the mouthpiece for Gaspirali's activity, and it achieved a position as the central organ of all the Turks of Russia and, to some extent, beyond the borders of the empire. Through *Terğuman*, a Turk from Kazan was informed about the needs of kinspeople in Kashgar. The paper became a living proof of unity in language, in deed, and in thought.

Gaspirali's aims were fourfold: school reform on the European pattern, creation of a common Turkish language, liberation of Moslem women, and establishment of charitable institutions for the advancement of education.[52] The achievements in all these fields were great. The main slogan of Gaspirali, in Ishaky's translation, was: "Uniform ideology, unity of efforts, common language."[53] Intelligentsia of Crimea and Kazan were fostering the idea of unity, and the same ideology penetrated into the Caucasus and Turkestan. Their literature promoted national ideals, in spite of censorship, and the Tatar Turkish language developed. Europeanized schools increased in number at an astonishing tempo.

An important preoccupation of Gaspirali (after the idea of the unity and revival of the Turko Tatars) was the question of Islam. In his conviction, the Islamic religion was part and parcel of the Turko Tatar national culture. His views on religion were very liberal and progressive and similar to those of Mergani; it is hard to say which of the two components of the Turko Tatar entity were more important to him, nationality or religion. On the one hand, Gaspirali saw in the resistance to Russification a precondition for the existence of the nation. This aim should be attained with the Europeanization of education and Turko Tatar life. On the other hand, he felt that modernization of the Islamic world was the only solution for the future. The Islamic and national trends were blended, and it was only after the formation of national feeling that the difference between these two directions became visible.[54] The community of religion never was forgotten, because Islam, even when criticized most severely, represented an outstanding trait of the Turks. In fighting the backward Moslem clergy, Gaspirali used their own methods and referred frequently to the Koran since it united both the clergy and the modernists.

Gaspirali avoided politics since he well understood that anti-Russian political action would be crushed with the utmost severity. In delivering his speeches, Gaspirali used an Aesopian style, omitting charged words and extreme slogans. Nonetheless, his ideas and work became the foundation of the broad cultural political trend of *usul-i-gedid* (the modernists' movement), which struggled against the religious and cultural backwardness of the Turko Tatars of Russia until the first Russian revolution of 1905.[55] Arsharuni and Gabidullin have asserted that this movement embraced the whole Turko Tatar bourgeoisie and that *djadidism* (Russified term, ğedid) was the slogan that

> became the foundation of the Pan Turkist movement in Russia. This movement exists up to the present [1931]. Organization of the *djadid* movement on an All-Turkish scale in Russia and the political direction of this movement was without doubt in the hands of the Crimean *murza* Ismail Gasprinski. . . .
>
> Pan-Turkism was formed in an evolutionary way. Arising in the eighties of the nineteenth century with the publication of *Terğuman*, this movement found perfect soil in Crimea, in the Kazan area, and afterwards, in Central Asia. The idea of Pan-Turkism, according to the views of its founders, consists in the postulate of the unification of the Turkish tribes living in Russia. This aim should be achieved, at first, by the creation of a common literary language and culture, and afterwards by a political organization for the struggle toward national revival.[56]

THE DJADID MOVEMENT

The *Djadid* (Modernists) movement was started by Merğani's reform of Islam in Russia, and Nasiri, Feizkhani, and others were among its chief supporters. Gaspirali supplied the movement with a concrete program, and under his guidance, the religious reform aspect was changed into a practical activism that aimed at the development of the populace, modernized education, unification of the

language, and general cultural progress. The Czarist government was penetrating enough to understand the hidden nationalist intentions of the leaders of the movement and especially their moves toward Turkish political unity; accordingly, they defined it as Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist. The Russians treated both pan-movements as being manifestations of Ottoman Turkish inspiration and influence.[57]

The external expressions of *Djadism* (modernism) were rather mild and, being careful and experienced citizens of a huge, centralized, and harsh "polizei staat," their leaders always pretended to be loyal to the Czar. Declarations of this loyalty served as a protective shield, yet in spite of efforts to be moderate and loyal, the anti-Russian and antigovernmental essence of the Djadid movement showed itself even in clerical Moslem institutions. Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamic propaganda was centered in the big medresse that prepared teachers and mullahs, including the Muhamediye medresse Kazan, the Haliye in Ufa, the Husainiye in Orenburg (Chkalov), and the Rasuliye in Troitsk. These feelings were sometimes shown in purely revolutionary ways: forbidden publications from Constantinople were distributed, students sang "criminal songs" in which Turkey was extolled, portraits of the Czar were profaned, and so on.[58]

The Russian police severely persecuted all political criminals and tried to divide the Turko Tatar society into two opposing groups. These were supporters of the "ancien régime," the Kadimists, and the modernists, or *Djadids*, who promoted national ideals and fought the idea of class struggle.[59] The Kadimists, a counteraction called forth by the unprogressive and conservative sections of the Moslem clergy, proved to be a useful tool in the hands of the Russian government. They were supported by the most backward and fanatical members of the Turko Tatar society, those who fought reforms and modernization. All known sources (Soviet as well as Tatar nationalists) have emphasized the destructive role of the Kadimist movement. The struggle between these two factions was so fierce that the Kadimists sometimes contacted the political police and helped the Russians combat the nationalists.[60] This fierceness had a deep basis in the two hundred-year-old Russian policy of wooing Islam, which had created a cadre of supporters of the Czarist regime among the Moslem clergy. The government's tool, the Moslem Spiritual Council (directorate), was established in 1788 in Orenburg and afterwards was transferred to Ufa. The Muftis were nominated by the minister of internal affairs from among the most loyal and pro-Russian sections of the clergy, and the state recognized mullahs had to be loyal governmental officers.[61] Even as late as 1913, for example, the power of Kadimism was seen when the emir of Bukhara closed all the modern Islamic schools in his vassal principality.[62]

Kadimism was supported by the Russians because they knew that unprogressive, traditional, and medieval Islamism was not dangerous for their state. The well-known Russian missionary, Ilminskiy, in one of his letters to Pobedenostsev, the procurator of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, expressed the opinion that it was better to leave the old Tatar schools as they were

and to forbid the Tatar youth from entering Russian high schools. European education of the Tatars was harmful for the state, since while one Tatar pupil in the Russian high school might embrace Orthodoxy, another, more significantly, might write a novel in the Tatar language.[63] The same opinion was expressed by Zarevand, who felt that the Russian government sided with the clerical and conservative leaders who defended "stationary Mohammedanism," and arrested and sent to Siberia such supporters of Gaspirali as the brothers Bobinsky and Ahmed Tukhtabayev.[64]

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905

The Russian-Japanese War of February 8, 1904, to September 5, 1905, inspired the whole Turkish world, and especially the Turko Tatars of the Kazan Area. Japanese victory and the moral and political defeat of Russia were seen by the Turko Tatars as offering a partial solution to their problems. During the war, the illegal political party Hürriyet (Freedom) was organized, which had a radical and national program embracing many representatives of the Turko Tatar intelligentsia. The organization conducted strong antigovernmental propaganda, and with the help of its periodical (also called *Hürriyet*), urged desertions from the Russian army.[65]

The Russian defeat and the ensuing abortive revolution of 1905 to 1906 opened new possibilities for legal and open propaganda by the Turko Tatar nationalists. In Kazan, Crimea, and some other neighboring regions, this propaganda brought about an avalanche of political events. The Kazan Tatars and others organized three All-Turkish Congresses, several political parties, and many periodicals, including a number of dailies. Turko Tatars took part in the elections for the newly established Russian parliament (Duma), and many of their delegates were elected.[66]

One of the most spectacular events in the Turko Tatar life of Russia in the period of the 1905 revolution was the First All-Moslem Congress of August 1905, which had long been the dream of the Turko Tatars.[67] Nizhniy Novgorod (Gorkiy) on the Volga, the location of the annual All-Russian Fairs, was chosen as the meeting place for the Congress, and in August 1905, it was overcrowded with merchants, businesspeople, and general visitors to the great fair. Nearly all the Turko Tatar leaders in Russia arrived, and Crimea, Kazan, Turkestan, and the Caucasus, were represented. The local governor did not permit the congress to organize, so, in order to avoid the secret police, it was held on the river ship *Gustav Struve* under the pretext of a pleasure trip on the Oka River. This conference was known as the "Congress on the Waters," and it brought together about 150 Turko Tatar leaders and representatives. The initiators of the congress were Rashid Ibrahimov (a very moderate Turko Tatar leader), Gaspirali, and others. In general, the congress was composed of moderate and liberal Turks. The leftists and radicals were represented by Ayas Ishaky and his group, while the most extreme leftists were absent.

The decisions of the Congress were important. It was decided to organize an *Ittifak* (union) uniting all the Moslems of Russia, irrespective of social divisions and classes. The protocol of the congress was issued on August 15, 1905, in the name of the delegates from all the provinces of Russia, representing all classes of the Turko Tatar population. It maintained the necessity of uniting the Moslem peoples of Russia in order to solve their important sociological, cultural, and political problems. The Congress decided to create an executive committee in Baku and to have local executive committees in the other Turko Tatar centers.[68]

The delegates emphasized that they sought the realization of other aims in consonance with the general interests of the Russian Empire.[69] This accent of loyalty was dictated by tactical reasons, since the Tatars were afraid to speak openly about their Pan-Turkist program before the proper conditions had been created. Russia was still a very strong power, and any signs of separatism or irredentism brought persecution and prompt arrest of the culprits.[70]

The revolution and the Czar's manifesto of March 3, 1905, promising to convoke a consultative assembly, brought preparations for the election of the first Russian Duma. The Turko Tatar leaders held a second All-Moslem Congress on January 13–23, 1906, in St. Petersburg to prepare a program of activity in connection with the general elections. About one hundred leaders and politicians participated and the constitution of the Ittifak organization was discussed, as well as the plans for Turko Tatar participation in the general elections. In the elections it was decided to unite the Turko Tatar voters with the votes of the Russian Constitutional Democratic party (abridged by the public into "Cadets")—probably the most reasonable and practicable course.[71] The Cadets were a party organized by P. Milyukov, the famous Russian politician and historian who had succeeded in uniting many liberals and moderate professionals. This party was the only one that had a clear conception of parliamentary tactics, and as a result, it gained over 150 seats and dominated the Duma. The program of the party advocated the introduction of a constitutional and parliamentary regime.[72]

The Third Congress of Ittifak was convoked on August 16, 1906, at Makariev, near Nizhniy Novgorod, and eight hundred delegates took part. This time the government gave permission for the congress because of intervention by the Moslem fraction of the Duma. Correspondents of Tatar and Russian papers were present, and the congress was well publicized. Ali Merdan Topçibaşi was elected chairman, and Yusuf Akçoraoğlu (Akchurin) read the general address and emphasized that, until 1903, the Russian government had discriminated against the non-Christian population. Akçoraoğlu felt that at the time, the situation was somewhat better, but that none of the government's promises had yet materialized. The conservative parties still existed and strove to reintroduce the status quo ante. He urged the creation of a Tatar party based on the principles of nationality and the Islamic religion.

A statute for the Ittifak organization was approved that sought the unity of all the Moslems of Russia in one party. They demanded equal citizenship rights for

Moslems and the introduction of a constitutional monarchy and parliament. The number of members of parliament should be in proportion to the numbers of the individual nationalities of the empire. Freedom of speech, publishing, association, and religion, as well as social reforms, also were sought. The congress elected a fifteen-person Central Committee of the Ittifak, including Rashid Ibrahimov, Yusuf Akçoraoğlu, S. Aklin, Ali Merdan Topçibaşi, and Ismail Gaspirali.[73]

The moderation and submissiveness of the Ittifak party in relation to the Czarist regime has been criticized.[74] The program of Ittifak, it is true, was the same as that of the Cadets, but the spirit of the party was Turko Tatar and national.[75] A more valid position is that the Ittifak congress officially was occupied with educational and cultural topics, but unofficially was concerned with national and political questions. However, even the official resolutions indicated political and Pan-Turkist inclinations and were marked by attempts to establish close contact with Turkey. Moreover, the language question was boldly faced. It was decided to introduce an All-Turkish literary language for all the Russian Turko Tatars based on the Constantinople Turkish dialect. The congress was against compulsory teaching of the Russian language in schools having Turko Tatar children, and a Turkish school curricula was sought for Tatar schools in Russia. In several Russian towns (for example, St. Petersburg, Tiflis, Orenburg, Tomsk, Astrakhan, and in Crimea), daily Turkish-language newspapers were established. These papers carried on open Turkophile propaganda until the Russian government retaliated by closing some of them.[76]

During the same period, Turko Tatar political action occurred outside the Ittifak party. The Tanchi party of the Social Revolutionaries was organized, as was the Social Democratic party. All these parties, including the Hürriyet party, published their own papers and journals.

A significant role was played in Turko Tatar life by the many Moslem Benevolent Societies, which were officially apolitical, but actually did conduct political activity. After the recurrence of an adverse reaction to their political activities in 1907, these societies took part in the elections for the Russian Duma under various names. There were also two secret youth organizations uniting the active Turko Tatar students of Kazan, Crimea, and Siberia. One of these was the Shakirdlik organization, which published its secret organ, *Terraki* (Progress), in Kazan. The program of this organization was antiCzarist and advocated the unity of the nation in order to fight for independence. Organized in 1901, it was liquidated by the police after some years of activity. After the revolution of 1905, a terrorist youth society was created for the special purpose of liquidating Russian spies and provocateurs in the Turko Tatar ranks.[77] There was also an organization of *shakirds* (medresse teachers) working for school reform as well as the economic betterment of teachers.[78] In spite of political differences in their party programs, they were united in action to preserve the national character of the Turko Tatar nation and to secure broad self-government. This spirit of unity was evidenced in the Russian Duma by the formation of a united Turko Tatar

Club, which for tactical reasons was called the Moslem Club (faction), and which defended the interests of all Moslems of Russia.[79]

The postrevolutionary period of political prosperity for the Turko Tatars was short-lived; the empire regained strength after its defeat in the war with Japan, and the results of the revolution were overcome. The rightist and conservative portions of Russian society regained their self-confidence and began a counter-offensive. The new electoral law of June 16, 1907, increased the Duma representation of the propertied classes and reduced that of the national minorities. The number of Turko Tatar deputies in the Duma was greatly reduced, as the following figures show:[80]

First Duma of 1906	25 deputies
Second Duma of 1907	35 deputies
Third Duma of 1907	10 deputies
Fourth Duma of 1912	6 deputies

Administrative restrictions were announced, which were aimed at checking the free development of Turko Tatar political life and preventing their unification. A special regulation forbade Kazan Tatar teachers from teaching in the Kazakh steppes and in Turkestan. In the Kazan area, heavy restraints hindered the opening of new Tatar secular schools and limited the introduction of nonreligious subjects in religious schools. Mullahs with non-Russian certificates (those who had completed their religious education in countries such as Turkey, India, Egypt, or Arabia) were refused the right to practice their profession in Russia. Censorship of the Turko Tatar periodicals was reintroduced by administrative regulation, and the number of Turko Tatar members on town councils was reduced.[81]

British diplomatic correspondence of December 1910 expressed the anxiety of the Czar over the "Pan-Islamic" propaganda carried on by the mullahs in Turkestan.[82] A Foreign Office dispatch dated January 3, 1911, replying to the British envoy in St. Petersburg, stated:

> There is no doubt that the Russians are becoming uneasy in regard to this movement and Benckendorff [embassy official] left with me the other day a series of questions, which I have passed to the India Office, as to what steps we were taking in India towards controlling and influencing the instruction which was given in our Moslem schools. When I was in Russia, I ascertained that the Young Turks were carrying on a fairly active propaganda in the South of Russia and in Turkestan.[83]

It was clear to the Turko Tatar leaders that the united efforts of the Turks of Russia were not strong enough to achieve their national aims. Without help from abroad, it was impossible to liberate themselves from Russian domination or to unite with their conationals abroad. The only foreign state that was in a position to assist was Ottoman Turkey, and thus it was necessary to improve contacts with the Turkish government. These motives, as well as the Russian restrictions,

provoked the emigration to Constantinople of a number of important leaders, including Yusuf Akçoraoğlu (1876–1933), Ali Hüseyinzade (Turan) (1864–1941), Ayas Ishaky (1878–1954), and others who are less well known.[84]

PAN-TURKISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Antecedents of the Movement

The arrival of Turko Tatar leaders from Russia, the suppression of liberalism in Russia after 1907, and the approach of the 1914–18 war resulted in the shifting of the center of gravity of Pan-Turkism from Russia to Turkey. This does not mean that before these occurrences there were no prior relations between the Ottoman Turks and their eastern relatives. In the fifteenth century, some indications of an all-Turkish rapprochement among the major Turkish states may be seen in the diplomatic history of EuroAsia and the Near East. In 1480 Moscow liberated itself from the Golden Horde, and in 1487 Ivan the Third (1462–1505) temporarily occupied Kazan, the capital of the Kazan Khanate, and put his own puppet, Muhammad Amin, on the throne. The virtual vassalage of the Kazan Khanate to Moscow provoked the dissatisfaction of the Kazan aristocracy. This was exploited by the Ottomans as a means to intervene in the internal affairs of the khanate and to facilitate organization of a bloc embracing the Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimean khanates, plus the Nogai Horde and the Ottoman state.[85] The broad plan was to surround Moscow from the south and east and then destroy it, but this did not completely materialize.

A second experiment aimed at a wide Turkish unity was undertaken in 1518 when Muhammad Amin, the last scion of the Kazan Ulu Muhammad dynasty died, and Moscow again managed to enthrone its own puppet, Shah Ali. Three years later, in 1521, when Crimean troops appeared in Kazan, the pre-Muscovite khan escaped with Russian protection and the throne of the khanate was then occupied by Sahib Giray, a member of the Crimean Giray house. This change made possible a joint anti-Muscovite military expedition by the Kazan and Crimean khanates, which was supported by Lithuania. These events were described by Russian historians as the entrance of the Kazan Khanate into the Ottoman Crimean bloc. It should be added that in 1475, Crimea became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, and in 1524, the Kazan Khanate was recognized as an Ottoman protectorate.[86]

The Kazan Khanate was conquered by Moscow in 1552, and the Astrakhan Khanate was occupied in 1556. These events caused further indications of Turkish unity. Pilgrims from Bukhara and Khiva asked the sultan to liberate Kazan and Astrakhan from the Russians. According to the reports of the Russian ambassador in the Crimea, Nagoy, these appeals incited the sultan to conquer Astrakhan, a place of great commercial importance.[87]

Disunity and Internal Struggles. Early moves toward broad Turkish reconciliation were generally accidental and superficial. In contrast, internal struggles

and disunity in the Turkish world were spectacular. One of the greatest Turkish rulers, Timur (1333–1405), himself administered crushing blows to two of the most prominent Turkish states. The Golden Horde never fully recovered from Timur's victorious attack in 1395. The last blow to this decaying empire was administered in 1502 by an ally of Moscow, the Crimean khan, Mengli Giray. A shattering military disaster in Ottoman history occurred when Timur defeated and captured Sultan Bayazit (1389–1403) at the battle of Angora in 1402. This event helped cause a fifty-year delay in the capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans.[88]

The Turk's Awakening. The conquest of Crimea in 1783 again made the Ottoman Turks aware of the growing pressure of the Slavic Empire. The Crimean conquest resulted in the emigration of a great number of Crimeans and their resettlement in Ottoman territories. Many representatives of the ruling class in Crimea arrived in Constantinople and were greeted as suffering brothers, or "double brothers," who were united by ties of religion, language, and culture.[89]

A more radical turn of events was initiated in the early nineteenth century when the Russians began to penetrate into Central Asia, Persia, and the Caucasus. The Russian-Turkish wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw Russian attempts to gain Constantinople and the Straits and to reestablish the Armenian Kingdom in Turkish Armenia. Attempts at a virtual protectorate over the Holy Land, as well as Pan-Slavic ambitions, all foretold the future destruction of the Ottoman Empire.[90] After Napoleon's defeat, Russia was an important power in the West as well as the East.

This Russian expansionism put the eastern Turks and the Ottoman Empire in a similar position. The subjugated eastern Turks were endangered with increased Russian colonization and Russifying pressure, while the western Turks faced a possible dismemberment of the empire and the occupation of Constantinople. France and England were also concerned by the growth of Russian ambitions. A counteraction to Russian imperialism was developed by the Ottoman Empire and Western powers. The Turkish-Russian war and the Crimean campaign (1853–56) united the Ottoman Empire with the West, checked Russian expansion at least in Western Asia and Europe, and removed Russian preponderance in the Black Sea.[91] Earlier, in the middle of the nineteenth century, a religious and cultural, and, later, political, revival began in the more civilized portions of the Turkish world. This revival carried with it the desire for independence and national existence and climaxed in the Turkist and Pan-Turkist movements in the twentieth century.

The Role of Western Turkologists and Turkophiles

In the political awakening of the Ottoman Turks, a significant role was played by Western Turkologists and Turkophiles.[92] In the middle of the eighteenth century, *A General History of the Huns, the Turks and the Mongols* was published in France by J. de Guignes.[93] In the early nineteenth century, a first grammar

of the Turkish language in English and French was also printed.[94] The grammars of the Turkish language generally contained a map of the Turkish peoples in Anatolia, Russia, the Balkans, and the Near East, as well as descriptions of their language affinities and dialects, which tended to stimulate the idea of Turkish unity.[95]

An important role in the awakening of Turkish pan-nationalism was played by a Polish political emigrant in Turkey, Konstanty Borzecki (1826–76), who, under the assumed name of Mustapha Djelalettin Pasha, became a Turkish general and writer. He was the author of a study published in 1869, *Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes*, which maintained that the sources of modern civilization are to be found in the Turkish past and that the influence of Turks on the development of European languages and history is valuable. Djelalettin Pasha demanded the purification of the Turkish language, and in 1869 he wrote letters to his son in Turkish using Latin letters. In the period of decline of the Ottoman Empire, Djelalettin Pasha contributed to the foundations of the Turkish national movement and raised the horizon of ideals of Turkish society. His theories served as a foundation for the ideology of the modern nationalist movement in Turkey after 1920.[96]

The famous Hungarian Turkologist and Turkophile, Arminius Vambery (1832–1913), embarked on adventurous travels in Russian Central Asia and in Persia and later acquainted his Turkish friends with their Central Asian relatives through his books and lectures.

Possibly the most important source of Pan-Turkist inspiration was found in the works of Leon Cahun. Ziya Gokalp stated that when he came to Constantinople in 1896, the first book he obtained was Cahun's *Introduction a l'Histoire de l'Asie*, which, he remarked, was written "as if to encourage the ideal of Pan-Turkism."[97] The book was at this time en vogue, having appeared in Constantinople bookstores in 1896, and it was translated into Turkish by Necip Asim (1861–1935). The French author glorified the Mongol warlords Genghis Khan and Timur as superheroes and the Mongols as a "racial" aristocracy. The Turks had descended from the Mongols and were far superior as warriors to the Arabs and Persians. The Arabs had poisoned them with their hypocritical Koran, denationalized and weakened them, and thus had prevented the building of a great Turkish world empire. In the last chapter, which is devoted to Timurides, he brilliantly described their achievements in culture, science, and the arts. Hertz stated that Cahun's ideas found great appeal among the Turkish intelligentsia and contributed to the foundations of "Pan-Turanism."[98]

The moral drawn by the Young Turks was that a return to their pre-Islamic institutions would bring national rejuvenation and, at the same time, would provide a basis for cooperation with other Turkish-speaking peoples outside the Ottoman frontiers.[99]

Europe also produced a number of novelists, poets, and journalists, who wrote with admiration about Constantinople, Turkish architecture, arts, literature, and similar topics. Among these writers are the well-known names of A. Lamartine

(1790–1869) and Pierre Loti (1850–1923); they caused many readers in Turkey to experience great national pride. Great stimulation was produced by travelers' descriptions of Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The memoirs of travelers in Turkey and other eastern countries, with their beautiful illustrations, gravures, and engravings, greatly impressed the forebears of the present Turkish generation.

Pan-Turkists in Turkey

A number of Turkish scientists and educators produced important books that were influenced by these Western stimulants. Ahmed Vefik (1823–1891), a lecturer in history at Constantinople University, was one of the first Turks in the second half of the nineteenth century to explain to his compatriots that the Ottomans were only one of the many tribes of a great Turkish nation and that their mother tongue was a dialect of a language spoken over wide areas outside the boundaries of Turkey. His contemporary, Suleyman Pasha (1836–1892), in his book *Tarih-i Alem*, discussed at length the pre-Islamic history of the Turks. In this book, which was composed for secondary schools, a Turkish historian for the first time made use of the research of western Turkologists and Sinologists. His new approach to the history of his people was shown also in the title of his grammar, *Sarf-i Turki* (Grammar of the Turks), in contrast to another historian, Cevdet Pasha (1822–95), who called his book *Kavaid-i Osmaniye* (Ottoman rules). Suleyman Pasha stated explicitly that Ottoman was the name only of a country and that the language and literature of the Turks should by rights be called Turkish.[100]

Among the significant Turkish writers and poets who contributed to the rise and development of Pan-Turkism was an Azerbaijani poet and writer, Ali Hüseyinzade (1864–1941). In Constantinople he wrote his poem "Turan," the first poetical call to Turkish unity.[101] Ziya Gökalp was the author of a poem in 1911 with the same title. The last couplet of this poem is:

> The country of the Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Turkestan,
> Their country is a broad and everlasting land—Turan.

In the succeeding years, Gökalp, the authoress Halide Edib (Adivar), and their associates dreamed of a union of all Turks under a single ruler who would renew the days of Atilla, Genghis, and Timur.[102]

Gökalp maintained that all the Turkish peoples, including the Ottomans, Azerbaijanis, Crimean Tatars, the Turkmens, the Kirghiz, and Uzbeks, potentially form one nation. Gökalp acknowledged that racial differences existed between them but nonetheless insisted that race does not determine nationality. The important thing was that all Turks have a common culture. All of them, with the exception of the distant Yakuts, are Moslems; they have similar customs and institutions and their language is fundamentally the same. The Turkish language

is divided into many dialects, but most Turks, according to Gökalp, can understand one another. Upon the outbreak of World War I, Gökalp opened his poem "Kizil Destan" with the couplet:

> The land of the enemy shall be devastated,
> Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan.[103]

Yusuf Akçoraoğlu

In the ranks of poets, writers and politicians who supported Pan-Turkism wholeheartedly (not sporadically, like Gökalp, nor temporarily, like Halide Edib), the first place belongs to Yusuf Akçoraoğlu (1876–1933).[104] Though he was a Kazan Tatar, he spent many years in Turkey, and his literary and political ties with Turkey were so strong that he may be regarded as a member of an all-Turkish society and a symbol of the unity of eastern and western Turks.

Yusuf Akçoraoğlu (or Akchurin) was born in the Simbirsk (now Ulianovsk) oblast of Russia.[105] He was educated in Constantinople and in Paris. Prior to the revolution of 1905, he went to Kazan, where he was one of the leaders of the Turko Tatar national and revolutionary movement. He took part in the organization of the All-Moslem Union Ittifak. After the reaction in Russia to the events of 1907, he emigrated to Constantinople and sent articles to the Kazan Tatar papers. He was a founder of the periodical *Türk Yurdu*, a rallying point for Pan-Turkists and Pan-Islamists. He took part in the works of Türk Dernegi (the Turkish association), a scientific society that aimed at the reformation of the Turkish-Arabic script. As a publicist, Akçoraoğlu attacked European colonial policies and appealed to the national feelings of all Turks, both in Turkey and abroad. His dream was the organization of a colossal Islamic Turkish Empire.[106] Akçoraoğlu was a member of the Russian Duma (Parliament), and, together with Ayas Ishaky, edited a Tatar paper entitled *Kazan Muhpiri* (Advertiser or herald).[107] In 1903 he wrote an article entitled "Three Political Systems" in the Cairo paper *Türk*, which discussed the foundations and principles of "Pan-Turanism."[108] It played a role similar to that of the Communist Manifesto of 1848 for the Marxists, and Akçoraoğlu is therefore considered to be one of the founders of Pan-Turkism. Akçoraoğlu's article "Three Political Systems," according to Zarevand's writings which were translated from the Russian, is summarized below.[109]

Ottomanism is a fantasy. Turkey is not a United States of America where several nationalities were blended giving birth to the American nation.

Ottomanism is against the wishes and aims of the Turks because the idea of equality of all the nationalities of the Empire is at the same time an idea degrading the dominant position of the Turks.

Ottomanism is against the teaching of Mahomet, because it preaches the equality of the believers and unbelievers.



Dominant Turkic Linguistic Groups—Soviet Central Asia

It is against the wishes of the non-Turkish peoples of the Empire, because they are striving toward independence and they do not like to live with their conquerors.

Ottomanism is against the Pan-Slavic and imperialist program of Russia, which aims at the occupation of Constantinople, and pretends to be the defender of the Christians.

Ottomanism is against European opinion, which is for the expulsion of "Barbarians" from Europe and for the liberation of Christians from their oppressors.

As concerns Pan-Islamism, it is in conflict with the increasingly national feelings of all Moslem nations. It is as well in conflict with the interests of the great and small colonial powers. Thus Pan Islamism cannot be treated as a real force to revive and strengthen the Ottoman Empire.

In conclusion, there is only one program left, namely the third political ideology of Pan-Turanism.[110]

In the Ottoman Empire the only supporters of the state are Turks. The future of the Empire may be based only on the unity of the Turkish peoples. Pan-Turanism is not in conflict with the factors, which are blocking the development and success of Pan-Islamism and Ottomanism. *Pan-Turanism is chiefly an enemy of Russia. Russia, although a great power, is not invincible. The European powers who are in conflict with Russia will support the Pan-Turanian plans of Turkey.*[111]

Akçoraoğlu, Ismail Gaspirali, and Ali Hüseyinzade were elected by the plenum of the Committee of Union and Progress of 1911 to the central committee of the party.[112] (This information, however, has been denied by M. E. Resulzade.)[113] Akçoraoğlu was one of the founders of several organizations that sprang up in Constantinople after 1910, including the Society of Tatar Emigrants, the Society of Students from Russia, the Society of Crimean Students, and the Bukharan Benevolent Society. In 1911, Akçoraoğlu founded the fortnightly paper *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish home) and a club known as *Türk Ocagi* (Turkish hearth).[114] The role and influence of these institutions was great; the paper attracted many writers, among them Ziya Gökalp, while the clubs had a famous successor to their work, the Kemalist *Halkevleri* (People's houses), which existed in every Turkish town.[115]

WORLD WAR I AND PAN-TURKISM

Two incentives motivated the Ottoman Empire to enter World War I: the historical ambitions and political aims of the empire in the Moslem world, which had been rendered precarious by Russian, British, and French encroachments, and the dynamic, aggressive stand of the Young Turks' government inner circle and their program of nationalism, which was not content with a merely passive attitude in the face of the belligerent aims of world powers.

Turkey's action in the war was directed toward union with those of the same religion, namely, Pan-Islamism, and toward union with ethnically and linguistically kindred peoples, namely, Pan-Turkism.[116] In both drives, the use of Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turkist slogans seemed to be indispensable, as these had the

common denominator of Islamic religion and civilization for both non-Turkish and Turkish Moslems. Thus, the Young Turks adhered to the strategy of the Holy War and made their famous war proclamation of November 23, 1914, in a Pan-Islamic spirit: It was signed by the caliph and the highest religious dignitaries. It enumerated the enemies of Islam—Russia, Great Britain, and France—and appealed to the world's Moslems without national distinction:

> All Mohammedans living in the territories exposed to the persecutions of the above named oppressive powers, such as the Crimea, Kazan, Turkistan, Bukhara, Khiva, India, China, Afghanistan, Persia, Africa and other countries, must consider it, in concert with Ottomans, as their most supreme religious duty to participate in the Holy War, with their bodies and goods, keeping in mind the inspirations of the Koran.[117]

In evaluating the proclamation, it can be noted that it was impossible for the Ottoman government to disseminate two separate pronouncements: one Pan-Turkish and one Pan Islamic. A Pan-Turkist declaration with a Turkish nationalist character would unveil to the non-Turkish Moslems the fact that the empire was not a supranational fatherland for all the world's Moslems but just a national Turkish empire. On the other hand, a separate Pan-Turkist proclamation would have been superfluous since the Pan-Islamic declaration was understood by the Russian Turks as also being Pan-Turkist.

Turkish-Arab relations and the attitude of the Moslems of India, Africa, and other Islamic regions in the sphere of influence of the Western powers reflected in general the fact that the strategy of Holy War was a failure. In the Turkish provinces of the Russian Empire, opinions are less known and underestimated. It has been held that the Czar's Turkish Moslem subjects were politically on the side of Ottoman Turkey and her allies. This is supported by Ishaky as well as Zarevand, two writers belonging to diametrically opposed camps.[118]

The events of 1918–19 produced additional proof of the general pro-Turkish attitude of the Turko-Moslem personalities of Azerbaijan, an important Czarist province, both strategically and economically. An eloquent fact about Turkish-Azerbaijan relations at the time of the establishment of an independent Azerbaijan Republic was pointed out by Kazemzadeh: "On 17th September [1918] the Azerbaijani Government arrived in Baku from Ganja. The Cabinet of Fath Ali Khan Khoiskii had the blessings of the Sultan, who, on 6th September, received Resulzade, Khasmamedov, and Safikurdskii in a special audience at the Hagia Sophia."[119]

In another strategically important Turko Tatar region, Crimea, there existed a widespread net of the secret Turko-Crimean organization *Vatan*, which was directed from Istanbul (see the subchapter on the Crimean Tatars).

The most spectacular anti-Russian rebellion during World War I burst forth in the Kazakh Steppes and certain other regions of Russian Central Asia. The immediate cause was the calling of Turkestanians for nonmilitary service in the rear of the long western front lines. The Asiatic population of the southern

borderlands, Kazakhstan included, were exempt from compulsory military service, but the Russian government canceled this exemption, and on June 25, 1916, a ukase mobilized the Kazakhs, Kirghizes, Uzbeks, Turkmens, and Uighurs from the age of eighteen to forty-three years.[120] Spontaneously, the lists of conscripts were destroyed, officials were beaten and murdered, offices were set on fire, and stations and posts were razed. Mass uprisings and general guerrilla activities covered extensive areas of Kazakhstan and Central Asia. In early August 1916, much of Kazakhstan was organized into partisan groups. The peak of the rebellion was staged in Turgai Oblast and in Semirechye under the leadership of Amangeldi Imam. Among the Russian civilian population, 2,390 persons were killed and 1,299, missing. The losses of the Kazakhs and Kirghizes and other Turkestanians are unknown. About 300,000 Kazakhs and Kirghizes emigrated into western China.[121]

Enver Pasha

Pan-Turkist aims in 1914–18 took a military aspect in the dynamic activity of the Turkish War minister, General Enver Pasha, the most influential member of a triumvirate that included Talaat Pasha and Ahmet Cemal Pasha. It was Enver Pasha's personal engagement in the abortive Caucasian offensive in 1914, as well as in the Turkestanian struggle with the Soviets in 1921–22, that inseparably linked him with the Turks in Russia and with Pan-Turkism. In the West, in general, the exploits of Enver Pasha had won little renown: He was an enemy of the Allies in World War I, and although his exploits beyond the Oxus caused anxiety in India, the tendency was to echo the Soviets and term him a mere adventurer. Caroe saw Enver as a gallant foe and a good loser:

> To many Turks, it seems he remains a national hero, who brought about the revolution in Turkey and played a noble part in Central Asia. A Turkish historian of today has compared him with the Seljuk Kilich Arslan, who smote the Crusaders. To such men Enver ranks among the Deli Dumrul—the epic heroes—of the Turks.[122]

Early Career. Enver Pasha was born in 1881 at Divanyolu (Istanbul).[123] His father was Turkish, his mother, Albanian, and he had a Circassian grandmother. He entered the Turkish army as a subaltern and was sent to Salonika, where he met the leaders of the Young Turks' movement. Enver achieved early fame, since he and Major Niazi Bey were the first to raise the standard of revolt of the Committee of Union and Progress.[124]

In Salonika, during the agitated period between 1906 and 1908, the Young Turks established their secret society and gained the allegiance of a large following within the Ottoman army stationed in the area.[125] In July 1908, Enver, now one of the recognized leaders of the insurgents, left the government service and led a band of *fedais* through the Macedonian mountains, where he won village after village to the revolutionary cause.[126] Several military formations

declared open rebellion against the sultan and demanded the reestablishment of the constitutional regime. The sultan yielded on July 10, 1908, and for the first time in thirty-two years, he issued a call for general parliamentary elections.[127]

Enver took a prominent part in the Tripolitan campaign of 1912. At the onset of the Balkan Wars he returned to Constantinople in 1913, where he was active in overthrowing the cabinet of Kamil Pasha which had capitulated to the Bulgarians.[128]

In the second Balkan War, on July 15, 1913, the Turks sent an army under Enver Pasha into Thrace to attack Adrianople. The Turks had no difficulty in recapturing that city, from which the Bulgarians had withdrawn nearly the whole of their garrison in order to strengthen their armies against Greece and Serbia; Enver also reoccupied Demolika and Kirk Kilisse. These victories intensified the prestige of the Young Turks and their leader, Enver Pasha. Thenceforth, until the outbreak of World War I, the influence of Germany in the Near East, and especially in Turkey, was continually on the increase. Enver Pasha, who now predominated in the councils of the Porte, was her devoted servant, and the Pan-Turkist ambitions of the Young Turk militarists, which had been modeled on the Pan-Germanic ambitions of the Prussians, ripened steadily toward 1914.[129]

From the time Enver had been Turkish military attaché in Berlin, he had retained an unwavering belief in the invincibility of German arms. At the end of 1913, General Liman von Sanders, who had been specially selected by Emperor William, proceeded to Constantinople at the head of a reinforced German military mission.[130] Upon von Sander's initial arrival in Turkey in December 1913, Enver was a colonel and chief of staff of an army corps. The following month (January 1914), however, Enver suddenly appeared in von Sander's office in the uniform of a general and announced that he was minister of war. Von Sanders wrote:

> The Sultan also did not have any earlier knowledge than I did of this nomination. He was that morning seated in his chamber and reading a newspaper. Suddenly he let it fall and said to his aide: "I read that Enver has become Minister of War. It is really not possible, he is still very much too young for that."[131]

In the spring of 1914 Enver married an imperial princess. The means by which Enver gained his high position permits one to judge the absolute impotence of the sultan vis-à-vis the all-powerful Committee of Union and Progress. Though von Sanders did not appreciate Enver's methods, he paid him this tribute: "Enver rendit un grand service a son armée dans la période qui précéda la guerre mondiale en appuyant, sans cesse et par tous les moyens dont il disposait au Ministère de la Guerre, tous les projets dont il reconnaissait la nécessité."[132]

When World War I broke out in August 1914, Sultan Mehmed V was a nonentity and the grand vizier, Said Halim, was little more than a respectable figurehead. Though the cabinet included other influential members of the Committee of Union and Progress, such as Talaat Pasha, who was minister of the

interior, and Djavid Pasha, who was minister of finance, the real ruler of Turkey was the minister of war, Enver Pasha, who was then thirty-two years old.[133]

Enver's Military Preparations. In addition to the existing three Turkish armies, Enver Pasha, as minister of war, created a fourth army in the Arabic provinces of the empire, and in November 1914, he entrusted its commander, his intimate friend Ahmet Cemal (Djemal) Pasha, with the "Pan-Islamic Campaign."[134] He reinforced troops on the Caucasian frontier and took over command of the Third (Caucasian) Army, replacing old, obstinate officers with younger, more imaginative men. On December 6, 1914, Enver arrived at Erzurum, and toward the end of that month, the Caucasian battle began. By January 1, 1915, the complete failure of the Turkish offensive was clear to both the Russian and Ottoman commands, but in spite of cold, weariness, and hunger, the troops on both sides were still willing to fight, and the battle continued another fourteen days.[135]

Enver's winter offensive had no real chance of success, considering the topographic and climatic obstacles during the winter months. The offensive resulted in a complete catastrophe and Turkish losses were appalling: about seventy-five thousand casualties, with most of the artillery. Russian losses were formidable enough: sixteen thousand killed and wounded, and twelve thousand sick, the majority from frost bite. Allen and Muratoff have commented: "It was a battle of annihilation in which both Turks and Russians gave proof of the incredible endurance and determination. . . . Sarikamis [the place of the main battle] must live in history as the most heroic manifestation of the spirit of the Turkish fighting man."[136]

On his return to Constantinople, Enver made efforts to conceal the catastrophe and the Vice Generalissimo's (Enver's title) official attitude was that nothing important had happened on the Caucasian frontier and that the Pan-Turkist campaign had been only temporarily deferred. In the meantime, the Russians evacuated Tabriz, and the irregular Kurdish troops, together with Turkish volunteers, provoked the Russians and local Christians, thus reviving Enver's Pan-Turkist hopes.[137]

The outbreak of the Russian revolution of 1917 created new opportunities for Pan-Turkish action in the Turko-Moslem areas of Russia. Russian might vanished; half-independent states sprang up in the Caucasus and new foreign forces appeared in this region: Germans, British, Russian Reds, and their White opponents.[138] Although Enver Pasha was personally absent from the Caucasus in 1917–19, it was through his directives that the Azerbaijan Turkish military preparations were started. These moves were without the encouragement of the Germans, who remained very critical of the Pan-Turkist plans in the Caucasus. Enver now hoped to realize his plans with the aid of the Army of Islam: It had been decided to organize this formation within the republic of Azerbaijan (proclaimed in May 1918), largely as an armed force of Azerbaijan Turks. A base was chosen at the ancient Moslem town of Ganja (Elizavetpol), and the Turkish Fifth Caucasian Division was moved there on June 20. A few days later, Enver's half-brother, Nuri Pasha, arrived to take over command of the Army of Islam,

which now numbered about six thousand Ottoman regulars and from ten to twelve thousand Azerbaijan volunteers and militiamen. The Turks were thus in a position to develop their Caucasian plan, which was directed first at the capture of Baku. Enver not only hoped to master Baku in four to six weeks, he envisaged his brother's green banner flying on the Terek and the Lower Volga, and even in Transcaspia.[139]

Meanwhile, the Germans had concluded that the best way to secure the Baku oil was with Moscow's consent. At the end of August, the Turks received news that a German-Soviet agreement on Baku had been practically concluded, and a storm of indignation shook the Turkish press. Enver sent an order to his half-brother to take Baku immediately, and this was carried out on September 14, 1918.[140]

After crushing the opposition of the British force under General L. C. Dunsterville, the Armenians, and the Centro-Caspian White Russian local government, the Turks left their Fifth Caucasian Division in Baku, while the Thirty-Sixth Division moved northward along the railway toward Derbent. Despite Turkey's predicament, the Thirty-Sixth Caucasian Division (now only three thousand strong) continued its triumphal "Pan-Turanian march" along the shores of the Caspian and, in October, occupied Petrovsk. This was the Army of Islam's last gesture; the September events on the Syrian front had already compelled the Turkish general staff to concentrate their Caucasian forces at Batum for transportation to the Bosphorus. Thus, external events put an end to this episode of the military Pan-Turkist campaign.[141]

On the day of the armistice of Mudros, on October 31, 1918, Enver, Talaat, and other Young Turk politicians fled from Turkey to Germany.[142] The final chapter in the story of Enver has been researched by two Western authors: Sir Olaf Caroe and Louis Fischer.[143] The latter is mentioned because his story of Enver is based on information related by Generals Kakurin, Chicherin, Karakhan, and other leading Soviet personalities of the period, who were engaged in Russian eastern policies. Enver first tried to reach Odessa, but a storm on the Black Sea broke his ship's mast and obliged him to return to Turkey. Bent on reaching Russia, he made his way to Germany, where he secretly boarded a plane en route to Moscow; however, the aircraft crashed, and he spent some time in prisons in Kovno and in Riga. He finally reached Moscow in 1920, preceded by Ahmet Cemal Pasha, one of the triumvirate, and other prominent Turks including Nuri Pasha and Halil Pasha. Officially, Enver came as a friend of the Soviets and an enemy of Great Britain, which was fighting the Communists and had destroyed the Turkish empire. Unofficially, however, he planned the reestablishment of the kingdom of Timur and saw himself the ruler of a realm embracing Chinese Turkestan, Russian Turkestan, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan. Like Alexander the Great, he contemplated marching through the Khyber Pass into India and striking a mortal blow at the British empire. Enver sustained the belief that the success of his empire depended on his commanding the center of the Turkish world, Turkey, and on the overthrow of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.[144]

Enver's supporters crossed the Turkish borders to meet him in Batum, and a conference organized by Enver Pasha took place, which, the Russians learned, had the purpose of planning a coup d'état against Mustafa Kemal's regime.[145]

He participated in the Congress of the Peoples of the East, which was called by the Third International Soviets at Baku in September 1920.[146] The Bolsheviks were eager to summon all Moslems and colonials to a Holy War against Western "imperialists"; Enver Pasha and other Turkish enemies of Great Britain and France seemed to be the useful tools. To plan a mobilization of the Islamic masses, the Bolsheviks convened a unique assembly, including Zinoviev and Radek, president and secretary of the Comintern, and Bela Kun, who came from Moscow. It was an odd gathering involving 1,891 delegates of thirty-seven nationalities. The Comintern's policy had been outlined by Zinoviev: "The Communist International turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them: Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British Imperialism." Enver reportedly presented a memorandum pledging the communists his support in the struggle against "Western Imperialism."[147] This meeting was the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, and the only one of its particular kind.[148]

In the fall of 1921, the former Soviet government wished to exploit Enver's popularity among Moslems and to send him to Central Asia to help fight the Basmachis. Experience had shown that much success could be achieved by employing onetime Turkish officers to win the sympathies of natives for the Soviet cause.[149] Enver maintained outwardly friendly relations with the Soviets. In the city of Bukhara, he made an official visit to the Soviet representatives; then, suddenly, he vanished.[150] Enver's stated aim in Bukhara was an alliance with Bolshevism in the fight for Islamic ideals against "imperialism."[151] His real objective, as he confided to the Bukhara National Union, was to assist in freeing the Bukhara emirate from the Russians. He intended to mobilize eastern Turkish resistance, particularly the Basmachis, against the Soviets, and to set up an independent state in Central Asia.[152]

He boldly endeavored to do what the Bukhara leaders could not do: unite the Union Party and the intelligentsia with the partisans or the Basmachis. On May 19, 1922, Enver addressed an ultimatum to the government in Moscow in which he outlined his propositions; he signed it as "Supreme Chief of the Armies of Bukhara, Khiva and of Turkestan."[153] His greatest success occurred in early 1922 with the capture of Dushambe (Stalinabad).

Enver lost the support of emir of Bukhara, partly because of his inappropriate handling and because of the struggle between the conservatives, represented by the emir, and the progressive Djadids. On Enver's last night in Bukhara, he sat cross-legged on the floor and made his decision as a *müjahit* (the Islamic equivalent of a Crusader), with tears in his eyes, feeling he was in the cradle of the Turks. His forces gave an excellent account of themselves for some months and caused the Soviet commanders much disquiet, but after a few successes, Enver was forced to retire to Raljivan in the Tajik hills, where he was killed in action against the Soviets on August 8, 1922.[154]

One might assume that a revival of possibilities for the Turkish ideal of liberation of the Turks in the former USSR would restore the popularity of Enver Pasha.[155] In 1941–42, during the German military offensive in Russia, Pan-Turkist periodicals in Turkey, such as *Bozkurt* (Grey wolf) and *Çinar-Alti* (Under the maple tree), while propagating unity for all the Turkish peoples and liberation of the Turks of the former Soviet Union, also described the exploits of Enver Pasha in Turkestan:[156]

> Enver was before his time yet his death sowed a seed . . . . If Enver had taken no part in developments in Turkistan, the rising would have faded without memory; he gave it a new form, a new significance . . . . He himself never expected his movement at that time to succeed, so he adopted the watchword, "Victory or death in the field." By his death on Turkistan soil he offered the supreme sacrifice for that country and for the history of the Turks.[157]

PAN-TURKISM BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS

After World War I, Pan-Turkism was discredited, not only within Turkey, but in the world in general. There was no hope of finding support for the movement in the new republic of Germany, and Austro-Hungary had ceased to exist. Great Britain, France, and the United States were unfriendly to the political conceptions held by the defeated Ottoman Empire and Germany, and Pan-Turkism was additionally held responsible for the anti-Armenian atrocities.[158] Thus, the leaders of the Turkish peoples of former Soviet Russia and their friends in Istanbul and Ankara were unable to openly manifest their common political ambitions; instead, they were forced to show their common ideal through newer, universal, more stimulating and subtle appeals.

These appeals were supplied by the postwar world situation. Radical political disruptions were brought about by factors such as the Wilsonian slogan of self-determination, the League of Nations, and the dismemberment and collapse of the Ottoman and Austro Hungarian empires, as well as movements for colonial liberation. These changes supplied the best possible screen for the development of the Turkish liberation movements and for subtle collaboration with the new Turkish republic.

Promethean League

An early opportunity arose for the Pan-Turkists in connection with Polish-Soviet relations and the tension between the newly created East European states and their former Soviet Russian neighbor. In 1920, during the Polish-Soviet War, there were signs of an understanding between the Turko Tatars in former Soviet Russia and Poland, in opposition to Soviet imperialism. In the Polish army there were volunteers from among Russian Moslems; Pilsudski's march on Kiev in May 1920 and his declaration that a free Ukraine was the intent of

his expedition aroused hope among the non-Russians in the former Soviet empire.[159]

At the end of this campaign, secret activity was carried on by Pilsudski and his followers, and plans were drawn for a common defensive action, including support from the peoples of Eastern Europe as well as the subjugated peoples of former Soviet Russia. Cautiously an attempt was made to prepare Poland and world political opinion for the inevitable Soviet Russian Communist offensive. A coup d'état was organized in May 1926, and Pilsudski returned to power in the Polish republic. He expanded military strength and strove to reduce the internal political rivalries of the many political parties and ethnic groups. His official program also had an unofficial counterpart in the political preparation for a possible war with the Soviets. Pilsudski and his followers had experience in underground struggles in Russia, Austria, and Germany, and had deep knowledge of the role of nationalism in Eastern Europe; this prompted them to look for possible allies among the subjugated peoples of former Soviet Russia.

This concept was the birth of the Promethean movement, which dominated the political activity of emigrants from behind the former Soviet Russian border in the period from 1926 to 1939.[160] After May 1926, the Polish government allocated a considerable sum of money to organize groups of men with experience in underground struggles against the former USSR; Leon Wasilewski, Tadeusz Holowko, Tadeusz Schaetzel, and others were summoned. By 1927, new centers of activity had been coordinated and periodicals were being regularly published. Dynamic groups in Western Europe, the Balkans, and the Near and Middle East, as well as in the Far East, worked to unite the active political elements from the former Soviet Union. National committees for independence, representing non-Russian nationalities as well as governments in exile, were drawn into this project and received regular subsidies and other support.

The Polish diplomatic system and the Polish intelligence service backed these activities. Promising youths were given fellowships. Former officers of the ex-Russian army, those of non-Russian nationalities, and young representatives of the new non-Russian armies of the Caucasus and other non-Russian territories of the Soviet empire were all admitted to the Polish army.

The Promethean League's published propaganda was the most visible element of its work. The publications that encouraged liberation through a common front made up of all subjugated peoples of the former Soviet Union were:

1. *Prométhée*, a monthly review, which outlined the interests of the peoples of the Caucasus, of the Ukraine and Turkestan. It was published in Paris in French.

2. *Kurtuluş* (Liberation), an Azerbaijan monthly in Turkish Azerbaijan. It was the appeal of the Musavat party and was published in Berlin.

3. *Sakartvelo* (Fatherland), the organ of the Georgian government in exile, was printed in Georgian in Paris.

4. *Severniy Kavkas-Şimali Kavkasya* (The North Caucasus), the organ of

the National Committee of the North Caucasus, in Russian, Turkish, and tribal languages of the North Caucasus, and was edited in Warsaw.

5. *Yeni Milli Yol* (New national road), the voice of the National Committee of Idel-Ural, was issued in the Turkish Tatar language in Berlin.

6. *Yash Turkestan* (Young Turkestan), the journal of the National Committee of Turkestan, appeared in Turkish Turkestanian in Berlin.

7. *Trisub* (The trident), the monthly medium of the Ukrainian government in exile, was printed in Ukrainian in Paris.

8. *Volnoye Kazachestvo-Vilne Kozactvo* (Free cossacks), the monthly of the Free Cossacks movement, was produced in Prague.

9. *Emel* (Ideal), the monthly of the Crimean Turkish Committee, in Crimean Turkish, was printed in Constanta, Rumania.

10. *Kovylniye Volni*, was the publication of the Kalmuk group promoting the independence movement of the Free Cossacks.

These were the most representative and regular publications; the national headquarters published other periodicals, pamphlets, and books in the various national languages, as well as in European, Turkish, Persian, and Polish versions. Some publications, for example, were printed in Finland in the Carelian dialect.[161]

The national headquarters and governments in exile were active during international gatherings in Geneva and elsewhere, presenting aides-mémoire and supplying international meetings with propaganda material through their unofficial delegations. Another notable activity of the Promethean League was the Promethean Club in Warsaw, with branches in Paris, Helsinki, and other European capitals. All national committees and governments in exile were represented in its discussions, and it planned political and propaganda action.[162] This was more or less open work, but the most serious and important activity was restricted to inner circles of the governments in exile, national committees, and special desks of the Polish general staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who formulated plans for possible future war and activities in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The events of 1939–45 destroyed all these projects. The war began in the West, not in the East, and Poland did not have the opportunity to test the soundness of its preparations to support the independence movements of the non-Russian peoples of the former Soviet Empire. After the occupation of Poland in 1939 and the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, the Germans did not revive the endeavors of the Promethean movement and instead followed their own policies. The liberation of the peoples of the former USSR from the Soviets' social and national yoke was not proclaimed by the Germans.

Thus, the Promethean movement was not merely the activity of the Prometheus Clubs working for the reconciliation and liberation of the individual non-Russian peoples. In reality, it was a complex program. It aimed at the creation of strong and stable national centers representing the individual subjugated nations of the former Soviet empire and the maintenance of a liaison with potentially anti-

Soviet foreign powers. It also urged the creation of a proper international arrangement among the most important powers and neighbors of the Soviet Union for promotion of the idea of the dismemberment of the former USSR on the basis of individual national states. Finally, it sponsored a spirit of unity and collaboration among the subjugated nations themselves.[163]

The Promethean movement was the only seriously effective body that, after 1926, was in a position to give assistance and protection to the Turkish leaders from within the Soviet Union. Most of the leading personalities among the Turkish-Russian peoples who had the chance to escape from the former USSR were involved, and no Turkish group from the Soviet Union was left outside the scope of the movement. Azerbaijan was represented by the Musavat party and its leader, Mehmet Emin Resulzade. The North Caucasian Turks (as well as a majority of the North Caucasus's non-Turkish tribes) were served by Said Shamil, grandson of the Iman Shamil. The Crimean Turko Tatars were represented by Cafer Bey Seydahmet (Kirimer) and the Kazan Turko Tatars by Ayas Ishaky.[164] Turkestan had Mustafa Chokai Oğlu (Çokaioğlu), Osman Khodja, and others.

Prometheus aimed to speak as the voice of the oppressed nationalities of the Caucasus, the Ukraine, and the Turks of the former Soviet Union. As such it was an anti-Bolshevik federation with an element of Pan-Turkism.[165] It helped those people to accept and propagate the same concepts: freedom for their nations, full disapproval of any reconciliation with Soviet imperialism, and unity among the Turks of the former USSR themselves and other subjugated nations. The old slogan of the Russian Turks propagated by Ismail Gaspirali, "Dilde, Fikirde, Iste Birlik" (Unity of thought, language and work), was realized in a new spirit, which was dictated by the new times.

PAN-TURKISM IN THE FORMER USSR

The Communist regime did not permit the existence of any rival trend or doctrine. Moscow was the seat of the central authorities of the Communist party, and the only giver of any spiritual values and the only point on the map of the former USSR which could grant unmolested existence. Under these circumstances only open revolt, or hidden beliefs and secret actions were possible for opposition movements, including Pan Turkism.[166] The nationality program from the point of view of Soviets was so uniform that there were essentially no differences toward Georgians and Tajiks, Ukrainians or Uzbeks. Its features from 1921–55 may be summarized in two series of political moves.

First, the Soviets recognized national differences and encouraged national languages and cultures. Universities, high schools, primary education, theaters, publishing houses, periodicals, all in national languages, were fostered. Soviet republics were given all the symbols of political independence: separate constitutions, capitals, strictly defined state borders, governments and parliaments.[167] At the outset, the only formal ties between the union republics and their common

supercapital of Moscow was a Communist ideology. In practice, local Communist parties were dominated by Soviet Russian elements and supported by Red Army detachments.

The second series of phenomena resulted from the negative attitude of the population of the Soviet republics toward the Communist regime. The memory of Czarist domination and the still more vivid memory of their short-lived independence from 1919 to 1921 occupied the minds of the leaders of the non-Russian peoples. The Communist terror, their economic and political experiments, and their suppression of religious and democratic freedoms prevented friendly relations between the new Soviet regime and the reconquered nations. These caused purges, mass arrests, and deportations to concentration camps of thousands of "disloyal" Communists and their non-Communist accomplices. Uprisings and guerrilla activity, as well as mass passive resistance, were also a form of response to the Communist pressure.[168]

Basmachi Movement

The Basmachi movement was a series of anti-Russian and anti-Soviet uprisings by Turkestanis that at times embraced great regions and large numbers of participants. It started in 1917 and, with some interruptions, continued until 1931. Isolated uprisings took place in the period from 1931 to 1939 and later. The word *Basmachi* is considered to be derived from the Turkish verb *basmak* (to press, tread underfoot, attack, or raid), thus, it means a raider or highwayman.[169]

Veli Kajum-Khan (Kayum-han), chairman of the National Turkestanian Unity Committee, one of the largest Turkestanian emigre political organizations, described the Basmachi movement in the following, somewhat lofty, words:

> The Russians call these remarkable fighters for national liberty whose names are venerated today, Basmachi, which means bandits. All tribes without exception took part in this movement for liberation. From 1921 to 1923 these struggles reached their zenith and extended over wide territories. Under their protection a Turkestanian National Government was created. The men to whom it was entrusted proclaimed the complete independence of Turkestan as a sovereign state. Throwing a big army into the country, the Soviets ultimately succeeded in limiting the Basmachi movement, but even their most violent efforts were never powerful enough to annihilate it completely . . . . The mass rising of the peasants in 1930 in answer to the planned collectivisation must be assessed as the indomitable will of the people to regain their lost liberty. It led to violent acts of sabotage and wanton destruction of all Soviet installations. Another widespread uprising under the leadership of Ibrahim Bek in 1931 must be noted. Then there was the destruction of the Soviet regiments in the Tschatkal mountains in 1935, the general rising in the Nurata mountains, and in 1937 in Karakum.[170]

The principal assertions of this Turkestanian leader are confirmed not only by neutral sources but by Vasilevskiy, the Soviet historian of the movement, who began his narration with familiar Marxist phrases. The disintegration of Turkestan

in 1914–18, as well as the isolation of the cotton area from the Russian industrial and grain-producing areas, provoked the uprisings. An army of 300,000 jobless farm hands in the Fergana Valley supplied the Basmachi recruits for the famous Irgach, Madamin-Bek, and other *kurbashes* (leaders) of the partisan troops. With obvious sincerity, the Soviet author declared that besides the economic element, "a not unimportant role was performed by the nationalist tendencies of the native bourgeoisie. They had developed an understanding of national aims yet were still too weak for the independent realization of these ends."[171]

The socially universal character of the movement was confirmed by the same author, who said that the Basmachi ranks were composed of:

a. Feudalists and clergy, aristocracy and officialdom of the Emir of Bukhara[j] . . . tribal leaders who played the role of heads (kurbashes) of the Basmachi "gangs"; Mullahs were in charge of propaganda;

b. Native bourgeoisie, aiming towards independence in the capitalist sense of the word. This section of the society was ready to conclude business agreements with British imperialism;

c. Kulaks [prosperous peasant farmers] in the villages who supplied the movement with food, forage and arms;

d. Peasants (Dokhans). At the beginning the Turkestanian peasants were so enraged with the Soviet mistakes that they supported the movement *en masse*.[172]

The assertion about the movement attempting to organize a sovereign and legal state was confirmed by Castagné. In the region under the Basmachi's control, order was introduced and local administration functioned well. Each locality was under a local Basmachi representative; pillage and banditry stopped; collection of taxes was reintroduced, and permission for the free movement of all foreigners, with the exception of Bolsheviks, was given. Moreover,

Les ouvriers russes, les ingénieurs chargés des travaux d'irrigation jouissaient dans la zone occupée par les Basmachis d'une complète securité. Dans un article publié dans le *Roul* de Berlin (Fevr. 13, 1923), le docteur Ross affirmait qu'il était plus facile d'obtenir par les chefs basmachis les ouvriers indigènes nécessaires aux équipes chargées de l'irrigation et autres travaux que les ordres des autorités soviétiques.[173]

In spite of the rivalry of individual chieftains and tribal feuds, the Pan-Turkish element in the Basmachi movement is clear, since they grouped tribes and local "subethnical" units of Turkestanis in the fight against "foreign" oppression. The Basmachi movement embraced groups of Kazakhs, Turkmens, Kirghizes, Tajiks, and, above all, Uzbeks, the most advanced and numerous of the Turkestanian people. Castagné and Vasilevskiy list the names of localities and leaders from all regions and tribes of Turkestan.[174]

A significant feature of Enver's period with the Basmachi movement was that this era represented a focal point of the united efforts of a group of Ottoman Pan-Turkist leaders and Turkestanis in their struggle for the liberation of the

greatest portion of the Turkish world. Non-Turkestanis, such as Zeki Velidi Togan, a Bashkirian, participated in the movement, and Kazan Tatars were also present.[175]

"Nationalist Deviations"

There were innumerable examples between the two world wars of "nationalist deviations" involving Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamic tendencies in the Communist parties of the Turko Tatar republics. The deviationists were in principle Turko Tatar members of the Communist party who, under the cover of their official positions and party status, sabotaged the aims of the Soviets in the interest of their peoples and at the expense of the unity and integrity of the Soviet empire. The Soviets uncovered the real feelings and activity of many nationalists, Pan-Turkists, and Pan-Islamists, and crushed them mercilessly. The chief accusations against these deviationists generally were local nationalism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism, contacts with the Basmachi movement and nationalist Turkish leaders abroad, or working for separation from the USSR.

A spectacular example of this was the affair of Sultan-Galiyev, a Tatar member of the Commissariat of Nationalities collegium, who was discovered in 1923 to have formed a conspiratorial organization in the Tatar ASSR and the Bashkir ASSR with the aid of his friends.[176] He was accused of transmitting secret information to Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turkist circles in Persia and Turkey, and of seeking contact with Zeki Velidi Togan, who, according to Soviet sources, was a Communist but became a leader of the Basmachi revolt in Turkestan with the hope of creating a Pan-Turkish Eastern International side by side with the Comintern.[177]

Stalin, in a speech delivered at the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the former USSR on June 10, 1923, spoke about the deviations of Sultan-Galiyev and his accomplices. This was the period when the Bolsheviks were flirting with the national feelings of the non-Russian peoples, and the words of the then commissar of nationalities are worthy of quotation:[178]

> I see nothing particularly reprehensible in Sultan-Galiyev's exercises in theory. If Sultan-Galiyev had confined himself to the ideology of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism, it would not have been in spite of the veto laid on it by the resolution of the Tenth Congress of the Party on the national question, and that we might confine ourselves to criticizing it within the ranks of our Party. But when exercises in ideology and in the establishment of contacts with leaders of the Basmachi, with Validov [Togan] and others, it becomes absolutely impossible to justify Basmachi practice on the grounds of an innocent ideology.[179]

In 1929, Sultan-Galiyev was executed after the Pan-Turkist trials on the charge that he had fomented an anti-Soviet conspiracy among the Soviet Turkish peoples.[180]

Even in such underdeveloped Turkish areas as Turkmenistan, Soviet sources have admitted that a strong nationalist Turkmenian organization was in existence at least between 1922 and 1931. It was said to be particularly active after 1927, when it prepared an armed uprising against Soviet power. It had its ramifications in the Turkmenian government, and two of its members, the Minister of Education, Boriev, and the Supply Minister, Ak Murad Orozov, were charged with working for the establishment of an independent Turkmenian State under British protection.[181] Soviet sources reported that in the late 1930s a widespread opposition movement developed with both nationalistic and religious characteristics. The Turkmen Azatlygi (Turkmenian freedom) group is stated to have carried out "terrorist and diversionist" acts. The Turkmenian nationalists and saboteurs of collectivization were protected by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen SSR, Nederby Aitakov, one of the thirty sponsors of the Stalin Constitution of 1936.[182]

One source of the Pan-Turkist undercurrent was explained by Kolarz, who stated that the political complications that the Soviet regime encountered in Turkmenistan were increased by linguistic difficulties. As the Turkmens are geographically and linguistically nearer to the Anatolian Turks than any other people of Central Asia, Pan-Turkish ideas had an attraction for their intellectual elite. A number of Turkmen intellectuals were even convinced that a Turkmen literary language was superfluous and that Anatolian Turkish should be introduced.[183]

In the ranks of the Communist party of the Crimean ASSR, there was a "nationalist deviation" by a leading personality in local Tatar affairs, Veli Ibrahimov, and his friends and supporters.[184]

Even in the outlying Turkish regions (outside the scope of any Pan-Turkist plans) in the Yakut ASSR, for example, Pan-Turkist tendencies were discovered. Until 1928, the Soviets leniently permitted the continuation of a Yakut cultural organization, Sakha Omuk (the Yakut people), founded in 1921, and a nationalistic literary journal, *Cholbon* (The morning star). In the editorial of its first issue, the journal made clear that it would deal exclusively with Yakut themes, and in the middle of the 1920s, it even refused to publish a poem entitled "Lenin Is Alive." Soviet authorities did not proffer charges since out of six well-known Yakut writers (from 1922 to 1925), only one could be described as "proletarian."[185] Of the "nationalist" writers, Kulakovsky's poem, "The Dream of the Shaman," depicts the Yakut's ideals for freedom through modern science, technique, and education. More important were the preachings of the political writer Altan Saryn on Pan-Turkism. He prescribed the purge of Russian expressions from the Yakut language and the borrowing of terms from other Turkic dialects. He soon was the chief antagonist of Bolshevism in Yakutia.[186]

In 1928, the Soviets intervened and deposed all Yakut Communist party leaders, admonishing them for their friendships with, and condonement of, nationalist intellectuals and their negligent rule over other nationalities. The newcomers banished many leading Yakuts, reorganized the journal *Cholbon*, and

dispersed the Sakha Omuk organization. Full-scale collectivization was exercised in the face of much sabotage and opposition. The Basharin incident, which covered several years and was a labyrinth of intrigues, confirmed the fact that "bourgeois nationalism" had not yet been finally annihilated.[187]

Pan-Turkism in Turkey

Open propaganda in Turkey in the span between the two world wars was almost infeasible, or at least very difficult and restricted. Pan-Turkism was the equivalent of irredentism in Soviet Russia. After the Ottoman defeat in 1918 and the Bolshevik revolution, Turkey became a close ally of Moscow in their common struggle against the Western "imperialists" who were supporting "intervention" in Soviet Russia, and who tried to divide Turkey among Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece. From 1918 to 1920, the prewar common frontier between Turkey and Russia ceased to exist due to the creation in Transcaucasia of the independent republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The liquidation of the independent Caucasian republics in 1920–21 and the restoration of the common frontier did not immediately destroy friendly relations.[188] This was due to the Soviets' initial desire to support a revolutionary and independent status quo in Turkey.[189]

Relations cooled and later deteriorated, and Turkey gradually reentered the Western orbit; this was natural and unavoidable, since the Turko-Soviet revolutionary alliance was only accidental and temporary. In the meantime, Soviet pressure against Turkey reappeared on the international scene to renew Turkey's historic dislike of things Russian. The growing Soviet military and economic power did not permit Turkey to return to Pan-Turkist slogans, nor to discreet support of Turkish irredentism in the former USSR. Pan-Turkism became a secretly cherished goal, a force that possibly could be of use in the future.

Turkish nationalism was, and is, too dynamic and too organic a force to be restricted to passively awaiting developments. In reality, many factions within new Turkey have been striving toward their goal of unity with the Turks living beyond the boundaries of the Turkish republic. Even the period of collaboration with the Soviets from 1919 to 1925 was fruitful in this direction, as is indicated by the Turkish-Soviet policy affecting Transcaucasia. The Kemalists, not satisfied with the Russian-Turkish frontiers of 1914, desired to open a land junction with the "Turanian world." A postulate of such a policy involved elimination of the independent Armenian republic separating Azerbaijan from Turkey. Lenczowski related:

> General Kiazim Kara Bekir advanced against the Armenians and in October, 1920, captured Kars. Armenia was simultaneously attached by the Bolsheviks, who conquered Erivan and installed there a Communist government. By the Treaty of Alexandropol, December 3, 1920, this government ceded to the Turks major portions of its Western territory, which included the fortresses of Kars and Ardahan . . . . On March 16 Kemal

signed a treaty of friendship and collaboration with Soviet Russia . . . . Turkey agreed to cede Batum to Russia, in return for which Russia recognized Turkish possession of Kars and Ardahan thus confirming the Treaty of Alexandropol . . . . This was later confirmed once again by the Treaty of Kars, October 12, 1921, concluded between Turkey and the Soviet Transcaucasian Federation.[190]

The elimination of Armenia had several consecutive phases. At the outset, it involved the expulsion of the Armenian population from the northeastern *vilayets* (provinces) of Turkey during World War I. Second, full support was given by the Ottoman government to the republic of Azerbaijan. Then occurred the Turkish Soviet reconquest and dismemberment of the Armenian Republic in 1920.

There is one more phase involving Soviet policy toward Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Soviets, possibly aiming to satisfy Turkish desires during that period, restricted the territory of Armenia to a very small area, while Azerbaijan was given the largely Armenian region of Nogorno-Karabakh and the historically Armenian province of Nakhichevan. These four occurrences created a common border between the Turkish ethnic element in Anatolia and the Turkish-Azerbaijan area in the Caucasus.[191]

There was a Turkification of the minorities in the northeastern provinces of Turkey (chiefly Kurds) and in other regions. During 1942, the foreign and non-Moslem minorities in the big cities, and especially in Istanbul, were submitted to the discriminatory capital levy.[192] This levy resulted in near ruin for many non-Turkish establishments.

Turkification of the Ottoman Turkish language was essentially a measure promoted by Pan-Turkists and was started by Turko Tatar leaders in Russia as a keystone in the work and philosophy of Gaspirali and Ittifak (Union). Turkification of the language brought it closer to the Turkic dialects of Russia, while the pro-Ottoman tendencies in the linguistic policy of Gaspirali brought the Russian Turkic dialects closer to Ottoman Turkish.

Pan-Turkist leanings have been observed in school curricula in Turkey; for example, in a history manual (*Tarih*) officially accepted by the Ministry of Education. This manual stressed that the Turks' country of origin is in Asia.[193] In Central Asia, in the Altai mountains, and in Siberia and Mongolia there lived the ancestors of the Turks who were the chief sources of human civilization. The Turks created many states and empires in Asia, and the present Turkish republic is the last and the most perfect Turkish state. Turkish statistical yearbooks have reminded their readers that the majority of Turks live outside the republic and within what was the Soviet orbit.[194]

WORLD WAR II AND AFTER

The outbreak of World War II (1939–45) produced great animation among Turkey's Turkists and Pan-Turkists. Until the outbreak of the German Soviet War (June 22, 1941) they were passive, but this action reversed the situation.[195]

Their wildest expectations and hopes looked less unreal and became more interesting. The German and Turkish Foreign Offices, supporters of German Turkish collaboration in the war, and Pan-Turkist leaders were actively engaged in promoting anti-Soviet schemes. Much help came from younger Turks, since Pan-Turkism was popular in many youth organizations in the cultural centers of Turkey, and a flood of periodicals promoting Pan-Turkism appeared.

Diplomatic Negotiations

Diplomatic functions are commonly secret; only portions of the transactions that fell into the hands of the enemies of Germany and Turkey have been disclosed. There were, for example, meetings involving Pan-Turkists in Berlin in the latter part of 1941 attended by Adolf Hitler, Franz von Papen, and Nuri Pasha. One informative diplomatic document (subsequently published by the Soviets) indicating German and Turkish interests in Pan-Turkism is a secret report from von Papen, German ambassador to Turkey, and addressed to the German Foreign Office.[196]

The full text, translated from Russian, is quoted:

German Legation — Secret
No. A 3018/41 — Terapia,[197]
To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, — August 5, 1941
Berlin
Subject: Pan-Turanian Movement

A confidential and well placed informant reveals that in the light of German military ascendancy in Russia, Turkish governmental circles show increasing interest in the fate of their kinsmen beyond the Turkish Soviet frontier, particularly the Azerbaijan Turks.

These circles tend to recollect 1918 events: their wish is to annex the above area, especially the rich Baku oil fields. To these ends a Committee of experts has been set up, embodying specialists who once officiated in this type of work during Abdul Hamid's time. This Committee is to gather all pertinent material and is to enlist, in Turkey from the ranks of recent emigrants, and from among immigrants—notably those in the Azerbaijan province of Iran, support for a union of the new Turkey with the Turk inhabited regions bordering on it in the East, up to the Caspian Sea.

The leader of this group is a Deputy from Istanbul, Sukru Yenibahca, who adjudges himself as a Tatar although his family has lived in Turkey for several generations.

Other members are:

Nuri Pasha (brother of Enver Pasha) who at one time occupied a leading post in the so-called Islam Ordu; there are presumptions that he earnestly sympathized with his brother's Turanian projects.[198]

Professor Zeki Velidi (Bashkirian) who was a professor of the University of Istanbul; clashes with Ataturk forced him to resign from the University and for a time he settled in Vienna, Halle, and Bonn.[199]

A Crimean Turk, Ahmed Cafer (Djafer, also Ahmed Sayit Djafer) is considered an unreliable man; he is a government spy. There are rumours that he is still close to General

Sikorsky's London "Prometheus" organization: he is well known as a a Turkologist under the pseudonym of Ahmed Caferoglu.

It is necessary to mention as a member of this group Memduh Sevket, the Turkish Minister to Kabul, who not long ago participated in negotiations in Ankara. He is an official, and he may hardly express any views but those of his government. He cannot properly be involved with the above persons, nevertheless he is believed to be a real friend of the Eastern Turks.

Regarding the Eastern Turks (Azerbaijanis excluded), i.e., Volga Turks, Tatars, Turkmens, etc., the actual projects of the Turkish ruling circles may be summed up as follows: uniting these Turks in their own, externally independent Eastern Turkish state; however, the role of the Western Turks in this state would be decisive in politics and culture; and they would serve in the capacity of advisers.

The Eastern Turks do not concur with all of these plans; they feel the Turks amalgamated in the new Turkish republic are not entitled to be included under the term "true Turkish nationality." They had lost their real Turkish character, not in the recent past, but long ago. In Baku the Anatolian Turks are regarded as being simply Levantines who speak Turkish; as little contact as possible with them is encouraged. This evolution has a history of many hundreds of years; in the last centuries of Ottoman history the higher officialdom of the court and of the empire were represented by only a small percentage of Turks. At first they were of Hungarian origin, then Albanians, and later, during the regime of Abdul Hamid, they were dislodged by Circassians and Arabs. [This historical fact and political point of view was often confirmed during political discussions with interested persons in Tabriz.] The topic is actual since the inhabitants of Tabriz are also Azerbaijan Turks and feel they have parentage with the Baku Turks. Attention is drawn to the fact that one of the leading personalities of this movement in Tabriz is the Iranian Governor General.

Mehmet Emin Resulzade, founder of the *Musavat* party (*Musavat* means equality) is considered to be the leader of the movement, now as in the past. He joined the Polish movement of *Prometheus* which was nothing else but a branch of the Polish General Staff. After the collapse of Poland in 1939, Resulzade was supported by General Staff funds (the so called funds of Pilsudski) which were transferred to Switzerland. In 1940 Resulzade visited Sikorsky in London with a political mission, then subsequently settled with other Polish emigrants in Bucharest. Resulzade is a serious (big) politician, aside from his financial dependency. (As some other Turkish members of the *Prometheus* organization have expressed not long ago their unfriendly opinions about Germany, some caution toward Resulzade is necessary).

Mirza Bala is a representative and an aide to Resulzade; he is presently in the Turkish Army, serving as a private near Istanbul. There is nothing much to say about him, except that he is a true pupil of his much greater teacher. The informant feels it is necessary to make use of both Resulzade and Mirza Bala; but another informer from among Eastern Turks states that all the old guard should be repudiated, as he feels all of them are unreliable and should not hold office in the new Azerbaijan state because of their previous activities and financial links.

The new Azerbaijan state does not wish to be hampered with other Eastern Turks. The Azerbaijanis maintain that Volga Turks, Tatars, Turkmen etc., because of their dispersion, cannot claim national independence; they need to pass through a long evolution, and the task of educating them in the operation of a state should not fall to the Azerbaijan revolutionary movement. Nevertheless the source dissuades leaving this direction to the

Soviets, and recommends that German organization and know—how take a decisive role in the state's future development.

Germany is called upon to pay special attention to the drawing of details for the formation of a strong state organization in the south east with the aim of keeping the Soviets constantly apprehensive of this state. This task cannot be fulfilled in a satisfactory manner by the Ukraine; its people are Slavs, and they could easily come to believe at any time (as well as the Bulgars and Serbians) that their own common concord lies with the former USSR. As far as the Turks are concerned, this possibility is wholly excluded.

I added that the Iranian government is also very inquisitive about the Azerbaijan Turks, and my source answered that this was quite natural. The Shah himself is of Turkish origin. Simply convincing him that such a change would help him retain his political independence would bring him to support such a move. A dash of his pen would change the outline of his state (with its Irano Arabic character) into a state with a heterogeneous population. This explains the role of the Tabriz Governor General in the movement.

PAPEN

P.S. Annex to Page no.1

General Hüseyin Husnu Emir Erkilet, of Tatar origin, is also a member of the Ankara government's confidential group handling Eastern Turkish affairs.

The same collection of German Foreign Office state papers (later published by the Soviets as propaganda against the Turks) reported on a meeting of German Ambassador von Papen with retired Turkish General Mursel Baku.[200]

Copy

German Legation Ankara, May 13, 1942
No. A 2632/42
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Berlin.
Contents: Turkish Interest in the Caucasus.
General Mürsel Bakü Pasha called on me today and informed me of his conference with Marshal Çakmak. The Marshal assured him that all civilians of value to us in this cause would instantly be allowed permission to depart for Germany. As to officers, for the time being he is obliged to deny this permission. There are in the Turkish Army large numbers of ex-Caucasian and Azerbaijan officers who know that region well. In the event of future successful operations, he [Marshal Çakmak] will grant these officers authorization to leave upon our request. . . .

PAPEN[201]

A third document selected from this collection is a memorandum from Baron Ernst Weizsacker (Secretary of State at the German Foreign Office) to Joachim von Ribbentrop (Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs).[202]

Berlin, August 5, 1941 Secret
No. 494 Copy

The Turkish Ambassador today presented his new Embassy Counsellor to me.[203] He soon directed the conversation to the border peoples of Turkish blood in Soviet Russia. He drew attention to the possibility of conducting anti Soviet propaganda through these

Turkish tribes. He then said quite bluntly that the Caucasian peoples could later be united into a buffer state, and hinted that an independent Turan state might also be formed east of the Caspian.

Gerede mentioned this in conversational tone. His remarks were however by no means casual, as they completely coincide with what Ali Fuad had said to Herr von Papen (see Ankara report of the 14th ultim., No. 2335). Gerede laid his finger on the crux of the matter when he remarked that Baku was a completely Turkish speaking city. For the attention of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs.

WEIZSACKER

Copy by courier to the German Embassy in Terapia.

There seems to be no doubt as to the authenticity of these documents on certain aspects of Turkish-German relations on Pan-Turkism. To a certain degree, they are one-sided and do not completely indicate the policy followed by President Ismet, Inönü, but they do reflect the sympathies of certain of his key advisers.

Lenczowski wrote:

Von Papen pressed Turkey to become more friendly to Germany [1941–42], and his device was an attempt to revive Pan-Turkist tendencies in Turkey. The advance of the German armies into the Moslem areas of Russia gave Germany a trump card. By conceding to Turkey the right to organize the liberated Turko Tatar areas into a federation, von Papen hoped to secure Turkish collaboration. This impressed Turkey's Pan-Turkists and attracted some military leaders including Marshal Cakmak.[204]

The Pan-Turkist irredentists regarded as inevitable the defeat of the former USSR and considered possible the creation of a confederation of all the Turkish peoples of Soviet Russia and Chinese Turkestan under the Turkish republic's leadership.[205]

In general, Soviet sources are in accord with the Western ones on this question and Miller, in his *Ocherki Noveyshey Istorii Turtsii*, began the story of German-Turkish collaboration with the period preceding the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. Four days prior to the German attack on the Soviets, on July 18, 1941, the Turkish German Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed; in the interval from 1941 to 1942, the Turkish press openly assailed the Soviets. There were indications of increased Turkish preparation to take part in events and to arrange Caucasian and other Turkish areas independently or with German occurrence. In the autumn of 1942, the Turks concentrated troops at the Caucasian border, anticipating the fall of Stalingrad. The anti-Soviet campaign of the Turkish press had by then reached its zenith.[206] One may conclude that highly placed persons in the Turkish state had plans ready to exploit all the possibilities the German-Soviet war and a collapse of the former USSR could furnish for the realization of Pan-Turkish ideals.

PAN-TURKIST LEADERS AND THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR

The outbreak of the war in June 1941 aroused great hopes among the Turko Tatar leaders scattered in the West and in Turkey; nearly all these leaders approached the Germans and supplied them with various aides-mémoire and documents; the Germans also sought contacts and the exchange of opinions.

Veli Kajum-Khan, one of the chief followers of Mustafa Chokai (also Çokaioğlu or Chokayov), a leader of the Turkestanis, was in touch with the Germans and had given them pertinent facts on Turkestan. He insisted that Turkestan should not become part of any future Russian federation.[207]

Mehmet Emin Resulzade, the head of the Azerbaijan Musavat party, went to Bucharest after the occupation of Poland in 1939; he sent an exhaustive report to the Germans and subsequently went to Berlin. The Promethean leaders who were living in Warsaw during the German occupation also supplied the Germans with material. Ayas Ishaky and Said Shamil, leaders of the Kazan Tatars and North Caucasians, respectively, also went to Berlin. The Crimean Turks were represented in Berlin by Mustegib Fasil and Edige Kirimal (mentioned above in the letter from General Erkilet to Henting), and several Turkish politicians and unofficial representatives, including ex-General Erkilet, traveled there or visited the front lines. Edige Kirimal and other Turko Tatar leaders were permitted by the Germans to visit the occupied portions of the Turko Tatar regions of the Soviet Union (Crimea and the Northern Caucasus).

A most important political and military aspect of World War Pan-Turkist activity involved the national military units formed of Turks from the Soviet Union who fought in the German armed forces against the Soviets. The idea of forming these units originated with two prominent Turks, Mustafa Chokai and Veli Kajum-Khan. Mustaf Chokai died in December 1941, but German educated Kajum-Khan became commissioner for Turkestan, together with the other commissioners for Azerbaijan, Volga-Ural, Caucasus, and Crimea, who were appointed by the German *Ostministerium* (Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories).[208]

The idea of using the Turks of the former USSR in the fight against the Soviets must have been readily accepted by the German high command, whose approach to such problems were purely utilitarian.[209] There was probably no serious Nazi political opposition to this idea, as the territories inhabited by Turks of the USSR lay in general outside the limits of planned direct expansion of the Reich. The Germans needed military security and combat replacements. The receptiveness of the Turkish prisoners of war to the proposal stemmed in part from their political and religious convictions. The Wehrmacht was aware of their propaganda influence on other Soviet troops of Turk background and also of their political potential of diminishing enemy resistance, achieving speedy pacification of occupied territory, and making allies out of these populations.

The overwhelming majority of the Turk volunteers were recruited from among Soviet prisoners of war captured by the Germans. The 162nd Infantry Division,

commanded by General Oscar von Niedermayer, a well-known German specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, was assigned the task of organizing them into combat battalions. This activity was implemented by Army Group South, which was largely in the Central Ukraine area. A top secret memoir by Rosenberg concerning his discussion with Hitler on December 14, 1941, indicates that by that date, partial "Turkisation" of these units had been completed, and the experience was judged successful.[210]

On December 30, 1941, the High Command of the Wehrmacht was directed to establish: (1) a "Turkestan Legion" consisting of members of the following nationalities: Turkmens, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghizs, Karakalpaks, and Tajiks; (2) a "Caucasian-Mohammedan Legion," composed of Azerbaijanis, Dagestanis, Ingushes, Lezhins, and Chechens; (3) a "Georgian Legion"; and (4) an "Armenian Legion."[211] A "Volga-Tatar Legion" and a "North Caucasian Legion" were formed in 1942.

These legions were training centers where national units were organized and indoctrinated. For each of them, a corresponding national committee existed. The commanding officers of these legions had the disciplinary authority of a commander of an independent battalion. They were subordinate to the Command of the 162nd Infantry Division. The legions received prisoners of war from collecting camps and were charged with training them into future combat battalions. Each legion headquarters had a permanent cadre of German military personnel and the necessary number of Turks selected by the legion commander. After completion of their training and political indoctrination the combat battalions left the 162nd Infantry Division for attachment to different active German divisions.

During the subsequent war years, the "Turks" (the Germans grouped the Georgians, Armenians, and other non-Turkish groups under this term as well) furnished the rank-and-file elements of nineteen unattached battalions and twenty-four companies.[212] Among other duties, these units were used for front line action and for fighting partisans. As early as May, 1942, Turk Battalion No. 450 fought valiantly against partisans near Jampol (Ukraine) and dispersed the enemy after suffering twenty-eight casualties. There were only two German officers and two noncommissioned officers attached to this battalion.

The post of General der Osttruppen was established in December 1942. It was occupied first by General Hellmich and then by General Koestering.[213]

As a result of the activities of the Turkestan National Committee, the East Turkish Waffen Verband (a Waffen-SS unit) was formed in 1944 of four regiments (of two battalions each): one composed of Turks from Turkestan, another of Azerbaijanis, a third one of Volga-Ural Turks, and the fourth of Crimean Tatars.[214]

The first political objective of the Turk leaders was to obtain recognition from the Germans of the principle of national independence for their areas. General Niedermayer stated that his men were politically minded and concerned about the future of their native countries. His division promised them political, cultural,

and economic freedoms. Niedermayer's officers assured them of political self-administration under German protection and the right to "codetermine" the future fate of their native land.

The Nazi government itself was not willing to bind itself with any promises for the future, and temporized up to March 1945, when it had clearly become too late. Although Kajum-Khan was long before unofficially allowed by subordinate German authorities to base his propaganda on the assumption of the future independence of his country, the uncertainty in that respect seriously affected the morale of the leaders.[215]

There are indications that Pan-Turkism was actually considered a danger by the Germans.[216] The danger did not materialize, but one must keep in mind that Turkey remained neutral during the war. However, the practical problem that immediately arose for the Turk leaders was, were they fighting to have the Turks of the former USSR united into one people or divided into several national states? The problem remained unresolved. The organization of the East Turkish Waffen Verband into four different national regiments reflects the dilemma (and was a compromise between two possible solutions of the problem).

Youth and the Mass Propaganda of Pan-Turkism in Turkey

Concurrently with the Turko-German diplomatic talks and the unofficial negotiations of Pan-Turkists in Berlin, certain youth organizations in Turkey engaged in noisy and wide-scale movements, patronized by some less responsible activists of the older generation. Racialism, fascism, nationalism, mania grandiosa, and romantic passions for the prehistorical Turkish symbols of the grey wolf or of leaders such as Attila or Genghis Khan were exploited. Possibly, these irresponsible, extreme groups were tolerated by the Turkish government as an ideological preparation for the Turkish youth in the event of war with Soviet Russia or in case of a mobilization of the Turkish army for military or political tasks in the eastern Turkish world. In general, these proceedings discredited Pan-Turkism in the democratic world and partially in Turkey.

One of the first organizations of a Pan-Turkist character after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war was sponsored by Zeki Velidi Togan. At that time, he sought permission to go to Germany; when this was declined in July 1941, he established a secret society. Its aims were to unite the Turks of the rest of Asia with Turkey to create one Turkish state and, as soon as Germany's victory was assured, to overthrow the Turkish government by a swift, bloodless coup d'état and replace it by a nationalist government that would implement policies of racialism and Pan-Turanism (Pan-Turkism). To accomplish this aim, the society planned to aid in the organization of the prisoners of war of Turkish origin who were in German hands and to conduct propaganda in Turkey fostering the society's ideals.[217]

Togan's principal lieutenant, Reha Öguz Türkkan, who later formed a separate secret society, is alleged to have spread Pan-Turanism ideas in 1936–37 when

he was a student.[218] Türkkan began his overt activities by publishing the periodical *Bozkurt* (Grey wolf) in 1939. His reason for using the medium of a magazine instead of a newspaper is evident in his article on "The Turkish Press":

The rigid control of newspapers by the authorities, particularly after 1934 to 1935, sapped their vitality and minimized their political influence. Magazines, on the other hand, were able to express themselves more freely. Since the capital investment was not large, any group could put out a periodical, and if it was suspended for any reason, it was not too difficult to start over again with a new weekly or monthly.[219]

In an article in *Bozkurt* entitled "The Grey Wolf's Creed," the extremist viewpoint of this faction of the movement is self-evident:

Who are we? We are Grey Wolves (*Bozkurtcus*): What is our ideology? The Turkism of the Grey Wolf (*Bozkurt*). What is the belief of the Bozkurtcus? They believe that the Turkish race and the Turkish nation are superior to every other race and nation: What is the source of this superiority? The Turkish blood: Is the Turk superior by birth? The Turk is superior by birth. The Turk receives his intelligence, his valour, his military genius and his capacity and ability in every way from his blood . . . . Are Bozkurtcus pan Turkists? Yes! It is the sacred aim of the Bozkurt Turkists to see the Turkish state become a nation of sixty five millions. What will be your justification for that? Bozkurtcus have long ago loudly proclaimed the principle involved in this matter: "Right is not given, it is seized." War? Yes! War, when necessary! War is the great and blessed law of nature. . . . We are the grandchildren of warriors. The Bozkurtcus have believed that war, militarism and heroism should be raised to the highest degree of reverence.[220]

When *Bozkurt* was suspended, Türkkan promoted a society called Kitapsevenler Kurumu (Booklovers' association), which, under the cloak of harmless cultural enlightenment, was intended, as attested by Türkkan, "to spread racialist and Pan-Turanian propaganda," and to lay a basis for the Gurem secret society, which he later founded. In 1941, permission was obtained to reissue *Bozkurt* and it soon drew the interest of Soviet representatives in Turkey, who are said to have cabled long extracts from its articles to Moscow. The magazine finally came to an end in 1942 and was succeeded by *Gökbörü* (Sky Wolf), 1942–43, and *Özleyis* (Yearning), 1946–48, by the same editor and with the identical policy.[221] In more veiled terms, Turkkan outlined his objectives in a book:

The dynamic Turkish group consisting of twenty millions in Turkey and 100 millions in the North and East cannot be held back for long. If Turkism and Turkey are to survive, they must unite without loss of time and form a Turkish Nation of sixty millions . . . . Turkists cannot remain indifferent observing the complete destruction of Turkism, including Turkey, in a hundred years. What should be done? If political and historical conditions can not show us solutions in a hurry, we should first solve Turkey's problems. We must become stronger, and must speed into the *Land of the Turkish Union*. Finally, in the near future, we must get into action to develop Turkism and form a Union. Perhaps tomorrow, perhaps even earlier than tomorrow.[222]

The trend led by Türkkan has been described by him as containing a political philosophy which "encompassed a form of racialism, but different from the Nazi brand, anti-fascism [its first magazine was closed because of a violent anti German editorial], anti-Communism, a mild form of socialism, and a blend of non-religious Turkish traditionalism and reformism."[223]

A third rival cluster of Pan-Turanians was led by the veteran politician, Riza Nur, a poet, writer and journalist who died in 1942. Since his death, the group has been led by Nihal Atsiz, a secondary school teacher, who was accused in 1944 of spreading racialist and Pan-Turanian ideas among his pupils.[224] This circle published several magazines, among them *Tanridag* (Holy mountain) in 1942–43, *Atsiz* in 1931–33, and *Orhun* in 1934 and again in 1942–43. Its political philosophy has been described by Türkkan as being "racist, Pan-Turanist, anti-communist, and anti-Kemalist, with fascist tendencies."[225] Nihal Atsiz laid emphasis on the prerequisite of purifying the Turks of all non-Turkish elements and of ensuring that only Turks of pure lineage hold official posts.[226] Atsiz affected a facsimile of Hitler's hair style, had a colorful uniform designed for himself and his followers, and enjoyed being photographed in martial poses. His behavior appears to have been turbulent since his student days when he was expelled from the Military Medical School for lack of discipline.

A fourth splinter group, which expressed a nostalgia for the past and a decided antagonism toward the modern transformation of the nation, was reflected in *Çinaralti* (Under the maple tree), 1941–45, edited by Orhan Seyfi (Orhon) and Yusuf Ziya (Ortac), followers of Ziya Gökalp; and *Türk Yurdu*, founded in 1921, which was interrupted for a time and resumed in 1942 by H. Ferid Cansever. The Turkestan refugees published a number of journals in the 1930s.

It must be kept in mind that the lines and policies of these splinter groups were not hard and fast: Their members and ideas shifted back and forth with ease and usually without announcement. Therefore, to sort them out into distinct and definite groups and trends would be impossible.[227]

PAN-TURANISM VERSUS PAN-TURKISM

Pan-Turkism was born under the reciprocal influence of the Eastern Turks, who were threatened by "Russianization," and Western Turks, who were exposed to Russian expansion. Pan-Turanism (seeking unity among Turkish, Mongol, and Finnish-Ugrian peoples), in contrast to Pan-Turkism (seeking unity of Turkish peoples), followed in the wake of Russian expansion in the Balkans and is correlated to Turkish and Hungarian experiments in anti-Slav collaboration. Pan-Slavism and Russian expansion in the Balkans endangered the Magyar and German ascendency over the Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This became evident following the collapse of the Ottoman domination over the Balkan Slavs and Russian intrusion into the Balkans. Other factors were still more alarming. In June 1876, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Serbian Army consisted largely of Russian volunteers and was commanded by

a Russian general. In September 1876, it was planned that if Ottoman Turkey refused to make reforms in its Balkan provinces, the Allied fleet would move into the Bosphorus. Bosnia was to be temporarily occupied by the Austrian army, and Bulgaria by the Russian army.[228] These and similar events vexed the Hungarians, who became anxious to find external allies; herein lies the source of the Hungarian concept of Pan-Turanism.

A "Pan-Turanian handbook," prepared in 1919 by the British Foreign Office, confirmed this assertion: "During the Balkan upheavals of 1876 to 1878, the Magyars were violently pro-Ottoman, and a deputation of Magyar students presented a sword of honour to the Sultan during the Serbo Turkish war."[229]

The seeds of Pan-Turanism, which were generally unperceived by outsiders, grew slowly. They subsequently evolved into the Pan-Turanian Congress in Constantinople (1913), in which Hungarians, and even Bulgarians participated.[230] The attempt to integrate the forces of Slavic Bulgaria with Ugro-Finnish Hungarians and Turkish Ottomans was purely tactical, although scientists, historians, and linguists have found Uralo-Altaic affinities among these nations. In spite of the chimeric concept of Pan-Turanism, some political forces were behind the rapprochement of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and they managed to include these Western Uralo-Altaics within the political compounds of the 1914–1918 Central European bloc. The role played by Pan-Turanian ideological elements in grouping the Western Uralo-Altaics is not known; ideological motives can become psychological complexes that fill a subconscious function without our full perception. In Bulgaria, the ruling dynasty was Saxe-Coburg, and there was a pervading German sympathy for Pan-Turanism and Pan-Turkism preceding World War I, of which Enver Pasha's pro-German enthusiasm is additional evidence.

When the Turks and Hungarians entered World War I, signs of Pan-Turanism faded and only the Turkish activity of this pseudo-movement remained. This was displayed by the Young Turks, by the Turkish incursion into the Caucasus in 1914, by Turkish manipulations in Caucasia in 1918, by Enver's exploits in Turkestan in 1921 to 1922, and by similar events. On the other hand, the Pan-Turkist activity of the Eastern Turks was evidenced by the convocation of several All-Turkish Congresses in 1905–6 and 1911. They participated in the disruption of the Russian Czarist Empire and fought for their unification and freedom in 1917–22. The nationalist revolution in postwar Turkey and its Pan-Turkist undercurrent are prominent indices of the All-Turkish élan in the fateful years during and after World War I.[231]

The weakness of Pan-Turanism as an aggregative plan for heterogeneous elements has been obvious to many Turks and Hungarians for some time. Arminius Vambery was attracted to the Pan-Turanian idea, but he confined his research to the Turkic languages and Turkish peoples.[232] By World War I, Pan-Turanism, with its principle of integration on a supranational and racial basis, had been discarded. In 1915, Tekin Alp stated:

Community of race is of extremely small importance in this modern age. The English and Germans are of the same race, and yet they are the bitterest enemies. . . .

The similar situation exists in Serbian Bulgarian relations. Russia proclaimed her hypocritical Pan-Slavism, but her policy is but the extension and glorification of Russian despotism by means of Slav nations. Poles and Ukrainians hate the Russian authority. Thus the bond of racial relationship is nowadays very slight. . . .

The Turks' national ideal cannot be the race theory, because the latter is really nothing but an utopian dream. The national ideal of the Turkish nation can only grow out of the national movement.[233].

Three years later, British researchers repudiated Pan-Turanism as an unlikely vision: "Owing to difference of religion, language, spheres of civilization, and to wide geographical separation, the Finns and Ugrians, the Samoyeds, the Tungus, the Mongols and the Siberian Yakuts, are not in the least likely to be drawn into the Pan-Turanian movement."[234]

Notwithstanding the difference in meanings of Pan-Turanism and Pan-Turkism, as well as the rejection of Pan-Turanism as unsound, there is a confusion in the use of these terms in political literature. The term Pan-Turanism had a Pan-Turkist connotation to the British Foreign Office when they used the term in the sense of a Pan-Turkish movement that "is part and parcel of the Ottoman Turkish nationalism and can only be understood in relation to it."[235] A confusion in these terms occurred in the works of Arnold Toynbee, the noted British authority in Turkish, Greek, and Near Eastern studies. Halide Edip (Adivar), the well-known Turkish authoress and Pan-Turkist, was depicted as an apostle of Pan-Turanism.[236] In a collective work on Turkey by Toynbee and Kirkwood, Pan-Turanianism was defined as supranational propaganda for unity "between all the Turkish speaking peoples, on the same lines as Pan-Slavism."[237]

Lenczowski also misused the term Pan-Turanism in relation to Pan-Turkism during World War II, namely, during a time when Pan-Turanism, as such, was out of the question.[238] He was probably influenced by German sources who mentioned Pan-Turanism despite meaning Pan-Turkism.[239] With the blending of Pan-Islamism with Pan-Turkism in the Russian-Turkish areas, the Soviets used both terms synonymously. Turkish sources avoid the term *Pan-Turkism* and prefer phrases such as "the Turkish world" (Turk Dunya). *Pan-Turkism* is translated inadequately with the word *Turkism* (Türkçülük).[240] Togan defined Pan-Turkism and its related pan-movements as follows:

Pan-Islamism is a movement to unite the followers of the Islamic religion;

Pan-Turanism seeks an agreement and unity among the Turkish, Mongol and Finnish-Ugrian peoples;

Pan-Turkism aims at the unity of all Turkish peoples.[241]

These concepts are defined in a descending series from extensive to less extensive, and then to the most moderate. The first movement embraces all

Islamic society, while the second is a transitory pseudo-racial slogan.[242] Finally, the third is based on the ethnic, linguistic, and historical affinities of the Turkish peoples.

In summation, the term *Pan-Turanism* should be used solely to designate the period of Turkish-Hungarian collaboration in the nineteenth century and the initial period of World War I. The term *Pan-Turkism*, on the contrary, describes the endeavors of the Turkish peoples toward collaboration and unity based on common ethnocultural and political foundations.

THE PAN-TURKIST IDEAL

Pan-Turkism, in contrast to Pan-Turanism, has been treated as a sound ideal by most researchers. An older British government publication concluded:

> Owing to community in religion, language, race, type of civilization, and geographical contiguity, the Pan-Turanian movement might possibly succeed among the following Turkish peoples: the Osmanli, the Caucasian, the Persian, the Afghan, the Volga, the Crimean Turks, and those of Turkestan (East and West), and of Siberia: a total population of 26,000,000.[243]

This source also made the following claim with regard to motivation: "Owing to their national indolence, to their political ineptitude, and to the steady diminution of the Turks of Anatolia, the best element in the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish peoples are not likely to combine, unless they allow themselves to be organized by an outside power, that is, Germany."[244]

In the almost seventy-five years that have elapsed since the publication of these observations, the situation has clearly changed. The Anatolian Turks, instead of disintegrating and diminishing in numbers, have achieved strength. Their numbers have greatly expanded, from about 9.5 million in 1918 in the entire Ottoman Empire, to about 57 million in the Turkish republic in 1990.[245] What was the multinational, multilingual, and multicultural Ottoman Empire is now a relatively homogeneous modern state (except for Turkey's Kurds), with the principle of Turkish nationalism as its slogan of internal, as well as external, policy. The Pan-Turkist undercurrent is present in the basic spheres of state life, such as education, the problem of minorities, and re-Turkification of language.

Pan-Turkist tendencies form a link between the new Turkey and the Eastern Turks. This ideal implies the explosive element of irredentism in the lands of the former Soviet Union. This is a source of indecision among the leading Pan-Turkists and Turkish nationalists, and it is the origin of the somewhat conspiratorial character of Pan-Turkism. The existing and visible links and the future possibilities of collaboration between Turkic peoples are obvious to the principal parties concerned, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Turkish republic. The possibility of Pan-Turkist irredentism is a real and constant political fact that is recognized as having a two-edged potential (such as Turkey's concern

over the forced Slavization of Bulgarian Turks in recent years). Its foundations and meaning were understood even in the period of World War I. One of the long-time Turkish leaders of Pan-Turkism is Alpaslan Türkes, a retired colonel and political leader.

The Ebb of Pan-Turkism

European and Soviet authors agree that the German defeats in the former USSR became the turning point of the unrestricted expansion of Pan-Turkist feelings in Turkey. After the German reverse, Turkish authorities appear to have decided that it would be politic to suppress the "Pan-Turanians" (Pan-Turkists), thinking no doubt that the denunciations of the movements and the arrest and trial of its leaders would gain them good marks in Moscow.[246] Krimskiy, a Soviet author, in an article in *Bolshevik* (now renamed *Communist*), wrote that the fear of responsibility for their Pan-Turkist activity forced the "Pan-Turanists" in Turkey to renounce their beliefs.[247] Miller stated that after the German defeat at Stalingrad, the Turks tried to hide their previous pro-German and anti-Soviet actions.[248]

In reality, the situation was somewhat different. The strong resistance of the Soviets, who did not collapse after enormous losses, played an important but secondary role. The ebb of the Pan-Turkist tide began much earlier and was caused by the disappointment of the Turkish government and Pan-Turkist leaders, who realized that German intentions from the outset were unclear and were in reality duplicitous. The Germans hoped to exploit Turkish and Turko Tatar assistance in the liquidation of the Soviet empire and to leave in German hands the future of the huge Soviet-Russian colonies. The Turks and the Turko Tatars of the Soviet Union soon realized the German aim, and as a result the enormous possibilities for collaboration by the Turks with Germany were reduced to mutual distrust, very reserved manifestations of friendship, and empty diplomatic phrases.

In this situation it is understandable that on August 27, 1942, the prime minister of Turkey, Sarajoglu, stated in an important conversation with von Papen that as a Turk, he "passionately [desired] the annihilation of Russia" and that such an exploit, about to be accomplished by the führer, did not occur more than once in a century. He believed that Germany had a major mission to accomplish in liberating the Turkish peoples of Soviet Russia. As prime minister of Turkey, however, he had to take care not to give the Soviets the slightest pretext to annihilate the Turkish minorities in reprisal, and for this reason, it was necessary for him to maintain absolute neutrality.[249]

Turkey was undoubtedly well informed that no tangible arrangement could result from the German-Turkish talks because of the opposition of Alfred Rosenberg's *Ostministerium* to any schemes for Turko Tatar autonomy. Rosenberg and his Nazi clique did not share the views of the foreign ministry in this matter. Selfishly looking for governorships of the occupied areas and anticipating a speedy conquest of Caucasia, they went so far as to dispatch to Turkey a man who loudly advertised himself as the "Gauleiter of Tiflis."[250]

The Germans reacted impatiently and indicated their inability to agree on any sincere collaboration with the Turks when Ribbentrop ordered von Papen to discontinue the Pan-Turkist conversations in view of "the stubborn Turkish neutrality."[251] This is, of course, a simplification of the situation. Turkish neutrality was provoked by the Nazis' arrogance and intention not to permit anyone to share in their booty in the former USSR.

The ebb of Pan-Turkism at high diplomatic levels was accompanied by a belated cessation of Pan-Turkist propaganda (within Turkey) because of measures taken by the Turkish government. These repressions were evidenced by two events: the arrest and trial of several Pan-Turkists, and the forced repatriation to Soviet Russia of 195 refugees, among them many Turks from the Soviet Union.

On May 9, 1944, the Turkish government ordered the arrest of Pan-Turkist leaders with wide publicity in the Turkish press. The decision to prosecute was taken by the cabinet on May 18, and in a speech on the following day, President Inönü declared that the government would not tolerate the subversive activities of the Pan-Turkists.[252] The trial opened on September 8, 1944, before the Istanbul Court of Martial Law, with twenty-three persons accused of spreading racialist and Pan-Turanian doctrines and of organizing secret societies with the purpose of conspiring to overthrow the Turkish government. The accused included a university professor, high school teachers, civil servants, and army officers. Between the date of their arrest in May and the trial in September, the prosecution prepared its case; the evidence before the court included the depositions of the accused, reports of meetings, speeches, and correspondence. A decision was announced on March 29, 1945, with sentences of two to ten years' hard labor for most of the defendants. By October 1945, however, when the Penal Section of the Military Court of Cassation had reviewed the court's decision, Turkish-Soviet relations were on such a footing that the Turks no longer felt it necessary to use the prisoners as scapegoats and to make concessions to the Soviets in the matter. The sentences were then canceled.

A second repressive measure was the forced delivery of a group of refugees to the former USSR for repatriation and sure death. Later, this again became a matter of concern and discussion. On July 13, 1951, during a session of the Turkish parliament in Ankara, Deputy T. S. Mocan demanded an explanation from the minister of justice, R. Nasuhioglu, who stated that during World War II, 237 men of various nationalities found refuge in Turkey. On February 23, 1945, Turkey declared war against Japan and became an ally of the Soviet Union, whereupon Moscow demanded the return of its citizens. The Turkish government agreed, and from among 237 refugees, 195 were delivered to Soviet authorities on August 6, 1945. Deputy Mocan defined this act as infamous in the history of Turkey. It should be added that among those forcibly repatriated were "many Azerbaijanis and other Caucasians," which aroused great indignation in Turkey.[253]

This action by the Turkish government was caused by strong Soviet pressure.

Between September 1944 and January 1945, the Red Army occupied the Balkans, Hungary, and Poland. Moscow chose this moment to present its demands for the surrender of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan and approval for a joint Soviet-Turkish defense of the Straits. The Soviet-Turkish treaty of friendship and neutrality of 1925 was denounced by the former USSR on March 19, 1945. The Potsdam conference was very helpful to the Soviets, and the governments of Great Britain and the United States acting in fulfilment of the Potsdam resolutions presented notes to Turkey in November 1945.[254] These notes asked Turkey to open the Straits to the passage of Soviet merchant and naval vessels, even in time of war. Such an obligation was really tantamount to yielding Istanbul to a potential enemy and made it impossible for Turkey to defend this part of her national territory.[255] Abandoned, Turkey was forced to renounce her war hopes and "misdeeds," which furnishes one explanation of the anti-Pan-Turkist trials as well as the repatriation to certain death of 195 Soviet escapees.

Resurgence of Pan-Turkist Feelings

The international situation improved when, in a note of August 19, 1946, the American government made it clear to Moscow that it would oppose any virtual monopoly of power by the Soviet Union in the strategic waterway. The Truman Doctrine was announced when Soviet pressure on Turkey and Greece was at its highest, and the American government declared that the preservation of Turkish and Greek independence was vital to the security of the United States. By mid-May 1947, Congress had approved the expenditure of $400 million, for economic and military aid, of which $100 million was assigned to Turkey. This was the beginning of the growing American interest in Turkey's welfare and security. On May 2, 1947, elements of the U. S. Mediterranean fleet visited Istanbul, and in June an American military mission arrived in Ankara.[256]

The Turks were reassured, and the anti-Pan-Turkist drive slackened. In the same month, August 1946, when the American note informed Moscow that the United States would oppose Soviet demands in the Straits, a second trial began of the previously accused Pan-Turkists. During this second trial, Zeki Velidi Togan testified:

> It was around the idea of an "Eastern Turkish Union" that friends of Turkestan and I met here from the end of June to the end of July, 1944. Our aim was to establish the "Eastern Turkish Union" and to obtain powerful members here. . . . We had those in the organization take an oath like this: "We shall work, even at the cost of our lives, for unity of thought, language and culture among the Turkestanians between North Caucasia and Chinese Turkestan, and we shall die for this if necessary."
>
> We thought of helping Turks in Turkestan and Turkestanians taken prisoner by the Germans in the German Soviet battles. This was, of course, subject to the consent of the government. We sent Dr. Hasan Ferit Cansever to see Governor Dr. Lutfi Kirdar. . . . We wrote our aims down on paper and he said he would reply later. He did reply but in the negative.

On one occasion, I went to Ankara and got in touch with Marshal Çakmak, then Chief of the General Staff, and Menemencioglu, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. I informed them that my friends, whose names I gave, wished to go to Germany and Turkestan via China or other routes, and I requested financial support . . . However, I failed to get any reply, affirmative or negative. . . .

I got in touch with the Germany Embassy to arrange for the passage of some friends who wished to go to Germany to get in touch with Turkestanians in Germany. The Embassy gave me a cold reception and said that the matter would be referred to Berlin and action would be taken when a reply had arrived . . . Some of us accepted Turks regardless of tribal differences, from the Caspian Sea to the Chinese Wall . . . On the other hand, others did not desire the union of all Turks in the East, and were in favor of setting up separate states . . . The Germans were not in favor of all Eastern Turks uniting. It suited them better that they should unite in groups.[257]

The retrial was finally concluded on March 31, 1947, with an acquittal for all the accused on all charges. This verdict closely reflected the change, through the period 1944–47, in the official Turkish attitude toward Pan-Turkism. This shift from strong official opposition to a mild tolerance also evidenced the diminishing Turkish sensitivity to possible Soviet criticism of such activity.

The retrial of the Pan-Turkists was not widely reported by the press and was generally limited to factual accounts of the sittings of the court. (This was in great contrast to the very wide publicity given the first trial in 1944.) The 1947 verdict of not guilty was played down in the press and there was no editorial comment on the outcome of the trial except in the new minor nationalist and Pan-Turkist periodicals, which again began appearing after the change of government policy had been sensed. The unanimous lack of comment on the trials, which had aroused great public interest, suggests that the Turkish government had intimated to the press its desire that no news emphasis be given to the trial and its outcome. *Tasvir* quoted the court's final decision as saying:

It was claimed that the oaths which were arranged in 1941 by Professor Zeki Veliki Togan, Dr. Ahmet Karadagli of Eastern Turkestan and his wife Nuruiman Karadagli were aimed at overthrowing the government. It was found, however, from the evidence . . . that the aim had been to help the people of Turkestan who had fallen prisoner into German hands; to work for the local rehabilitation of Turkish communities which would obtain their independence, like the Hatay, if Russia were to fall; and to go to those places and work for the cause of their coming to an understanding without falling into discord; and nothing was found pointing to the contrary except for one statement given to the police. Professor Zeki Velidi Togan, Nuruiman Karadagli, Ahmet Karadagli, and Reha Oğuz Tükkan, thus proved to have, on the contrary, striven for a national cause, were acquitted of this charge.[258]

Turko Tatar leaders regained confidence and with the development of the Cold War between the West and the East, recommenced their activity in Turkey under a cultural guise. With the inclusion of Turkey in the international commitments of the Western bloc, the Anatolian Turks, and the representatives of the eastern

Turks may be considered to form a de facto regional element united in spirit to the Western nations.

These changes found expression in events that may be compared to some of the activities of the Promethean League. For example, Mehmet Emin Resulzade, in 1951 to 1952, broadcast six times for the Voice of America (from August 1951 onward). One of his speeches dealt with the independence of Azerbaijan, and another, with the Soviet occupation of his country. Resulzade's literary work entitled *Azerbaycan Şairi Nizami* (the Azerbaijan poet Nizami), was published with the assistance of the Turkish Ministry of Education in 1951 and distributed to the school libraries of the republic.[259] Other Turko Tatar politicians, such as Ayas Ishaky, Said Shamil, and Togan, regained at least partial freedom to work politically. Turko Tatar leaders residing in Turkey made many trips to Munich and Paris after 1950, in order to take part in conferences of anti-Soviet groups of Turkish and non-Turkish leaders from Soviet Russia.

The current action of the Turko Tatar leaders in Turkey, in spite of the more liberal and reassuring attitude of the government, was more cultural-political than strictly political in the full sense of the word. The full political activity of these leaders was conducted beyond the Turkish frontiers in West Germany and France, where, about 1949, there were developed political centers for the subjugated peoples of the Soviet Union. These Turkish peoples from the former USSR began publication of the following political periodicals:

a. *United Caucasus*, a monthly review edited by A. Kantemir, in Munich, was started in 1951. This was the organ of the Committee for Caucasian Independence. Azerbaijanis played an important role on the Committee and in editorial work;
b. *Svobodniy Kavkas* (The free Caucasus), edited by A. Avtorkhanov, was a monthly review which was started in 1951. It was the organ of Caucasian National Democratic thought. Azerbaijanis participated in this paper but it terminated at the end of 1953;
c. *Azerbaycan*, a monthly review, was edited by Abdul Fatalibeili.[260] It was the organ of the Azerbaijan National Association and was started in 1952, in Munich;
d. *Millij Türkistan* (National Turkestan) was a monthly review edited by Veli Kajum-Khan and served as the organ of the National Turkestanian Unity Committee for the Liberation of Turkestan. It was started in 1951, in Geneva, and then moved to Dusseldorf.
e. *Azat Vatan* (Free homeland) was a review of the National Committee of Tatar Bashkirs and was started in 1952.

There were also periodicals by non-Tatar independence groups, such as Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Georgians, and Armenians. Not all these had sound material or firm political foundations, and their existence was sometimes

precarious and often dependent on foreign support. Conferences, meetings, and contacts were organized, and steps were taken to fuse the endeavors of the rival political groups. Great Britain's support was partially concealed, while American attempts to coordinate the efforts of political émigrés from the Soviet Union was represented by the widely publicized American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, which was later called the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, of New York.[261] Outwardly these activities did not have a Pan-Turkist character: The American Committee and Western European organizations (such as British and German Intelligence) were not interested in separate aggregations of the peoples of Soviet Russia, but were involved in backing all anti-Communists of the Soviet Union (such as Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Belorussians, and Free Cossacks, as well as the Turkish peoples of the former USSR).[262] Within these groups, the Turks were tightly bound, not only by linguistic, historical, and political affinities, but also by their consciousness of the existence of the relatively powerful Turkish republic. Among most leaders of Turkish and non-Turkish peoples in what was Soviet Russia, there was an identity of basic political aims: liberation of their countries from Soviet domination. Differences were restricted to secondary and mostly tactical questions (i.e., the form and content of collaboration with the Russian anti-Bolshevik émigrés abroad, degree of compliance with the postulates of the patronizing powers, and so forth). This screen of open problems enabled the Turks to conceal their particular aims without any harm to their cause and without incurring the risk of definite responsibility and consequential defeat.

In postwar Soviet Russia, there was a gathering of historians from Central Asia and Kazakhstan, which convened in Tashkent from January 30 to February 7, 1954.[263] Present at this conference were professors of the history departments of the former USSR Academy of Sciences and Eastern Institute; historians from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Tatar ASSR, Bashkir ASSR, and Dagestan ASSR; secondary school teachers from Tashkent; and representatives of government and party organizations. The agenda listed the following topics:

1. The essence of the patriarchal and feudal relations of the nomadic peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
2. The development of the Uzbekian and Kazakhian bourgeois nationalities.
3. *The reactionary contents of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism.*[264]
4. The character of the uprising of 1916.
5. The periods of history of Central Asian and Kazakh peoples.

The main object of this conference was to "legalize" the Communist falsehoods that had been injected into the history of Central Asia in the postwar period. This was not the first conference of its kind. In 1935, there was a resolution enacted to revise all historical manuals for the secondary and higher

schools in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. At that time, the question arose: Is the history of the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and other Central Asian peoples one undivided unit of the general history of Central Asia, or is it part of histories of the separate and individual peoples? The members of this conference were forced to renounce the view that the history of these peoples was one undivided whole, and from this time on, the term *Turkestan* disappeared, having been forbidden for use in historical publications.[265]

In 1936, in Samarkand, a second conference was convened; this was the last partially liberal meeting of historians. Papers were read such as that of Asfandiarov on the "Genesis of the Uzbek and Kazakh Peoples," and that of Pullat Sadi on "Some Contributions to the Cultural Achievements of Turkestan." These conferences were the last indication of resistance by Turkestanian historians to Communist pressure. It was an ill-fated resistance, however, since these same lecturers were accused of being nationalists and Pan-Turkists and were later arrested and caused to disappear.

From 1936 until 1954, there were introduced into the history of Central Asia a great number of falsehoods regarding the national independence movements, the conquest of Central Asia, the common Turkestanian Moslem culture, and the common history of the Turkish peoples of Turkestan. For example, the famous hero of the national independence struggle, Kene Sari Khan (Kenesarikhan), was transformed into a reactionary oppressor of the Kazakh people. Such epics of the Turkish peoples as *Alpamish Korkut-Ata* and *Tales of Great Campaign (March)*, from the epic of *Manas*, were forbidden. In June 1953, a scientific conference dealing with national movements in Kirghizia was convened in Frunze. It defined new revisions in the history of Central Asia that were connected with the history of Djadism and the history of Alash-orda in Kazakhstan.

At the 1954 Tashkent Conference, special interest was attracted by a paper on the reactionary contents of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism (*O reaktsionnoy sushchnosti panislamisma i pantiurkisma*), by Babadjan Gafurov, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Tajik SSR. Gafurov stated that Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were under the special protection of international imperialism and that America was trying in every way to exploit these ideologies for its aggressive aims. Pretending to protect the Moslems, American aggressors were organizing military blocs in the Near and Middle East and were fighting the independence movements in the Moslem world. He stressed that nationalism in Central Asia and in Kazakhstan was primarily an expression of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and Pan-Iranism. Gafurov's lecture permitted Shtakelberg to draw several conclusions:

First, the Soviet government was wary of the pacts concluded among Near Eastern countries and was attempting to lower Turkey's prestige by accusing it of Pan-Turkist inclinations. Any expression of sympathy toward democratic Turkey by the Soviet Union's Moslems was stamped as Pan-Turkism.

Second, the Turks in the former Soviet Union retained a consciousness of their common origin with those in the Turkish Republic. These feelings had not

been destroyed since the former Soviet government actively feared a combined anti-Soviet action by the Turkish peoples. This has resulted in a ban on all narratives relating to the common character of Turkestanian epic works. This was also the reason for preventing the publication of Turkish classics in the Chagatai language or comparative studies on the Turkic and Uralo-Altaic languages. All tendencies showing links between these languages were labeled an expression of Pan Turkism.

Third, development of national (non-Russian) cultures had been stifled, and purges in the Moslem republics have continued unabated.

Soviet sources substantiate the conclusions of Shtakelberg and have attacked "certain historians" in the "Turkish" republics of the former USSR who have not eliminated traces of the Pan-Turkist theory of the "imaginary existence" of an ancient, united Turkish people that are alleged to have inhabited the territory of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Turkmenia. The Uzbek historian Gulyamov wrote of these people in his article, "On Studying the Navoi Epoch." There were similar views in the "History of the Kazakh Republic," where the authors depicted it as a national state with a single culture. Pan-Turkist tendencies also appeared in V. M. Zhirmunsky and K. T. Zarifov's work entitled *The Uzbek Popular Heroic Epos* (1947), in which the oral folklore of the Central Asian peoples is regarded as "all Turkish."[266]

Pravda underlined the same nationalistic and Pan-Turkist tendencies in former Soviet Central Asia and referred to the growth of nationalism in Uzbekistan. It demanded a "ruthless struggle" against "bourgeois-nationalism" and called for exposure of the "reactionary essence of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism."[267]

C. L. Sulzberger has stated that the first secretary of Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party, A. I. Niyazov, complained publicly of the attitude in the Turkmen, Uzbek, Kazakh, and Tajik ASSRs, and admitted that a purge had occurred among Kazakhstan and Turkmenian intellectuals. Niyazov excoriated the persistence of "bourgeois-nationalism," old-fashioned "religious" attitudes, and the counterrevolutionary theories of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism. Sulzberger believed that Moscow recognized this Turkish link as a potential magnetic force, which was detrimental to its own Central Asian empire.[268] Even the leaders in Uzbekistan, such as Mohammed Salikh, chairman of Uzbekistan's Democratic party and one of the founders of the Central Asian independence movement known as *Birlik* ("unity" or "union," meaning "oneness"), stated "that the old union cannot last, and new changes are essential." The reason for the more moderate attitude of the Moslem-Turkic republics was felt to be their backwardness, but another potent reason was their knowledge that time was on the side of the over 55 million Moslems of what is now the former USSR.

5

Summary and Perspectives

ESTIMATE OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF UNITY: THE COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE AMONG THE TURKS OF THE FORMER USSR

The general conditions of life under the former Soviet regime undoubtedly tended to undermine the religious, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic links that existed between the various peoples of Turkish origin. To what point have these ties actually been weakened since the leadership of Gorbachev and the stirring changes in 1991 to the present?

Islam

Soviet colonial policy in the past made no secret of its long-range intention to eliminate Islam. Open atheist propaganda was sponsored, and restrictions were made on the use of buildings for religious purposes. In the past, many mosques were closed except for a few propaganda showplaces. Supposedly scientific endeavors actively demeaned the Islamic faith in the eyes of the public, as was stated in a Soviet book:

> The task confronting Soviet investigators of Islam is . . . unmasking the contemporary role of Islam as a support for the exploiter classes and the colonial regime disclosing the reactionary, anti-popular essence of the ideology of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, used primarily by the American imperialists to enslave the peoples of the East.
>
> Finally, our literature on Islamic questions must instruct . . . the inhabitants of those republics and oblasts where this religion is still to be found; it must arm our propagandists with knowledge to assist their struggle with religious traditions, rites, and concepts; it must educate the workers in the spirit of Soviet patriotism.[1]

Islam is too intimately a part of the native culture of the Central Asian Turks to be entirely eliminated under any circumstance, but there are indications of a considerable decline in its power. Family life in the former USSR left so much to be desired that it was understandably difficult for many Moslems to view the adoption of those customs, and the abandonment of their own "backward" ones, as an improvement. Although Islam is still a strong social bond, linking people who often reject its tenets and rituals, it seems that the powerful dynamism of Islam was diminishing in the former USSR. In recent years, however, an Islamic revival has been taking place, especially since Gorbachev introduced glasnost and perestroika. Moscow embarked on a policy, now largely successful, of wooing moderate Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia. In 1991, Moscow permitted an increase in the number of Soviet Moslems who could make the *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca, even though that number was still quite modest. Most of the pilgrims were from the former Soviet Union's Turkic peoples. The Jeddah-based Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is opening an office in Soviet Central Asia to assist Soviet Moslems religiously. There are also burgeoning private economic relations, such as the opening of a branch in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, of the Al Baraka Islamic Banking Organization, in a 50–50 venture with the government of Kazakhstan. The strong feeling of Turkish identity held by these peoples will be a balancing factor to the above.

Culture and Language

Richard Pipes believes that Soviet linguistic policy in Central Asia had two major objectives, both of which follow closely the general lines of what was the Soviet nationality policy. First, it attempted to prevent the formation of a single Turkic literary language in Central Asia in the belief that such a language would serve as a weapon for the establishment of a united Central Asian national movement. Second, it promoted the acceptance of Russian as the primary language of communication among persons of different groups.[2] The first goal was fostered by exploiting all dialectical differences among the various Turkic groups and by granting the status of full-fledged national literary languages to local variants of Turkic. The second aim was promoted through the official change of Turkic alphabets from Arabic to Latin, and then from Latin to the Russian Cyrillic; through the gradual introduction of Russian words in their original form and spelling into the native vocabularies; through compulsory Russian-language instruction in all schools above the elementary level; and finally, through the requirement of a good knowledge of the Russian language for all citizens, regardless of nationality, who were desirous of a career. It was apparently the hope of the authorities that, given sufficient time, these policies would make Russian the language of the socially dynamic elements of the Moslem population and relegate Turkic to the status of a peasant dialect devoid of political importance.

The British specialist Colonel G. E. Wheeler believes the Soviet authorities

evidently hoped to achieve by Russification an effect similar to that produced by the "Arabization" of the indigenous languages of the peoples who came under Arab Islamic domination. The adoption of the Arabic script and of numerous Arabic words and phrases was a powerful factor in the perpetuation of Islam, and thus of Arab culture, even after the tide of Arab conquest had receded. However, this was the result of conversion to Islam, not the cause, and while the Arabs may have insisted on the use of Arabic for official purposes, there is no evidence that they ever instituted a policy of Arabization of existing languages.

The Soviet government attempted to achieve the same end by arbitrary means: It was insisting on the Russification of Central Asian languages by the introduction of the Cyrillic script and Russian loan words; it even envisaged the modification of grammar and phonetics.[3] In recent years, the Turkic republics have started to revert to Latin, Arabic, or Turkish scripts.

The effects of the then-existing Soviet linguistic policy of Russification through methods that were both negative (the division of Moslem groups) and positive (the imposition of Russian through compulsion, linguistic infiltration, career inducements, and Russian colonization) are as yet not fully known. By World War II, the Moslem rural masses seemed to have been largely unaffected by the Soviet linguistic measures, as were the poorer and less educated elements in the cities. These groups continued, as before, to communicate exclusively in their native dialects, and they were largely ignorant of Russian. Soviet policies did cause the numerous and growing Moslem intelligentsia to acquire a working knowledge of Russian; however, instead of becoming Russified, these groups became bilingual, necessarily using Russian for their work and Turkic for all other purposes. Of linguistic assimilation there does not seem to be any evidence; on the contrary, all signs point to a remarkable ability of the local languages to survive in the face of strong external pressures.[4]

Ethnic Distinctiveness and Population Growth

Soviet sources were unanimous in asserting that their regime had succeeded in suppressing racial inequalities in what was then the USSR.[5] This assertion seems, however, only partially true: If the Turko-Russian relationship is called brotherly, the sources seldom omitted to emphasize the assistance the "Great Russian people" were giving their Turk brothers. As a rule, the racial hostility between the Soviets and Turks seemed to prevail only among the lowest and least educated groups of the population of both these nationalities; on the whole, it did not seem to play an important role in the national problems in Central Asia.

Soviet sources tried to glorify wartime Soviet Turk cooperation and the conduct of Turk soldiers in the Soviet army, perhaps aiming to eliminate any bitterness over anti-Soviet wartime activities and to create among Turk peoples a supranational Soviet patriotism.[6]

These Russian efforts are bound to have had some effect. Nevertheless, the

Turks of the former USSR have maintained their ethnic distinctiveness, and the native populations give up these ethnic differences only when they are clearly incompatible with material progress.

One could conclude that the over seventy years of Bolshevist rule have considerably weakened the elements of spiritual unity on which Pan-Turkish ideas are based.[7] However, the ethnic identity of the Turks remains mostly intact. From this, the new Turk intelligentsia takes the force that makes their motivating ideas important to the future of the Turkic population of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Another very important consideration is the size and remarkable growth of the Moslem population in the CIS. According to the 1989 census of the then-USSR, the Moslem nationalities totaled 54.826 million. The Moslem share of the total population had risen in 1989 to 19.2 percent (up from 16.55 percent in 1979). The Moslem nationalities accounted for 49.4 percent of the total increase in the population of the former USSR during the 1979–89 period. (The comparative figure for 1970–79 was 42.1 percent.)

The Turkic-speaking population constitutes the second largest linguistic group in the CIS, after the Slavs. The Turkic-speaking population rose by 24.5 percent between 1979 and 1989, to 49.523 million or 17.3 percent of the total CIS population.[8]

It has been estimated that by the year 2000, the population of the CIS (286.717 million in 1989) will reach 308 million. The present Moslem population of 54.8 million is estimated to reach 76.8 million (25 percent) of the population of the CIS by the year 2000, and the Turkic population of 49.5 million (1989) would reach over 60 million.[9]

New Intelligentsia

The Soviets trained cadres of native personnel into a new educated class. In the autonomous republic of Tatarstan, the percentage of Tatars occupying higher governmental posts is about half of the total.[10] The new intelligentsia is connected with the Turkic population by origin, family ties, language, and customs. By training, work, and much of its psychology, however, they were tied to the Russians and the former Communist system. However, their sympathies lie clearly with the Turks. In a referendum on March 21, 1992, 61.4 percent of the Tatars voted for a "Sovereign" separate status within the Russian federation. Chechnya is the other autonomous republic (out of sixteen) that refused to sign the Russian federal treaty on March 31, 1992. Not only do the lower grades of the Turkish intelligentsia retain their Turkish links, but also do those most closely identified with the then-existing regime. The former Soviets apparently did not succeed in permanently enrolling significant numbers of Tatar intellectuals into their ranks.[11] In general, the relations between native officials who then served the Communists and the Turk population at large were good; the population viewed them as protectors and helpers vis-à-vis the then-existing regime. The

indigenous educated class in Central Asia is politically even less mature than their Russian counterpart. These new intellectuals are the source from which the cadres of the future leaders of Central Asia will undoubtedly arise. One danger seems to be that for many of the Turks of the CIS, the Russians were exponents of Western culture in its most advanced form; this is apparently a basis of their grip on some of the Turks.

The former Communist entity extended into all facets of society and brought the state into close relationship with the thoughts and actions of most individuals. Its bureaucratic authoritarianism sought to place on each individual of the community direct responsibility, not only for the achievements of national political policy, but also in the fields of economics and morality.

Purges in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan gave additional evidence that the Turks of the former USSR shared the same growing nationalistic spirit that is causing difficulties in the Middle and Near East.[12] Evidence of disaffection among the Turks in the former Soviet Union was available when thousands in the Soviet armed forces went over to the Germans to fight in the Wehrmacht (as outlined previously). From 1945 to the present, Soviet leaders sought to combat this discontent by frequent purges. Soviet external propaganda expressed friendship for the Moslem world, yet inside its own borders, Pan-Turkism was labeled as the most serious of "ideological perversions."

In words that have not lost their full value, Tekin Alp concluded:

> The history of recent times shows us that all nations on awakening to national consciousness think first of their brothers in neighboring lands. This thought has . . . gradually risen to become their national ideal.
>
> The ideal of the new nations, and the policy of their governments as interpreters of the national ideal, show a strong tendency towards the liberation of their compatriots abroad from the foreign yoke, or at least an awakening of their national consciousness. The newly awakened Turks can have no other aim. The Turkish Irredenta may be directed towards material or moral reforms according to circumstances. If the geographical position favors the venture, the Turks can free their brothers from foreign rules . . . and they can . . . carry on their Irredenta on moral or intellectual lines.
>
> The Ottoman Turks are indeed the only strength of their brothers abroad, but they themselves are dependent on the cooperation of the different parts of their nation in foreign lands, because their numbers in the fatherland are too small, and they are thus constantly menaced by the danger of annihilation in their milieu. The Irredenta, which other nations may regard as a luxury, is a political and social necessity for the Turks . . . If all Turks in the world were welded into one huge community, a strong nation would be formed, worthy to take an important place among the other nations of the world.[13]

The above observations by Tekin Alp may prove to be fatefully relevant if modern day Europe rejects Turkish membership in the European Community in a manner that creates an impression that the rejection was made on ethnic and/or religious grounds.

Responsible Pan-Turkist leaders have searched for realistic solutions and have

discarded maximum demands and attempts to solve all problems at one stroke. Concessions are made and a modus vivendi is accepted. As Graham Fuller pointed out, with the end of the Cold War, an additional uncertainty is the question of whether, and how, the Central Asian states will coordinate their external policies. Some might look more to Russia, Turkey, Afghanistan, or Iran. The only certainty is that these dynamics will effect permanent changes in Central Asian and Middle Eastern politics.[14]

With regard to the multinational character of the Caucasus, some may explore the ideal of a solution by a Caucasian confederation of the Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Armenians, and North Caucasians (those now in Dagestan and some remnants of other North Caucasian tribes). This confederation, tied with a treaty of friendship and collaboration to the Turkish republic and other neighboring Turkish dominions, could be one of the components of a Middle East region.[15] However, this concept appears infeasible at the present since so much mutual antagonism among Armenians Azeris, Georgians, and Osetians is currently evident. An independent united Turkestan, probably with the exception of the Slavic-populated northern areas of Kazakhstan, could be another entity of the liberated Turks.

The Kazan-Bashkir-Chuvash complex is the subject of much speculation. The idea of a Middle Volga federation, embracing not only the Turkish-speaking peoples but also the Finno-Ugrian Maris and Udmurts and other neighboring tribes, is somewhat outweighed by the concept involving exchange of the Turko-Tatar population of this region with Russians living in more homogeneous Turkish areas.

To repopulate the Crimean peninsula with Turkish refugees from other remote provinces and Crimean Tatar exiles is an improbable but sweeping idea, which is supported because of the strategic protection and influence it would give to the Turkish republic. Re-Turkification of this peninsula would mean a neutralization of the Black Sea. This aim, though very unlikely, is appealing not only to Turkey, but also to Caucasians and Rumanians. It seems unrealistic now, however, since the coming of perestroika and glasnost.

The Pan-Turkists' policy is simply to deepen the Turkish national feelings of unity in their Turkish hinterland and to "wait and see" rather than provoke genocide of the Karachai, Balkarian, or Crimean type. They believe in their Pan-Turkist ideal, but they know its minimum precondition was a weakening or disintegration of the Soviet empire, which has now occurred. They feel that their belief in the Pan-Turkist ideal is sound. While Soviet policy had been to weaken Islamic and Pan-Turkist movements and sentiment in the Caucasus and Central Asia, in the period since 1990, there was a change in this attitude.

During 1990–91, certain important events may have influenced a softening of attitudes towards the Moslems and Turkic peoples of Central Asia. During September 1990, the Assembly of the Peoples of the East of the former Soviet Union met in Moscow. They called for improved conditions and defense of their sovereignty. They did not mention the concept of a common union of Moslem

republics, which they knew the Kremlin opposed. Instead, they appeared to seek sovereignty within the then Soviet Union.

The March 17, 1991, referendum about the future relationship between the union republics and the central government was another important occasion in which all six Moslem union republics voted in favor of the referendum to preserve the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (Kazakhstan asked: "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the former USSR as a union of sovereign states?" Ninety-four percent said yes. Uzbekistan had a similar formulation.)[16]

Showing a certain ambivalence, during 1987, 1988, and 1989, the then Soviet authorities appeared to have sided with the Armenians in the unrest and riots in Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, during spring 1991, the Soviet authorities seemed to have aligned themselves with the Azeris in local ethnic disturbances.

When Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, Moscow began to soften its approach to religion, including Islam. As it seeks to develop and strengthen ties with moderate Arab countries, it has opened opportunities for an Islamic revival in Central Asia. That revival could lead to a resuscitation of Turkic identity among many in Central Asia.

THE COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA

The creation of the new Central Asian Republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has created an echo of the "Great Game" that was played by European imperial powers at the turn of the century. On February 28, 1992, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan took their seats at the United Nations, though they are sensitive to the fact that as yet, they have few other attributes of full statehood. Among the countries best positioned to be key players in seeking influence in the rapidly changing newly independent Central Asian Republics and Azerbaijan are the following, which will be discussed below: the Russian Republic, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Pakistan, and China (though obviously Japan and Europe will be highly interested participants). Israeli entrepreneurs have made a number of significant barter agreements (largely involving drip irrigation), encouraged by the Israeli government, which is eager for commercial links that might help keep some leverage with the Moslem republics.

Obviously, these countries each have specific objectives, and the competition has economic, political, ideological, and religious dimensions. All these nations are seeking whatever economic benefits may be possible. Turkey is concerned that Iran may attempt to turn the CIS Islamic States toward theocracy, which is an apprehension shared by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China, and the Gulf States. Iran is worried that Turkey's active role in Central Asia is aimed at forging a Pan-Turkic hegemony on Iran's northern and western frontiers. At present, Turkey is widely seen in the CIS as a gateway to the developed West, and there is apprehension among some individuals and governments that reliance on Iran will carry dangers of continued isolation.

There are constraints on each nation's policies. Neither Turkey nor Iran wishes to alienate or alarm Moscow by exerting too much activity in the new Islamic CIS states. Very importantly, none of these potential partners or benefactors of the Central Asian states has at present the financial capacity to extend major resources as assistance.

The Russian Republic

The Russian Republic and the other non-Moslem republics of the CIS fear that Islamic fundamentalism could find fertile ground in the predominantly Moslem states as freedom blossoms. Moscow is also apprehensive that the region could become an area of conflict, not just between Christianity and Islam, but also between Turkey and Iran and between Sunni and Shiite. Although Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan have joined the CIS, deep religious, cultural, and historical differences divide them from the Slavic center of the former Soviet Union. Economic separation will produce dislocations as these areas, which were once interdependent, seek new markets and relationships. Since many of the Turkic intelligentsia and decision makers were trained and educated in the Communist system, it would be naive to expect that they would quickly change their past methods and practices.

The parliamentary deputies from the CIS are still considering ways of coordinating their actions, since they still share most of the characteristics of a unitary state. They have no formal borders, although they have lots of informal trade barriers and many still share a common currency.

Russia's present internal problems have somewhat distracted Moscow from the Central Asian states. This has caused a reduction or end to many subsidies and has eroded Moscow's domination of their economies. It appears that the Central Asian Moslem republics may now tend to orient toward regional economic and political arrangements. However, the continuing presence of large Russian minorities in the area, who still occupy key positions in many cases, constitute a basis for direct and indirect Russian influence.

As noted by Daniel Sneider in the October 13, 1992 issue of the *Christian Science Monitor*:

> The Commonwealth of Independent states increasingly is becoming a two-tier body, with a core of states closely tied to Russia, surrounded by what are essentially observer states. The core states have chosen to join the "ruble zone," continuing to use the ruble as their common currency and submitting, de facto, to Russian monetary and credit controls. Aside from Russia, the "ruble zone" comprises Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia.

Ukraine, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are developing their own currencies and resisting any coordination of security or economic policy with Russia. (The 11th member, Tajikistan, is embroiled in civil war.)

Even these lines are far from solid, however. Both Belarus and Armenia are already printing their own currencies, according to the independent Interfax news agency, but are holding off their introduction. "We need the commonwealth for a transitional period," Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akayev told Reuters after the close of the summit in his capital. "It slows down the negative consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union."

The Russian attitude toward the commonwealth has been one of "take it or leave it." Russia has almost invited former Soviet republics such as Ukraine to issue their own currency as soon as possible, seeking to end disputes over mutual payments and use of the ruble. Russians say Ukraine and others have expanded ruble circulation by issuing ruble-based credits and piling up ruble debt between Russian enterprises and counterparts in other former republics.

"Either ruble-zone states jointly work out common rules and abide by them, or they should leave it civilly by agreement," Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared to the Russian parliament. This tough approach is also being displayed on oil and energy shipments from energy-rich Russia. Russian officials complain they are not being paid, and recently the Russian energy minister warned that supplies might be cut off if debts were not paid.

But even those who elect to stay in the zone complain that they are the victims of arbitrary Russian policies over which they have no say. The massive increase in credits issued by the Russian Central Bank, in large part to avert bankruptcy of state-run industries, now is flowing outward to other republics in the zone. "Kyrgyzstan is only a little island in the huge ruble ocean and we are drowning in the waves of Russian inflation," Mr. Akayev said. "Russia will do all it can to prevent the ruble zone plan from collapsing. If we try to get out of the ruble zone, Russia will make the problem of payments more difficult."

Some observers say Russia is reluctant to give up sole control over the issuance of the ruble. Russians have not been enthusiastic supporters of Kazakh President Nazarbayev's desire to create a tighter economic union, including the formation of a super-central bank with joint control by all members.

Those two neighbors form the innermost core of the commonwealth, however. The Kazakh and Russian leaders made that clear by meeting separately after the Bishkek summit of October 1992 and signing an agreement to have open borders for trade, to use the ruble as common currency, and to coordinate military and foreign policies. A news report said that the leaders of five former Soviet republics in Central Asia agreed to set up a common market as they wanted to continue using the ruble as their joint currency. Top officials from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan attended the summit in the Uzbek capital, Tashkent (W.S.J. 5 Jan 1993).

The Central Asians realize that though they are now independent, they currently continue to be influenced by, and depend on, Moscow. There is a widely shared apprehension among the people that, though they are politically free of Moscow, they may need to turn to Russia to seek basic necessities, political assistance, and academic talent in order to implement their governments and run

economies based on Western models with which they are unfamiliar. Unemployment is a serious and significant problem facing Central Asia.

While no imminent challenge is apparent, Central Asian leadership, hopefully, will exercise a cautious balance to avoid misinterpreting the spirit of Islamic revivalism that is encouraged by interested parties. It should not be confused with, or automatically be equated with, an Iranian version of conservative Islam. However, some of the economic, political, and demographic elements that preceded Islamic upheavals in Iran and Algeria can be found in Central Asia.

Turkey

Turkey, as a secular republican model, is regaining some of the influence it had during the Ottoman Empire and is perhaps the primary external influence at present. Even Turkey's onetime possessions in the Balkans are seeking that country's help.

As Graham Fuller pointed out, Turkey, which always has been strategically located, is "at the absolute geopolitical center of a newly emerging world. . . . A responsible Turkey can have a powerfully moderative effect on the region."

Fragmentation of the former Soviet Union and the breakaway of the Eastern European states, however, has led Turkey to reexamine its traditional policy of noninterference regarding the Turks living outside Turkey. With the decline of Moscow's central authority, Ankara has begun to expand its economic and political ties with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. A flurry of diplomatic visits has been accompanied by the signing of economic and commercial agreements as well as cultural exchanges. Ankara's new attitude toward ethnic Turkic groups in Azerbaijan and the former Soviet Central Asian republics is based more on pragmatic economic and foreign policy considerations than on ideological concerns. In mid-December 1991, Uzbek president Islam Karimov paid an official visit to Turkey, during which he asked that Turkey recognize not only the independence of Uzbekistan but that of all the states of Central Asia, for which he used the term Turkestan. His use of this designation for the Central Asian region could have been interpreted as a plea that Turkey regard Central Asia as a single entity, since Karimov has been a supporter of the creation of a Central Asian commonwealth in which Uzbekistan would play a central role.

The Turks expect to gain major economic benefits from the development of closer ties with Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Turkmens, and Azerbaijanis. In January 1992, Ankara established the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) to coordinate the flow of assistance to the area. At the same time, there is the expectation that Turkey will become politically more important in regional and global politics because of its cultural and ethnic links with the large Turkic populations in a region undergoing profound political changes. This view is also based on the belief that Turkey's secular and emerging democratic credentials

will enhance its importance as a model for the future development of the former Soviet Turkic republics.[17]

On October 30–31, 1992, the following met in Ankara: Turgut Özal, President of Turkey and Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey; Ebulfez Elchibey, President of Azerbaijan; Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan; Askar Akayev, President of Kyrgyzhstan; Islam Karimov, President of Uzbekistan and Saparmurad Niyazov, President of Turkmenistan. In their "Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation" they noted "the special bonds among their peoples, stemming from the common history, language and culture." They "reaffirmed their belief in a social order established on the basis of the principles of democracy, respect of human rights, secularism, social justice and market economy." They agreed to economic cooperation and to develop infrastructure projects and to regularly continue their summit meetings, with the next to be planned for Baku in October 1993.

On April 1, 1992, Turkey made a major move in the contest for the "hearts and minds," of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and for market share, and political influence by focusing satellite television toward Central Asia. Utilizing Intelsat VI, Turkish television will be sending initially 468 hours a week of Turkish-language news, entertainment, and cultural programs to some 57 million new viewers in Central Asia.

Initially, one-third of the programs will be in simplified Turkish, which has been assessed to be understandable to an audience that speaks a variety of Turkic dialects. It will reach listeners who, for more than seventy years, were prevented from traveling to Turkey and the capitalist West. The first programs will introduce Central Asian viewers to what they have been missing and to what they might want to emulate: the Turkish model of Moslems looking for a bridge to the West.

An additional high-technology action was inaugurated in December 1992 linking Turkey's telephone network to help provide worldwide telephone service to Central Asia. Turkey's PTT is supplying public exchanges and earth stations through a $25 million donation, which the PTT should comfortably recover in time through telephone transit revenues. The existing telephone system, which channels nearly all international calls through Moscow, is said to be collapsing.[18]

On the one hand, Turkey's new policy initiatives regarding the Turkic ethnic peoples in former Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan have the potential to fulfil Ankara's economic and political expectations. On the other hand, however, they are also likely to pose new challenges and problems. Turkey's interest in developing closer economic and political tiés with the Turkic republics carries with it the danger of Ankara's involvement in ethnic and nationalist conflicts in the region. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has already presented Turkey with a sense of the difficulties that it might encounter in the near future. In its approach to the conflict in Nogorno Karabakh, Ankara faced difficult policy choices between domestic pressures, stemming from the sympathy of the Turkish public for the Azeris, and its desire to remain neutral and play a moderating role. In support of the latter choice, Ankara refrained from providing support to the

Azeris and began a constructive dialogue with Armenian officials to establish new trade and political relations. Following Azerbaijan's declaration of its independence, however, Turkey came under increasing pressure from the Azeris to recognize their new political status. Ankara's decision to become the first state to recognize Azerbaijan's independence, in October 1991, underscored the dilemma that the Turks face in their efforts to maintain strict neutrality regarding ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet republics.

Turkey's new initiatives regarding the Turkic republics are also likely to increase tensions between Ankara and Tehran. Iran, too, is interested in maintaining a strong influence in the political and economic future of Azerbaijan and the other former Soviet Central Asian republics. The balance of the decade, therefore, is likely to witness increasing competition between the two opposing models of political development for the Turco-Moslem peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia: the secular model of Turkey, with its political pluralism, and the Islamist model supported by Iran.

An important aspect of the race for influence in Central Asia could prove to be which alphabet—Latin, Arabic or Cyrillic—ultimately secures the most everyday usage. An alphabet secures the moorings of economic, cultural, and intellectual life. Since the 1920s, Central Asia has been forcibly tied to Russian Cyrillic. However, like communism itself, Cyrillic is no longer relevant in Central Asia.

There was a Turkish Language Congress in Turkey in June 1992. One of the topics for consideration was the introduction of a Latin script for the Turkish dialects spoken in each Republic. Latinizing these alphabets would be a boon to Turkish efforts to increase its influence in Central Asia, although there is some resistance to this idea. On December 25, 1991, however, the Azerbaijanis decided to shift from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. This is a linguistic victory that the Turks will be repeating in some of the other Central Asian states (though non-Turkic-speaking Tajikistan already has adopted the Arabic script).

According to Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel (in the Turkish press in February 1992), his country offers "a model of democracy, secularism and free market economy." He has offered Turkey as a base from which foreign investors and businesspeople could operate in the former Soviet republics. He also called on the West to encourage the Moslem republics in Asia to adopt the "Turkish model" rather than the Iranian and Arab models.

Some of the euphoria with which the Turkish business community greeted the dissolution of the Soviet Union is evaporating as officials struggle to make sense of the new trade relations and the all-but-nonexistent financial structure within the emerging republics. However, Turkey feels it has a headstart in the Turkish-speaking Central Asian states as a conduit for Western companies and as a political counterweight to Iran (particularly with Uzbekistan).

With the shortage of foreign exchange, traders will have to consider barter deals. The Turkic Central Asian republics have still to tackle the issue of price controls, private land ownership, and private enterprise, and they have no banking

infrastructure. Western officials worry that early steps by the poorer Central Asian republics may include raising tariffs to protect themselves.

In the religious sphere, there are concerns about future confrontations between modernists and fundamentalists. Being in favor of Islam (as are the Islamists) and fundamentalism (as in political Islam) or fanaticism is certainly not the same thing.

Other concerns include the possibility that exaggerated promises or expectations of aid or quick solutions within the Central Asian republics could result in a negative reaction. As well, there is apprehension that some anti-Turkish elements (such as the Greeks, Armenians, or Cypriots, and later, possibly certain Russians) may cause political and other difficulties. Turkey's other long-term concerns include avoiding instability that could initiate a wave of Turkic refugees, establishing secular, free market democracies, comparable to their own and in discouraging Islamic fundamentalists whose activity could cause a religious reaction within Turkey.

Iran

Iran has moved quickly to exert what it sees as its legitimate influence with the Moslem members of the CIS, and as a contiguous power, by dispatching diplomats, traders, and mullahs throughout Central Asia. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati made a tour of the Asian Moslem republics in December 1991, and Iranian embassies were quickly opened in 1992.

On November 28, 1992, Afghanistan and the six former Soviet Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan joined the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). The ECO was founded by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey in 1967. It was essentially defunct after the 1979 Iranian revolution. With the new members, the ECO has the potential for the beginnings of an Islamic common market uniting more than 300 million Moslems.

This broader ECO conceivably could bring about a long-term change in the economic and geopolitical situation of the region and could impact adversely on Russian interests in the area. The most important potential of the new organization could be a large infrastructure developing over time from expanded air, road, and rail links between member countries. Iran and Turkey, whose ideological positions clash, both hope to influence these countries, and this competition may inhibit the development of the ECO. While the economic problems of many of the ECO members pose serious challenges to achieving a viable, economic force, if cohesion was to be maintained, the ECO could have an impact.

Strained relations between ECO founding members Iran and Turkey, and their competition for influence among the Moslem states of the region, will undoubtedly hinder the development of multilateral ties. Moreover, in an indication of the new members' continuing wariness of any attempts by Tehran to promote its brand of Islam in their states, Kyrgyz Vice Prime Minister Abdyganiy Er-

kebayev noted Kyrgyzstan's decision to follow a "secular path," while adding that the state remains open to cooperation with "the East, as well as the West" (*Interfax*, February 22, 1992).

For ethnic, linguistic, and religious reasons, Iran has close ties to Tajikistan and Azerbaijan (whose population is largely Shiite, as is Iran's). Talks between Iran and Azerbaijan have resulted in agreements (1) to construct a gas pipeline to Nakhuchivan, (2) to enter into a barter deal in which Azeri industrial machinery, chemicals, timber, and cement would be exchanged for Iranian clothing and dried fruit, and (3) to cooperate in Caspian Sea shipping, oil, and gas exploration, and in fisheries and rail cooperation.

Turkmenistan started construction work on a railway from Tajan to the border-crossing point of Sarakhs. According to an agreement, Iran will lay another two hundred kilometers of track from Sarakhs to Mashad by 1993. Turkmenistan has also offered to supply surplus oil and gas to the Iranian border provinces, and has agreed to jointly build two reservoir and deviation dams on the border.

With Azerbaijan, Iran has signed an agreement to help modernize the republic's international telecommunications link. This follows the establishment of direct phone lines with the Christian republic of Armenia.

Leaders of the Moslem CIS states have, in general, responded positively to Iran's overtures, mostly to seek to meet their economic needs. The new CIS states are wary of the spread of Iranian-style fundamentalism and probably will expand economic ties to Tehran while trying to minimize contacts between the Iranians and their domestic Islamic activists.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, as an Islamic moderate nation, has established diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhistan, and Uzbekistan (especially in Uzbekistan because of long-standing cultural and religious ties stemming from the role that Moslem scholars from Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara have played in Islamic history). By early 1992, Saudi Arabia was estimated to have invested more than $1 billion in Central Asia, much of it on Islamic studies centers and efforts to promote the use of the Arabic language. The Saudi Foreign Minister traveled across Central Asia in late February 1992 with a message that included warnings to Moslems to avoid secularism. Prior to his visit, Saudi Arabia's contacts with Central Asia had largely been limited to providing transport for Moslem pilgrims to Mecca and sending tens of thousands of Korans for distribution to believers.

Riyadh is considering ways to help the Moslem CIS states economically and can count on financial help from its private sector (who will want to help support Islam).

The Saudis are wary of Iranian intentions in the area because of Iran's geographical proximity, religious fundamentalism, transport routes, and because of the intensity of Iranian diplomatic activity.

United States

The United States recognized the independence of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan on December 25, 1991. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker made visits to these countries in February 1992 and conducted detailed discussions with their leaders on the political, economic, and security principles of most importance to the United States. He then stated that the depth, extent, and richness of U.S. relations with each of these countries will depend on their commitment to these principles. Following Baker's visit, U.S. President George Bush decided that the United States would take immediate steps to establish diplomatic relations with them and with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and U.S. embassies would be opened by March 15, 1992. The United States will also support their membership in relevant international organizations, including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The United States should take a more active role as a role model being secular, democratic and free-market. Its financial and technological contribution could be mutually beneficial, particularly since the United States does not historically have an imperialistic past in this part of the world.

Pakistan

As an Islamic state, Pakistan has thus far been playing an active but secondary role. For example, Pakistani Economics Minister of State, Sardar Aseff Ahmad Ali, said in mid-January 1992 that Islamabad is willing to join the five Moslem states of Central Asia in building a railway line across the mountains of Afghanistan to the coast in western Pakistan. If that were to occur, it would give Central Asia and Afghanistan direct access to the sea for imports and exports and Pakistan would have a new port on the Baluchistan coast. A preliminary feasibility study showed that the construction of such a rail link would probably cost at least $4 or $5 billion and take eight to ten years.

Pakistan views Central Asia as a potential source of strategic support against India, but may find it difficult to assuage resentment from Pakistan's support for fundamentalist Afghan insurgents. An unstable Afghanistan would complicate their access to the Moslem CIS states.

Pakistan has widely offered credits and rice and has opened a number of embassies in Central Asia (including in Baku, where Pakistan is interested in an Azeri offer to share oil exploration technology). However, Pakistan is believed to consider Uzbekistan its most important potential trading partner in Central Asia and has offered $30 million in credits.

There have also been discussions of exporting Turkmen gas to Pakistan through Afghanistan, and of extending the Herat Turkmenistan road into Pakistan. Islamabad's economic initiatives are likely to be constrained by its tight financial situation. Pakistan is seeking to avoid direct competition for influence with Iran

in the hope of protecting their bilateral relations, but independent Pakistani Sunni activists could undermine these intentions.

China

The Central Asian states provide a dilemma for the People's Republic of China. The Chinese were quick to send a delegation to discuss diplomatic and economic relations with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in early January 1992. China shares a six hundred mile mountainous border with Kyrgyzstan and so far has not interfered with their efforts to erect a multi-party constitutional system or pursue free market reforms. China was among the first to recognize Kyrgyzstan and maintains a regular diplomatic presence. China's interest in Central Asia include:

1. Concerns about the example that the independent states of Central Asia provide for China's own restless minorities, especially the Turkic-speaking Uigurs of Sinkiang, which borders on Kazakhstan; and
2. Its goals for the development of China's hinterland, which complains of being left behind the coastal provinces.

China has sent delegations thoroughout the Central Asian area and has permitted transport links and a lively trade to develop in recent years between Sinkiang and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, China may move cautiously in expanding its ties with Central Asia because of apprehension that uncontrolled exchanges with West Turkestan may tend to destabilize Eastern Turkestan, as the Uigurs call Sinkiang.

CURRENT SITUATION

Consequently, as of early 1993, we find a very fluid, emerging situation in Central Asia. The dissolution of the USSR has brought six new countries with traditionally Moslem populations onto the international scene. Some Western observers have feared that some of the new states might fall under the influence of Iranian-style religious extremism; might sell advanced weapons or components to anti-Western regimes such as those in Libya, Iran, or Iraq; or would upset the present balance of power in the Middle East. Thus, major diplomatic, economic, and cultural initiatives (though until now, largely uncoordinated) have been set in motion to draw the Central Asian states toward the Western model.

Moslem believers in the predominantly Sunni Central Asian states have not exhibited much sympathy for the revolutionary orientation of Shiite Iran. Some of the Central Asian states, moreover, have not hesitated to identify the dangers of Iranian-style fundamentalism. They may feel that the spectre of the radical political model set by Iran could help to guarantee a favorable Western response

for economic and other assistance. The need for prompt foreign investment; technical, cultural and economic assistance; and stability is vital to helping determine Central Asia's future.

Though Turkey appears to have clear advantages, no outside power has yet emerged as a leader in the competition for influence in the six CIS countries which have significant Moslem populations. All of the competitors have political and economic constraints on their activities.

Appendix 1

Excerpts from "Observations on the Future of the Turkish World"

By Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer[1] (written in the 1930s)

In deliberating on the Turkish world, we have in mind those Turks professing the same religion and having a homogeneous language and culture.[2] While a large number of Turkish nationalists and internationally known Turkologists agree with justification as to the unity of those peoples included under the term "Turk," this matter is currently being questioned.

If all the Turkish peoples had, by their own will, been able to maintain the nationalist current that had fired them with great enthusiasm since 1905, especially in the Soviet Union, where live the majority of the peoples of Turkish nationality, there is no reason to doubt that unity of all these Turks would now be an actual fact. Turkish intellectuals have sustained the assumption that the peoples of which they were descendants were part of the Turkish nation, and they were all convinced that uniformity of language and culture constituted their sacred base. At that time, the predominant language of all newspapers, periodicals, and books was the clear Turkish language, which had been purged of grammatical rules and words of Arabic and Persian origin.

This political gospel, launched by the great Crimean renovator Ismail Bey Gaspirali in his newspaper Terğüman (founded in 1883), which was read by all Turk intellectuals, had taken deep roots in Russian Turk circles. The benevolent committees suggested by Gaspirali and established in all Turk cities and villages aided those in need and, in particular, helped poor children to complete their studies. The work of the benevolent committees had such a great influence on the development of the nationalist movement among the Turks of Russia, that, *had the Russian revolution been maintained within democratic bounds, no one could doubt the national unity of these Turks.*[3]

It is evident that the realization of this national and cultural unity and the development of this solidarity could have, at a favorable opportunity, led the

Turks to unify their political destinies and create a national consciousness and a single political and cultural unit. The fact that the Bolsheviks dominated the Russian revolution, adopting as their policy the class struggle and intensifying the policy of Russification, raised a question as to Turkish national unity.

If the Bolsheviks hold authority for a long time—let us say twenty to twenty-five years—and if they continue to divide Turkish national unity by pursuing their methodical propaganda concerning tribal feelings and continue to people the area with Russian and foreign elements, one cannot look forward to seeing the oppressed nationalities of Soviet Russia thinking in terms of national and territorial unity.

The political emigrants of those Turkish nationalities whose countries had been invaded anew by Bolshevik hordes have outlined their wishes in their publications for more than thirty years and through memoranda, presented several times to Western states, as well as in appeals to international political institutions. Their stated desires may be outlined as follows:

1. The independence of Turkestan through the union of Kazakhs, Kirghizs, Turkmens, Uzbeks, and the other Turkish tribes;
2. The independence of Idel-Ural through the unification of the Turks (Tatars) of Kazan and the Bashkirs;
3. The allied confederation of Azerbaijan and of the North Caucasus with the republics of Georgia and Armenia; and
4. The independence of Crimea.

The creation of these republics will enormously accelerate the cultural and spiritual reconstruction of the Turks while restoring among them the idea of cultural unity. Thus, all intellectuals of the Turkish world will form a single body and their publications will not be confined to limited regions. This union of intellectual strength will enable Turkish thought to place itself in the current of world opinion and to attain an influential level.

It must be recognized that the political émigrés of the Turkish countries do not possess an intellectual framework equal to that of the Russians or even the Ukrainians. It is true that an intellectual class has formed inside the Turkish areas of the Soviet Union. However, to be able to make their work more effective and to adapt themselves to the thought and the technique of the West, and especially, to quickly obliterate Bolshevik political, social, and cultural influences in order to lay the foundations of jurisprudence and public instruction on democratic and national principles, there will be a great need for a well-formed group of Turkish intellectuals in the West.

It is another bitter truth that along with the other Western countries, the United States does not understand that the Turkish world, by its wealth and by the powerful role it will be able to play against Soviet Russian imperialism, occupies an exclusive place that cannot be compared to that of the Ukraine. However,

the Turkish world is less known by the United States than is the Ukraine. The material difficulties in which the Turkish political emigration abroad has found itself have played a predominant role in this ignorance of the Turkish world. The few émigrés abroad of Turkish origin hesitated to seek material assistance, thus making impossible an exposition of their just cause to the Anglo-Saxons.

If the present conditions continue and a war breaks out prior to the development of these opportunities, the future of the Turkish world will depend solely on chance. In case of a war it is certain that all the Turks will engage in a struggle without mercy designed to overthrow the Bolsheviks. We can also state with the same certitude that, following the overthrow of the Bolsheviks, all the Turks will want to be masters of their own destiny. However, whether they will act in a large sense or in the narrow tribal sense that the Bolsheviks have inculcated in them for more than three decades is an important question. Whether it will be a limited concept of tribes or a large concept emcompassing the interests of all the Turkish nationalities in Soviet Russia will depend solely on the formula that Western policy will trace for the Russia of the future.

The principal enemy of the United Nations (which has the task of creating a new era of solidarity and fraternity among the nations of the world) is imperialism. It is for this reason that we find it absolutely vital to give great importance to the form that Russia will take following the overthrow of Bolshevism. If the future Turkish states are not formed on a solid basis and in more or less important units, and *if a tight union is not established between these states, the Russians without doubt will profit from the weakness of these states and Russian imperialism will again rise.*[4]

It is not solely for the interest and security of the Turkish nationalities, but because they can be useful to world civilization as a fortress of the Free World in the East against all forms of imperialism, that it will be vital to consider seriously, without delay, the question of the independence of the Turkish countries and the possibility of helping those Turks materially as well as morally in the realization of their task.

The republic of Turkey, from the period of Turko-Soviet friendship until the end of World War II, unfortunately has not given Turkish political émigrés any concrete help. Therefore, it is of primary importance that Western intellectuals ponder seriously the future of their countries conjointly with that of the world, and take in hand equally seriously the questions relating to the future of the Turkish world.

It is certain that those who aid in the development of these vital issues (which will doubtless provide significant results) will thereby aid the particular interests of their country and of world peace, and will never regret their efforts.

Appendix 2

Biographical Sketch of Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer

Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer was born in Crimea in 1889 and graduated from a secondary school in Constantinople. In 1910, while at law school in Constantinople, he wrote his first essay, "The Unfortunate Situation of the Tatar Nation in the Twentieth Century." His views were considered too radical by the Ottoman government, and he was forced to leave. He proceeded to France, where he studied law and social science at the Sorbonne.

He returned to the Crimea upon the outbreak of World War I and, foreseeing the collapse of the Russian empire, prepared the nucleus of an organization of Tatar nationalist youth which was to participate in the struggle for liberation. The Russian revolution of 1917 brought the promise of a national revival for the subjugated peoples; it also marked the rise of Seydahmet as a prominent leader of the Moslems in Russia.

The first Crimean Tatar Congress, of March 5, 1917, entrusted him with the chairmanship of the Land Reform Commission, and in May 1917, nominated him as a delegate to the All-Russian Moslem Congress at Moscow, during which he came out strongly in favor of local autonomy and federalization in Russia. Following the independence proclamation (de facto) of Tatar Crimea, on November 24, 1917, Seydahmet was appointed minister of war and foreign minister. His spectacular winning over of a Crimean Tatar cavalry regiment at Kherson and his success in leading them to Crimea showed his personal courage and ability.

After the Communist occupation of Crimea, Seydahmet went into exile and directed the independence movement of the Crimean Turks. In 1919 he worked with the Kemalist movement in Turkey until he was expelled by the sultan's government and went to Italy and Switzerland. He is well known in the Turkish world as a publicist and political writer, and his works have appeared in *Terğüman*

and *Millet*.[1] He contributed also to Azerbaijan and Turkestan papers and the monthly *Emel (Emel Mejmuasi)* (organ of the Crimean independence movement prepared in Constanţa, Rumania). In 1920 he published a book in Lausanne entitled *Crimea*. This work was revised and enlarged in 1930 and was issued in Polish. In Istanbul he wrote *The Russian Revolution* (1930) in Turkish and then *Ismail Bey Gaspirali* (1934). He was very active in the Promethean movement and resided in Istanbul.[2]

Appendix 3

Biographical Sketch of Ayas Ishaky (Idilli) (1878–1954)

Ayas Ishaky was born in 1878 at Yevshirma near Kazan into the family of a village *imam* who owned a small estate. His early education was obtained in his father's school, and afterwards in a Tatar school at Chistai. In 1890 he began his education in a college for imams and teachers in Kazan, where several well-known Tatar educators and religious leaders (such as S. Merğani, A. Nasiri, and I. Maksudi) were teaching. The influence of Gaspirali's *Terğüman* was very strong among the teachers and pupils of the school. After completing a course in this college, he entered a higher school for Tatar youth in Kazan where he studied Russian and Western literature and began his participation in Tatar youth organizations.

Ishaky took an active part in the secret Tatar organizations of Hürriyet and Tancilik. Clandestine printing presses in Kazan, Samara, Ufa, and Turkestan were organized under his direction. He founded and was an editor of several Turko-Tatar periodicals:

1. *Tan Yildizi*, a paper published in Kazan (May 1906 to September 1906) and closed by the Russian police;
2. *Tan Mejmuasi* (November 1906 to April 1907);
3. *Tavush* (1907);
4. *Vatan* (1913 to 1915) in St. Petersburg;
5. *Söz*, which began in 1915 in Moscow, was closed by the Russian police in 1916, reappeared in March 1917, and was closed by the Bolsheviks in 1918;

6. *Il Sözu* (1916) in Moscow. After leaving Russia, Ishaky founded and edited *Milli Yol* in 1928 in Berlin and *Milli Bayrak* in 1935 in Mukden (Manchuria).

Protesting against oppression by czarist officials and unveiling the Russian system of denationalization, Ishaky was forced to hide his activities. However, he was arrested and, after six months of imprisonment, was deported to Siberia for three years. After one year he escaped to St. Petersburg, where he again returned to his conspirational work in the secret organization of Tatar students. Ishaky was then deported to Archangel, but after two years, he returned to St. Petersburg and was admitted to the law faculty of St. Petersburg University, where he headed the local independence (Tatar) organization. In May 1917, he took part in the Congress of Moslems of Russia in Moscow and was elected to its executive committee. On behalf of the second All-Russian Moslem Congress at Ufa, he was elected a delegate in connection with the Versailles Conference in Paris. After the occupation of the Idel-Ural by the Bolsheviks, he withdrew with his paper to Samara, then to Ufa, and then to Kizil-Jar. In 1919 he left the country via Japan and went to Paris to propagate his national cause.

In 1923 Ishaky organized the Turan society in Berlin and in 1925 was invited to Turkey to edit *Türk Yurdu*. The growing Soviet pressure on Turkey forced him to return to Europe, where he organized the Independence Committee of the Idel-Ural. In 1928 he started publication of *Milli Yol*, the organ of this committee, and took part in the Prometheus movement.

In 1931 Ishaky participated in the Third Moslem Congress in Jerusalem, and, before an audience of 150 delegates representing all Moslem countries, delivered a speech on the critical situation of the Moslems in the former USSR. In 1933 he was delegated to the Far East to organize the Tatar political refugees in Japan and Manchuria. During the congress of the Tatar emigrants in the Far East in 1935, the Religious National Center of Idel-Uralians in the Far East was organized, and the Tatar paper *Milli Bayrak* was established. In 1936 he returned to Europe.

Ishaky was also a well known novelist and dramatist. In the period 1897 to 1918, he wrote twenty-nine novels and dramas on national Tatar topics, and after the revolution, he authored approximately nine novels and dramas.[1] During World War II Ishaky lived in Turkey; he died of cancer in Istanbul in 1955.

Appendix 4

Biographical Sketch of Mehmet Emin Resulzade

Mehmet Emin Resulzade, a prominent Azerbaijan politician and writer, was born into a pious family in Baku in 1884. His first education was obtained at home, but in 1903, when he was only nineteen years old, he published his first article in the Tiflis paper *Şark-i Rus*.[1] He regularly sent articles to the papers *Hayat* and *Füyusat*, which were edited by Ali Hüseyinzade, and to the papers *Irşad* and *Terâkki*, which were edited by Ahmed Ağaoğlu. He also collaborated with and edited the following periodicals:

Tekâmul and *Yoldaş*, weeklies published in Baku, 1905 to 1908.

Iran-i Nev (The new Iran), in Persian, a democratic weekly published in Teheran, 1908 to 1911.

Açik Söz, a democratic weekly published in Baku, 1915 to 1917.

Yeni Kafkasya (The new Caucasus), the organ of the Azerbaijan National movement (place of publication unknown), 1923 to 1928.

Azeri Türk (Azerbaijan Turk), published in Istanbul, 1928 to 1929.

Odlu Yurt, published by the Azerbaijan National movement, 1929 to 1931.

Kurtuluş (Liberation), published by the Azerbaijan National movement in Berlin, 1934 to 1938.

Resulzade was the author of several important books, including:

Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti Keyfiyet-i Tesekkülü ve Şimdiki Vaziyeti (The Republic of Azerbaijan, its birth and actual situation), Istanbul, 1922.

Azerbaidzan w walce o niepodległość (Azerbaijan in its struggle for independence), in Polish; Warsaw, 1938.

Das Problem Aserbeidschan (The problem of Azerbaijan), in German; Berlin, 1938.

Azerbaycan Şairi Nizami (The Azerbaijan poet Nizami), his most extensive work, was about a literary character and dealt with Nizami's life (1141–1203) and poetry.

Resulzade's political work started in 1905, when he directed a secret anti-Russian youth organization. His political and liberal activity from 1908 to 1910 caused him to be expelled from Iran on the demand of the Russian embassy. He went to Istanbul in 1911 and participated in the work of *Türk Ocagi* (Turkish Hearth) and collaborated with the paper *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish homeland). As a result of the 1913 amnesty given to some categories of political offenders (on the occasion of the three hundredth anniversary of the Romanoff dynasty), he returned to Baku but was soon arrested for continuing his political activity.

In 1917, he was elected by the Congress of the Musavat (Equality) party as its leader and took part in the Congress of the Moslems of the Caucasus in April 1917. Later, in the Congress of the Moslems of Russia (convened in Moscow in May 1917), he advocated the federalization of Russia, the separation of the Caucasus from that country, and the establishment of an independent Azerbaijan republic. On May 20, 1918, after the declaration of independence of his country and the election of an Azerbaijan parliament in December 1918, he was elected president of this body. As such, he became de facto president of the republic, since the president of the parliament had the right, until the Constituent Assembly met, to choose a premier and entrust him with forming a cabinet. In 1919 he was elected leader of the Musavat Party for the second time. After the occupation of Azerbaijan by the Reds in April 1920, Resulzade went underground, but later he was arrested by the Cheka (special commission in the USSR (1917–22) charged with preventing counter-revolutionary activities). On the order of Stalin, Resulzade was transferred to Moscow, where he lived under police supervision. In 1922 he managed to escape to Finland and went to Istanbul. His activity as a writer in Istanbul aroused the protests of the Soviets. The former Soviet legation forced his expulsion from Turkey by Atatürk's government, and he emigrated to Western Europe. In the West he participated in the Promethean movement and in 1934, with other Caucasian leaders, he signed the Pact of Caucasian Confederation in Brussels.[2]

In 1934 he established residence in Warsaw, and after the occupation of Poland by the Germans in 1939, he went to Bucharest, Rumania. After the Russian campaign began in 1941, he and other Caucasian leaders were invited to go to Berlin by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1942. Resulzade did not find in the Germans a real understanding of the problems of the subjugated peoples of the former Soviet Russia, and he left Berlin for Bucharest on August 5, 1943. In 1944, upon the advance of the Red Army, he went to Germany and, on April 24, 1945, arrived in the American Zone of Germany. In 1947, he went to Turkey and he lived in Ankara until his death on March 6, 1955.[3] Resulzade was one of the most significant personalities in the national movement of Turkism in the former Soviet Russia.

Appendix 5

Biographical Sketch of Zeki Velidi Togan

Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan was born on December 10, 1890, in the village of Kuzen (southern Urals) in Bashkiria, Russia. His father Ahmedshah was an imam and a teacher who managed a religious school.[1] As a village boy in the Urals, Togan was ambitious to become a person of international reputate. This ambition, along with his drive against all obstacles, are dominant features of his personality and his life.

After teaching at the Superior Theological and Pedagogical Institute of Kasimiye in Kazan, he represented the Moslems of the province of Ufa in the 1916 Russian Duma (elective lower house of parliament). He was active with organizational work among the Moslems of Turkestan. When the decision was made on November 17, 1917, to form an autonomous Bashkirian state, Zeki Velidi came into prominence as a leader and mainstay of the short-lived republic of Little Bashkiria in the Urals. In 1917 he was a member of the Bashkirian Central *Shuro* (council) and a member of the Bashkirian *Kurultai* (national assembly). In the summer of 1918, in agreement with the Committee of the Constituent Assembly, he began the organization of Bashkir national troops. Following defeat of the Kolchak (White) Army, the government of Bashkiria made peace with the former Soviets and for fifteen months tried the experiment of working to preserve their autonomy under the Bolsheviks.[2] When this failed, Togan escaped to Bukhara. A source in the former Soviet Union, however, claimed that Togan:

> was a member of the Communist party and a member of the Bashkir Revolutionary Committee, where he defended an extreme nationalist policy. As a result he was excluded from the Committee, and with a group of Bashkir nationalists he went to Turkestan, aiming at the organization of a separate Eastern Communist Party.[3]

Actually, he spent three years in the vicinity of Bukhara in an attempt to organize resistance to the reestablishment of Russian rule. There, he was in contact with

Enver Pasha and the Basmachi movement. In 1922 he withdrew to Afghanistan and then to Turkey, where he attained academic distinction as a professor at Istanbul University.[4]

At the age of sixty-five, Togan was considered by his contemporaries to be a controversial figure. He devoted his life to the cause of Turkism, on which he wrote profusely, and personally, he played an intimate role in its modern history.[5]

Appendix 6

Excerpts from the Pact of Caucasian Confederation, Adopted in Paris on May 28, 1940

"The representatives of the National centers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, North Caucasia and Georgia . . . have decided to adopt and to sign the act of Caucasian Confederation according to the following principles:

1. The Caucasian Confederation, while guaranteeing the national character and internal sovereignty of each of the Caucasian republics, will conduct foreign relations in the name of the republics as an international unit of higher authorty.
2. The Confederation will have one single common political frontier. Customs barriers as well as all other obstacles to free communication . . . shall be abolished and the said Republics will form a customs union and a single territorial unit for international transit trade.
3. The foreign policy of the Confederated Republics shall be directed by the competent authority of the Confederation.
4. The defense of the frontiers of the Confederation shall be entrusted to the army of the Confederation, comprising the armies of the Confederated Republics under a single command and subordinate to the directive and authority of the Confederation.
5. The Confederation shall guarantee the rights of national minorities in each Confederated Republic.
6. Every dispute . . . which cannot be settled by direct negotiation, must be submitted for compulsory arbitration. . . .
7. A commission of experts will proceed forthwith to elaborate a draft Constitution for the Caucasian Confederation, bearing in mind the principles formulated above; this draft shall serve as a working basis for the first constitutent assembly of each republic."[1]

On May 28, 1940, the new Council of the Confederation issued a declaration in which the liberation of Caucasia from the Soviet Russia continued to be their aim. With regard to Turkey and Persia, the foreign policy of the confederation was to be founded on sincere friendship and neighborly relations. (The Confederation, of course, has not materialized.)

Appendix 7

Heads of Government, Leading State and Legislative Officials of the Moslem Union Republics of the Former USSR (mid-1992), and Heads of State of the New Republics (1993)

HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

Republic of Azerbaijan

GASANOV, Gasan Aziz Ogly: Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan since January 1990; CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) member since 1963; born October 20, 1940; Azerbaijani.

Kazakh SSR

KARAMANOV, Uzakbai: Prime Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR since July 1989; CPSU member since 1962; born August 20, 1937; Kazakh.

Republic of Kirghizia

ISANOV, Nasirdin: Prime Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kyrgyztan (Kirgizia) since January 1991; CPSU member since 1969; born November 7, 1943; Kirgiz.

Tajik SSR

MAKHKAMOV, Kakhar: Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR since December 1990; President of the Tajik SSR since November 1990;

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Tajik Communist Party since December 1985; member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee since July 1990; CPSU member since 1957; born April 16, 1932; Tajik.

Turkmen SSR

AKHMEDOV, Khan: Prime Minister of the Turkmen SSR since December 1989; CPSU member since 1963; born 1936; Turkmen.

Uzbek SSR

KARIMOV, Islam (also Islom) Abduganievich: Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR since November 1990; President of the Uzbek SSR since March 1990; First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party since June 1989; member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee since July, 1990; CPSU member since 1964; born January 30, 1938; Uzbek.

HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (NON-MOSLEM REPUBLICS: ARMENIA AND GEORGIA)

Republic of Armenia

MANUKYAN, Vazgen Mikaelovich: Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Armenia since August 1990; born 1946; Armenian.

Republic of Georgia

SIGUA, Tengiz Ippolitovich: Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Georgia since November 1990; born November 9, 1934; Georgian.

LEADING STATE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS OF THE MOSLEM UNION REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER USSR

Republic of Azerbaijan

KAFAROVA, El'mira Mikail Kyzy: Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Azerbaijan since May 1990; CPSU member since 1958; born 1934; Azerbaijani.

MUTALIBOV, Ayaz Niyazi Ogly: President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

since May, 1990; First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist party Central Committee since January, 1990; member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee since July 1990; CPSU member since 1963; born May 12, 1938; Azerbaijani.

Kazakh SSR

ASANBAEV, Erik Magzumovich: Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet since April 1990; CPSU member since 1967; born March 10, 1936; Kazakh.

NAZARBAEV, Nursultan Abishevich: President of the Kazakh SSR since April, 1990; First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist party since June 1989; member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee since July 1990; CPSU member since 1962; born July 6, 1940; Kazakh.

Republic of Kyrgyzstan (Kirgizia)

AKAEV, Askar: President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan since October 1990; CPSU member since 1981; born November 10, 1944; Kirgiz.

SHERIMKULOV, Medetkan: Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan since December, 1990; CPSU member since 1962; born November 17, 1939; Kirgiz.

Tajik SSR

ASLONOV, Kadriddin: Chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet since December 1990; CPSU member since 1972; born May 29, 1947.

MAKHKAMOV, Kakhar: President of the Tajik SSR since November 1990; Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR since December 1990; First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Tajik Communist party since December 1985; member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee since July 1990; CPSU member since 1957; born April 16, 1932; Tajik.

Turkmen SSR

MURADOV, Sakhat Nepesovich: Chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet since November 1990; CPSU member since 1951; born 1932; Turkmen.

NIYAZOV, Saparmurad Ataevich: President of the Turkmen SSR since October 1990; First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkmen Communist Party since December 1985; member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee since July, 1990; CPSU member since 1962; born February 19, 1940; Turkmen.

Uzbek SSR

IBRAGIMOV, Mirzaolim: Chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet since March 1990; CPSU member since 1948; born 1928; Uzbek.

KARIMOV, Islam (also Islom) Abduganievich: President of the Uzbek SSR since March 1990; Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR since November 1990; First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist party since June 1989; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee since July 1990; CPSU member since 1964; born January 30, 1938; Uzbek.

LEADING STATE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS (NON-MOSLEM REPUBLICS: ARMENIA AND GEORGIA)

Republic of Armenia

TER-PETROSYAN, Levon Akopovich: Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia since August, 1990; born January 9, 1945; Armenian. (Referred to as President of Armenia.)

Republic of Georgia

GAMSAKHURDIA, Zviad: Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia since November 1990; born March 11, 1939; Georgian.

HEADS OF STATE OF THE NEW REPUBLICS (1993)

Armenia:	Levon Ter-Petrosian
Azerbaijan:	Ebulfez Elchibey
Georgia:	Eduard Shevardnadze
Kazakhstan:	Nursultan Nazarbaev
Kyrgys:	Askar Akayev (Akaev)
Tasikistan:	Imamali Rakhonov
Turkmenistan:	Saparmurad A. Niyazov
Uzbekistan:	Islam A. Karimov

Notes

PREFACE

1. Baron Clement Augustus de Bode, "On the Yamud and Goklan Tribes of Turkomania," *Journal of the Ethnological Society* (London) (1848).

CHAPTER 1

1. It should be noted that it is Pan-Turkism to which reference is made, while Pan-Turanism is considered to be an improbable fantasy. (This distinction will be clarified below.) Pan-Turkism will be discussed in two aspects, as a maximum and a moderate program.

2. Some non-Turkish republics were liquidated for the same reason: the Kalmyk ASSR, the Volga-German ASSR, and the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. See Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies* (London: George Philip and Son, 1953), pp. 67, 185. See the following works for recent information: M. Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge* (New York: Sharpe, 1990), p. 149; A. Benningsen and S. E. Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 216–18; B. Nahaylo and V. Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion* (New York: Free Press, 1990), p. 361; and Hedrick Smith, *The New Russians* (New York: Random House, 1990), ch. 14 (Uzbekistan), chs. 14 and 15 (Armenia and Azerbaijan).

CHAPTER 2

1. J. S. Gregory and D. W. Shave, *The USSR: A Geographical Survey* (London: G. G. Harrap and Co., 1944).

2. Mesocephalic means medium-headed: having a skull of which the maximum breadth is not more than 81 percent, and not less than 76 percent, of the maximum length of the head. Brachycephalic means short-headed: having a skull of which the breadth is 80 percent or more of the length from front to back.

3. Great Britain Naval Staff, *Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turaniaism* (London: H.M.S.O., 1918), p. 115. This is a valuable and unique manual on the Turanian (Ugro-Finnish, Turkish, Mongolian, etc.) peoples of Euro-Asia and the Near and Middle East. A. J. Toynbee stated that this publication was "compiled by a distinguished English scholar" and prepared at the Geographical Section, Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty. See Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London: Constable and Co., 1923), p. 355. (Z. V. Togan told me that this "distinguished English scholar" was Sir Denison Ross.)

4. J. K. Birge quotes G. E. Smith, the author of *Human History* (New York: 1929), p. 131, for whom the profound difference between the Mongol and the Turkish peoples cannot be too strongly emphasized. See John Kingsley Birge, *A Guide to Turkish Area Study* (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, Committee on Near Eastern Studies, 1949), p. 37.

5. Jean Deny, "Répartition géographique des dialectes turcs," in *Les Langues du Monde*, par un groupe de linquistes sous la direction de A. Meillet et Marcel Cohen, et le Société Linguistique de Paris nouvelle édition (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1952), p. 334.

6. Stefan Wurm is another authority who has classified the Turkish dialects of the former USSR in his work, *Turkic Peoples of the USSR: Their Historical Background, Their Languages and the Development of Soviet Linguistic Policy* (London: Central Asian Research Center, in association with St. Anthony's College, Oxford, Soviet Affairs Study Group, 1954). Wurm paid attention to the differences in minute dialects, treating tiny linguistic groups and analyzing the overlapping linguistic areas and ancient Turkish languages which died out long ago. His classification is prepared for linguists. However, Wurm's historical sketch of the Turkish language, as well as his brief descriptions of each Turkish dialect in Soviet Russia, have practical value and are used in this work.

7. Deny, "Répartition," p. 343.

8. Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 124. See also E. H. Parker, *A Thousand Years of the Tatars* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1924), p. 1; W. Barthold, *Histoire de Turcs d'Asie Centrale*, adaptation française par W. Donskis (Paris: Librarie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1945), p. 6. *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, edited by M. T. Houtsma, A. J. Wensinck, H. A. R. Gibb, W. Heffening, Levi-Provençal, T. W. Arnold, R. Basset, and R. Hartmann, 4 vols. plus supplement (Leyden, Holland: E. J. Brill, 1913–1938), article on the Turks by W. Barthold, 4:900.

9. Barthold, *Histoire*, pp. 6, 9; and Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 10.

10. Barthold, *Histoire*, pp. 26, 37; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, p. 902; Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 2.

11. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 4:903; Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 3.

12. Sogdians were the people of Sogdiana, the ancient, civilized country in the basin of the Zarevshan River in Central Asia, which was bordered by Baktria in the south and Khoresmia (Khiva) in the west. The capital of Sogdiana—Marakanda (today, Samarkand)—was destroyed by Alexander the Great who, after crossing the Hindu Kush Mountains in 329 B.C., conquered Sogdiana and Batkria. See V. I. Lebedev, B. D. Grekov, S. V. Bekbrushin, and M. V. Nechkiwa, eds., *Istoria SSSR* (The history of the USSR), 2 vols. (Moscow: State Social-Economic Publications, 1939–40), 1:28. This rather objective two-volume Soviet University manual describes the decline of the eastern Turkish States and the Russian expansion.

13. Kansu, the third largest province of China, is situated in the northwest. The area

is 125,483 square miles, but the population density is low. Islam penetrated here in the thirteenth century, and Ilochou is the most important center of Moslem life in the province. See Houtsma, Wensinck, Gibb, et al., *Encyclopaedia of Islam* 2:719. Bishbalik (Five Towns) is a town in the present Chinese Turkestan north of the Celestial Mountains. The site of the town was mentioned in the Orkhon inscriptions of the eighth century A.D. Kara-Khodja is a town near the modern Turfan: ibid., 1:728.

14. Barthold, *Histoire*, p. 37.

15. Ibid., pp. 49, 54; see also Lebedev, Grekov, Bekbrushin, and Nechkiwa, *Istoria SSSR*, pp. 58, 63.

16. Houtsma, Wensick, Gibb, et al., *Encyclopaedia of Islam* 4:908.

17. The Amu-Darya (the ancient Oxus) and the Syr-Darya (the ancient Jaxartes) are the two principal rivers of Soviet Central Asia. For a historical and geographical description, see Houtsma, Wensick, Gibb, et al., *Encyclopaedia of Islam* 4:448, 1:339. Concerning Turkish rule, see Barthold, *Histoire*, pp. 34, 66, 69.

18. Ibid., p. 62.

19. William Stearns Davis, *A Short History of the Near East* (New York: Macmillan, 1943), pp. 169, 76.

20. Barthold, *Histoire*, p. 94.

21. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 4; Davis, *Short History*, p. 181; Lord Eversley, *The Turkish Empire, 1288–1924*, abridged by Shaikh Abdur Rashid, 2d ed., (Lahore, Pakistan: Shaik Muhammad Ashraf, 1952), p. 3.

22. Houtsma, Wensick, Gibb, et al., *Encyclopaedia of Islam* 4:906; Barthold, *Histoire*, pp. 119, 123, 136.

23. Barthold, *Histoire*, p. 139. See the subchapters on the Kazan Tatars and Crimean Turks and the accompanying map of these Khanates (in the former subchapter).

24. George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, vol. 3, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 248.

25. Michael Prawdin, *The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy*, translated from German by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, 2d ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1941), pp. 424, 465, 479, 488; Barthold, *Histoire*, p. 182.

26. Barthold, *Histoire*, pp. 185, 190.

27. For a history of the Pechenegs in the medieval period, see Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Peçenek Tarihi* (History of the Pechenegs) (Istanbul: n.p., 1937).

28. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 4; Barthold, *Histoire*, pp. 81–88.

29. Article on the Turks, *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 22:625.

30. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 8.

31. The "Lenin national policy" is a Soviet abbreviation for the program which aimed at securing the confidence of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR using spectacular concessions. Among these were the right to develop native cultures, languages, and arts, and to create national republics (but without endangering the unity of the Soviet state or the homogeneous concepts of the Communist party). The theoretical foundation of this policy is explained by the slogan, "National in form but Socialist in content." For a full analysis, see Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR, 1917–1947* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 50.

32. Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* (London: Macmillan, 1953), p. 31.

33. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, abridgement of volumes 1-4 by D. C. Somervell (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 169, 175.

34. This figure was obtained by adding the population totals of the individual Turkish peoples of the former USSR according to the census of January 17, 1939. See "Results of the Soviet Census," *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union* (New York: American-Russian Institute, November 1940), p. 99.

35. Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Turkey," *Britannica Book of the Year, 1955* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1955), p. 755. This source shows the total 1950 census of the Turkish Republic as 20,934,670, with the 1954 estimate at 23,000,000 (of which 87.3 percent speak Turkish as a primary language: a total of 20,079,000).

36. Mehmet Emin Buğra, *Doğu Turkistan* (Eastern Turkestan) (Istanbul: Guven Basimevi, 1952), p. 5. This figure seems exaggerated.

37. Institute of the Soviet Encyclopaedia, *Strani Blizhnevo i Srednevo Vostoka* (The Countries of the Near and Middle East) (Moscow: Institute of the Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1944), p. 212; *Kalendar-Spravochnic* 1952 (1952 calendar handbook), p. 694.

38. Institute of the Soviet Encyclopaedia, *Strani Blizhnevo i Srednevo Vostoka*, p. 268; *Kalendar-Spravochnik 1952*, p. 692.

39. *Turkiye Yilligi* (Turkish yearbook) (Istanbul: Turkiye Basimevi, 1947), p. 291. The latest figures are estimates or are based on *The World Factbook* (Washington, D.C.: July 1990).

40. Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer, preface to Edige Kirimal, *Der Nationale Kampf der Krimturken* (The National Struggle of the Crimean Turks) (Emsdetten, Germany: Verlag Lechte, 1952), p. xv. For a biographical sketch and observations by Kirimer, see Appendices 1 and 2.

41. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations* (London: Constable and Co., 1923), pp. 111, 114, 119. Eliot Grinnell Mears, *Modern Turkey* (New York: Macmillan, 1924), p. 39. Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 213; Great Britain, Foreign Office, *The Rise of the Turks—The Pan-Turanian Movement*, handbook prepared under the direction of the Historical Section, No. 96 c and d (London: H.M.S.O., February 1919), pp. 38; Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Anatolia*, handbook prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office (London: H.M.S.O., 1920), p. 18.

42. Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 213.

43. The data on the non-Ottoman tribes in Turkey is based on ibid., p. 214. Great Britain, *Anatolia*, p. 19. Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk* (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939), p. 44.

44. Turkish State Office of Statistics, *Istatistik Yilliği* (Statistical yearbook) (Ankara: Turkish State Office of Statistics, 1951), vol. 19, chapter on population. Estimates for 1954 place the Turkish population at about twenty-three million.

45. Ibid.: See chapter on distribution of population.

46. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk*, pp. 38, 50, 60, 117, discusses re-Turkification under the Kemalist regime. Postwar Turkish governments have accepted many thousands of Pomaks (a Turkish-speaking minority from Sovietized Bulgaria) as well as Turkish refugees from Sinkiang fleeing Communist persecution.

47. Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1938).

48. George A. Arnakis, "Futuwwa Traditions in the Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 12, no. 4 (October 1953).

49. Wittek, *Ottoman Empire*, pp. 14, 37, 40.

50. For a general geographical description of the Caucasus, see Gregory and Shave,

The USSR, p. 465; N. N. Baranskiy, *Ekonemicheskaya Geografya SSSR* (The economic geography of the USSR) (Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1951), p. 211–26, 336–63; I. Erhorn, *Kaukasien* (The Caucasians) (Berlin: Verlagsanstalt Otto Stollberg, 1942), pp. 7–14, and *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia* (*BSE*) (Great Soviet Encyclopaedia) vol. 30 (1937), pp. 451–81. The first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia was published in sixty-five volumes between 1926 and 1948. It has now been withdrawn as ideologically unsound and embarrassing. These encyclopedias contain articles on the non-Russian peoples of the former USSR by leading Russian and non-Russian authors.

51. See biographical sketch of Mehmet Emin Resulzade in Appendix 4.

52. M. E. Resulzade, "The Caucasian Problem," *The Caucasus* (Munich: Caucasian Emigrants Group), vol. 9, no. 4 (April 1952): 4.

53. P. F. Yudin and F. N. Petrov, eds., *Strani mira* (The countries of the world), 2d ed. (Moscow: Ogiz, 1946), p. 127; Oscar Janowsky, *Nationalities and National Minorities* (New York: Macmillan, 1945), p. 75.

54. The Chechens, the Ingush, and the Balkarians were deported wholesale to Siberia and other remote and underdeveloped regions after the end of World War II. For a description of the liquidation, see Kolarz, *Russia and her Colonies*, pp. 67, 185.

55. *BSE*, vol. 1 (1926), p. 660.

56. Mehmet Emin Resulzade, *Azerbajdzan w walce o niepodlaglosc* (Azerbaijan in its struggle for independence) (Warsaw: Azerbaijan National Publications, 1938), pp. 31–33.

57. Ibid., p. 34.

58. Ibid., p. 38.

59. Ibid., p. 39.

60. Ahmet Caferoğlu, *Azerbaycan* (Istanbul, 1940), p. 23 (in Turkish).

61. The reformism and somewhat materialistic outlook of Fathali are now extolled by the Soviets. The famous dramatist and poet was one of the most propagandized "fathers of socialism" in the Caucasus. See A. A. Sharif, "Mirza-Fathali Akhundov" (in connection with seventieth anniversary of his death), in *Kratkiye Soobshchenia Instituta Vostokovedenya* (Short articles by the Institute of the East) (Moscow: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1953), 9:3.

62. M. E. Resulzade, "Literatura Azerbajdzanu" (The literature of Azerbaijan), *Wschód-Orient* (Warsaw: Eastern Institute, 1930–39), nos. 2–3 (1936): p.63–67.

63. For a detailed description of the Musavat party, see Firuz Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921)*, with an introduction by M. Karpovich (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), pp. 20–22.

64. Ibid., p. 32.

65. A. Gugushvili, "The Struggle of the Caucasian Peoples for Independence," *Eastern Quarterly* (London: Morven Press) 4, no.4 (October 1951). This is the best short piece of diplomatic history on Caucasia in the period 1917–40. The author resided in London and in 1918–21 was a member of the staff of the Georgian diplomatic representation in that city.

66. Kazemzadeh, *Struggle for Transcaucasia*, pp. 222–32.

67. Resulzade, *Azerbajdzan*, pp. 90, 156.

68. Kazemzadeh, *Struggle for Transcaucasia*, p. 225.

69. A description of the first British occupation is given by L. C. Dunsterville in *The Adventures of Dunsterforce* (London: Edward Arnold, 1932).

70. Kazemzadeh, *Struggle for Transcaucasia*, p. 166.

71. *BSE*, vol. 1 (1926), p. 663.

72. Kazemzadeh, *Struggle for Transcaucasia*. Concerning U.S.-Azerbaijan relations, see pp. 165, 225, 266.

73. Ibid., p. 266.

74. Gugushvili, "Struggle," p. 34.

75. B. A. Wwedenskiy, editor-in-chief, *Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar* (Encyclopaedic dictionary), 3 vols. (Moscow: State Scientific Publications—"Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia," 1953), 1:33.

76. I. M. Reisher and B. K. Rubcov, eds., *Novaya istoria stran zarubezhanavo Vostoka* (The modern history of the eastern countries beyond the Soviet borders) (Moscow: Moscow University, 1952), 1:364–71.

77. W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828 to 1921*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), pp.19–21.

78. The modern history of Russian-Prussian-British relations is thoroughly treated by Percy Sykes in *A History of Persia*, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1930, 2 volumes), 1:294, 311–14, 319–20, 369.

79. State Institute of the Soviet Encyclopaedia, *Strani Blizhnevo i Srednevo Vostoka* (The countries of the Near and Middle East) (Moscow: State Institute of the Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1944), pp. 229–36.

80. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 168–73.

81. Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," *Middle East Journal* (July 1947): 247.

82. Lenczowski, *The Middle East*, pp. 174. See also his *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918 to 1948* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949), and Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies*, p. 246.

83. Wwedenskiy, *Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar*, p. 33.

84. *BSE*, vol. 1 (1926), pp. 641–43.

85. Ibid., special double volume on the USSR (1948), pp. 59–62.

86. Ibid., vol. 45 (1940), p. 161; State Institute of the Soviet Encyclopaedia, *Strani Blizhnevo i Srednevo Vostoka*, p. 212.

87. N. Marr, (Article on Azerbaijan language), *BSE*, vol. 1 (1926), p. 665. See also Fuad Koprulu, "Azeri Language," *Islam Ansiklopetdisi* (Istanbul), 10 (1949): 118–51.

88. L. P. Elwell-Sutton, *A Guide to Iranian Area Study* (Mich.: J. W. Edwards for the American Council of Learned Societies, 1952), p. 19.

89. A remarkably uniform Unified Turkic Latin Alphabet was devised by the All-Union Central Executive Committee for the New Turkic Alphabet, which was established in 1927 in Baku. This alphabet made use of Latin letters for all Turkic languages in the USSR, enriching them with specially devised signs for local sounds. It was introduced and accepted by all Turkic-speaking peoples of the USSR in 1934, to be replaced about 1940 by a Cyrillic alphabet: see Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, pp. 13, 14, 45; Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, pp. 155, 253; Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies*, p. 34.

90. Codex Cumanicus is a collection of different texts in the Turkish-Kuman language and written in the Latin alphabet. The codex includes a Latin-Persian-Kuman dictionary and is the most important document on the language of the nomadic Turkish peoples from the Black Sea steppe region. See article on the Polovtsy language, *BSE* 46:169, 173. Concerning the origins of the Karachis, see Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 198.

91. Article on Karachai language, *BSE*, vol. 31 (1937), p. 480.

92. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 16.

93. Article on Kabardino-Balkaria, *BSE*, Vol. 30 (1937), pp. 401–19; Article on the Balkars, *BSE*, vol. 46 (1937), p. 513.

94. Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 196.

95. Article on the Nogais, *BSE*, vol. 42 (1939), p. 281.

96. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 17.

97. Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 198; article on the Kumyks, *BSE*, vol. 35 (1937), p. 481.

98. The following sources were used: N. N. Baranskiy, *Ekonomicheskaya geografya SSSR* (The economic geography of the USSR) (Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1951), pp. 178, 227; Theodore Shabad, *Geography of the USSR: A Regional Survey* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 181–88, 251–55; Gugk, *Politico-administrativnaya Karta SSR* (Political and administrative map of the USSR) (Moscow: Scientific Cartographic Division of the Gugk, 1941); Great Britain, *Manual* (data on the Kazan Turks, Bashkirs, Chuvashes, Votiaks, Mordvinians and Cheremisses); *BSE*, special double volume (1948), p. 61; G. Aleksandrov, V. Galianov, and N. Rubenstein, eds., articles on the above republics, *Politicheskiy Slovar* (Political dictionary) (Moscow: State Publication of Political Literature, 1940), pp. 52, 330, 356, 563, 587; C. Lamont, "National and Racial Minorities," in *USSR: A Concise Handbook*, ed. E. J. Simmons (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947), p. 6.

99. The number of Tatars includes the Crimean Turks (Tatars according to Russian terminology), as well as Tatars dispersed in the neighboring areas and in the whole former USSR. This explains why the number of Tatars in general is greater than the whole population of the Tatar ASSR. The Bashkir ASSR has a large non-Bashkir majority. For details, see Ronald Wixman, *The Peoples of the USSR* (London: Macmillan, 1984). Finally, many of the Mordvinians, Chuvashes, Udmurts, and Maris live outside the borders of their republic.

100. This sketch is based on: Ayas Ishaky, *Idel-Ural* (in Russian) (Paris: Idel-Ural National Committee, 1933) (for a biographical sketch of Ishaky, see Appendix 3); Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, pp. 1–9; *BSE*, vol. 30 (1937), pp. 545–50; Barthold, *Histoire*, p. 10; Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies*, p. 40.

101. For a map of the territories of the Kazan, Nogai, Astrakhan, and Crimean Khanates in A.D. 1500, see Edige Kirimal, *Der Nationale Kampf Der Krimtürken* (The national struggle of the Crimean Turks) (Emsdetten, Germany: Verlag Lechte, 1952), Karte 1 (at end of book). It is reproduced in this book in chapter 2.

102. Stepan Razin, a Don Cossack, organized a great rebellion of peasants in 1670. The towns of Tsaritsyn (now Stalingrad), Astrakhan, Saratov, and Samara (Kuibishev) were taken. The revolt extended over an enormous area, including all the middle and lower Volga. Razin was subsequently defeated by government forces and executed in Moscow in 1871. See George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia* (New York: New Home Library, 1944), p. 79.

103. Pugachev (Pugachyov), a Don Cossack, led a rebellion in 1773 which embraced the region of the Ural Cossacks, the Bashkirs, and the whole Volga region as far north as Kazan. The rebellion took the form of a social upheaval with serfs rising and killing their landlords, and required two years of strenuous military operations to crush. See Leonid I. Strakhovsky, ed., *A Handbook of Slavic Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 300.

104. Gaspirali's (1851–1914) activity and the rise of nationalism are treated in Chapters 3 and 4.

105. For a description of the Lausanne Conference, see J. R., "Wystapienia Ujarzmionych Narodow na Kongresie w Losannie w 1915 R" (Position taken by the subjugated peoples in the conference at Lausanne in 1916), *Wschód-Orient* (The East-Orient), 9, no. 1 (January-March 1938): 58–60. See also Joussuf Aktchura-Oglu, *L'Etat actuel et les aspirations des Turco-Tatars Musulmans en Russie* (Lausanne, Switzerland, 1918). For a biography of Yusuf Akçoraoğlu, see Chapter 4.

106. For firsthand information on Turko-Tatar military efforts among prisoners of war in Germany and Austro-Hungary (as well as in Russia after the revolution of 1917), see Ayas Ishaky, "Tatarska organizacja wojskowa podczas wojny" (Tatar military organizations during the war), *Wschód-Orient*, (The East-Orient) 3, nos. 1 and 2 (January 1932): 18.

107. Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1947), p. 542.

108. *BSE*, special double volume (1948), p. 61.

109. *Ibid.*

110. For details on the Tatar Turks, see A Bennigsen and S. E. Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 223–40.

111. Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 182.

112. See the subchapter on the Uzbeks for a discussion of the Chagatai literary language.

113. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 15.

114. This sketch is based on articles on Chuvashes and Chuvashian ASSR, *BSE*, vol. 61 (1934), p. 699; and Lebedev, Grekov, Bekbrushin, and Nechkiwa, *Istoria SSSR* 1:564.

115. Bolotnikov, a peasant serf, headed a rebellion in 1607. His forces looted estate owners and merchants and demanded equality. The rebellion covered an area from Smolensk province to Astrakhan and his army was expected in Moscow. The rebellion was crushed and its leader, executed. See Lebedev, Grekov, Bekbrushin, and Nečbkiwa, *Istoria SSSR* 6:812.

116. *Yasak* were taxes in kind.

117. *Burlaks* were members of gangs who towed barges.

118. The first Soviet census of December 17, 1926, listed 101,500 Kriasheny, according to Gerhard von Mende, *Der Nationale Kampf der Russlandtürken* (The national struggle of the Russian Turks) (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1936), p. 8.

119. Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 192.

120. *BSE*, special double volume (1948), p. 61.

121. As quoted in Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 191.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

123. *BSE*, vol. 61 (1934), p. 720.

124. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 18.

125. This sketch is based on: Richard E. Pipes, "The First Experiment in Soviet National Policy: The Bashkir Republic, 1917–1920', *Russian Review* (New York) (October 1950); Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan) ve Yakin Tarihi* (Modern Turkestan and its recent history) (Istanbul: Arkadaş Ibrahim Horoz ve Güven Basimevleri, 1947) pp. 368–78.

126. For a discussion (in Turkish) of the creation of "Baskurdustan", see Togan, *Bügünku Türkili*, pp. 368–78.

127. *BSE*, special double volume (1948), p. 61.

128. Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 7.

129. Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 188.

130. Ibid., p. 188 (ethnic and linguistic maps).

131. *BSE*, vol. 5 (1927), p. 137.

132. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 15.

133. *Kirimal, Nationale Kampf*, p. 323.

134. "Chto skryvaietsia za ukasom o peredache Krima Ukrainye" (What is behind the ukase concerning the transfer of the Crimea to the Ukraine), *Biuleten Instituta po isucheniu istorii i kulturi SSSR* (Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR) (Munich), no. 1 (April 1954).

135. Dzafer Sejdamet, *Krym* (The Crimea) (Warsaw: Eastern Institute, 1930), pp. 68–74. See also Kirimal, *Nationale Kampf*, pp. 1–3.

136. *BSE*, vol. 35 (1937), p. 294.

137. The political attitude and numbers of the Crimean emigrants in Turkey were ascertained in Istanbul during this author's interviews in August 1954 and June 1955 with Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer, their political leader. (See Appendices 1 and 2.)

138. A biographical sketch of Gaspirali is presented in Chapter 4.

139. *Kirimal, Nationale Kampf*, p. 24.

140. Ibid., pp. 27–29.

141. A biographical sketch of Yusuf Akçoraoğlu is presented in Chapter 4.

142. *Kirimal, Nationale Kampf*, p. 126.

143. See the Istanbul daily newspaper *Tanin* for June 30, 1918.

144. Kirimal, *Nationale Kampf*, p. 238.

145. For a description of Ottoman-Crimean relations, see ibid., pp. 253–70.

146. Concerning this action, see Allen and Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields*, p. 457.

147. Constantinople daily newspaper, *Tanin*, for April 9, 1918. For other quotations from the Turkish press, see Kirimal, *Nationale Kampf*, pp. 253–58.

148. Constantinople daily newspaper, *Tanin*, for May 5, 1918.

149. *Die Welt des Islams* (The world of Islam) (Berlin, 1913–43) 23:44–47.

150. As it was, with Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer as its leader.

151. Kirimal, *Nationale Kampf*, p. 317.

152. Ibid., p. 317. These military organizations are discussed further in Chapter 4.

153. Aleksandrov, Galianov, and Rubinstein, *Politicheskiy Slovar*, p. 296.

154. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 14.

155. *BSE*, vol. 35 (1937), p. 302. See also Edward Allworth, ed., *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989); M. Ulkusal, *Kirim Türk Tatarlari* (The Crimean Turkish Tatars) (Istanbul, 1980).

156. N.L. Korshenevskiy, *Sredniaya Asya, Kratkiy Fisiko-Geograficheskly Ocherk* (Central Asia, a short physical-geographical sketch) (Tashkent: Central Asian State University, 1941), p. 5; *Kazakhskaya SSR* (The Kazkh SSR) (Moscow: Ogiz-Gospolitizdat, 1941), which includes a general description of the Kazakh SSR; Theodore Shabad, *Geography of the USSR: A Regional Survey* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), a careful compilation of many Soviet sources which pictures the partition of Turkestan into two geographical parts (see pp. 334, 371).

157. Mustafa Czokai-Ogly, "O Wschodnim Turkiestani" (About eastern Turkestan), *Wschód-Orient* 4, no. 2 (July 1931): 32–37.

158. Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 2; see also Reiner Olzscha and George Cleinow, *Tur-*

kestan: Die Politisch Historischen and Wirtschaftlichen Probleme Zentralasiens (Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang, 1942), p. 8.

159. See the sections of this chapter on the Azerbaijanis in Persia, the Turks of Afghanistan, and the Sinkiang Turks.

160. Korshenevskiy, Stredniya Asya, pp. 5–8.

161. Baranskiy, *Ekonemicheskaya Geografya SSR*, pp. 364–415, describes the five republics of this region. Also see the maps showing ethnic composition and the dominant Turkic linguistic groups.

162. Aleksandrov, Galianov, and Rubinstein, *Politicheskiy Slovar*: see descriptions on the above republics. Also see Lamont, "National and Racial Minorities," p. 6.

163. Russian and Ukrainian immigrants form a significant percentage of the population.

164. Area and population are included within the borders of the Uzbek and Tajik SSRs, respectively.

165. *BSE*, special double volume (1948), p. 59.

166. M. Abdikalikov and A. Pankratova, eds., *Istoria Kazakhskoy SSR's Drevneyhikh Vremion Do Nashikh Dney* (History of the Kazakh SSR from ancient times to our days) (Alma-Ata: Kazogiz, 1943), p. 94.

167. Ibid., p. 109.

168. Ibid., p. 111.

169. Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1947), pp. 291–93.

170. Lebedev, Grekov, Bekbrushin, and Necbkiwa, *Istoria SSSR* 2:670–72, 675; *Istoria Kazakhskoy SSR*, pp. 292, 304, 339, 350–55.

171. Prerevolutionary Russian sources identified the basic population of Kazakhstan alternately as *Kirgiz-Kaisacks*, *Kirghizes*, or *Kirghiz-Kazacks*. Soviet specialists in the field of nationalities after 1925 used the name *Kazakhs*, which is popular and correct. Great Britain's *Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism* (p. 161) stressed that these people never call themselves *Kirghizes* but only *Kazaks*, a word supposed to mean *rider*. In April 1925, the Fifth Congress of Soviets of Kazakhstan replaced *Kirghiz* with the proper name *Kazakh*. Between the name *Kazak*, used by the authors of *Manual on the Turanians*, and *Kazakh*, used by Soviet sources, there is a slight difference, probably due to transcription or error. The term *Kazakh* is correct.

172. *Istoria Kazakhskoy SSR*, p. 59.

173. Ibid., p. 90.

174. American University, Bureau of Social Science Research, *Population of Soviet Central Asia, Report II, Changes in Size and Distribution of Population, Kazakhstan, 1926–1954*, prepared for U.S. Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C., July 1954), p. 57.

175. *BSE*, special double volume (1948), p. 1943.

176. For an interesting account of the attempted escape of 18,000 Kazakhs (of whom only 350 survived) to Ladakh, Kashmir, in 1951, see M. Phillips Price, "The Great Kazak Epic," *Royal Central Asian Journal* 41 (July-October 1954): 249–52.

177. Baranskiy, *Ekonemicheskaya Geografya SSR*, p. 402.

178. Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 161.

179. *Literaturnaya Entsiklopedia* (Literary encyclopedia) (Moscow: Publications of the Communist Academy, 1929-present), vol. 5 (1931), p. 22.

180. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 15.

181. *Soviet Affairs Notes*, no. 183 (Dec. 20, 1955): 12.

182. G. E. Wheeler, "Cultural Developments in Soviet Central Asia," *Royal Central Asian Journal* 41 (July-October 1954): 182.

183. This discussion is based largely on Barthold, *Histoire*, pp. 185–93.

184. For a fairly recent, semi-official Soviet source on Tajikistan, see P. Lutnitski, *Tadzhikistan* (in Russian). (Moscow, 1951), p. 367.

185. Eugene Schuyler, *Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldia*, 2 vols. (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1876), 2:88.

186. *BSE*, 2d ed., vol. 6 (1951), p. 408.

187. *Central Asia Review*, a quarterly review of current development in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan (London: Central Asian Research Center, 1953-present), no. 3 (July-August 1953): 97, presents a map of the meeting point of four Central Asian republics.

188. On the Uzbeks in Sinkiang, see the subchapter on the Sinkiang Turks. Concerning the Uzbeks of Afghanistan, see *BSE*, 2d ed., vol. 3 (1950), p. 494.

189. Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, pp. 32–34, 39–41.

190. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 12.

191. Baranskiy, *Ekonemicheskaya Geografya SSR*, p. 380.

192. Barthold, *Histoire*, p. 190.

193. *Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies*, p. 290; Lebedev, Grekov, Bekbrushin, and Nechkiwa, *Istoria SSSR*, vol. 2, p. 552.

194. Wilfrid Malleson, "British Military Mission to Turkistan, 1918–20," *Journal of the Central Asian Society* 9, part 2 (1922): 96.

195. E. Genkina, *Obrasovanye Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (The creation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) (Moscow: Ogiz, 1943), pp. 27, 65.

196. Baranskiy, *Ekonemicheskaya Geografya SSR*, pp. 372–76.

197. Great Britain, *Manual*, pp. 171, 210.

198. The Turkmens are divided into seven main tribes (the Chauders, Yomud, Goklans, Tekkes, Sariks, Salors, and Ersaris), of whom the Tekkes and Yomuds are the most numerous and influential. See ibid., p. 172.

199. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 14.

200. This discussion is based on an article on the Kirghiz SSR, *BSE*, vol. 32 (1936), pp. 362–88.

201. Pishpek was renamed in 1925 for N. V. Frunze (1885–1925), the Russian general who recovered Turkestan from Kolchak and who was born here. Frunze is the capital of Frunze Oblast and the Kirghiz SSR, and is situated on a branch of the Turksib Railroad. See *Columbia Encyclopaedia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 732.

202. T. R. Ryskulov, *Kirghizistan* (Moscow, 1935), p. 44.

203. Olash or Alash Khan was a mythical ancestor of all three Kazakh Hordes, all of whom used "Alash!" as their rallying cry. Under this motto, the short-lived Alash Orda independent state was proclaimed on November 17, 1917, in northern Kazakhstan. See Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 103; and Richard E. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 172.

204. *BSE*, special double volume (1948), p. 62; *BSE*, vol. 32 (1936), p. 366.

205. Baranskiy, *Ekonemicheskaya Geografya SSR*, p. 393.

206. Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 169.

207. *BSE*, vol. 32 (1936), p. 386.

208. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 16.

209. Akesandrov, Galianov, and Rubinstein, *Politicheskiy Slovar*, p. 686.

210. Walter Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East* (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 107.

211. *BSE*, vol. 65 (1931), pp. 507–9; Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 133.

212. Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies*, p. 34.

213. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 18.

214. Wwedenskiy, *Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar*, p. 453.

215. *BSE*, vol. 42 (1939), p. 795.

216. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 17.

217. Akesandrov, Galianov, and Rubinstein, *Politicheskiy Slovar*, p. 616.

218. *BSE*, vol. 39 (1935), p. 397.

219. Kolarz, *Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, p. 161.

220. Shabad, *Geography of the USSR*, p. 294.

221. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 18.

222. Ibid.

223. *BSE*, vol. 62 (1933), p. 594.

224. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 18.

225. *BSE*, vol. 31 (1937), p. 463.

226. Ibid., vol. 32 (1936), p. 49.

227. Ibid., vol. 39 (1938), p. 541; Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 26. See also A. Benningsen and S. E. Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 218, 233; and Ronald Wixman, *The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook* (London: Macmillan, 1984).

228. Concerning the Dolgans, see S. D. Lappo, *Spravechnaya Knizhka Polarnika* (Manual for the worker in the Arctic) (Moscow: Glavsevmorput, 1945), p. 34B. On the Tofa, see *BSE*, vol. 41 (1939), p. 233.

229. Mustafa Czokai-Ogly (Çokayoğlu), "O Wschódnim Turkiestanie" (About eastern Turkestan), *Wschód-Orient* 4, no. 2 (July 1931): p. 36. See also Fernand Grenard, "Haute Asie" *Geographie Universelle* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1929), 8:287–353; and *Strani Tikhovo Okeana* (The countries of the Pacific area) (Moscow: State Institute of the Soviet Encyclopedia, 1942), p. 189.

230. Chinese Ministry of Information, *China Handbook, 1937–1943* (New York: Macmillan, 1943), p. 1.

231. Bugra's estimate may be found in Czokai-Ogly (Çokayoğlu), "O Wschódnim Turkiestanie," p. 36. For the larger population estimate, see Mehmet Emin Buğra, *Doğu Türkistan* (Eastern Turkestan) (Istanbul: Güven Basimevi, 1952), p. 5. These facts were discussed in an interview with Bugra in Istanbul in August 1954. Bugra is currently the leader-in-exile of the approximately eight thousand Chinese Turkestanis living in six Near Eastern countries, principally Saudi Arabia.

232. Ibid., p. 21; Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 158.

233. The term *Dungan* is the name for a group of Chinese-speaking Turkic peoples living in Chinese Turkestan.

234. Bugra, *Doğu Türkistan*, p. 28.

235. Czokai-Ogly (Çokayoğlu), "O Wschodnim Turkiestanie," p. 42.

236. Ibid., p. 45.

237. Bugra, *Doğu Türkistan*, p. 52.

238. Ahmed Ali, *Muslim China* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1949), p. 31.

239. For the total population, see Chinese Ministry of Information, *China Handbook*, p. 2. On the Moslem population, see Ahmed Ali, *Muslim China*, p. 31.

240. Schuyler, *Turkistan* 2:173.

241. Wurm, op.cit., p. 2.

242. Great Britain, *Manual*, pp. 158.

243. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, pp. 8, 16.

244. A. Maksimov, "Dunganie," *BSE*, vol. 23 (1931), p. 624.

245. William Samolin, *Turkisation of the Tarim Basin up to the Qara-Qytay* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1953).

246. Czokai-Ogly (Çokayoğlu), "O Wschódnim Turkiestanie," p. 36.

247. Owen Lattimore, *Solution in Asia* (London: Cresset Press, 1945), p. 91.

248. Great Britain, *Manual*, p. 151.

249. Wurm, *Turkic Peoples*, p. 16.

250. Ahmed Ali, *Muslim China*, p. 31.

251. The name *Uighur* has lately been applied to the Turkic-speaking population of Chinese Turkestan (Kazakhs and Kirghiz excluded). Chinese-speaking Dungans and Iranian-speaking Tajiks are not included in the term *Uighur*.

252. Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies*, p. 298.

253. Ibid., pp. 270, 297.

254. China Islamic Association, ed., *Moslems in China* (album), (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1953), pp. 1, 3 of the English text (which is trilingual: Chinese, Arabic, and English).

255. *BSE*, 2d ed., Vol. 3 (1950), p. 496.

256. M. G. Reiser, *Afghanistan* (Moscow: State Editions of Geographical Literature, 1946), p. 32.

257. Gunnar Jarring, *On the Distribution of Turk Tribes in Afghanistan* (Leipzig, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1939), p. 51.

258. Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies*, p. 284.

259. For a geographical description of Afghan Turkestan, see H. Roskoschny, *Afghanistan und Seine Nachbarländer* (Leipzig, Germany, 1885), pp. 93–128; A. Hamilton, *Afghanistan* (London, 1906), pp. 242–68; and O. R. Niedermayer, "Persian und Afghanistan," in *Handbuch der Geographischen Wissenshaft: Vorder- und Sudasien* (Potsdam, Germany, 1937), pp. 116–18.

260. Jarring, *Distribution of Turk Tribes*, p. 11.

261. *The World Factbook* (Washington D.C., July 1990), p. 1.

262. Great Britain, *Manual*, pp. 204–8

263. Ibid., p. 205.

264. Elwell-Sutton, *Guide to Iranian Area Study*, p. 10.

265. Lenczowski, *Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 169.

266. Ananjasz Zajaczkowski, "Elementy tureckie na ziemiach polskich," (Turkish-speaking peoples living in Poland), *Rocznik Tatarski* (Tatar yearly) 2, pp. 199.

267. Deny, "Répartition," p. 339.

CHAPTER 3

1. Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1929), pp. 222–65.

2. Lewis V. Thomas, "Nationalism in Turkey," in *Nationalism in the Middle East*, series of addresses, ed. Middle East Institute (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1952), p. 2.

3. Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism* (London: Luzac Harvill Press, 1950), pp. 32–34.

4. Carlton H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931), p. 1.

5. Ibid., p. 292.

6. Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1945), p. 1.

7. Max Hildebert Boehm, "Nationalism," *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1933) 9:236.

8. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations* (London: Constable and Co., 1923), pp. 111–14.

9. Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 15.

10. Boehm, "Nationalism," p. 235.

11. Roman Smal-Stocki was a president of the Prometheus League (1929–39), uniting the leaders of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. This allowed him to analyze and observe the practical and ideological foundations of many national groups. See Roman Smal-Stocki, *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism* (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Bruce Publishing Co., 1952,) p. 2.

12. Hertz, *Nationality*, p. 410, describes nationalism as a "specific form of national consciousness centered on superiority, prestige, power and domination."

13. Kohn, *History of Nationalism*, pp. 98, 101, 103.

14. See Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, abridgement of vols. 1–6 by D. C. Somervell (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 130.

15. For a picture of Turkish rule in the Ottoman Empire as it involved the help of the non-Turkish slaves, see ibid., p. 174.

16. Hans Kohn, "General Characteristics of Nationalism in the Middle East," in *Nationalism in the Middle East*, ed. William Sands (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1952), p. 61.

17. Kohn, *History of Nationalism*, p. 222.

18. Abdulhak Adnan-Adivar, "Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey," in *Near Eastern Culture and Society*, ed. T. Cuyler Young (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 123.

19. For a complete discussion of Pan-Islamism, the following works are useful: C. H. Becker: "Panislamismus," in *Von Werden und Wesen der Islamischen Welt: Islamstudien* (Leipzig, Germany, 1924–32), 2:231–51; Gabriel Charmes, *L'Avenir de la Turquie: Le Pan Islamisme* (Paris: Calman Levy, 1883); Jelal Nuri Bey, *Ittihadi Islam* (Pan-Islamism) (Istanbul, 1913); Dwight E. Lee, "Origins of Pan-Islamism," *American Historical Review* (January 1942); H. A. R. Gibb, ed., *Whither Islam?* (London: V. Gollancz, 1932).

20. Franz von Werner [Murad Effendi], *Turkische Skizzen* (Leipzig, Germany, 1877), 1:95.

21. For details on Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani, see M. T. Houtsma, A. J. Wensinck, H. A. R. Gibb, Levi-Provençal, T. W. Arnold, R. Bassett, and R. Hartmann, eds., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 4 vols. plus supplement (Leyden, Holland; E. J. Brill, 1913-

38), vol. 1 (1913), pp. 1106–11; H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 27–39; E. O. Brown, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910); and Kerim K. Key, "Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani and the Muslim Reform Movement," *Islamic Literature* (Lahore, Pakistan) (October 1951): 5–10.

22. H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 176.

23. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, vol. 1 (London, 1927), p. 39.

24. A. Vambery, *Nineteenth Century*, vol. ILIV, *Sketches*, pp. 16–19, and *A History of Bokhara* (London, 1873), pp. 400–419.

25. On the Kashgar mission, see Louis E. Frechtling "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkestan, 1863 to 1881," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 26 (July 1939): 478–80.

26. A. Vambery, *Central Asia* (London, 1874), p. 353.

27. "L Angleterre et la Russie," *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique* 10 (1896): 62.

28. Vambery, *Bokhara*, p. 405; Vambery, *Central Asia*, p. 167.

29. Lee, "Origins of Pan-Islamism," p. 284.

30. 'L'Angleterre et la Russie," pp. 177–80; Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, pp. 36–38, 40–41.

31. Lee, "Origins of Pan-Islamism," p. 286.

32. Kohn, *History of Nationalism*, p. 45.

33. Ibid., p. 51.

34. Constantine K. Zurayk, "The National and International Relations of the Arab States," in *Near Eastern Culture and Society*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 207.

35. See Ali Haydar Midhat, *Midhat Pacha: Sa Vie—Son Oeuvre* (Paris: Stock, 1908); and, in Turkish, Mehmed Zeki Pakalin, *Mithat Paşa* (Istanbul, 1940).

36. I. M. Reisner and B. K. Rubcov, eds, *Novaya istoria stran zarubezhanavo Vostoka* (The modern history of the eastern countries beyond the Soviet borders), vol. 2. (Moscow University), p. 383.

37. Kohn, *History of Nationalism*, p. 230. For a study on the Young Turks (in Turkish), see A. B. Kuran, *Inkilap Tarihimiz ve Ittihad ve Terakki* (History of our revolution and the union and progress) (Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 1948); and Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

38. J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 434.

39. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938), p. 103; Kohn, *History of Nationalism*, p. 231.

40. Reisner and Rubcov, *Novaya Istoria*, 2:383.

41. Antonius, *Arab Awakening*, p. 104.

42. Kohn, *History of Nationalism*, p. 235.

43. *Novaya Istoria* 2:381.

44. A. F. Miller, *Oczerki Noveyshey istorii Turtsii* (Outlines of the newest history of Turkey) (Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1948), p. 20.

45. Zarevand [Zaven Nalbandian], *Turtsia i Panturanism* (Turkey and Pan-Turanism), introduction by A. N. Mandelstam (Paris: Publisher Kerensky, Dni, 1930), p. 61. From Simon Vratzian, former premier of the Independent Armenian Republic, I learned that

Zarevand is Zaven Nalbandian (who lived in Washington, D.C.). I contacted Zarevand in Washington in 1954 and obtained background data.

46. Ibid., p. 68.

47. Marriott, *Eastern Question*, p. 435.

48. George Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East* (London: Methuen, 1948), p. 120.

49. William Stearns Davis, *A Short History of the Near East* (New York: Macmillan, 1943), p. 367.

50. Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Syria and Palestine* (London: H.M.S.O., 1920), p. 47.

51. The titles of other collections of works by Ziya Gökalp published in book form were *Kízíl Elma* (The red apple) (Istanbul, 1941); *Türkleşmek, Islamlaşmak, Muasirlaşmak* (Turkification, Islamization, modernization) (Istanbul, 1918); *Yeni Hayat* (New life) (Istanbul, 1918; repr. 1941); *Altín Işik* (The golden light) (Istanbul, 1923; repr. 1942); *Türk Töresi* (Turkish law) (Istanbul, 1923); *Doğru Yol* (The True Path) (Ankara, 1923); *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi* (History of Turkish civilization); Birinci Bölüm: Islam İncesi Türk Medeniyeti (*First Part: Pre-Islamic Turkish Civilization*) (Istanbul, 1925). Further volumes did not appear. For a list of Gökalp's works, see Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, pp. 171–74, and the bibliography published by Cavit Orhan Tutengil, *Ziya Gökalp Hakkinda Bir Bibliyografya Denemesi* (A Bibliography on Ziya Gökalp) (Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi Iktisat Fakultesi, 1949).

52. The Turkish Historical Society has undertaken the publication of his complete writings, but only the first volume (containing his poems and tales) has appeared: Fevziye A. Tansel, ed., *Ziya Gökalp Külliyati*, (Collected works of Ziya Gökalp vol. 1, *Şurler ve Halk Masallari* (Poetry and Folk Tales) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlarindan (Publication of Turkish Historical Society) 1952.

53. Other books on Gökalp include: Yusuf Akçoraoğlu, *Üç Tarź i Siyaset* (Three Methods to Policy) (Istanbul, 1938); Ali Nuzhet, *Ziya Gökalpin Hayati ve Malta Mektuplari* (Life of Ziya Gökalp and Letters from Malta) (Ankara, 1931); Enver Behnan Sapolyo, *Ziya Gökalp, Ittihad ve Terakki ve Meşrutiyet Tarihi* (Ziya Gökalp: Unity and Progress Party of the First Parliament) (Istanbul, 1943); and Hilmi Ziya Ülken *Ziya Gökalp* (Istanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, n.d.).

54. Boehm, "Nationalism," p. 234.

55. Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, pp. 24–29.

56. Ibid., pp. 30–33.

57. Ibid., pp. 34–37.

58. Ibid., pp. 31–57.

59. Tekin Alp, *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal* (London: Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, 1917), p. 8.

60. Ahmed Emin (Yalman), *Turkey in the World War* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 190.

61. Adnan-Adivar, "Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought," p. 126.

62. Niyazi Berkes, "Ziya Gokalp: His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism," *Middle East Journal* 8, no. 4 (Autumn 1954): 376.

63. Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, p. 102.

64. Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Attatürk* (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939), p. 30.

65. Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, p. 104.

66. Ibid., p. 110.

67. Ibid., p. 115.
68. Ibid., p. 123.
69. Webster, *Turkey of Attatürk*, p. 30.
70. Halide Edib, *Turkey Faces West* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 212.
71. Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, p. 149.
72. Berkes, "Ziya Gokalp," p. 390.
73. Mahmut Bey, "Le Ghazai et la Revolution," *Le Millet*, November 26, 1929–February 8, 1930.
74. Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927* (Leipzig, Germany: K. F. Koehler, 1929), p. 378; Elaine D. Smith, *Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement* (Washington, D.C.: Judd and Detweiler, 1959). For a biography of Atatürk, see Lord Kincross, *Atatürk*. (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1965). For a study of modern Turkey, see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
75. Precipitous anti-Islamic moves were somewhat softened later, and after 1960, public and private interest in Islam grew substantially in Turkey. See Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey," *Middle East Journal* 8, no. 3 (Summer 1954): 267–82.
76. Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 162.
77. Uriel Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey* (Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1954), p. 16.
78. In his foreword to Sadri Maksudi's book, *Türk Dili Için* (Istanbul, 1930) as quoted in Heyd, *Language Reform*, p. 19.
79. Heyd, *Language Reform*, p. 26.
80. Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 243.
81. *Türk Dili, Bulten* (Turkish language bulletin) (Istanbul, 1935), 1, no. 16, pp. 21–53.
82. *Tarih* (History), 4 vol. (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaasi, 1934).
83. For a short analysis and translation of some characteristic fragments of this history, see F. F. Rynd, "Turkish Racial Theories," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 21 (1934): 476–87.
84. Ibid., pp. 477–87.
85. Thomas, "Nationalism in Turkey," p. 5.
86. For a detailed description and appraisal of the period from 1920 to 1930, see Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: Macmillan, 1932).
87. Webster, *Turkey of Atatürk*, p. 273.
88. George Lenczowski, *Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 120.
89. Tekin Alp [M. Cohen], *Le Kemalisme*, preface du President Edouard Herriot (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1937), p. 226.
90. Thomas, "Nationalism in Turkey," p. 2.

CHAPTER 4

1. Tekin Alp [M. Cohen], *Turkismus und Panturkismus* (Weimar, Germany: Verlag Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1915). See also Jacob M. Landau, *Panturkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism* (Hamden, Conn: Archon Books, 1981).

2. René Pinon, *La Reconstruction de l'Europe Politique*, p. 263, as quoted in Tekin Alp [M. Cohen], *Le Kemalisme* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1937), p. 2. Churchill called Tekin Alp "a profoundly informed Turk": Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911–1918* (London: Macmillan, 1943), p. 276.

3. The Admiralty of Great Britain made an English translation (originally classified "Secret") of Tekin Alp's book which was circulated officially under the title *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal* (London: War Staff, Intelligence Division, 1917). A microfilm of this book was obtained with some difficulty and with the kind permission of the admiralty, the British Museum, and the Verlag Gustav Kiepenheuer, Weimar.

4. Ibid., p. 38.

5. Concerning the number of Yakuts, see the subchapter on Siberian Turks (Chapter 2) and the census of 1939 in Oscar I. Janowsky, *Nationalities and National Minorities* (New York: Macmillan, 1945), p. 75. Many Russians settled in the Yakut ASSR, and Buddhists and Eastern Orthodox Christians make up the majority of the population.

6. See Ronald Wixman, *The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook* (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 198–99. Note that of the 49.5 million Turkic-speaking peoples of the former USSR, about 3 million are not Muslims (rather, they are mostly Christians and Buddhists). The majority of the Turkic Moslems are Sunnites.

7. See the census of 1939 in Janowsky, *Nationalities*, p. 75, and compare with the table of the Caucasian basic nations and tribes in the subchapter on the Caucasian Turks (Chapter 2). The non-Turkish Muslim tribes of northern Caucasus embrace some Dagestan tribes, Ossetians, Kabardians, and Adygheyan Cherkesses.

8. Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire* (London: Macmillan, 1953), p. 32.

9. V. Kajum-Khan, "Turkestan," *Eastern Quarterly* (London: Morven Press), 3, no. 4 (Oct. 1950): 33–39; Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 244.

10. T.M. "Sushchnost Problemy Odnova Yazyka" (Heart of the problem of common language), *Simali Kafkasya-Severniy Kavkaz* (The Northern Caucasus), monthly organ of the national party of the Caucasian Mountaineers (Warsaw: 1934–39), no. 7 (November 1934). This monthly was a extension of the monthly *Kavkasya Dagilari Gorey Kavkasa* (Caucasian mountaineers).

11. A. Arsharuni and K. Gabidullin, *Oczerki panislamism i panturkisma v Rosii* (Outlines of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Russia) (Moscow: Bezbozhnik, 1931), p. 3.

12. Ibid., p. 4.

13. Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, English translation authorized by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1942), p. 3.

14. Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, *Vsesoyuznaya Komunisticheskaya Partya (bolshevikov) v resolutsyakh i reshenyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov, chast 1, 1898–1925* (All-Union Communist party [Bolsheviks] in resolutions and decisions of the congresses, conferences and plenums, part 1, 1898–1925), 6th ed., enl. (Moscow: Ogiz, 1941), p. 388. This is an official publication of the Moscow-based Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the Central Committee of the All Union Communist party and contains all party resolutions.

15. *BSE*, vol. 49 (1939), p. 62. In regard to the statement describing the German founding of a special Pan-Islamist center led by Enver Pasha, I have found no evidence that this is true.

16. Lavrenti Beria, *K voprosu ob istorii Bolshevitskikh Organizatsii v Zakavkazye*

(A contribution to the history of Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia), 9th ed. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, I. M. Reisner and B. K. Rubcov, eds., 1952), p. 284; *Novaya istoria stran zarubezhnavo Vostoka* (The modern history of the eastern countries beyond the Soviet borders), ed. I. M. Reisner and B. K. Rubcov (Moscow: Moscow University, 1952).

17. Gerhard von Mende, *Der Nationale Kampf der Russlandtürken* (The national struggle of the Russian Turks) (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1936), p. 33.

18. Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Oczerki panislamism i panturkisma* p. 10. The Russian policy was to separate the Tatars from any contact with the West and modern science and to prohibit the printing of books in the Turkish Tatar language. This was done because the medieval Islamic tradition of scholasticism and the teaching of the Arabic and Persian languages discouraged national revival and aided Russian domination.

19. Ayas Ishaky, *Idel-Urel* (in Russian) (Paris: Idel-Ural National Committee, 1933) p. 30.

20. See the subchapter on distribution and numbers of the Kazan Tatars (Chapter 2); see also Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Oczerki panislamism i panturkisma*, p. 8.

21. Ibid., p. 11.

22. Mende, *Nationale Kampf*, p. 39.

23. Ibid., p. 40.

24. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 30.

25. Mende, *Nationale Kampf*, p. 40.

26. Ibid., p. 38.

27. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 30.

28. Ibid., p. 31; Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Oczerki panislamism i panturkisma*, pp. 6–14.

29. Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, pp. 225–26; also see the subchapter on the Kazakhs (Chapter 2).

30. Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Oczerki panislamism i panturkisma*, p. 12.

31. Mende, *Nationale Kampf*, pp. 44–61.

32. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 31.

33. Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer, *Gaspirali Ismail Bey* (Istanbul: n.p., 1934). See also B. Nahaylo and V. Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion* (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 213, 267. A. Benningsen and S. E. Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986, pp. 84, 101; M. Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia* (New York: Sharpe, 1990), p. 100; *Time*, March 21, 1990, p. 38.

34. A. Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan) Ve Yakin Tarihi* (Modern Turkestan and its recent history) (Istanbul: Arkadaş Ibrahim Horoz ve Güven Basimevleri, 1947), pp. 557–63.

35. This sketch is based on Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, pp. 31–34; Mende, *Nationale Kampf*, p. 48; Communist Academy, *Literaturnaya Entsiklopaedia* vol. 2 (1929), (Moscow: Publications of the Communist Academy, 1929-present) p. 403; and Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Oczerki panislamism i panturkisma*, p. 33.

36. Previous publications in Turkish languages in Russia had played a local and restricted role, such as the small paper *Ekingi* (The ploughman), which was published in Baku in 1875 by Hasan Melik Zade Zerdabi, while the contents of *Terguman* were universal and cultural. There were books, novels, manuals, and calendars in the Turkic languages, and a rich literature in religious matters, which had preceded the appearance of *Terguman*. See Mende, *Nationale Kampf*, p. 48; and Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 32.

37. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 32.
38. As quoted by Mende, *Nationale Kampf*, p. 59.
39. As quoted ibid., p. 80.
40. Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili*, p. 361.
41. Ibid., p. 551.
42. Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 226. Caroe erred in stating that Gaspirali went through the Russian War Academy (ibid.). Mende and some Russian sources identically refer to a secondary school. Mende, *Soviet Empire*, p. 45, called it the "Moskauer Milatärgymnasium." The same information was given by Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 31; and Communist Academy, *Literaturnaya Entsiklopedia*, vol. 2 (1929), p. 405.
43. Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili*, p. 556, as quoted by Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 227.
44. Abdullah Zihni, in his article, "Ismail Bey Gaspirali," *Wschód-Orient*, nos. 3–4 (December 1933), omitted mention of the contacts and the Russian influences on Gaspirali.
45. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, pp. 31–34.
46. On Katkov, see Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1947), pp. 381, 408, 419, 445; and *BSE*, vol. 31, (1937), pp. 761.
47. From 1866 to 1868, the Cretans were in a state of continuous revolt against the Turks. See J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 376.
48. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 32.
49. Mende, *Nationale Kampf*, p. 45.
50. Ibid., p. 48.
51. Ibid., p. 49.
52. Ibid., p. 58.
53. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 33.
54. Mende, *Nationale Kampf*, pp. 58–60.
55. Ibid., pp. 57, 45.
56. Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Oczerki panislamism i panturkisma*, p. 11.
57. Ibid., p. 13.
58. Ibid., p. 14.
59. *BSE*, vol. 29 (1935), p. 392.
60. Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Oczerki panislamism i panturkisma*, p. 21.
61. *BSE*, vol. 29 (1935), p. 391.
62. Ibid., vol. 39 (1938), p. 545.
63. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 34.
64. Zarevand [Zaven Nalbandian]. *Turtsia i Panturanism* (Turkey and Pan-Turanism; in Russian) (Paris: Publisher Kerensky, Dni, 1930), p. 39.
65. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 35.
66. Zarevand, *Turtsia*, p. 41., Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Oczerki islamism i panturkisma*, pp. 23.
67. Ibid., pp. 23–25.
68. Ibid., p. 26.
69. Ibid., p. 25.
70. Zarevand, *Turtsia*, p. 40.
71. Ibid., p. 27.
72. Pares, *History of Russia*, pp. 491, 494.
73. Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Oczerki islamism i panturkisma*, pp. 27–33.
74. Ibid., p. 33.

75. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 36.

76. Zarevand, *Turtsia*, pp. 47.

77. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 35.

78. Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Oczerki islamism i panturkisma*, p. 33.

79. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 36.

80. Ibid., p. 37; Arsharuni and Gabidullin, *Oczerki islamism i panturkisma*, pp. 35–45.

81. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 37.

82. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War (1898–1914)*, vol. 10, *The Near and Middle East on the Eve of War* (London: H.M.S.O., 1936), p. 583.

83. Ibid., 10:600.

84. Zarevand, *Turtsia*, p. 49.

85. See the map of Kazan, Astrakhan, Nogai, and Crimean Khanates (Circa A.D. 1500).

86. Based on two Soviet sources: V. I. Lebedev, B. D. Grekov, S. V. Bekbrushin, and M. D. Nechkiwa, eds., *Istoria SSSR* (The history of the USSR), 2 vols. (Moscow: State Social-Economic Publications, 1939–40), I:295, 337; *BSE*, 2d ed., vol. 19, (1953), pp. 310–12.

87. Halil Inalcik, "The Origin of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal (1569)," *Extrait d'Annales de l'Université d'Ankara* (Ankara, Turkey: University of Ankara, 1947), p. 72.

88. William Stearns Davis, *A Short History of the Near East* (New York: Macmillan, 1943), p. 217; Lebedev, Grekov, Bekbrushin, and Nechkiwa, *Istoria SSSR* 1:280; Alexander Pallis, *In the Days of the Janissaries* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1951), p. 32.

89. Edige Kirimal, *Der Nationale Kampf der Krimtürken* (The national struggle of the Crimean Turks) (Emsdetten, Germany: Verlag Lechte, 1952), pp. 7–9, lists the numbers and periods of the mass emigrations of the Crimean Turks after the Russian occupation. See also the subchapter on the Crimean Turks.

90. The expansion of Russian influence in the Holy Land in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is discussed by W. Baczkowski, "Russia and the Holy Land," *Eastern Quarterly* (London: Morven Press), 2, no. 2 (September 1949): 42–49.

91. Pares, *History of Russia*, p. 367, 418, 486, 388; and J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 249.

92. For the influence of Western historiography on Turkish intellectual thought, see Bernard Lewis, "History-Writing and National Revival in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Affairs* (June-July 1953).

93. J. de Guignes, *Histoire Generale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongols* (Paris, 1765–68).

94. Arthur Lumley David, *A Grammar of the Turkish Language* (London, 1832).

95. For example, a contemporary grammar contains a colorful map of the Turkish peoples and statistics concerning individual tribes and groups. See Jean Deny, *Grammaire de la Langue Turque* (Paris: Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes, 1920).

96. Adam Lewak, "Konstanty Borzecki (Dzelaleddin-Pasza)," *Polski Slownik Biograficzny* (Polish biographical dictionary) (Cracow: Polish Academy of Sciences, 1936), 2:365.

97. Leon Cahun, *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie, Turcs et Mongols, des Origines 1405* (Paris: Armand Colin et Compagnie, 1896). See Heyd, p. 28.

98. Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1945), p. 143, compare Leon Ostrorog, *The Angora Reform* (London: University of London Press, 1927), p. 56.

99. A. J. Toynbee and K. P. Kirkwood, *Turkey* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 56.

100. Heyd, p. 105.

101. Ibid., pp. 107, 126.

102. See Halide Edib, *Das Neue Turan*, translated by Friedrich Schreder from the Turkish novel *Yeni Turan* (New Turan) (Weimar, Germany: Verlag Gustav Kieppenheuer, 1916). For a brief biographical sketch of Halide Edib, see Eleanor Bisbee, *The New Turks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 282.

103. Heyd, p. 126. Gokalp later narrowed his Pan-Turkist program to the belief that even cultural unity could be realized under present conditions only among the *Oghuz* Turks, namely, those in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Persia, and Turkmenistan, who had a common literary heritage. Ibid., p. 129.

104. Caroe erred in describing Akçoraoğlu as one of the prominent "Azeri" exiles in Turkey, as he was a Kazan Turko Tatar and not an Azerbaijani. Compare Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 156.

105. According to Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurlari Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1946), p. 28, Akçoraoğlu is called a "Turk from the North born in Semir."

106. *BSE*, vol. 2 (1926), p. 121.

107. Zarevand, *Turtsia*, p. 69.

108. The date was 1904 according to Heyd, op.cit., p. 149.

109. Zarevand, *Turtsia*, p. 56.

110. The term *Pan-Turanism* is used by Akçoraoğlu in the sense of Pan-Turkism.

111. The italics are the author's.

112. Zarevand, *Turtsia*, p. 70.

113. M. E. Resulzade, *O panturanisme v svyasi s kavkaskoy problemoy* (On Pan-Turanism in connection with the problem of Caucasia), introduction by N. Jordania (Paris: K.N.K., 1930), p. 26.

114. Zarevand, *Turtsia*, p. 70.; Heyd, p. 34.

115. Ibid., p. 160. The Democratic party took over the property of the Halkevleri in 1951 and 1952.

116. Ahmed Emin (Yalmin), Turkey in the World War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 64.

117. Ibid., p. 174.

118. Ishaky, *Idel-Urel*, p. 38.; Zarevand, *Turtsia*, p. 109. Ishaky was a Turko Tatar nationalist and Zarevand, an Armenian (and thus inclined to be anti-Tatar and anti-Turkish).

119. Firuz Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917 to 1921)*, introduction by Michael Karpovich (New York: Philosophical Library and George Ronald, 1951), p. 148.

120. This privilege, according to Togan, was granted ostensibly as an act of grace, but it was mainly granted because the Russians had been alarmed by the Turkestanian uprisings. See Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 89.

121. M. Abdikalikov and A. Pankratova, eds., *Istoria Kazakhaskoy SSR's*, Drevney-

hikh Vremion Do Nashikh Dney (History of the Kazakh SSR from ancient times to our days) (Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan: Kazogiz, 1943), p. 370, and *BSE*, vol. 30 (1937), p. 594.

122. Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 127.

123. Gövsa, *Türk Meşhurlari Ansiklopedisi*, p. 116.

124. Edwin Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid* (London: Constable and Co., 1917), p. 285.

125. E. F. Knight, *The Awakening of Turkey* (London: John Milne, 1809), pp. 93, 185.

126. *Fedais* were devoted ones.

127. Emin, *Turkey*, p. 40.

128. *BSE*, vol. 64 (1945), p. 231.

129. Lord Eversley, *The Turkish Empire* (New York: Dodd, Mead, Co., 1923), pp. 366–68.

130. Ibid., p. 374.

131. Liman von Sanders, *Cinq Ans de Turquie* (Paris: Payot, 1923), pp. 13, 16.

132. Ibid., p. 19.

133. Eversley, *Turkish Empire*, p. 375.

134. W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), pp. 238, 249. The expressions *Pan-Islamic offensive* and *Pan-Turkist offensive* are used by these authors to indicate military actions in the Caucasus, and possibly in other Turko-Moslem areas of Russia.

135. Ibid., pp. 238, 251.

136. Ibid., pp. 276, 283, 285.

137. Ibid., pp. 286, 289.

138. Kazemzadeh, *Struggle for Transcaucasia*, pp. 147, 211, 221.

139. Allen and Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields*, p. 478.

140. Ibid., p. 480.

141. Ibid., pp. 494–96.

142. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 83.

143. Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, 2 vols. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1930), 1:383.

144. Fischer, *The Soviets*, p. 386.

145. Ibid., p. 383.

146. Alfred Dennis, *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia* (New York: Dutton and Co., 1924), p. 262.

147. Kommunisticheski Internatsional i osvobozhdenie Vostoka, *Pervyi S'ezd Narodov Vostoka—Stenographicheskie Otchety* (Communist International and [the problem of] the liberation of the East, the First Congress of the Peoples of the East—Stenographic Report) (Petrograd, 1920), pp. 108–12.

148. Fischer, *The Soviets*, p. 283.

149. D. Soloveichik, "Revolutsionnaia Bukhara," *Novyi Vostok*, no. 2 (1922): 277 (as quoted in Richard E. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 257.

150. Fischer, *The Soviets*, pp. 383–87.

151. Zeki Velidi Togan, was a professor at Istanbul University and himself a chief actor in the field. He was the author of *Bügünkü Türkili (Türkistan) ve Yakin Tarihi* (Modern Turkestan and its recent history). See the biographical sketch in Appendix 5.

152. Vernaksky, op.cit., p. 302; see the subchapter on the Basmachis.

153. Joseph Castagné, *Les Basmatchis* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1925), p. 50.

154. Concerning his death, see Louis Fischer, "The End of Enver Pasha," *Virginia Quarterly Review* (April 1930): 232–39; or the Turkish account by Feridun Kandemir, "Enver Pasanin Ölümü" (The death of Enver Pasha), *Resimli Ay Mecmuasi* (Istanbul) (April 1950).

155. For additional sources on Enver Pasha, see Kurt Okay [pseudonym] *Enver Pascha: Der Grosse Freund Deutschlands* (Berlin: Verlag für Kültürpolitick, 1935); Muallim Fuad Gücüyener, *Enver Paşa* (Istanbul: Anadolu Türk Kitabevi, 1937); Feridun Kandemir, *Şehit Enver Paşa Türkistanda* (Enver Pasha in Turkestan) (Istanbul: Bariman Yayinevi, 1946); Feridun Kandemir, *Enver Paşanin son Günleri* (The last days of Enver Pasha) (Istanbul: Güven Basimevi, 1943).

156. A. F. Miller, *Ocherki Noveyshey istorii Turtsii* (Outlines of the newest history of Turkey) (Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1948), p. 205.

157. Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili*, as quoted by Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 126.

158. It is maintained that the members of the Ottoman triumvirate (of Pan-Turkist sympathy) were killed by Armenians or with Armenian participation: Talaat Pasha was killed by Armenians of the Dashnak party in Berlin, on March 16, 1921, and Ahmet Cemal (Djemal), by Dashnaks in Tiflis on July 21, 1922. See Miller, *Ocherki Noveyshey istorii Turtsii*, p. 257. Armenians in the Near East have a living tradition that Enver was discovered in his last refuge in Turkestan by an Armenian in the Soviet Service. In an interview in Beirut in 1955, Simon Vratzian, the former prime minister of the Independent Armenian Republic, confirmed that this tradition exists.

159. W. Baczkowski, *Prometeizm Polski* (Polish Prometheism) (Warsaw: Polityka, 1939), p. 7.

160. W. Baczkowski, "Pilsudski and the Problem of Russia," *Wschód-Orient*, no. 2 (April-June 1938): 1–4; and, by the same author, "Co to jest prometeizm polski?" (What is Polish Prometheism?) in *Grunwald czy Pilawce* (Grunwald or Pilawce) (Warsaw: "Mysl Polska," 1938), p. 68.

161. A list of Promethean publications was shown to me in Istanbul, and various copies of these publications are in private collections.

162. Roman Smal-Stocki, *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism* (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Bruce Publishing Co., 1952), p. 158.

163. Roman Smal-Stocki, the only author who has yet treated in English the Promethean movement, erred by reducing its complex merely to the clubs and their propaganda and unification activities. See ibid.

164. Ishaky represented all the Idel-Ural, namely, Bashkirs, Chuvashes, and the other small Turkish and Finno-Ugrian groups of the Middle Volga-Ural area.

165. David Tutaeff, *The Soviet Caucasus* (London: Harrop, 1942).

166. Compare this assertion with that of Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR, 1917–1947* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 52, 91.

167. Rudolph Schlesinger, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1945), p. 341.

168. See the subchapter on the Basmachi movement (Chapter 4) and the historical sketches in Chapter 2.

169. Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 100n.

170. Kajum-Khan, "Turkestan," p. 38.

171. Vasilevskiy (first name not given), "Fazy Basmacheskavo Dvizhenya v Sredney Azii" (The phases of the Basmachi movement in Central Asia), *Novyi Vostok*, book 29

(1930): 126–28. This is a general description of the Basmachi movement and furnishes much good, and often objective, material.

172. Ibid., p. 14.

173. Castagné, *Les Basmatchis*, p. 16.

174. Ibid. Vasilevskiy, in "Fazy Basmacheskavo Dvizhenya," stated that the movement started in the Fergana Valley and spread into Turkmenistan, Bukhara, Tajikistan, and neighboring regions. He also discusses the rivalry among tribal components: Kazakhs and Uzbeks, as well as Uzbeks and Tajiks. See pp. 126, 135, 138.

175. Concerning the participation of Zeki Velidi Togan, see Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 99. On the presence of the Kazan Tatars, see Castagné, *Les Basmatchis*. The book contains a group photograph including Osman Bey Tokoumbet, a Russian Tatar who served as Enver's private secretary. See also p. viii.

176. For details concerning Sultan-Galiyev, see Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 168–70, 190, 260–63.

177. Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR, 1917–1947* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 98.

178. Among the commissariats established after the Bolshevik accession to power was the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities. It was headed by Stalin and existed until July 1923. See ibid., p. 70.

179. Stalin, *Marxism*, p. 176.

180. *Soviet Affairs Notes*, no. 144 (April 20, 1953): 14.

181. *Revolyutsiya Natsionalnosti* (Revolution and nationalities) (Moscow), no. 54 (August 1934): 73.

182. Boris Kandidov, *Tserkov i Shpionash* (The church and espionage) (Moscow, 1938), p. 84.

183. Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies* (London: George Phillip and Son, 1953), p. 294.

184. Kirimal, *Nationale Kampf*, p. 288.

185. Walter Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East* (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 107.

186. Ibid.

187. Ibid.

188. In February 1918, the Federal Democratic Republic of Transcaucasia was proclaimed. Subsequently, in May of the same year, it was dissolved and the individual Caucasian peoples declared their independence. On May 26, 1918, Georgia established sovereignty and was followed on May 28, 1918, by Armenia and Azerbaijan. In April 1940, Baku was taken by the Reds, and later, the Republic of Azerbaijan was Sovietized. In October 1920, the combined forces of Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia crushed the independence of the Armenian republic. In the period of February 11-March 18, 1921, Red troops occupied Georgia. See Kazemzadeh, *Struggle for Transcaucasia*, pp. 276, 286, 314.

189. Zarevand, *Turtsia*, p. 138.

190. Lenczowski, *Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 105.

191. Zarevand, *Turtsia*, pp. 132, 138.

192. Bernard Lewis, "Recent Developments in Turkey," *International Affairs* 27 no. 3 (July 1951).

193. *Tarih*, as described by F. F. Rynd, "Turkish Racial Theories," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 21 (1934): 476–487.

194. *Türkiye Yilliği*, p. 291.

195. Lenczowski, *Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 138.

196. Arkhivnoye Upravleniye Ministerstva Inostranykh Del Soyusa SSR (Administration of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR), *Dokumenty Ministerstva Inostranykh Del Germanii Vypusk II Germanskaya Politika v Turtsii (1941 do 1943 g.g.)* (Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, second issue, German politics in Turkey [1941 to 1943]) (Moscow: Ogiz-Gospolitizdat, 1946), pp. 34–39.

197. Terapia is a resort near Istanbul and was the summer residence of the German legation.

198. *Islam Ordu* (Army of Islam).

199. Professor Z. V. Togan.

200. He commanded the Turkish unit in the Caucasus which occupied Baku in 1918; from March 1943 on, he was a member of the Committee of National Defense and deputy from Kocaeli.

201. Arkhivnoye Upravleniye Ministerstva Inostranykh Del Soyuza SSR, *Dokumenty Ministerstva Inostranykh Del Germanii*, p. 80.

202. Ibid., p. 39 (English-language version).

203. Husrev Gerede was Turkish ambassador in Berlin from 1939 through 1942.

204. Lenczowski, *Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 142.

205. A.C. Edwards, *International Affairs Quarterly* (London), (July 1946): 398.

206. Miller, *Ocherki Noveyshey istorii Turtsii*, p. 206.

207. Veli Kajum-Khan, "Recollection of the Last Years of Mustafa Chokai," *Millij Türkistan*, nos. 70–71B (March 1951): 21.

208. Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, 243–47.

209. George Fischer, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 14; and W. Anders, *Hitler's Defeat in Russia* (Chicago: Regnery, 1953), p. 176.

210. *Trials of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunals* (Nuernberg: Secretariat of Tribunal, 1948), 27, Trial Doc. 1517, p. 272.

211. Anders, *Hitler's Defeat*, p. 176; and Fischer, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin*, p. 48.

212. Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 247.

213. Juergen Thorwald, *Wenn Sie Verderben Wollen* (How things were spoiled) (Stuttgart, Germany: Steingruben-Verlag, 1952), p. 127.

214. Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 247.

215. Ibid., p. 249.

216. *Trials of Major War Criminals* 27:272.

217. Alexander Henderson, "The Pan-Turanian Myth in Turkey Today," *Asiatic Review*, n.s. 41, no. 145 (January 1945): 88.

218. Türkkan lived in New York State and furnished me original material on the Pan-Turkist movement in 1953. Note that the name *Türkkan* means "Turkish blood."

219. Reha Oğuz Türkhan "The Turkish Press," *Middle Eastern Affairs* (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs), (May 1950): 143.

220. Translated from *Bozkurt* magazine (Grey wolf) (Istanbul), March 5, 1942.

221. Charles W. Hostler, "Trends in Pan-Turanism," *Middle Eastern Affairs* 3 no. 1 (January 1952): 8.

222. Reha Oğuz Türkkan, *Türk çülüge Giriş* (Introduction to Turkism) (Istanbul, 1940), p. 116.

223. Türkkan, "The Turkish Press," p. 143.

224. Atsiz is sometimes spelled *Adsiz*. He registered his protest to the Kemalist law requiring family names by taking this one, which means "nameless."

225. Türkkan, "The Turkish Press," p. 144. By "racist" was meant opposed to Turkish citizens of different origin, such as Albanians, Circassians, and Kurds.

226. Henderson, "Pan-Turanian Myth," p. 89.

227. Hostler, "Trends," p. 9.

228. J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question*, p. 330.

229. Great Britain, Foreign Office, *The Rise of the Turks—The Pan-Turanian Movement* (London: H.M.S.O., February 1919), p. 14.

230. *Larousse du XX Siècle* (1932), vol. 5, p. 350.

231. There were other movements in Russia and neighboring countries with Turanian tendencies. These were lead by both non-Russians and non-Europeans. The Buriat movement in the Far East and the Georgian and Armenian movements in the West had common anti-Russian and pro-independence objectives. These groups struggled against the yoke of subjugation without a unifying organization, and, as separate entities, they were vulnerable to local geographical conditions and the strategic demands of larger powers. The lack of a unifying ideal in these struggles (and those of the non-Turanian and non-Russian peoples, such as the Ukrainians) contributed significantly to their defeat.

232. Great Britain Foreign Office, *Rise of the Turks*, p. 13.

233. Tekin Alp [M. Cohen], *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal* (London: Admiralty War Staff, 1917), p. 40.

234. Great Britain, Naval Staff, *Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism* (London: H.M.S.O., 1918), p. 223.

235. Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Rise of the Turks*, p. 16. The Foreign Office neglected to mention the basic role of the Russian Turks in the rise and development of Pan-Turkism in Ottoman Turkey, as discussed in Chapter 3.

236. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London: Constable and Co., 1923), p. 180.

237. Arnold J. Toynbee and K. P. Kirkwood, *Turkey* (New York: Scribner's, 1927), p. 56.

238. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 50, 142, 371.

239. See the report by von Papen on the Pan-Turanian movement in Turkey in 1941 (pp. 297-304).

240. Hüseyin Namik Orkun, *Yeryüzünde Türkler* (The Turks in the world) (Istanbul: Kenan Matbaasi, 1944), p. 12.

241. Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili*, p. 560. See also the maps showing the ethnic composition and linguistic groups of former Soviet Central Asia.

242. A British government publication prepared in the early part of World War II fearfully—and amusingly—described Pan-Turanism as a movement doomed to failure because it "fosters a nonexistent desire for a spurious union based on the erroneous idea that unity of language is correlated with racial and national unity." See Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division, *Turkey*, Geographical Handbook Series, vol. 1, B.R. 507 (London: H.M.S.O., 1942).

243. Ibid., p. 223.

244. Ibid.

245. Ibid., p. 212.

246. George Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East* (London: Methuen, 1948), p. 267.

247. V. Krimskiy, *Bolshevik* (monthly magazine) (Moscow: Central Committee of the Communist Party), Nos. 10–11 (1944): 80.

248. Miller, *Ocherki Noveyshey istorii Turtsii*, p. 206.

249. Documents Secrets du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères d'Allemagne, *La Politique Allemande, 1941–1943, Turquie* (Paris: 1946), p. 89. Concerning Sarajoglu, see Harry N. Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey during World War II," *U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin*, July 18, 1948.

250. L. C. Moyzisch, *Operation Cicero* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1950), p. 5.

251. Lenczowski, *Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 143.

252. Anadolu Ajansi (Anatolian News Agency), *Bulletin* (Ankara), May 4, 1944.

253. *Kavkas* (The Caucasus), monthly review edited by A. Kantemir (Munich: Verlag Der Kaukasus, 1951–54), no. 1 (August 1951): 24.

254. Michael Sokolnicki, *The Turkish Straits* (Beirut: American Press, 1950), pp. 27, 29.

255. Ibid., p. 30.

256. Lenczowski, *Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 147.

257. Translated from the newspaper *Tasvir*, Istanbul, dated September 20, 1946.

258. Ibid., March 31, 1947.

259. Nizami, Nizamuddin (1141–1203), an Azerbaijan poet from Ganja (Kirovabad).

260. The Cairo *Daily Egyptian Gazette* of December 3, 1954, stated that "Abdul Fatalibeili, 46, a Turk who wrote and broadcast anti-Communist programmes to Azerbaijan for Radio Liberation, an American sponsored anti-Communist station, was murdered in Munich on November 23 in the apartment of the suspect M. Ismailov, 34, a native of Azerbaijan, who is believed to be a double agent, working for both American and Soviet intelligence."

261. The aims of the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism are analyzed by Eugene Lyons in *Our Secret Allies, the Peoples of Russia* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1954); see especially p. 319.

262. Useful material on the peoples of Soviet Russia was prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the U.S. Library of Congress under the title *Tensions within the Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 32–36.

263. G. Shtakelberg, "Tashkentaskaya sesya 1954 goda po istorii narodov Sredney Asii i Kazakhstana" (Conferences on the history of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, convened in 1954 in Tashkent), *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR* (Munich) (May 1954): 13–19.

264. The italics are the author's.

265. Shtakelberg, "Tashkentaskaya," p. 14.

266. *Voprosy Istorii* (Problems of history), monthly magazine (Moscow: Pravda), no. 4 (April 1952): p. 4–15.

267. *Pravda* (Truth), daily newspaper, official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow), 28 September 1952.

268. C. L. Sulzberger, "Soviet Is Worried over Central Asia," *New York Times*, 23 May 1952.

CHAPTER 5

1. N. A. Smirnov, *Ocherki Izucheniya Islama v SSSR* (Essays on the study of Islam in the USSR) (Moscow, 1954). In the last few years, new mosques have been opened.
2. Richard E. Pipes, "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects (Part I)," *Middle East Journal* 9, no. 2 (Spring 1955): 159.
3. G. E. Wheeler, "Cultural Developments in Soviet Central Asia," *Royal Central Asian Journal* 41 (July-Oct. 1954): 181.
4. Pipes, "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia," p. 162.
5. Tubert, *L'Ouzbekistan* (Paris: Pavillon, 1951), p. 129; L. Kolbin, *Kirgizskaya SSR* (Moscow: Communist party, 1954), p. 14; A. Saakian, *25 let v Turkestane* (Ashkhabad, Turkmen Republic: Official Publication, 1950), p. 31; N. Mikhailov, *The Sixteen Republics of the Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.: USSR Information Bulletin, 1955), p. 101.
6. Concerning this glorification, see S. Karakostov, *Ot Leningrada do Tashkent* (Sofia, Bulgaria: Izgrev, 1947), pp. 81, 89, Saakian, *25 Let v Turkestane*, p. 9. Concerning the underlying motivation, compare Tubert, *L'Ouzbekistan*, p. 129.
7. Allen Hetmanek, "Aesop and the Turkistanian Idea," in Erling von Mende, ed., *Turkestan als Historischer Faktor und Politische Idee* (Koln: Studienverlag, 1988), pp. 59–80.
8. These figures are based on an article by Ann Sheehy entitled "Ethnic Muslims Account for Half of Soviet Population Increase," *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR*, January 19, 1990.
9. M. Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge* (New York: Sharpe, 1990), p. 81.
10. T. Dawletschin, *Cultural Life in the Tatar Autonomous Republic* (New York: EEF, 1953), pp. 24, 30.
11. Ibid., p. 24.
12. *New York Times*, 30 January 1952, p. 3.
13. Tekin Alp, *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal*, pp. 39, 40.
14. Graham Fuller, "Emergence of Central Asia," *Foreign Policy* 78 (Spring 1990): 65.
15. See excerpts from the Pact of the Caucasian Confederation in Appendix 6.
16. *Economist Magazine*, 23 March 1991, p. 26.
17. "TURKEY: The Changing European Security Environment," *Middle East Journal* 46 (Winter 1992), SABRI SAYARI, p. 15.
18. *Washington Post*, 22 March 1992, p. A1.

APPENDIX 1

1. This material was prepared at my request by Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer (see Appendix 2 for a biographical sketch).
2. Kirimer has in mind the Anatolian Turks, Azerbaijanis, Crimean Tatars, Turkmens, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirghizes, and other groups who are discussed in Chapter 2 of this work.
3. Italics supplied by author.
4. Italics supplied by author.

APPENDIX 2

1. *Millet*, a daily newspaper published in Simferopol, official organ of the Crimean government.
2. *Wschód-Orient*, no. 3 (1935): 13–24; and author's interviews with Turkic personnel in Istanbul (August 1954 and June 1955).

APPENDIX 3

1. Mehmed Veysi, "Ayas Ischaky," *Wschód-Orient*, nos. 1–2 (January-June 1937): 95–98.

APPENDIX 4

1. This sketch is based on the following sources: *Azerbaycan, Aylik Kültür Dergisi* (Azerbaijan Monthly Organ of the Cultural Society) (Ankara), nos. 10–11 (pp. 22–23) (January-February 1954); *Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan*, presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, 1918 (Paris, 1919), p. 25. It discusses the privileges of the president of the Parliament; *Rocznik Tatarski* (The Tatar yearly), deals with Tatar life in Poland and relations with the Moslem world. It is edited by Leon Najman Mirza Kryczynski: (Zamosc: Central Council of the Cultural Educational Association of Polish Tatars, 1935), p. 116; Typewritten (unpublished) material in French and English furnished the author by Resulzade.
2. See Appendix 6 for excerpts of the text.
3. I visited his home in Ankara in the summer of 1954 to gather material.

APPENDIX 5

1. Herbert Jansky, "Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan," *Zeki Velidi Togan and his Works* (pamphlet reprinted from *Zeki Velidi Togan's Armagan*) (Istanbul: Maarif Basimevi, 1955), p. 17.
2. Letter from Z. V. Togan to author, dated July 15, 1955.
3. *BSE*, vol. 8 (1927), p. 645.
4. Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, p. 7.
5. These observations are based on conversations with Turkist leaders and personal impressions gained in an interview by author with Togan in Istanbul in June 15, 1955.

APPENDIX 6

1. Quoted in A. Gugushvili, "The Struggle of the Caucasian Peoples for Independence," *Eastern Quarterly* 4, no. 4 (October 1951): 37. This pact was based on an earlier one concluded on July 14, 1934, in Brussels, by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and northern Caucasia. At that time, the Armenians did not participate in the pact, but paragraph six of the Brussels Pact did reserve a place for Armenia. See *Prométhée* (monthly magazine, Organe de défense nationale des Peuples du Caucase, de l'Ukraine et du Turkestan) (Paris: Typographie Franco-Caucasienne, July 1934), p. 3.

Bibliography

Abdikalikov, M., and A. Pankratova, eds. *Istoria Kazakhakoy SSR's Drevneyhikh Vremion Do Nashikh Dney* (History of the Kazakh SSR from ancient times to our days). Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan: Kazogiz, 1943.

Adnan-Adivar, Abdulhak. "Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey." In *Near Eastern Culture and Society*, edited by T. Cuyler Young. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951.

Ahmad, Feroz. *The Young Turks*. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Akçoraoğlu, Yusuf. *Üç Tarź i Siyaset*. Istanbul, Turkey, 1938.

Akhmedov, Ismail. *In and Out of Stalin's GRU: A Tatar's Escape from Red Army Intelligence*. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1984.

Akiner, Shirin. *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*. New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1987.

Aktchura-Oglu, Joussuf. *L'Etat actuel et les aspirations des Turco-Tatars Musulmans en Russie*. Lausanne, Switzerland, 1918.

G. Aleksandrov, V. Galianov, and N. Rubinstein, eds. *Politicheskiy Slovar* (Political dictionary). Moscow: State Publication of Political Literature, 1940.

Ali, Ahmed. *Muslim China*. Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1949.

Ali, Nuzhet. *Ziya Gök-Alpin Hayati ve Malta Mektuplari*. Istanbul, Turkey, 1931.

Alishan, M. "Berlin to India: German Use of Pan-Turanianism," *Asia* (New York) 18, no. 5 (May 1918).

Allen, W. E. D., and Muratoff, Paul. *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828 to 1921*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953.

Allworth, Edward. *The Modern Uzbeks from the 14th Century to the Present Time: Cultural History*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990.

———. *Soviet Asia: Bibliographies*. New York: Praeger, 1975.

———. *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989.

———, Allworth, Edward, ed. *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia.* New York: Praeger, 1973.

Alp, Tekin [M. Cohen]. *Le Kemalisme.* Preface du President Edouard Herriot. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1937.

———. *Turkismus und Panturkismus.* Weimar, Germany: Verlag GustavKiepenheuer, 1915.

———. *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal.* London: Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, 1917.

Altstadt, A. "Nationality Education Policy in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union." *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs* 10, no.2 (1989).

American University, Bureau of Social Science Research. *Population of Soviet Central Asia, Report II, Changes in Size and Distribution of Population, Kazakhstan, 1926–1954.* Prepared for the U.S. Bureau of the Census. (Washington, D.C., July 1954).

Anadolu Ajansi (Anatolian News Agency). *Bulletin* (Ankara), May 4, 1944.

Anders, W. *Hitler's Defeat in Russia.* Chicago: Regnery, 1953.

"L'Angleterre et la Russie." *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique,* 10 (1896).

Antonius, George. *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement.* London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938.

Arabshah, Ahmed ibn. *Tamerlane or Timur, the Great Amir,* vol. 2. Translated by J. N. Saunders. London: Luzac and Co., 1938.

Arkhivnoye Upravleniye Ministerstva Inostranykh Del Soyusa SSR (Administration of the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR). *Dokumenty Ministerstva Inostranykh Del Germanii Vypusk II Germanskaya Politika v. Turtsii (1941 do 1943 g.g.)* (Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, second issue, German politics in Turkey [1941 to 1943]. Moscow: Ogiz-Gospolitizdat, 1946.

Armstrong, H. C. *Grey Wolf-Mustafa Kemal: An Intimate Study of a Dictator.* London: Arthur Baker, 1937.

Arnakis, George A. "Futuwwa Traditions in the Ottoman Empire." *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 12, no. 4 (October 1953).

Arsharuni, A., and Gabidullin, K. *Oczerki panislamism i panturkisma v Rosii* (Outlines of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Russia). Moscow: Bezbozhnik, 1931.

Avery, C. Robert, Jr. "Muslim Life in Turkey Today." *Moslem World.* 37 (July 1947).

Azer, San'an. *Iran Turkleri.* Istanbul, Turkey: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1942.

Azerbaycan, Aylik Kültür Dergisi (Azerbaijan monthly organ of the Cultural Society) (Ankara), Nos. 10–11 (pp. 22–23) (January-February 1954).

Baczkowski, Wlodzimierz. "Co to jest prometeizm polski?" (What Is Polish Prometheism?). In *Grunwold czy Pilawce* (Grunwold or Pilawce). Warsaw: Mysl Polska, 1938.

———. "Pilsudski and the Problem of Russia." *Wschód-Orient,* no. 2 (April-June 1938).

———. *Prometeizm Polski* (Polish Prometheism). Warsaw: Polityka, 1939.

———. "Russia and the Holy Land." *Eastern Quarterly* (London: Morven Press) 2, no. 2 (September 1949).

Baranskiy, N. H. *Ekonomicheskaya Geografya SSSR* (The economic Geography of the USSR). Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1951.

Barker, Ernest. *National Character and the Factors in Its Formation.* 3d ed. London; 1939.

Barthold, W. *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale*. Adaptation Française par M. Donskis. Paris: Librarie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1945.

Becker, C. B. "Panislamismus." *Von Werden und Wesen der Islamischen Welt: Islam-studien*. Vol. 2. Leipzig; Germany, 1924–32.

Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Lemercier-Quelquejay, Chantal. *Islam in the Soviet Union*. New York: Praeger, 1967.

Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Wimbush, S. Enders. *Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.

Beria, Lavrenti. *K voprosu ob istorii Bolshevitskikh Organizatsii v Zakavkazye* (A contribution to the history of Bolshevik organization in Transcaucasia). 9th ed. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1952.

Berkes, Niyazi. "Ziya Gökalp: His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism." *Middle East Journal*, 8, no. 4 (Autumn 1954).

Birge, John Kingsley. *A Guide to Turkish Area Study*. Washington; D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, Committee on Near Eastern Studies, 1949.

Bisbee, Eleanor. *The New Turks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951.

Bode, Clement Augustus de. "On the Yamud and Goklan Tribes of Turkomania." *Journal of the Ethnological Society* (London) (1848).

Boehm, Max H. "Nationalism." In *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, vol. 11. New York: Macmillan, 1933.

Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia (Great Soviet Encyclopaedia). Moscow: Ogiz, 1926–48. Complete in sixty-five volumes which appeared in odd numbers at irregular intervals. It was withdrawn as ideologically unsound and embarrassing, and is a revealing example of the shifts of Soviet thought and policy. It contains articles on the non-Russian peoples of the former Soviet Union by leading Russian and non-Russian authors.

Bozkurt (Grey Wolf) (Istanbul), March 5, 1942.

Brown, E. O. *The Persian Revolution of 1905 to 1909*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Failure*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989.

Buğra, Mehmet Emin. *Doğu Türkistan* (Eastern Turkestan). Istanbul; Turkey: Guven Basimevi, 1952.

Bury, George Wyman. *Pan-Islam*. London: Macmillan, 1919.

Caferoğlu, Ahmet. *Azerbaycan*. Istanbul; Turkey, 1940.

Cahun, Leon. *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie, Turcs et Mongols, des Origines 1405*. Paris: Armand Colin et Compagnie, 1896.

Caroe, Olaf. *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*. London: Macmillan, 1953.

Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène. *L'Empire éclaté*. Paris: Flammarion, 1978. (Published in English as *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt*. New York: Newsweek Books, 1979).

Castagne, Joseph. *Les Basmatchis*. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1925.

———. "Le Bolchevisme et l'Islam." *Revue de Monde Musulman* (Paris) 51 (1922).

Cebesoy, Ali Fuat. *Moskova Hatiralari*. Istanbul: Vatan Neşriyati, 1955.

Central Asia Review (London: Central Asian Research Center), no. 3 (July-August 1953).

Central Asiatic Journal (The Hague; Holland: Mouton).

Charmes, Gabriel. *L'Avenir de la Turquie: Le Pan-Islamisme*. Paris: Calman Levy, 1883.

China Islamic Association, ed. *Moslems in China*. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1953.

Chinese Ministry of Information, comp. *China Handbook, 1937 to 1943*. New York: Macmillan, 1943.

Chokayev, Mustafa. "The Basmachi Movement in Turkestan." *Asiatic Review* 24:273.

"Chto Skryvaietsia za ukasom o peredache Krima Ukrainye" (What is behind the ukase concerning the transfer of Crimea to the Ukraine). *Biuletin Instituta po isucheniu istorii i kulturi SSSR* (The bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR) (Munich, Germany), no. 1 (April 1954).

Churchill, Winston. *The World Crisis, 1911–1918*. Macmillan, 1943.

Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan. Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, 1918. Paris: n.p., 1919.

Columbia Encyclopaedia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950.

Conquest, Robert, ed. *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future*. Stanford, Calif.: 1986.

Constitution [Fundamental Law] of the USSR. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1944.

Czaplicka, M. A. *The Turks of Central Asia*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918.

Czokai-Ogly, Mustafa. "O Wschódnim Turkiestanie" (About Eastern Turkestan), *Wschód-Orient* (Warsaw: Eastern Institute, 1930–39) 4, no. 2 (July 1931).

Dallin, David, J. *Soviet Russia and the Far East*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948.

David, Arthur Lumley. *A Grammar of the Turkish Language*. London: 1932.

Davies, R. A., and Steiger, A. J. *Soviet Asia*. New York: Dial Press, 1942.

Davis, William Stearns. *A Short History of the Near East*. New York: Macmillan, 1943.

Dawletschin, T. *Cultural Life in the Tatar Autonomous Republic*. New York: EEF, 1953.

Dennis, Alfred. *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia*. New York: Dutton and Co., 1924.

Deny, Jean. "Ziya Goek Alp." *Revue du Monde Musulman* 61 (1925).

———. *Grammaire de la Langue Turque*. Paris: Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes, 1920.

Djemal Pasha. *Memories of a Turkish Statesman*. London: Hutchinson, 1921.

La Politique Allemande, 1941–1943, Turquie. Documents Secrets du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères d'Allemagne. Paris, 1946.

Dunsterville, L. C. *The Adventures of Dunsterforce*. London: Edward Arnold and Co., 1932.

Edib, Halide. *Das Neue Turan*. Translated into German Friedrick Schroder from the Turkish novel *Yeni Turan* (New Turan). Weimar, Germany: Verlag Gustav Kieppenheuer, 1916.

———. *Turkey Faces West*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1930.

Edwards, A. C. *International Affairs Quarterly* (London) (July 1946): 398.

Egyptian Gazette (Cairo daily newspaper), December 3, 1954.

Elwell-Sutton, L. P. *A Guide to Iranian Area Study*. Mich.: J. W. Edwards for the American Council of Learned Societies, 1952.

Emin (Yalman), Ahmed. *Turkey in the World War*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1930.

Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vols. 8, 17, 22, 23. London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1951.

Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences. Vol 2, pp. 544–54; Vol. 11, p. 235. New York: Macmillan, 1933.

Erhorn, I. *Kaukasien* (The Caucasians). Berlin: Verlagsanstalt Otto Stollberg, 1942.

Eversley, Lord. *The Turkish Empire*. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1923. Also see the edition abridged by Shaikh Abdur Rashid, The Turkish Empire, 1288–1924. 2d ed. Lahore, Pakistan: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1952.

Fierman, William. "Glasnost in Practice: The Uzbek Experience." *Central Asian Survey*, no. 16 (Summer 1989).

Fischer, George. *Soviet Opposition to Stalin*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952.

Fischer, Louis. "The End of Enver Pasha." *Virginia Quarterly Review*, (April 1930): 232–50.

———. *The Soviets in World Affairs*. 2 vols. London: Jonathan Cape, 1930.

Frechtling, Louis E. "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkestan, 1863 to 1881." *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 26 (July 1939).

Fuller, Elizabeth. "Gorbachev's Dilemma in Azerbaijan." *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR*, February 2, 1990.

Genkina, E. *Obrasovanye Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (The Creation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics). Moscow: Ogiz, 1943.

George-Gaulis, Berthe. *Les Origines Intellectuelles du Nationalisme Turc*. Paris, 1922.

Gibb, H. A. R. *Modern Trends in Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947.

———. *Mohammedanism*. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.

———, ed. *Whither Islam?* London: V. Gollancz, 1932.

Gibb, H. A. R., and Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*. Vol. 1, Oxford, 1950.

Gibbons, H. A. *A New Map of Europe*. London, 1915.

Giritli, Ismet. "Turkish-Soviet Relations." *India Quarterly* (January-March 1970).

Goble, Paul A. "Central Asian Studies on Non-Soviet Islam: A Bibliographical Guide." *Middle East Journal* (Autumn 1989).

———. "Gorbachev: Facing the Nationality Nightmare." *Washington Post*, March 25, 1990.

Gökalp, Ziya. *Altin Işik* (The golden light). Istanbul, Turkey, 1923; repr., 1942.

———*Doğru Yol* (The right way). Ankara, Turkey, 1923.

———. *Kizil Elma* (The red apple). Istanbul, 1941.

———*Türkçülügün Esaslari* (Foundations of Turkism). Ankara, Turkey, 1923.

———*Türkleşmek Islâmlaşmak, Muasirlaşmak* (Turkification, Islamization, modernization). Istanbul, 1918.

———*Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi* (History of Turkish civilization). Vol. 1, *Pre-Islamic Turkish Civilization* Istanbul, Turkey, 1925.

———*Türk Türesi* (Turkish law). Istanbul, Turkey, 1923

———*Yeni Hayat* (New life). Istanbul, Turkey: 1918; repr. 1941.

Gooch, G. P., and Temperley, Harold, ed. *British Documents on the Origins of the War (1898–1914)*. Vol 10, *The Near and Middle East on the Eve of War*. London: H.M.S.O., 1936.

Gövsa, Ibrahim Alaettin. *Türk Meşhurlari Ansiklopedisi*. Istanbul, Turkey, 1946.

Great Britain. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons) vol. 377, (Jan..8, 1942): col. 373.

Great Britain, Foreign Office. *Anatolia*, Handbook prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office. London: H.M.S.O., 1920.

Great Britain, Foreign Office. *The Rise of the Turks—The Pan-Turanian Movement*. Handbook prepared under the direction of the Historical Section, No. 96 c and d. London: H.M.S.O., February 1919.

Great Britain, Foreign Office. *Syria and Palestine*. London: H.M.S.O., 1920.

Great Britain, Naval Staff. *Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism*. London: H.M.S.O., 1918.

Great Britain, Naval Staff, Intelligence Division. *Turkey*. Geographical Handbook Series, vol. 1, B.R. 507. London: H.M.S.O., 1942.

Great Britain, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Study Group. *Nationalism*. London: Oxford University Press, 1939.

Gregory, J. S., and Shave, D. W. *The USSR: A Geographical Survey*. London: G. G. Harrap and Co., 1944.

Grenard, Fernand. "Haute Asie." *Geographie Universelle*. Vol. 8. Paris: Armand Colin, 1929.

Gücüyener, Muallim Fuad. *Enver Paşa*. Istanbul, Turkey: Anadolu Türk Kitabevi, 1937.

Gugushvili, A. "The Struggle of the Caucasian Peoples for Independence." *Eastern Quarterly* (London: Morven Press) 4, no. 4 (October 1951).

Guignes, J. de. *Histoire Generale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongols, etc.* Paris: 1765–68.

Hajda, Lubomyr. "The Nationality Problem in the Soviet Union." *Current History* (October 1988).

Hamilton, A. *Afghanistan*. London, 1906.

Harris, George S. "The Soviet Union and Turkey." In *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*, edited by Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1974.

Hayes, Carlton, J. H. *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931.

———. "Nationalism." In *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, Vol. 11. New York: Macmillan Co., 1933.

Hayit, B. "Bugünkü Türkistan." *Egitim Kültür*, no. 14 (March 1982).

Henderson, Alexander. "The Pan-Turanian Myth in Turkey Today." *Asiatic Review*, n.s. 41, no. 145 (January 1945).

Henze, Paul. "Kazakistan and Uzbekistan Impressions." *The Turkish Times* (Washington, D.C.) (Serial, i–x, July 1991).

Hertz, Frederick. *Nationality in History and Politics*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1945.

Hetmanek, Allen. "Aesop and the Turkistanian Idea." In *Turkestan als Historischer Faktor und Politische Idee*, edited by Erling von Mende. Koln: Studienverlag, 1988,. pp. 59–80.

Heyd, Uriel. *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*. London: Luzac and Co. and the Harvill Press, 1950.

———. *Language Reform in Modern Turkey*. Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1954.

Hostler, Charles W. "Trends in Pan-Turanism." *Middle Eastern Affairs* 3, no. 1 (January 1952).

Houtsma, M. T., Wensinck, A. J., Gibb, H. A. R., Heffening, W., Levi-Provençal, Arnold, T. W., Bassett, R., and Hartmann, R., eds. Encyclopaedia of Islam. 4 vols. plus supple. Leyden, Holland: E. J. Brill, 1913–38.

Howard, H. N. "Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey during World War II." *U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin*, July 18, 1948.

Ikdam (Istanbul daily newspaper). June 20, 1918.

Imaoka, Juichiro. *Sphere of the Turanian People* (in Japanese). Tokyo: Ryuginsha, 1942.

Inalcik, Halil. "The Origin of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal (1569)." *Extrait d'Annales de l'Université d'Ankara, 1947*. Ankara, Turkey: University of Ankara, 1947, p. 72.

International Who's Who, Eighth Edition, 1943–1944. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1945.

Irkcilik-Turancilik (Ankara, Turkey: Turk Inkilap Enstitüsü Yayini), no. 4 (1944).

Ishaky, Ayas. *Idel-Ural* (in Russian). Paris: Idel-Ural National Committee, 1933.

———. "Tatarska organizacja wojskowa podczas wojny" (Tatar military organizations during the war). *Wschód-Orient* 3, nos. 1 and 2 (January 1932).

Jackh, Ernest. *The Rising Crescent*. New York, 1944.

Jaeschke, Gotthord. *Der Turanismus der Jungturken*. Leipzig, Germany, 1941.

———. "Der Turanismus und die Kemalistische Turkei." *Beitraege zur Arabistik, Semitistik und Islamwissenschaft*. Leipzig, Germany, 1944, pp. 468–83.

Jansky, Herbert. "Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan." *Zeki Velidi Togan and His Works* (pamphlet reprinted from *Zeki Velidi Togan's Armagan)*. Istanbul, Turkey: Maarif Basimevi, 1955.

Janowsky, Oscar I. *Nationalities and National Minorities*. New York: Macmillan, 1945.

Jarring, Gunnar. *On the Distribution of Turk Tribes in Afghanistan*. Leipzig, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1939.

Jelal Nuri Bey. *Ittihadi Islam* (Pan-Islamism). Istanbul, Turkey, 1913.

———. "Turkestan." *Eastern Quarterly* (London: Morven Press), 3, no. 4 (October 1950).

Kajum-Khan, Veli. "Recollections of the Last Years of Mustafa Chokai." *Millij Türkistan*, nos. 70–71 B (March 1951).

Kalendar-Spravochnik, 1952 (1952 calendar handbook).

Kandemir, Feridun, "Enver Paşanin Ölümü" (The death of Enver Pasha). *Resimli ay Mecmuasi* (Istanbul, Turkey), April 1950.

———. *Enver Paşanin son Günleri* (The last days of Enver Pasha). Istanbul, Turkey: Güven Basimevi, 1943.

———. *Şehit Enver Paşa Türkistanda* (Enver Pasha in Turkestan). Istanbul, Turkey: Bariman Yayinevi, 1946.

Kandidov, Boris. *Tserkov i Shpionash* (The church and espionage). Moscow, 1938.

Karakostov, S. *Ot Leningrada do Tashkent*. Sofia, Bulgaria: Izgrev, 1947.

Karklins, Rasma. *Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspective from Below*. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986.

Kavkas (The Caucasus) (monthly review edited by A. Kantemir. Munich: Verlag Der Kaukasus, 1951–54), no. 1 (August 1951).

Kazakhskaya SSR (The Kazakh SSR). Moscow: Ogiz-Gospolitizdat, 1941.

Kazemzadeh, Firuz. *The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917 to 1921)*. Introduction by Michael Karpovich. New York: Philosophical Library and George Ronald, 1951.

Kemal, Ghazi Mustafa. *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal. President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927*. Leipzig, Germany: K. F. Koehler, 1929.

Key, Kerim K. "Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani and the Muslim Reform Movement." *Islamic Literature* (Lahore, Pakistan) (October 1951).

———. "Vignettes of Turkish History," newsletter since 1990, P.O. Box 70024, Chevy Chase, Md. 20813.

Kirimal, Edige. *Der Nationale Kampf der Krimtürken* (The National Struggle of the Crimean Turks). Emsdetten, Germany: Verlag Lechte, 1952.

Kirimer, Cafer Seydahmet. *Gaspirali Ismail Bey.* Istanbul: n.p., 1934.

Kirk, George. *A Short History of the Middle East.* London: Methuen, 1948.

———. *The Middle East in the War, 1939–1946.* Oxford, 1953.

Klimovich, L. *Islam v Tsarskoi Rossii.* Moscow, 1936.

Knight, E. F. *The Awakening of Turkey.* London: John Milne, 1908.

Kolarz, Walter. *Russia and Her Colonies.* London: George Phillip and Son, 1953.

———. *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East.* New York: Praeger, 1954.

Kolbin, L. *Kirgizskaya SSR.* Moscow: Communist Party, 1954.

Kohn, Hans. "General Characteristics of Nationalism in the Middle East." *In Nationalism in the Middle East.* Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1952.

———. *A History of Nationalism in the East.* London: George Routledge and Sons, 1929.

Kommunisticheski Internatsional *i Osvobozhdenie Vostoka, Pervyi S'ezd Narodov Vostoka--Stenographicheskie Otchety* (Communist International and [the problem of] the Liberation of the East, The First Congress of the Peoples of the East—Stenographic Report). Petrograd, 1920.

Koprulu, Fuad. "Azeri Language." In *Islam Ansiklopetdisi,* vol. 10. Istanbul, 1949.

Korshenevskiy, N. L. *Sredniaya Asya: Kratkiy Fisiko-Geograficheskiy Ocherk* (Central Asia: A short physical-geographical sketch). Tashkent, Uzbek Republic: Central Asian State University, 1941.

Kratkiye Soobshchenya Instituta Vostokovedenya (Short articles of the Institute of the East) (periodical issued at irregular intervals. Moscow: Academy of Sciences of the USSR), 9 (1933).

Krimskiy, V. *Bolshevik* (monthly magazine. Moscow: Central Committee of Communist Party), Nos. 10–11 (1944).

Kuran, A. B. *Inkilap Tarihimiz ve Ittihad ve Terakki* (History of our revolution and the union and progress). Istanbul, Turkey: Tan Matbaasi, 1948.

———. *Inkilap Tarihi ve Jön Turkler* (The history of our reformation and the Young Turks). Istanbul, Turkey, 1954.

Kurat, Akdes Nimet. *Peçenek Tarihi* (History of the Pechenegs). Istanbul, Turkey, 1937.

Kuzeyev, R., and Mukhamed--Yarov, F. "Ethnogenesis and Ethnocultural Relations of Turkic Peoples of the Volga and Ural Areas: Problems and Tasks" (in Russian). *Sovyetskaya Tyurkologiya,* no. 2 (1990).

Ladas, Stephen P. *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.* New York: Macmillan, 1932.

Lamont, Corliss. "National and Racial Minorities." In *USSR: A Concise Handbook,* edited by E. J. Simmons. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947.

Landau, Jacob M. *Panturkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism.* Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1981.

Lapidus, Gail W. "Gorbachev and the Nationality Question." *Soviet Economy* 5, no. 3 (July-September 1989).

Lappo, S. D. *Spravochnaya Knizkha Polarnika* (Manual for the worker in the Arctic). Moscow: Glavsevmorput, 1945.

Larousse du XX Siecle. Vol. 5 (1932).

Lattimore, Owen. *Solution in Asia.* London: Cresset Press, 1945.

Lebedev, V. I., Grekov, B. D., Bekbrushin, S. V., and Nechkiwa, M. D., eds. *Istoria SSSR (The History of the USSR),* 2 vols. Moscow: State Social-Economic Publications, 1939–40.

Lee, Dwight E. "Origins of Pan-Islamism." *American Historical Review* (January 1942).

Lenczowski, George. *The Middle East in World Affairs*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952.

———. *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918 to 1948*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949.

Le Strange, G. *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1905.

Lewak, Adam. "Konstanty Borzecki (Dzelaleddin-Pasza)." In *Polski Slownik Biograficzny* (Polish biographical dictionary), vol. 2 Cracow: Polish Academy of Sciences, 1936.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

———. "History-Writing and National Revival in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Affairs* (June-July 1953).

———. "Recent Developments in Turkey." *International Affairs* 27, no. 3 (July 1951).

Lieven, Dominic. *Gorbachev and the Nationalities*. Conflict Studies, no. 216. London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1988.

Literaturnaya Entsiklopedia (Literary encyclopedia). Moscow: Publications of the Communist Academy, 1929– . Vol. 5 (1931).

Lubin, Nancy. *Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.

———. "Uzbekistan: The Challenges Ahead." *Middle East Journal* (Autumn 1989).

Lutnitski, P. *Tadzhikistan* (in Russian). Moscow, 1951.

Lyons, Eugene. *Our Secret Allies, the Peoples of Russia*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1954.

Mahmut Bey, "Le Ghazi et la Revolution." *Le Millet*, November 26, 1929-February 8, 1930.

Makal, Mahmut. *A Village in Anatolia*. Translated from Turkish by Sir Wyndham Deedes. London: Vallentine, Mitchell and Co., 1954.

Maksudi, Sadri. *Türk Dili Için*. Istanbul, Turkey, 1930.

Malinowski, Bronislaw. [Introduction]. In Feliks Gross, *Koczownictwo* (Nomadism). Warsaw, Poland: Kasa Im. Mianowskiego, 1936.

Malleson, Wilfrid. "British Military Mission to Turkistan, 1918–20." *Journal of the Central Asian Society* 9, part 2 (1922).

Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. *The Rise of Nations in the Soviet Union*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991.

Manisali, Erol, ed. *Turkey's Relations with the Soviet Union and East Europe*. Proceedings of the seventh International Girne Conference, May 11–12, 1991. Istanbul: Middle East Business and Banking Magazine Publications, 1991.

Marriott, J. A. R. *The Eastern Question: An Historical Study*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940, repr., 1951.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for International Studies. *Attitudes of Major Soviet Nationalities*. Vol. 3, *Transcaucasus*; vol. 4, *Central Asia*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1973.

Mears, Eliot Grinnel. *Modern Turkey*. New York: Macmillan, 1924.

Meillet, A., and Cohen, Marcel, Chief eds., *Lanques du Monde*. Par un groupe de linguistes sous la direction de A. Meillet et Marcel Cohen. Nouvelle édition. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1952.

Mende, Gerhard von. *Der Nationale Kampf der Russlandtürken* (The national struggle of the Russian Turks). Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1936.

Mirza, Leon Najman, ed. *Rocznik Tatarski* (The Tatar yearly). Zamosc, Poland: Central Council of the Cultural--Educational Association of Polish Tatars, 1935.

Michaeli, Mirza, and William Reese. "The Popular Front in Azerbaijan and Its Program." *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR*, August 25, 1989.

Midhat, Ali Haydar. *Midhat-Pacha, Sa Vie—Son Oeuvre*. Paris: Stock, 1908.

Mikhailov, N. *The Sixteen Republics of the Soviet Union*. Washington, D.C.: USSR Information Bulletin, 1955.

Miller, A. F. *Ocherki Noveyshey istorii Turtsii* (Outlines of the newest history of Turkey). Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1948.

Moyzisch, L. C. *Operation Cicero*. New York: Coward-McCann, 1950.

"Muslims in China." *Aramco World*, July-August 1985.

"Muslims in the USSR." *Aramco World*, January-February 1990.

Nahaylo, Bohdan, and Swoboda, Victor. *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR*. New York: Free Press, 1990.

Newman, Phillip. *Guide to Cyprus*. Nicosia, Cyprus: Rustem and Bros., 1948.

New York Times, January 30, 1952.

Niedermayer, O. R. "Persien und Afghanistan." In *Handbuch der Geographischen Wissenshaft: Vorder- und Sudasien*, Potsdam, Germany: 1937.

Nozoe, Shigetsugu. *Turanian Movements and the New Mission of Japan* (in Japanese). Tokyo: Nippon Korousha, 1934.

Nuzhet, Ali. *Ziya Gökalpin Hayati ve Malta Mektuplari*. Ankara, Turkey, 1931.

Okay, Kurt [pseud.]. *Enver Pasha, der Grosse Freund Deutschlands*. Berlin: Verlag für Kültürpolitik, 1935.

Olcott, Martha Brill. "Central Asian Independence." *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1992).

———. *The Khazakhs*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute, 1987.

———. "Perestroyka in Kazakhstan." *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1990).

Olzscha, Reiner, and Cleinow, George. *Turkestan: Die Politisch Historischen und Wirtschaftlichen Probleme Zentralasiens*. Leipzig, Germany: Kohler und Amelang, 1942.

Orhan, Seyfi. *Türkcülügün Davasi* (Aims of Turkism). Istanbul, Turkey, 1943.

Orkun, Hüseyin Namik. *Türkcülügün Tarihi* (History of Turkism). Ankara, 1944.

———. *Yeryüzünde Türkler* (The Turks in the world). Istanbul, Turkey: Kenan Matbaasi, 1944.

Ostrorog, Leon. *The Angora Reform*. London: University of London Press, 1927.

Pakalin, Mehmed Zeki. *Mithat Paşa*. Istanbul, 1940.

Paksoy, H. B. *Alpamysh: Central Asian Identity under Russian Rule*. Hartford, Conn.: Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research, 1989.

Pallis, Alexander. *In the Days of the Janissaries*. London: Hutchinson and Co., 1951.

Pares, Bernard. *A History of Russia*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1947.

Parker, E. H. "Origins of the Turks." *English Historical Review* (July 1896): 431–45.

———. *A Thousand Years of the Tatars*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1924.

Pears, Edwin. *Life of Abdul Hamid*. London: Constable and Co., 1917.

———. "Turkey, Islam and Turanianism." *Contemporary Review* (London) (October 1918): 371–79.

Pipes, Richard E. "The First Experiment in Soviet National Policy: the Bashkir Republic, 1917 to 1920." *The Russian Review* (New York) (October 1950).

———. *The Formation of the Soviet Union.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954.

———. "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia." *Middle East Journal* 9, no. 2 (Spring 1955); no. 3 (Summer 1955).

Politico-administrativnaya Karta SSR (Political and administrative Map of the USSR). Moscow: Scientific Cartographic Division of Gugk, 1941.

Prawdin, Michael. *The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy.* Translated from German by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1941.

Pravda (Truth) (daily newspaper and official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow), March 8, 1949.

Prométhée (monthly magazine) (Organe de défense nationale des Peuples du Caucase, de l'Ukraine et du Turkestan. Paris: Typographie Franco-Caucasienne), July 1934.

Price, M. Phillips. "The Great Kazak Epic." *Royal Central Asian Journal* 41 (July-October 1954).

Rafikov, A. "Racist Ravings in Turkey." *New Times* published by newspaper *Trud*, Moscow, no. 37, (1949): 30–32.

Reed, Howard A. "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey." *Middle East Journal* 8, no. 3 (Summer 1954).

Reiser, M. G. *Afghanistan.* Moscow: State Editions of Geographical Literature, 1946.

Reisner, I. M., and Rubcov, B. K., eds. *Novaya istoria stran zarubezhanavo Vostoka* (The modern history of the eastern countries beyond the Soviet borders). Vol. 1 Moscow: Moscow University, 1952.

"Results of the Soviet Census." *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union* (New York: American-Russian Institute) (November 1940).

Resulzade, M. E. *Azerbajdzan w walce o niepodleglosc* (Azerbaijan in its struggle for independence). Warsaw, Poland: Azerbaijanian National Publications, 1938.

———. "The Caucasian Problem." *The Caucasus* (Munich: Caucasian Emigrants Group) (1952).

———. "Literatura Azerbajdzanu." (The literature of Azerbaijan). *Wschód-Orient* (Warsaw, Poland: Eastern Institute, 1930–39), nos. 2–3 (1936).

———. *O panturanisme v svyasi s kavkaskoy problemoy* (On Pan-Turanism in connection with the problem of Caucasia). Introduction by N. Jordania. Paris: K.N.K., 1930.

Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti (Revolution and nationalities) (Moscow), no. 54 (August 1934).

Rhenisch-Westfalische Zeitung (Essen daily newspaper), no. 533, July 5, 1918.

R., J. "Wystapienia Ujarzmionych Narodow na Kongresie w Losannie w 1916 R" (Position taken by the subjugated peoples in the conference at Lausanne in 1916). *Wschód-Orient* (The East-Orient) (Warsaw, Poland: Eastern Institute, 1930–39), 9, no. 1 (January-March 1938).

Ro i, Yaacov. *The USSR and the Muslim World.* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984.

———. "Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia." *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1990).

Romainville, F. de. *L'islam et l'U.R.S.S.* Paris, 1947.

Rondot, Pierre. "L'Experience Sovietique chez les Peuples Turcs de l'Asie Centrale."

L'Afrique et l'Asie (Paris: Bulletin de l'Association des Anciens du C.N.E.A.M.) (Fourth quarter, 1948): 3-16.

Roosevelt, Archie, Jr. "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad." *Middle East Journal* 1 (July 1947).

Roskoschny, H. *Afghanistan und Seine Nachbarländer*. Leipzig, Germany, 1885.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. *Moscow's Third World Strategy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Rumer, Boris Z. *Soviet Central Asia: A Tragic Experiment*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989.

Rynd, F. F. "Turkish Racial Theories." *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 21 (1934).

Ryskulov, T. R. *Kirghizistan*. Moscow, 1935.

Rywkin, Michael. *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia*. New York: Sharpe, 1990.

Saakian, A. *25 let v Turkestane*. Ashkhabad, Turkmen Republic: Turkmen Republic Official Publication, 1950.

Saman, Gabriel. *La Nationalite en Turquie*. Prague, Czechoslovakia: Imprimerie Orbis, 1933.

Samolin, William. *Turkisation of the Tarim Basin up to the Qara-Oytay*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1953.

Sanders, Liman von. *Cing Ans de Turquie*. Paris: Payot, 1923.

Sapolyo, Enver Behnan. *Ziya Gökalp, Ittihad ve Terakki ve Meşrutiyet Tarihi*. Instanbul, Turkey, 1943.

Schuyler, Eugene *Turkistan: Notes of Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja*. 2 vols. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1876.

Schlesinger, Rudolph. *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1945.

Sejdamet, Dzafer. *Krym* (The Crimea). Warsaw, Poland: Eastern Institute, 1930.

Shabad, Theodore. *Geography of the USSR: A Regional Survey*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.

Sharif, A. A. "Mirza-Fatali Akhundov" (in connection with the seventieth anniversary of his death). In vol. 9 of *Kratkiye Soobshchenia Instituta Vostokovedenya* (Short articles by the Institute of the East), edited by the Institute of the East. Moscow: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1953.

Sheehy Ann. "Ethnic Muslims Account for Half of Soviet Population Increase." *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR*, January 19, 1990.

Shtakelberg, G. "Tashkentaskaya sesya 1954 goda po istorii narodov Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana" (Conferences on the history of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, convened in 1954 in Tashkent). *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR* (Munich) (May 1954).

Smal-Stocki, Roman. *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism*. Milwaukee, Wisc.: Bruce Publishing Co., 1952.

Smirnov, N. A. *Ocherki Izucheniya Islama v SSSR* (Essays on the study of Islam in the USSR). Moscow, 1954.

Smith, Elaine D. *Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement*. Washington, D.C.: Judd and Detweiler, 1959.

Smith, G. E. *Human History*. New York: 1929.

Smith, Graham, ed. *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*. New York: Longman, 1990.

Smith, Hedrick. *The New Russians*. New York: Random House, 1990. (See especially chapter 14, Uzbekistan, and Chapter 15, Armenia and Azerbaijan.)

Sokolnicki, Michael. *The Turkish Straits*. Beirut, Lebanon: American Press, 1950.

Soloveichik, D. "Revolutsionnaia Bukhara." *Novyi Vostok*, no. 2 (1922).

Soviet Affairs Notes, no. 144 (April 20, 1953).

Stahlin, Karl. *Russisch-Turkestan Gestern und Heute*. Konigsberg [Kaliningrad], Russia, 1935.

Stalin, Joseph. *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*. English translation authorized by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1942.

Stoddard, Lothrop. "Pan-Turanism." *American Political Science Review* II (1917): 12–23.

Strakhovsky, Leonid I., ed. *A Handbook of Slavic Studies*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949.

Strani Blizhnevo i Srednevo Vostoka (The countries of the Near and Middle East). Moscow: State Institute of the Soviet Encyclopedia, 1944.

Strani Tikhovo Okeana (The countries of the Pacific area). Moscow: State Institute of the Soviet Encyclopedia, 1942.

Sulzberger, C. L. "Soviet Is Worried over Central Asia." *New York Times*, May 23, 1952.

Sykes, Percy. *A History of Persia*. 2 vols. London: Macmillan, 1930.

Tanin (Constantinople Daily Newspaper), April 9, 1918; May 5, 1918; June 30, 1918.

Tansel, Fevziye A., ed. *Ziya Gökalp Kulliyati*. Vol. 1, *Şurler ve Halk Masallari*. Ankara, Turkey: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlarindan, 1952.

Tarih (History). 4 vols. Istanbul, Turkey: Devlet Matbaasi, 1934.

Tasvir (Istanbul daily newspaper), September 20, 1946; March 31, 1947.

Thomas, Lewis V. "Nationalism in Turkey." In *Nationalism in the Middle East* (series of addresses), edited by the Middle East Institute. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1952.

———. "Recent Developments in Turkish Islam." *Middle East Journal* 6, no. 1 (Winter 1952).

Thomson, William. "Nationalism and Islam." In *Nationalism in the Middle East*, edited by the Middle East Institute. Washington, D.C.: 1952.

Thorwald, Juergen. *Wenn Sie Verderben Wollen* (How things were spoiled). Stuttgart, Germany: Steingruben-Verlag, 1952.

T., M. "Sushchnost Problemy Odnovo Yazyka" (Heart of the problem of common language). *Simali Kafkasya-Severniy Kavkaz* (The northern Caucasus) (Warsaw: National Party of the Caucasian Mountaineers), no. 7 (November 1934).

Togan, Zeki Velidi. *Buünkü Türkili (Türkistan) ve Yakin Tarihi* (Modern Turkestan and its recent history). Istanbul, Turkey: Arkadaş Ibrahim Horoz ve Güven Basimevleri, 1947.

Togay, Muharren Fevzi. *Turkistan Dunya Politikasindaki Mevki* (Position of Turkistan in world politics). Istanbul, Turkey: Osmanbey Matbaasi, 1936.

Towster, Julian. *Political Power in the USSR, 1917–1947*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948.

Toynbee, Arnold J. *A Study of History*. Vol. 6. London: Oxford University Press, 1939,

revised as *A Study of History*. Abridgement of vols. 1–4, by D. C. Somervell. London: Oxford University Press, 1949.

———. *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations*. London: Constable and Co., 1923.

———. *Survey of International Affairs*, Vol. 1. London, 1925.

———., and Kirkwood, K. P. *Turkey*. New York: Scribner's Sons, 1927.

Trials of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. Nürnberg: Secretariat of Tribunal, 1948. Vol. 27, Trial Doc. 1517.

Tubert, Gen. *L'Ouzbekistan*. Paris: Pavillon, 1951.

Tunaya, Tarik Z. *Türkiyede Siyasi Partiler, 1859–1952*. Istanbul, Turkey: Dogan Kardeş Yaninlari Basimevi, 1952.

Türk Dili, Bulten (Turkish language bulletin) (Istanbul and Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu), 1, no. 16 (1935).

Turkish Republic, State Office of Statistics. *Istatistik Yilliği* (Statistical yearbook). Ankara, Turkey: Turkish State Office of Statistics, 1951.

Turkhan, Reha Oğuz. *Milliyetcilik Yolunda* (On the path of nationalism). Istanbul, Turkey, 1944.

———. *Turkculuge Giris* (Introduction to Turkism). Istanbul, Turkey, 1940.

———. "The Turkish Press." *Middle Eastern Affairs* (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs) (May 1950): 143.

Türkiye Yilligi (Turkish yearbook). Istanbul, Turkey: Türkiye Basimevi, 1947.

Tutaeff, David. *The Soviet Caucasus*. London: Harrop, 1942.

Tutengil, Cavit Orhan. *Ziya Gökalp Hakkinda Bir Bibliyografya Denemesi*. Istanbul, Turkey: Istanbul Universitesi Iktisat Fakültesi, 1949.

Ulken, Hilmi Ziya, *Ziya Gökalp*. Istanbul, Turkey: Kanaat Kitabevi, n.y.

United States. Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, *Tensions within the Soviet Union*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951.

United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. *U.S.S.R. Background Notes*. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., December 1989.

United States Information Service (USIS). *News Review* (Washington, D.C.: USIS) 5, no. 31 (Aug. 5, 1954).

Vakar, Nicholas. "The Annexation of Chinese Turkestan." *Slavonic Review* (July 1935).

Vambery, Arminius *Central Asia*. London, 1874.

———. *A History of Bokhara*. London, 1873.

———. *Western Culture in Eastern Lands*. New York, 1906

Vasilevskiy, (no first name). "Fazy Basmacheskavo Dvizhenya v Sredney Asii" (The phases of the Basmachi movement in Central Asia). *Noviy Vostok*, Book 29 (1930).

Vernadsky, George. *History of Russia*. New York: New Home Library, 1944; repr., New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1951.

Veysi, Mehmed. "Ayas Ischaky." *Wschód-Orient*, (Warsaw), nos. 1–2 (January-June 1937): 95–98.

Voprosy Istorii (Problems of history) (Moscow: Pravda), no. 4 (April 1952).

Vratzian, Simon. *Armenia and the Armenian Question*. Boston: Hairenik Publishing Co., 1943.

Vsesoyuznaya Komunisticheskaya Partya (bolshevikov) v rezolutsyakh i reshenyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov, chast 1, 1898–1925. (All-Union Communist party [Bolsheviks] in resolutions and decisions of the congresses, conferences and plenums, part I, 1898–1925). 6th ed., enl. Moscow: Ogiz, 1941.

Webster, Donald E. *The Turkey of Atatürk*. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939.

Werner, Franz von [Murad Effendi]. *Turkische Skizzen*. Vol. 1. Leipzig, Germany, 1877.

Wheeler, G. E. "Cultural Developments in Soviet Central Asia." *Royal Central Asian Journal* 41 (July-October 1954).

Wheeler, Geoffrey. *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*. New York: Praeger, 1964.

Die Welt des Islams (The world of Islam) (Berlin, 1913–43), 23:44–47.

Wilhelm, Warren. "Soviet Central Asia: Development of a Backward Area." *Foreign Policy Report* 25 (February 1, 1950): 218–27.

Wimbush, Enders S. *Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective*. London: St. Martin's Press, 1985.

Wittek, Paul. *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*. London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1938.

Wixman, Ronald. *The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook*. London: Macmillan, 1984.

Wright, Robin. "Islam and Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1992).

Wschód-Orient (Warsaw), no. 3 (1935).

Wurm, Stefan. *Turkic Peoples of the USSR: Their Historical Background, Their Languages and the Development of Soviet Linguistic Policy*. London: Central Asian Research Center in association with St. Anthony's College, Oxford, Soviet Affairs Study Group, 1954.

B. A. Wwedenskiy, chief ed. *Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar* (Encyclopaedic Dictionary). Vol. 1. Moscow: State Scientific Publications, Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia, 1953. (As of February 1954, only the first volume had appeared.)

Yalman, Ahmet Emin. "Turkey." In *Britannica Book of the Year, 1955*. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1955.

Yudin, P. F., and Petrov, F. N., eds. *Strani Mira* (The countries of the world). 2d ed. Moscow: Ogiz, 1946.

Zajaczkowski, Ananjasz. "Elementy tureckie na ziemiach polskich" (Turkish Groups on the territories of Poland), *Rocznik Tatarski* (Tatar yearly), 2.

Zarevand [Zaven Nalbandian]. *Turtsia i Panturanism* (Turkey and Pan-turanism; in Russian). Introduction by A. N. Mandelstam. Paris: Publisher Kerensky, Dni, 1930.

Zihni, Abdullah. "Ismail Bey Gaspirali." *Wschód-Orient*, Nos. 3–4 (December 1933).

Zurayk, Constantine K. "The National and International Relations of the Arab States." In *Near Eastern Culture and Society*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951.

Index

About the Author

CHARLES WARREN HOSTLER was the U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain from 1989 to 1993. He was recognized by high decorations from the Emir of Bahrain, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. State Department for outstanding service during the Gulf War-Desert Storm. He has spent over fifty years traveling, researching, and studying the Moslem world, especially in Central Asia.